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
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


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THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE
OF FRANCE

VOL. III.







HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE

UNDER NAPOLEON

By LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

With Thirty-six Steel Plates



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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BOOK XVII.

CAMP OF BOULOGNE.

THE fondness for war which the First Consul might naturally be supposed to cherish would have awakened suspicion in the public opinion in France, and perhaps caused him to be accused of too much precipitation in breaking with England, had she not, by her manifest violation of the treaty of Amiens, taken it upon herself to justify him completely. It was evident to all minds that she had not been able to resist the temptation to keep Malta, and thus to secure a compensation not the most legitimate for our greatness. The rupture was, therefore, accepted as a necessity of honour and interest, though people indulged in no illusions respecting the consequences. They were aware that war with England might become war with Europe; that its duration was as incalculable as its extent, for it was not easy to go to London to terminate it, as one might go to the gates of Vienna to settle a quarrel with Austria. It must, moreover, strike a mortal blow at commerce, for the seas could not fail to be soon closed. Two considerations, however, greatly diminished the chagrin for France. Under a chief such as Napoleon, the war would no longer be the signal for new internal commotions; and people did flatter themselves that they might perhaps witness some prodigy of his genius, which should put an end at one stroke to the long rivalry of the two nations.

The First Consul, who on this occasion resolved to pay great deference to public opinion, conducted himself as the head of the oldest established representative government might have done. He convoked the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribune, and communicated to them such papers relative to

the negotiation as deserved to be known. He had no need, in fact, to resort to any dissimulation ; for, excepting some gusts of passion, he had in reality nothing to reproach himself with. These three bodies of the State responded to the proceeding of the First Consul by sending deputations charged to convey to the government their entire approbation. A man who excelled in that studied and solemn eloquence which so well befits the head of great assemblies, M. de Fontanes, recently introduced into the Legislative Body through the influence of the Bonaparte family, was deputed to express to the First Consul the sentiments of that body, and did it in terms worthy of being recorded by history.

“ France,” said he, “ is ready to cover herself again with those arms which have conquered Europe. Woe to the ambitious government which would recall us to the field of battle, and which, grudging humanity so brief an interval of repose, would plunge it back into the calamities from which it has scarcely emerged ! . . . England can no longer assert that she is defending the conservative principles of society threatened in its foundations ; it is we who shall be able to hold that language if war is rekindled ; it is we who shall then avenge the rights of nations and the cause of humanity, in repelling the unjust attack of a nation which negotiates but to deceive, which demands peace only to recommence war, which signs treaties only to break them. Let us not doubt that, if the signal is once given, France will rally with one unanimous movement around the hero whom she admires. All the parties which he keeps in silence about him will then vie only in zeal and courage. All are sensible that they have need of his genius, and acknowledge that he alone can support the weight and the greatness of our new destinies. . . .

“ Citizen First Consul, the French people cannot entertain any but grand ideas and heroic sentiments like yours. It has conquered that it might have peace ; it desires peace like yourself, but like you it will never be afraid of war. Does not England, who fancies herself so well protected by the Ocean, know that the world sometimes sees extraordinary men arise, whose genius executes what before them appeared impossible ? And if one of these men has appeared, ought she imprudently to provoke him and to force him to obtain from his fortune all that he has a right to expect ? A great people is capable of everything when it has for its leader a great man, from whom it can never separate its glory, its interests, and its happiness.”

In this brilliant and polished language, one could not, to be sure, discover the enthusiasm of '89, but it exhibited the prodigious confidence which every one felt in the hero who held in his hand the destinies of France, and from whom was expected

the ardently desired humiliation of England. A circumstance, easy enough, it is true, to be foreseen, served greatly to increase the public indignation. Almost at the moment of the departure of the two ambassadors, and before any regular manifestation, news arrived that the ships of the royal English navy were capturing French merchantmen. Two frigates had taken in the bay of Audierne a number of trading vessels, which were going to seek refuge at Brest. These first acts were soon followed by many others, intelligence of which arrived from all the ports. It was a violence not at all conformable to the law of nations. There was a formal stipulation on this subject in the late treaty signed between America and France (30th of September 1800, Art. 8), but in the treaty of Amiens, it is true, there was nothing of the sort. That treaty contained no stipulation for delaying in case of rupture the commencement of hostilities against commerce. But this delay resulted from the moral principles of the law of nations, placed far above all written stipulations. The First Consul, all the ardour of whose character was kindled by this new situation, determined instantly to use reprisals, and drew up an *arrêté*, by which he declared all the English travelling in France at the time of the rupture prisoners of war. Since the English, he said, were determined to visit upon mere traders, innocent of the policy of their government, the consequences of that policy, he was authorised to do the same, and to secure means of exchange by constituting the British subjects actually arrested on the soil of France his prisoners. This measure, though actuated by the conduct of Great Britain, nevertheless exhibited a character of rigour which was liable to ruffle the public opinion, and to excite apprehensions of the renewal of the violences of the last war. M. Cambacérès strongly remonstrated with the First Consul, and obtained a modification of the projected dispositions. Thanks to his efforts, those dispositions were made to apply only to such British subjects as were in the military service or held any commission whatever from the government. For the rest, they were not confined, but merely prisoners on parole in various fortified places.

All France was soon in vehement commotion. For a century past, that is to say, ever since the English navy seemed to take the lead of ours, the idea of terminating the maritime rivalry of the two nations by an invasion had possessed all minds. Louis XVI. and the Directory had made preparations for a landing. The Directory, in particular, had kept for several years a certain number of flat-bottomed boats on the coasts of the Channel; and it will be recollected that in 1801, shortly before the signature of the preliminaries of peace, Admiral Latouche Treville had repulsed the repeated attempts of Nelson to carry the Boulogne flotilla by boarding. It had become a

sort of popular tradition that it was possible to transport an army from Calais to Dover in flat-bottomed boats. By an impulse absolutely electric, the departments and the great cities, each according to its means, offered the government flat-bottomed boats, cutters, frigates, even ships of the line. This patriotic idea was first broached by the department of the Loiret, which taxed itself to the amount of 300,000 f. to build and equip a frigate of 30 guns. At this signal, communes, departments, and even corporations came forward to imitate the example. The mayors of Paris opened subscriptions, which were soon filled with a multitude of signatures. Among the models of boats proposed by the marine were some of different dimensions, costing from 8000 to 30,000 f. Each locality could consequently proportion its zeal to its means. Small towns, as Coutances, Bernay, Louviers, Valogne, Verdun, Moissac, gave merely flat-bottomed boats of the first or second dimension. The more considerable towns voted frigates, and even ships of the line. Paris voted a ship of 120 guns, Lyons one of 100, Bordeaux an 84, Marseilles a 74. These gifts of the great cities were independent of those made by the departments. Thus, though Bordeaux had offered an 80-gun ship, the department of the Gironde subscribed 1,600,000 f. to be expended in building vessels. Though Lyons had given a ship of 100 guns, the department of the Rhone added a patriotic gift amounting to one-eighth of its taxes. The department of the North added a million to the sum voted by the city of Lille. The departments in general levied on themselves a contribution of from two to three hundred thousand francs up to 900,000 and a million. Some gave their share in produce of the country serviceable for the navy. The department of Côte d'Or made a present to the State of 100 pieces of cannon of large calibre, which were to be founded at Creuzot. The department of Lot and Garonne voted an addition of 5 centimes to its direct contributions for the service of the year XI. and the year XII., to be expended in the purchase of sail-cloth in the country. The Italian Republic, imitating this spirit, offered the First Consul four millions of Milanese livres to build two frigates, one called the *President* and the other the *Italian Republic*, besides twelve gunboats, named after the twelve Italian departments. The great bodies of the State would not be left behind, and the Senate gave a ship of 120 guns for its donation. Mercantile houses, such as that of Barillon, persons holding situations in the finances, as the receivers-general, for instance, offered flat-bottomed boats. Such a resource was not to be disdained, for it could not amount to less than 40 millions. Compared with a budget of 500 millions, it was of real importance. Added to the price of Louisiana, which was 60 millions, to various sub-

sidies obtained from allies, to the natural increase of the produce of the taxes, it would relieve the government from the necessity of recurring to the expensive, and at that time almost impossible, resource, a loan in annuities.

We shall presently describe in detail the creation of this flotilla, capable of carrying 150,000 men, 400 pieces of cannon, 10,000 horses, and which for a moment was very near effecting the conquest of England. For the present it will be sufficient to mention that a condition imposed by the marine on these flat-bottomed boats of all dimensions was that they should not draw more than 6 or 7 feet water. When disarmed, they were not to draw more than 3 or 4. Thus they could float upon all the rivers, descend them to the mouth, and then be collected in the ports of the Channel, keeping close to the coasts. This was a great advantage, for our ports would not have been adequate, for want of stocks, timber, and workmen, to the building of 1500 or 2000 boats, which were required to be finished in a few months. By building in the interior, the difficulty was surmounted. The banks of the Gironde, of the Loire, of the Seine, of the Somme, of the Oise, of the Scheld, of the Meuse, of the Rhine, were all at once covered with building yards. The workmen of the country, under the direction of boatswains of the navy, were perfectly equal to these singular creations, which at first astonished the population, which sometimes furnished it with subjects of raillery, but which, nevertheless, soon became a cause of serious alarm to England. In Paris, from La Rapée to the Invalides, there were 90 gunboats on the stocks, and more than 1000 workmen employed in building them.

The first thing to be done on occasion of the new war with England was to collect our naval force, distributed in the West Indies, and engaged in reducing our colonies under the authority of the mother-country. This was the very first point to which the First Consul turned his attention. He lost no time in recalling our squadrons, in ordering them to leave at Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Domingo all the men, ammunition, and *matériel* they could. The frigates and light vessels only were to remain in America. But it was necessary to beware of being too sanguine. The war with England, if it could not wrest from us the smaller islands, such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, was destined to cause us to lose the most valuable of all, that for the preservation of which an army had been sacrificed—we mean St. Domingo.

We have seen the Captain-General Leclerc, after well conducted operations and a considerable loss of men, become master of the colony, having reason to flatter himself even that he had restored it to France, and Toussaint, retiring to his

habitation at Ennery, waiting there for the month of August as the term of the reign of the Europeans in the island of Haïti. That terrible black predicted truly when he foresaw the triumph of the climate of America over European soldiers. But he lived not to enjoy that triumph, for he was destined to perish himself from the inclemency of our climate—melancholy retaliations of the war of races, obstinately bent on disputing with each other the regions of the equator.

Scarcely had the army begun to establish itself when the noble soldiers of the army of the Rhine and of Egypt, transported to the West Indies, were attacked by a scourge frequent in those parts, but this time more destructive than ever. Whether the climate, from some unknown decree of Providence, was this year more fatal than usual, or whether its action was more powerful upon fatigued soldiers, crowded together in considerable number, forming a stronger focus of infection, Death swept them away with awful rapidity and violence. Twenty generals were carried off nearly at once: officers and soldiers perished by thousands. To the 22,000 men brought by several squadrons, 5000 of whom were *hors de combat*, and 5000 ill of various diseases, the First Consul had added, towards the end of 1802, about 10,000 more. The newcomers, in particular, were seized at the very moment of their landing. Fifteen thousand men at least perished in two months. The army was reduced to nine or ten thousand soldiers, seasoned, it is true, but mostly convalescents, and unfit to resume arms immediately.

As soon as the yellow fever commenced its ravages, Toussaint l'Ouverture, delighted to see his sinister predictions verified, felt all his hopes revive. From his secluded retreat of Ennery he secretly placed himself in correspondence with his trusty followers, ordered them to hold themselves in readiness, enjoined them to obtain accurate information relative to the progress of the disease, and particularly to the state of the health of the captain-general, on whom his cruel impatience invoked the infliction of the scourge. His proceedings were not so secret but that some of them came to the knowledge of the captain-general, and especially of the black generals. These lost no time in giving notice of them to the French authority. They were jealous of Toussaint, though they obeyed him, and this sentiment had contributed not a little to their prompt submission. These *noirs dorés* (*gilt blacks*), as the First Consul called them, were content with the repose and the opulence which they enjoyed. They had no desire to recommence the war, and they were afraid lest Toussaint, if he should again become all-powerful, would make them atone for their desertion. They endeavoured, therefore, to persuade General Leclerc to

seize the old dictator. The secret influence exercised by the latter was revealed by an alarming symptom. The blacks formerly composing his guard, and incorporated with the colonial troops which had passed into the service of the mother-country, left the ranks to return, they said, to work, but in reality to throw themselves among the bluffs about Ennery. The captain-general, pressed by a twofold danger, on one hand the yellow fever which was sweeping off his army, on the other revolt, which was manifesting itself on all sides, having, moreover, instructions from the First Consul, enjoining him on the first sign of disobedience to get rid of the black chiefs, resolved to have Toussaint arrested. Besides, the intercepted letters of the latter would sufficiently authorise this step. But it was necessary to resort to dissimulation in order to seize that powerful chief, surrounded already by an army of insurgents. His advice was asked respecting the means of inducing the return of the blacks who had run away to work, and the choice of the most suitable stations for re-establishing the health of the army. To flatter his vanity thus was the very way to entice Toussaint to an interview. You clearly see, cried he, that these whites cannot do without old Toussaint. Accordingly, he repaired to the place of rendezvous, surrounded by a party of blacks. No sooner had he arrived than he was seized, disarmed, and carried prisoner on board a vessel. Surprised, ashamed, and nevertheless resigned, he uttered only these memorable words: In overthrowing me, you have overthrown only the trunk of the tree of liberty of the negroes; but the roots are left; they will shoot up again, because they are deep and numerous. He was sent to Europe, where he was confined in the fort of Joux.

Unfortunately, the spirit of insurrection had spread among the blacks; it had again taken possession of their hearts, accompanied by distrust of the designs of the whites and the hope of conquering them. The tidings of what had been done in Guadeloupe, where slavery had lately been re-established, had reached St. Domingo, and produced an extraordinary impression there. A few words on the re-establishment of slavery in the West India islands, dropped in the tribune of the Legislative Body in France, words applicable exclusively to Martinique and Guadeloupe, but which, with a slight degree of mistrust, might be extended to St. Domingo, had contributed to impress the blacks with a conviction that the Europeans designed to reduce them again to slavery. From the humble labourers to the generals, the idea of again falling under the yoke of slavery thrilled them with indignation. Several black officers, more humane, more worthy of their new fortune, such as Laplume, Clervaux, even Christophe, who, not aspiring like Toussaint to be dictator of the island, were

perfectly satisfied with the authority of the mother-country provided that she respected the freedom of their race, expressed themselves with a warmth which left no doubt of their sentiments. We are willing, said they, to remain French, to be submissive, and to serve the mother-country faithfully, for we have no desire to begin anew a life of pillage; but if the mother-country attempts to make slaves again of our brethren or our children, she must come to the resolution to slaughter us to the last man. General Leclerc, whose integrity touched them, quieted them for a few days by assuring them upon his honour that the intentions attributed to the whites were an imposture; but, at bottom, their jealousy was incurable. Let the general-in-chief do what he would, he found it impossible to remove that. If Laplume and Clervaux, sincerely reconciled to the mother-country, argued as we have just shown, Dessalines, an absolute monster, such as slavery and revolt alone can form, was intent, with deep treachery, in setting the blacks against the whites and the whites against the blacks, on urging the one to exasperate the other, on triumphing amidst the general massacre, and on stepping into the place of Toussaint l'Ouverture, whose apprehension he had been the first to call for.

In this painful perplexity, the captain-general, having only a small part of his army left, and seeing that remnant diminishing daily, threatened at the same time by a speedy insurrection, thought it right to give orders for disarming the negroes. The measure appeared reasonable and necessary. The black chiefs whose principles were upright, such as Laplume and Clervaux, approved it; but those blacks who harboured perfidious intentions, like Dessalines, recommended it most earnestly. It was set about immediately, and downright violence was required to carry it into effect. Great numbers of blacks fled to the bluffs; others submitted to torture rather than give up what they considered as liberty itself—their musket. The black officers, in particular, showed no mercy in this kind of search. They caused men of their own colour to be shot, and acted thus, some to prevent war, others, on the contrary, to excite it. By these means, however, there were taken out of their hands about 30,000 muskets, mostly of English manufacture, and purchased through the forecast of Toussaint. These severities excited insurrections in the north, in the west, in the environs of Port au Prince. Toussaint's nephew, Charles Belair, a negro who possessed a certain superiority over the blacks by his manners, his understanding, and his acquirements, and whom, on account of these qualities, his uncle purposed to make his successor, Charles Belair, irritated by some executions perpetrated in the department of the west, fled to the bluffs and raised the standard of revolt. Dessalines, who resided at St. Marc, solicited most

urgently to be employed in reducing him; and finding here the twofold occasion of displaying the deceptive zeal which he affected, and to revenge himself upon a rival who had given him great umbrage, he kept up an unrelenting war against Charles Belair. At length he found means to take him with his wife, sent them before a military commission, and had both those unfortunate persons shot. Dessalines excused himself to the blacks for this conduct by alleging the merciless injunctions of the whites, and at the same time availed himself of the occasion for destroying a detested rival. Melancholy atrocities, which prove that the passions of the human heart are everywhere the same, and that climate, time, features, and complexion make no perceptible difference in man! Thus everything urged on the revolt of the blacks—the dark mistrust which had taken possession of their minds, the vigorous precautions necessary to be adopted in regard to them, and the ferocious passions by which they were divided; passions which the French were obliged to tolerate, and frequently even to employ.

To these misfortunes of situation were added faults, owing to the confusion which the disease, the danger springing up everywhere at once, the difficulty of communication between one part of the island and another, began to introduce into the colony. General Boudet had been withdrawn from Port au Prince to be sent to the Windward Islands as successor to Richepanse, who had died of the yellow fever. General Rochambeau, appointed to fill his place, was a brave officer, equally intelligent and intrepid, but had contracted in the colonies, where he had served, all the prejudices of the Creoles residing there. He hated the mulattoes, as did the old colonists themselves. He found them dissolute, violent, cruel, and said that he liked the blacks better, because, as he alleged, they were more simple, more sober, more hardy for war. General Rochambeau, commanding in Port au Prince and in the south, where mulattoes abounded, manifested on the approach of the insurrection as strong a distrust of them as of the blacks, and imprisoned a great number. Another thing he did which irritated them, and that was to send away General Rigaud, formerly chief of the mulattoes, long the rival and enemy of Toussaint, vanquished and expelled by him, naturally taking advantage of the victory of the whites to return to St. Domingo, and hoping for a favourable reception there. But the same fault that the whites committed at the commencement of the revolution in St. Domingo, in not allying themselves with the people of colour, they again committed at its conclusion. The mulattoes, offended, grieved, thenceforward showed a disposition to unite with the blacks; which was extremely prejudicial, especially in the south, where they predominated.

By these concurring causes, the insurrection, which had at first been partial, was rendered general. In the north, Maurepas and Christophe fled to the bluffs, not without expressing regret, but mastered by a sentiment stronger than themselves—the love of their threatened liberty. In the west, the barbarous Dessalines, at length throwing off the mask, joined the revolters. In the south, the mulattoes, united with the blacks, began to ravage that fair province, hitherto left intact and flourishing as in the most prosperous times. Laplume was the only black who continued faithful, definitively attached to the mother-country, and preferring that to the barbarous government of men of his own colour.

The French army, reduced to eight or ten thousand men, scarcely fit for service, had in the north nothing but the Cape and a few surrounding positions; in the west, Port au Prince and St. Marc; in the south, Les Cayes, Jeremie, and Tiburin. The anguish of the unfortunate Leclerc was extreme. He had with him his wife, whom he had lately sent to Turtle Island, to save her from the pestilence. He had witnessed the death of the wise and able M. Benezech, and of several of the most distinguished generals of the armies of the Rhine and Italy; he had just received intelligence of the decease of Richepanse; he was a daily spectator of the end of his most valiant soldiers, without having it in his power to afford them relief; and he saw that the moment was approaching when he should no longer be able to defend against the blacks the small strip of coast that was still left him. Tormented by these distressing reflections, he was more exposed than any other to the attack of that malady which was destroying the army. He was actually seized by it in his turn, and after a short illness, which, assuming the character of a continued fever, at last deprived him entirely of strength, he expired, expressing incessantly noble sentiments, and his mind appearing to be wholly occupied with his wife and his companions-in-arms, whom he left in a deplorable situation. He died in November 1802.

General Rochambeau, as senior officer, assumed the command. This new governor of the colony was not deficient either in valour or military talents, but he wanted prudence and the coolness of a chief untinctured with the passions of the tropics. General Rochambeau reckoned upon quelling the insurrection everywhere, but it was too late. It would be as much as he could do, by concentrating his forces at the Cape, and abandoning the west and the south, to maintain his ground. Attempting to make head at all points at once, his efforts were everywhere feeble and inefficient. He returned to the Cape to take possession of his new authority. He arrived there at the moment when Christophe, Clervaux, and the black chiefs of the north

attacked, in hopes of reducing, that capital of the island. General Rochambeau had for its defence a few hundred soldiers and the national guard of the Cape, composed of planters, brave like all the men of those countries. Christophe and Clervaux had already carried one of the forts; General Rochambeau retook it with extraordinary courage, seconded by the energy of the national guard, and behaved so bravely that the blacks, concluding that reinforcements must have arrived on the island, beat a retreat. But during this heroic defence a frightful scene had taken place in the road. Twelve hundred blacks had been sent on board the ships, because the French knew not how to guard them on shore, and were unwilling to give such an additional force to the enemy. The crews, decimated by the disease, were much weaker than their prisoners. At the sound of the attack on the Cape, they threw—we shudder while we write—they threw part of them overboard. At the same instant, a mulatto, named Bardet, in the south of the island, was subjected to the like treatment: he was drowned on account of an unjust and atrocious suspicion. From that day the mulattoes, who had still wavered, joined the negroes, slaughtered the whites, and completely ravaged the fine province of the south.

Let us close this doleful recital, in which History has nothing more that is worthy of record to introduce. At the period of the renewal of the war between France and Great Britain, the French, shut up at the Cape, Port au Prince, and Cayes, had difficulty to defend themselves against the united blacks and mulattoes. The new European war heightened their despair. They had no alternative but between the negroes, who had become more ferocious than ever, and the English, waiting till they should be forced to surrender to them, when they would be sent prisoners to England, after being stripped of the last remnant of their property.

Out of from thirty to thirty-two thousand men sent by the mother-country, there were finally left seven or eight. More than twenty generals had perished, and among them Richepanse, the most to be regretted of all. At the moment Toussaint l'Ouverture, ill-boding prophet, was dying of cold in France, a prisoner in the fort of Joux, our soldiers were sinking under the rays of a burning sun. Deplorable compensation, this death of a black of genius for the loss of so many heroic whites!

Such was the sacrifice made by the First Consul to the ancient commercial system of France, a sacrifice for which he has been keenly censured. Still, to judge soundly of the acts of the heads of governments, we should always take into account the circumstances under the control of which they acted. When peace had been made with the whole world, when the ideas of old commerce poured in again like a torrent, when, in Paris

and in all the seaports, the merchants, the ruined colonists, loudly demanded the re-establishment of our commercial prosperity; when they urged the recovery of a possession which once constituted the wealth and the pride of the ancient monarchy; when thousands of officers, seeing with mortification their career cut short by peace, offered to serve in any part of the world where their arms were needed—was it possible to refuse to the regrets of the former and to the activity of the latter the occasion for restoring the commerce of France? What has not England done to preserve North America, Spain to preserve South America? What would not Holland do to preserve Java? Nations never suffered any great possession to slip out of their hands without making an effort to retain it, even though they have no chance of success. We shall see if the American war has furnished the English with a lesson, and if they will attempt to defend Canada whenever that northern colony shall indulge the very natural predilection which attracts it towards the United States.

The First Consul had recalled to Europe all our squadrons, with the exception of the frigates and light vessels. They had all entered our ports, one only excepted, consisting of five sail of the line, which had been obliged to put into Corunna. A sixth ship had taken refuge in Cadiz. It was necessary to collect these scattered elements, for the purpose of engaging in a conflict hand to hand with Great Britain.

It would have been a difficult task even for the ablest and the most firmly established government to maintain a conflict with England. It was easy, it is true, for the First Consul to screen himself from her blows; but it was just as easy for England to screen herself from his. England and France had conquered a nearly equal empire, the former at sea, the latter on land. Hostilities having commenced, England was about to unfurl her flag in both hemispheres, to take some Dutch and Spanish colonies, perhaps, but with more difficulty some French colonies. She was about to interdict navigation to all nations, and to arrogate it to herself exclusively; but, unaided, she could do no more. The appearance of English troops on the continent would but have brought upon her a disaster similar to that of the Helder in 1799. France, on her part, could, either by force or by influence, forbid England access to the coasts of Europe from Copenhagen to Venice, confine her intercourse to the shores of the Baltic alone, and oblige her to bring down from the Pole the colonial produce of which during the war she would be the sole depository. But in this struggle of two great powers, who ruled each on one of the two elements, without having the means of quitting them to grapple one another, it was to be feared that they would be restricted to threatening without

striking, and that the world, trampled upon by them, would finally rebel against one or the other, for the purpose of withdrawing itself from the consequences of this tremendous quarrel. In such a situation, success must belong to that which should contrive to get out of the element in which it reigned to reach its rival; and if that effort proved impossible, to that which should find means to render its cause so popular in the world, as to gain it over to its side. It was difficult for both to attach nations to themselves; for England, in order to arrogate to herself the monopoly of commerce, was obliged to harass neutrals; and France, in order to close the continent against the commerce of England, was obliged to do violence to all the powers of Europe. To conquer England, therefore, it was requisite to solve one of these problems: either to cross the channel and march to London, or to sway the continent, and to oblige it, either by force or by policy, to refuse all British commodities; to realise, in short, an invasion or a continental blockade. We shall see in the course of this history by what series of events Napoleon was gradually led from the first of these enterprises to the second; by what a concatenation of prodigies he at first approached his aim so as nearly to attain it; by what a combination of faults and misfortunes he was afterwards hurried away from it, and finally fell. Happily, before reaching that deplorable term, France had achieved such things, that a nation which Providence permits to accomplish them remains for ever glorious, and perhaps the greatest of nations.

Such were the proportions which this war between France and Great Britain must inevitably take. It had been from 1792 to 1801 the struggle of the democratic principle against the aristocratic principle; without ceasing to have this character, it was about to become, under Napoleon, the struggle of one element against another, with much more difficulty for us than for the English; for the whole continent, out of detestation to the French Revolution, out of jealousy of our power, must hate France much more heartily than the neutrals hated England.

With his keen glance, the First Consul soon perceived the drift of this war, and he took his resolution without hesitating. He formed the plan of crossing the Strait of Calais with an army, and putting an end to the rivalry of the two nations in London itself. We shall find him for three successive years applying all his faculties to this prodigious enterprise, and remaining calm, confident, even happy, so full of hope was he in anticipation of an attempt which must either lead to his becoming absolute master of the world, or bury himself, his army, his glory, in the depths of the Ocean.

The reader may say, perhaps, that Louis XIV. and Louis XVI. had not been driven to such extremities to fight England, and

that numerous squadrons, contesting the plains of Ocean, had then been sufficient. We answer that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, England had not yet, by making herself mistress of universal commerce, acquired the greatest maritime population of the globe, and that the means of the two navies were much more unequal. The First Consul was determined to make immense efforts to raise the French navy, but he had doubts of any great success, though he possessed a vast extent of coast, though he had at his disposal the ports and dockyards of Holland, of Belgium, of ancient France, and of Italy. We say nothing of those of Spain, then too unworthily governed to be a useful ally. Reckoning his whole naval force now collected in Europe, he had not above 50 sail of the line to send to sea in the course of the year. He might procure 4 or 5 in Holland, 20 or 22 at Brest, 2 at Lorient, 6 at La Rochelle, 5 which had put into Corunna, 1 at Cadiz, 10 or 12 at Toulon, in the whole about 50. With the timber with which his vast empire was covered, floated down the rivers to the docks of Holland, the Netherlands, and Italy, he might build 50 more ships of the line, so that there would be 100 sail bearing his glorious tri-coloured flag. But he would want more than 100,000 sailors to man them, and he had scarcely 60,000. England would presently have 75 sail of the line quite ready for sea; it would be easy for her to raise her establishment to 120, with the number of frigates and small vessels which such an establishment supposes. She could put on board them 120,000 seamen and more, if she ceased to show any delicacy to neutrals, and pressed out of their merchantmen. She possessed, moreover, experienced admirals, confident because they had conquered, behaving at sea as Generals Lannes, Ney, and Masséna behaved on land.

The disproportion of the two fleets resulting from time and circumstances was therefore very great: the First Consul, however, was not daunted. He purposed to build everywhere, in the Texel, in the Scheld, at Havre, at Cherbourg, at Brest, at Toulon, at Genoa. He thought to introduce a certain number of land troops into the composition of his crews, and to make amends by this expedient for the inferiority of our maritime population. He had been the first to perceive that a ship, having a crew of 600 good seamen and two or three hundred picked landmen, kept under sail for two or three years, trained to manœuvres and firing, was capable of fighting any ship whatever. But in employing these means and others, it would take him ten years, he said, to create a navy. Now he could not wait ten years, with his arms crossed, till his navy, running over the seas in small detachments, should have qualified itself to enter into conflict with the English navy. To employ ten years in forming a fleet without doing anything of consequence

in the meantime would have been a plain avowal of impotence, mortifying to any government, still more mortifying to him, who had made his fortune, and who had to keep it up by dazzling the world. He must, therefore, while applying himself to reorganise our naval force, boldly attempt to cross the Strait, and make use at the same time of the terror inspired by his sword to oblige Europe to close the access to the continent against England. If with his genius of execution for great enterprises he united a skilful policy, he might by these combined means either destroy the British power at a blow in London itself, or ruin it for a long time by ruining its commerce.

Many of his admirals, especially Decrès, the minister, recommended to him a slow recomposition of our navy, consisting in forming small naval divisions, and sending them out to sea to cruise about till they were sufficiently trained to manœuvre in large squadrons; and meanwhile, they exhorted him to stop there, considering as doubtful all the plans proposed for crossing the Channel. The First Consul would not submit to be bound by such opinions: he proposed, indeed, to restore the French navy, but yet to make some more direct attempt to strike England. In consequence, he ordered numerous vessels to be built at Flushing, which was at his disposal in consequence of his power over Holland; at Antwerp, which had become a French port; at Cherbourg, at Brest, at Lorient, at Toulon, lastly, at Genoa, which France occupied by the same title as Holland. He directed 22 ships to be repaired and equipped at Brest; 2 to be finished at Lorient; 5 to be launched and equipped at La Rochelle. He claimed from Spain the means of refitting and revictualling the squadron which put into Corunna, and despatched from Bayonne by land all that it was possible to send, in men, money, and *matériel*. He took the same precautions respecting the ship which had put into Cadiz. He gave orders for the equipment of the Toulon fleet, which he intended to compose of 12 ships. These various armaments, added to 3 or 4 Dutch ships, would, as we have said, make the force of France amount to about 50 ships, without including what might afterwards be obtained from the Dutch and Spanish navies, or what might be built in the ports of France, and manned with a mixture of sailors and land soldiers. The First Consul, however, did not flatter himself that with such a force he should gain in pitched battle the maritime superiority or even equality in regard to England: he resolved to employ it for keeping the sea, for going to and coming from the colonies, for opening the Strait of Calais for a few moments by movements of squadrons, of the profound combination of which the reader will soon be enabled to judge.

Towards this Strait all the efforts of his genius were concentrated. Whatever means of conveyance might be devised, it was first requisite to have an army, and he formed a plan for the composition of one, which left nothing to be desired in respect to number and organisation; for distributing it in several camps from the Texel to the Pyrenees; and for placing it in such a manner that it might be concentrated with rapidity at certain points of the coast judiciously chosen. Independently of a corps of 25,000 men assembled between Breda and Nimeguen to march for Hanover, he ordered the formation of six camps, the first in the environs of Utrecht, the second at Ghent, the third at St. Omer, the fourth at Compiègne, the fifth at Brest, the sixth at Bayonne, the latter destined to overawe Spain, for reasons which shall be given hereafter. He began with forming parks of artillery at these six points of assemblage, a precaution which he usually took before any other, saying that it was this which was always most difficult to be organised. He then sent to each of these camps a sufficient number of demi-brigades of infantry to make them amount to 25,000 men at least. The cavalry was despatched more slowly, and in less proportion than usual, because in case of embarkation but very few horses could be transported. It was requisite that the quality and quantity of the infantry, the excellence of the artillery, and the number of pieces, should compensate in such an army for the numerical inferiority of the cavalry. In this twofold respect, the French infantry and artillery combined all the conditions that could be desired. The First Consul took care to assemble on the coast and to form into four great divisions the whole arm of the dragoons. The soldiers of that arm, capable of serving on horseback or on foot, were to be separately embarked with their saddles, and to be useful as foot-soldiers till they could become horsemen, when mounted with horses taken from the enemy.

All the dispositions were ordered for manning and horsing 400 field-pieces, besides a vast park of siege artillery. The demi-brigades, which were then of three battalions, were to furnish two war battalions of 800 men each, taking out of the third battalion sufficient to complete the first two. The third battalion was left at the dépôt, to receive the conscripts, and to instruct and train them. Nevertheless, a certain number of these conscripts were sent immediately to the war battalions, that with the old soldiers of the Republic there might be mixed a sufficient proportion of choice young soldiers, having the vivacity, the ardour, and the docility of youth.

The conscription had been definitively introduced into our military legislation, and regularised under the Directory upon the plan proposed by General Jourdan. The law by which it

was established nevertheless still exhibited some chasms, which had been filled by a new law of the 26th of April 1803. The contingent had been fixed at 60,000 men per year, levied at the age of twenty years. This contingent was divided into two parts of 30,000 men each. The first was to be always raised in time of peace; the second formed the reserve, and might be called out in case of war to complete the battalions. It was now the middle of the year XI. (June 1803); the government demanded authority to levy the contingent for the years XI. and XII. without touching the reserve of those two years. There would thus be 60,000 conscripts to take immediately. By calling for them in advance, time would be gained for instructing them and training them to military service in the camps formed on the coasts. Recourse could further be had, if necessary, to the reserve of those two years, which afforded 60,000 more disposable men, but who were not expected to be wanted unless in case of a continental war. Thirty thousand men only demanded out of each class were a small sacrifice, which could scarcely be felt by a population composed of 109 departments. Besides, there was yet left to be taken part of the contingents of the years VIII., IX., and X., which had not been called for, thanks to the peace which the country had enjoyed under the consulate. An arrear of men is as difficult to recover as an arrear of taxes. In regard to this matter, the First Consul made a sort of compromise. And of these arrears of contingents the First Consul demanded a certain number of men, picked from among the most robust and the most disposable; he exempted a greater number on the coast than in the interior, imposing upon those who were not called the service of a coastguard. In this manner he provided the army with about 50,000 more men, older and stronger than the conscripts of the years XI. and XII. The army was thus raised to 480,000 men, distributed in the colonies, Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Out of this effective force, about 100,000, employed in guarding Italy, Holland, Hanover, and the colonies, were no expense to the French treasury. Subsidies in money or provisions furnished on the spot defrayed the cost of their keep. Three hundred and eighty thousand were wholly paid by France, and entirely at her disposal. Deducting from these 380,000 men, 40,000 for ordinary non-effectives, that is to say, for ~~soldiers sick~~ ^{soldiers sick}, temporarily absent, on the way, &c., 40,000 for ~~gendarmes~~ ^{gendarmes}, veterans, invalids, drill-sergeants, one might reckon upon 300,000 disposable men, seasoned and capable of taking the field immediately. If 150,000 were destined to fight England, there would be left 150,000, 70,000 of which, forming the dépôts, were sufficient for guarding the interior, and 80,000 might hasten to the Rhine, in case of any alarm on the part of

the continent. It is not from the number that one ought to form a judgment of such an army. These 300,000 men, almost all tried soldiers, inured to fatigue and war, commanded by accomplished officers, were worth six or seven hundred thousand, a million, perhaps, of those that one usually has after a long peace; for between a perfect soldier and one who is not the difference is infinite. In this respect, the First Consul had nothing to wish for. He commanded the finest army in the world.

The grand problem to be resolved was the assemblage of the means of transport for conveying this army from Calais to Dover. The First Consul had not yet fully made up his mind on the subject. One thing only was definitively fixed, after a long series of observations—that was the form of the vessels. Flat-bottomed boats, which could run aground, and advance with sails and oars, had appeared to all the engineers of the navy the means best adapted for crossing, besides affording the advantage that they might be built anywhere, even in the upper basin of our rivers. But then they were to be collected, to be sheltered in harbours suitably situated, to be armed, to be equipped, and the best system of manœuvres for working them with order before an enemy was to be devised. For this purpose it was necessary to undertake a series of long and difficult experiments. The First Consul purposed to establish himself in person at Boulogne, on the coast of the Channel, to live there very often and for a considerable time together, to study the localities, the circumstances of the sea and of the weather, and to organise himself, in all its parts, the vast enterprise which he meditated.

Till the vessels ordered to be built throughout all France should be sufficiently forward to render the presence of the First Consul on the coast useful, his attention was engaged in Paris with two essential points, the finances and the relations with the powers of the continent; for it was necessary, on the one hand, to provide for the costs of the undertaking, and on the other, to make sure of not being disturbed during its execution by the continental allies of England.

The financial difficulty was not the least of the difficulties attending the renewal of the war. The French Revolution had swallowed up an immense mass of national domains under the form of assignats, and ended in bankruptcy. The national domains were almost exhausted, and credit was ruined for a long time. To spare the alienation of national domains to the value of 400 millions in 1800, they had been divided among various public services, such as Public Instruction, the Invalides, the Legion of Honour, the Senate, the Sinking Fund. Thus changed into endowments, they eased the budget of the State, and reserved domains that would hereafter be of immense value,

thanks to the rise of landed property, steady at all times, but always greater immediately after a revolution. They would, it is true, be diminished by some portions to be restored to emigrants, portions not considerable, because the domains not alienated were almost entirely domains of the Church. To what was left were to be added the domains situated in Piedmont and in the new departments of the Rhine, to the value of from 50 to 60 millions. Such were the disposable resources in national domains. As for credit, the First Consul was resolved not to have recourse to that. It will be recollected that, when he completed in the year XI. the liquidation of the preceding, he availed himself of the rise of the public funds to pay in annuities part of the arrears of the years V., VI., VII., and VIII.; but this was the only operation of the kind upon which he would venture, and he paid the services of the years IX. and X. entirely in cash. In the year X., the last budget voted, he had caused it to be laid down as a principle, that the annual charge on the public debt should never be allowed to exceed 50 millions, and that, if such a thing did happen, a resource should be immediately created for extinguishing the surplus in fifteen years. This precaution had been necessary to support confidence, for, notwithstanding a general prosperity, credit was so destroyed that the 5 per cent. annuities were scarcely ever above 56, and had never exceeded 60 at the moment when peace was most firmly anticipated.

For a long time past in England, and of late in France, the public funds have become an object of regular commerce, in which the great houses, ever disposed to treat with governments for the supply of such sums as they need, take a part. That was not the case at this period. Not a house in France would have subscribed a loan. It would have lost all credit by avowing that it was connected by business with the State; and if rash speculators had consented to make a loan, they would have given at most 50 francs for a 5 per cent. annuity, so that the treasury would have had to bear the enormous interest of 10 per cent. The First Consul, therefore, declined so expensive a resource. There was at that time another way of borrowing: it was to run in debt with the great companies of contractors for the army supplies, by not paying up all that was owing to them. They indemnified themselves by getting paid for their services twice or thrice as much as they were worth. Hence bold speculators, who are fond of launching into great enterprises instead of sticking to loans, were eager to engage in contracts. By applying to them, of course, one might have had a substitute for credit; but this expedient would have been far more costly than a loan itself. The First Consul intended to pay the contractors regularly, to oblige them to execute their services

regularly, and to execute them at reasonable prices. He rejected, therefore, the resource of the alienation of national domains, which could not yet be sold to advantage, and the resources of loans then too difficult and too dear, and lastly, the resource of the great contracts, entailing abuses difficult to calculate. He flattered himself, with strict order and economy, with the natural increase of the produce of the taxes, and some accessory receipts which we are about to mention, to escape the hard necessities to which speculators oblige those governments to submit which are destitute at once of revenues and credit.

The last budget, that of the year X. (September 1801 to September 1802), had been fixed at 500 millions (620 with the expense of collection and the additional centimes). This amount had not been exceeded, owing to the peace. The taxes alone had surpassed in their produce the anticipations of the government. A revenue of 470 millions had been assumed, and a small alienation of national domains voted to make the receipts equal the expenditure. But the taxes had exceeded the expected amount by 33 millions, and the alienation voted had therefore become unnecessary. This unexpected augmentation of resources arose from the registration, which, thanks to the increasing number of private transactions, had produced 172 millions instead of 150; the customs, which, thanks to reviving commerce, had produced 31 millions instead of 22; lastly, from the posts and some other less important branches of revenue.

Notwithstanding the renewal of the war, it was hoped, and the event confirmed the expectation, it was hoped that there would be the like increase in the produce of the taxes. Under the vigorous government of the First Consul, no fears were entertained either of further commotions or of reverses. While confidence kept up, private transactions, internal trade, the daily extending commerce with the continent, could do no other than follow an increasing progression. Maritime commerce alone was liable to suffer; and the revenue of the customs, then figuring at 30 millions in the budget of the receipts, plainly showed that from this suffering no great loss could result to the treasury. There was reason, therefore, to calculate upon receipts to the amount of more than 500 millions. The budget of the year XI. (September 1802 to September 1803) had been voted in March with a fear, but not with a certainty, of war. It had been fixed at 589 millions, exclusively of the costs of collection, but including in it part of the additional centimes. This was consequently an augmentation of 89 millions. The navy, raised from 105 millions to 126, the war from 210 to 243, had obtained part of that augmentation. The remainder had been divided among the public works, the clergy, the new civil lists of the Consuls, and the fixed expenses of the

departments, entered this time in the general budget. It was assumed that this augmentation of expenditure would be met by the supposed increase of the produce of the taxes, by the additional centimes, formerly applied to the fixed expenses of the departments, and by several foreign receipts arising from the allied countries. The current budget might be considered as in equilibrium, excepting an indispensable excess for the expenses of the war. In fact, it was not to be supposed that twenty millions added to the charge for the navy, and thirty to the charge for the army, could suffice for the necessities of the new situation. The war with the continent cost in general very little, for our victorious troops, crossing the Rhine and the Adige at the commencement of the operations, went and supported themselves at the cost of the enemy; but here the case was different. The six camps established on the coast from Holland to the Pyrenees must be subsisted upon the soil of France till the day when they should cross the Strait. It was requisite, moreover, to provide for the expenses of the ships that were to be built, and to place a prodigious mass of artillery upon our coasts. One hundred millions additional per annum would be scarcely sufficient to meet the expense of the war with Great Britain.* The following were the resources of which the First Consul purposed to avail himself.

We have just adverted to some foreign receipts already carried to the budget of the year XI., in order to cover in part the sum of 89 millions, by which this budget exceeded that of the year X. These receipts were those of Italy. The Italian Republic, having as yet no army, and being unable to do without ours, paid 1,600,000 f. per month (19,200,000 f. per annum) for the subsistence of the French troops. Liguria, in the same predicament, furnished 1,200,000 f. per annum; Parma, 2 millions. This was a resource of 22 millions and a half, already carried, as we have just said, to the budget of the year XI. There was still to be found the whole of the sum of 100 millions, which it would probably be necessary to add to the 589 millions of the budget of the year XI.

The voluntary donations, the price of Louisiana, the subsidies of the other allied States—such were the means on which the First Consul reckoned. The voluntary donations of the towns and the departments amounted to about 40 millions, 15 payable in the year XI., 15 in the year XII., the remainder in the following years. The price of Louisiana, sold for 80 millions, 60 of which were to be paid in Holland on behalf of the French

* This sum will appear trifling in comparison with the present amount of our budgets; but we must bear in mind the value of money at that period, and recollect that 100 millions in those days were equivalent to 200 or 250 at the present day, perhaps more, when military expenses are in question.

treasury, and the net sum of 54 to be received for it, the expense of negotiation deducted, furnished a second resource. The Americans had not yet legally accepted the contract, but the house of Hope offered already to advance part of that sum. By dividing this resource of 54 millions between two years, there would be 27 millions added to the 15 arising from the voluntary donations, which would raise the annual supplement to about 42 for the services of XI. and XII. (September 1802 to September 1804). Lastly, Holland and Spain were to furnish the surplus. Holland, delivered from the stadtholdership by our arms, defended against England by our diplomacy, which had obtained the restitution of the greater part of her colonies, would now have been glad to be released from an alliance which dragged her anew into war. She would fain have remained neuter between France and Great Britain, and, happily situated between the two countries, reaped the profits of her neutrality. But the First Consul had taken a resolution, the justice of which cannot be denied: that was to make all the maritime nations concur in our contest with Great Britain. Holland and Spain, said he incessantly, are undone if we are conquered. All their colonies in India and America will be either taken or destroyed, or urged into revolt by England. No doubt those two powers would find it convenient not to take either side, to look on at our defeats if we are vanquished, to profit by our victories if we are victorious; for if the enemy is beaten, it will be as much for their benefit as for ours. But that cannot be: they must combat with us, like us, with equal effort. Justice requires it, and their interest too, for their resources are indispensable to our success. If by uniting all our means we conquer the rulers of the sea, it is as much as we can do. Singly, each limited to our separate strength, we shall not succeed, we shall be beaten. The First Consul had, therefore, concluded that Holland and Spain should assist him; and it may be said with perfect truth that, in forcing them to concur in his designs, he merely obliged them to take care of their own interest. Be this as it may, in order to compel attention to language so reasonable, he had, in regard to Holland, force, since our troops occupied Flushing and Utrecht, and in regard to Spain, the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonso.

For the rest, at Amsterdam, all enlightened and truly patriotic men, with M. de Schimmelpenninck at their head, thought like the First Consul. There was no difficulty, therefore, in coming to an arrangement, and it was agreed that Holland should assist us in the following manner. She engaged to subsist and pay a corps of 18,000 French and 16,000 Dutch, in all 34,000 men. To this land force she promised to add a naval force, composed

of a squadron of ships of the line and a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. The squadron was to consist of five sail of the line, five frigates, and transports sufficient to convey 25,000 men and 2500 horses from the Texel to the coast of England. The flotilla was to be composed of 350 flat-bottomed boats of all sizes, and capable of carrying 37,000 men and 1500 horses from the mouth of the Scheld to that of the Thames. In return, France guaranteed to Holland her independence, the integrity of her territory, European and colonial, and the restitution of the colonies lost in the late war. The aid obtained by means of this arrangement was considerable; for 18,000 French ceased for a time to be a burden to the treasury of France; 16,000 Dutch were to swell our army, and lastly, means of transport for 62,000 men and 4000 horses were to be added to our naval resources. It would be difficult to say, however, for what sum such aid might figure in the extraordinary budget of the First Consul.

The concurrence of Spain was yet to be obtained. That power was less disposed to devote herself to the common cause than even Holland. We have already seen her under the capricious influence of the Prince of the Peace meanly wavering between the most contrary directions, sometimes leaning towards France, in order to obtain an establishment in Italy, sometimes towards England, to relieve herself from the efforts imposed by a courageous and indefatigable ally, and losing in these fluctuations the valuable island of Trinidad. Alike impotent, whether friend or foe, one knew not what to do with her either in peace or war; not that the noble Spanish nation, full of patriotism, not that the magnificent soil of the Peninsula, containing the ports of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagen, were to be despised—very far from it. But an unworthy government betrayed by profound incapacity the cause of Spain and that of all the maritime nations. Accordingly, after mature reflection, the First Consul made up his mind to derive no other advantage from the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonso but that of obtaining subsidies. By that treaty, signed in 1796, during the first administration of the Prince of the Peace, Spain engaged to furnish France with 24,000 men, 15 sail of the line, 6 frigates, and 4 cutters. The First Consul resolved not to claim these succours. He considered, and very justly, that to draw Spain into a war would not be doing any service to France or to herself; that she would not cut a brilliant figure in it; that she would be stripped at once of her only resource, the piastres of Mexico, which would be intercepted; that she could not equip either an army or a fleet; that, consequently, she would be of no use, and merely furnish England with a pretext which she had long been seeking to excite all South.

America to revolt; that if it was true the participation of Spain in hostilities changed the whole coast of the Peninsula into an enemy's coast for the English ships, none of her ports could have a useful influence like those of Holland on the operation of the invasion; that, consequently, the advantage of having them at one's disposal was not great; that in a commercial point of view the British flag was already excluded from Spain by the tariffs, and that French productions would continue to find there a sure preference, whether in peace or war. From all these considerations, he caused it to be privately intimated to M. d'Azara, ambassador of Charles IV. in Paris, that if his court had a dislike to the war, he was willing to allow it to remain neuter on condition of a subsidy of 6 millions per month (72 millions per year), which would open to French manufactures a more extensive market than they at that moment enjoyed.

This very moderate offer was not received at Madrid with the favour which it deserved. The Prince of the Peace was closely connected with the English, and openly betrayed the alliance. It was for this motive that the First Consul, anticipating this treachery, had placed at Bayonne itself one of the six camps destined to operate against England. He was determined to declare war against Spain, rather than suffer her to desert the common cause. He therefore ordered General Beurnonville, his ambassador, to explain himself on this subject in a peremptory manner. The English, by usurping an absolute authority over the seas, obliged him to exercise an absolute authority over the land, for the defence of the general interests of the world.

To the succours of the allied States must be added those about to be derived from such States as were hostile, or ill-disposed, or at least on the point of being occupied. Hanover would suffice for subsisting 30,000 men. The division formed at Faenza, and on march for the Gulf of Tarento, would have to live at the expense of the court of Naples. Informed by his ambassador, the First Consul knew positively that Queen Caroline, governed by Acton, the minister, was in perfect harmony with England, and that it would not be long before he should be obliged to drive the Bourbons from the continent of Italy. He did not fail, therefore, to explain himself frankly to the Queen of Naples. "I will no more suffer the English in Italy," said he, "than in Spain and Portugal. On the first act of complicity with England, war shall do me justice for your enmity. I have it in my power to do you either a great deal of good or a great deal of harm. It is for you to choose. I have no wish to take your dominions from you; I am satisfied to make them subservient to my designs against England, but I

will surely take them if they are employed in serving her." The First Consul spoke sincerely, for he had not yet made himself the head of a dynasty, and had no thoughts of conquering kingdoms for his brothers. In consequence, he required that the division of 15,000 men established at Tarento should be subsisted by the treasury of Naples, the expense to be accounted for thereafter. He considered this charge as a contribution imposed on enemies quite as much as that which was about to burden the kingdom of Hanover.

On recapitulating what goes before, we find that the resources of the First Consul were the following. Naples, Holland, and Hanover were to keep about 60,000 men. The Italian Republic, Parma, Liguria, Spain, were charged with the payment of a regular subsidy. America was preparing to pay the price of Louisiana. The patriotism of the departments and of the great cities furnished wholly voluntary supplements to taxes. Lastly, the public revenue promised an increasing augmentation of receipts, even during the war, thanks to the confidence inspired by an energetic government, a government reputed invincible. With all these means, the First Consul flattered himself that he should add to the 589 millions of the budget of the year XI. the extraordinary resource of 100 millions per annum, for two, three, or four years. He had for the future the indirect taxes. He was thus sure of being able to keep an army of 150,000 men on the coasts, another army of 80,000 on the Rhine, the troops necessary for the occupation of Italy, Holland, and Hanover, 50 sail of the line, and a flotilla of transports of unknown extent, hitherto unexampled, since the object was to convey 150,000 soldiers, 10,000 horses, and 400 pieces of cannon.

The world was agitated, affrighted, one may say, at the preparations for that gigantic conflict between the two most powerful empires of the globe. It was scarcely possible for it to be indifferent to the consequences: the war was not confined to France and England, for neutrals would be subject to the annoyance of the British navy, and the continent obliged to promote the designs of the First Consul, either by closing its ports or by suffering inconvenient and expensive occupations. At bottom, all the powers laid the blame of this rupture on England. The pretension to keep Malta had appeared to all, even to those which were least favourable to us, a manifest violation of treaties, not justified by anything that had occurred in Europe since the peace of Amiens. Prussia and Austria had sanctioned by formal conventions what had been done in Italy and Germany, and approved by notes what had been done in Switzerland. Russia had less expressly adhered to the conduct of France, but excepting some remonstrances, in the form of a claim for the too long deferred indemnity of the King of Sardinia, she had as good

as approved all his acts. She had praised, in particular, our intervention in Switzerland as skilfully conducted and equitably terminated. None of the three powers of the continent, therefore, could find in the events of the last two years a justification of the usurpation of Malta, and on this subject they explained themselves with frankness. Still, notwithstanding this mode of viewing things, they leaned rather to England than to France. Though the First Consul had taken the greatest pains to repress anarchy, they could not help recognising in him the French Revolution victorious, and much more glorious than was agreeable to them. Two of them, Prussia and Austria, were too unmaritime to feel strongly interested in the liberty of the seas; the third, that is, Russia, had also too remote an interest in that liberty to be strongly prepossessed in its behalf. All three were far more sensitive to the preponderance of France on the continent than to the preponderance of England on the ocean. The maritime law which England strove to enforce seemed to them an infringement of justice and of the general interest of commerce; but the domination which France already exercised, and which she would soon be led to exercise still more in Europe, was an immediate and pressing danger which greatly alarmed them. Hence they were angry with England for having provoked this new war, and loudly said as much; but they had returned to that aversion for France which the wisdom and glory of the First Consul had, as it were, suspended for a moment by a sort of surprise given to their hatred by his genius.

A few words, dropped by the greatest personages of the time, prove better than anything that we can say the sentiments of the powers towards us. M. Philip de Cobentzel, ambassador at Paris, and cousin of M. Louis de Cobentzel, minister of foreign affairs at Vienna, conversing at table with Admiral Decrès, who by the vivacity of his ideas called forth a like vivacity in others, M. de Cobentzel could not help saying, Yes, England is to blame; she advances pretensions that cannot be maintained; that is true. But, to confess the truth, you frighten everybody too much to let them think of being afraid of England.* The Emperor of Germany, Francis II., who finished his long and prudent career not many years ago, and who covered great shrewdness with apparent simplicity, speaking to our ambassador, M. de Champagny, about the new war, and expressing his sorrow for it with manifest sincerity, declared that for his part he was determined to remain at peace, but that he was filled with involuntary uneasiness, the cause of which he durst scarcely mention. M. de Champagny encouraging him to confidence, the emperor, with a thousand excuses, with a thousand protesta-

* I have read this statement in a note in the handwriting of M. Decrès himself, addressed immediately to Napoleon.

tions of esteem for the First Consul, said, If General Bonaparte, who has accomplished so many miracles, fails to accomplish that for which he is now preparing, if he does not cross the Strait, it is we who shall be the victims; for he will fall upon us, and fight England in Germany.* The Emperor Francis, who was timid, felt regret for having said so much, and would have recalled his words, but it was too late. M. de Champagny immediately transmitted them to Paris by the first courier. It afforded proof of extraordinary foresight in that prince, but which was of little service to him; for it was not very long before he himself offered Napoleon an occasion to fight, as he said, England in Germany.

Of all the powers, however, Austria had least to fear from the consequences of the present war, if she could withstand the suggestions of the court of London. She had, in fact, no maritime interest to defend, since she possessed neither commerce, nor ports, nor colonies. The port of old Venice, choked with sand, which had recently been given to her, could not create for her interests of that kind. She was not like Prussia, Spain, or Naples, mistress of extensive coasts, which France was tempted to occupy. It was, therefore, easy for her to keep out of the quarrel. She gained, on the contrary, full liberty of action in the Germanic affairs. France, obliged to confront England, could no longer bear with all her weight upon Germany, and Austria, on the contrary, had free scope upon questions left unresolved. She was desirous, as we have seen, to change the number of votes in the College of the princes, to appropriate fraudulently to herself all the personal property of the secularised States, to prevent the incorporation of the immediate nobility, to wrest the Inn from Bavaria, and by all these combined means to recover her superiority in the empire. The advantage of resolving all these questions in her own way comforted her greatly for the renewal of the war, and but for her extreme prudence would almost have inspired her with joy.

The two powers of the continent which felt most chagrin at this moment were Prussia and Russia, and they felt it from different motives and not in equal degree. The most affected was Prussia. It is easy to conceive, from the character of her king, who hated war and expense, what pain the prospect of a new European conflagration must give him. The occupation of Hanover would have, moreover, the most serious inconveniences for his dominions. To prevent that occupation he had attempted an arrangement, which might suit at once both France and England. He had offered England to occupy that electorate with Prussian troops, promising to hold it faithfully in trust, on

* I have no need to say that this statement also is extracted from an authentic despatch of the ambassador of France.

condition that she would throw open the navigation of the Elbe and Weser. On the other hand, he had offered the First Consul to hold Hanover for France, and to pay the revenues of the country into the French treasury. This twofold zeal, testified to both powers, was prompted, in the first place, by a desire to save the navigation of the Elbe and Weser from the rigorous measures of England; and in the second, to spare the north of Germany the presence of the French. These two were important interests for Prussia. It was by the Elbe and Hamburg, by the Weser and Bremen, that all the produce of her territory was exported. The linens of Silesia, which constituted her principal exportable wealth, were purchased by Hamburg and Bremen, exchanged in France for wines, and in America for colonial produce. If the English blockaded the Elbe and the Weser, all this trade would be at an end. It was a point of equal importance to her not to have the French in the north of Germany. In the first place, their presence made Prussia uneasy. In the next, it drew upon her keen reproaches from the German princes, who were her partisans in the empire. They told her that, connected as she was with France from reasons of ambition, she abandoned the defence of the soil of Germany, nay, contributed by her pusillanimous complaisance to draw foreign invasion upon it. They even went so far as to maintain that, by the Germanic law, she was obliged to interfere for the purpose of preventing the French from occupying Hanover. These princes were most assuredly wrong, according to the strict principles of the law of nations; for the German States, though united to each other by a federative bond, had the individual right of peace and war, and might be, each separately, at peace or at war with a power without the confederation's being on the same terms with that power. It would have been strange, in fact, if King George III. could have alleged that he was at war for England, which is inaccessible, and at peace for Hanover, which is not so. This way of interpreting the public law would have been too convenient, and the First Consul, when an attempt was made to take an advantage of it, replied by a parable equally true and ingenious. There was, said he, among the ancients a right of sanctuary in certain temples. A slave fleeing for protection to one of these temples had almost cleared the threshold when he was caught by the foot. The right anciently established was not contested; the slave was not dragged from his asylum, but his foot which was outside the temple was cut off. Prussia negotiated, therefore, before she spoke out definitively respecting the occupation of Hanover, announced, for the rest, by the First Consul as certain and near at hand.

The rupture which had recently taken place between France and England had disagreeably surprised the court of Russia, on

account of the matters with which that court was then engaged. The young emperor had taken a new step in the execution of his projects, and consigned the affairs of the empire a little more to his young friends. He had dispensed with the services of Prince de Kourakin, and called to the head of his councils a considerable personage, M. de Woronzoff, brother of him who was ambassador of Russia in London. He had given to M. de Woronzoff the title of chancellor, minister of foreign affairs, and divided the administration of the State into eight ministerial departments. He had made a point of putting at the head of these different departments men of known merit, at the same time taking care to place beside them as assistants his friends Messrs. de Czartoryski, de Strogonoff, and de Nowosiltzoff. Thus Prince Adam Czartoryski was attached to M. de Woronzoff as assistant in the department of foreign affairs: M. de Woronzoff, on account of his health, being frequently absent on leave at his estates, Prince Adam was charged almost entirely with the foreign relations of the empire. M. de Strogonoff was attached to the department of justice; M. de Nowosiltzoff to that of the interior. The Prince de Kotschoubey, the oldest of the personal friends of the emperor, had been made minister in title, and charged with the department of the interior. These eight ministers were to deliberate jointly on all affairs of State, and to make annual reports to the Senate. It was a first considerable change to make ministers deliberate, and a still greater to make them report to the Senate. The Emperor Alexander considered these changes as a step towards the institutions of free and civilised countries. Wholly occupied with these internal reforms, he was painfully affected to find himself recalled into the immense and perilous field of European politics; and manifested an evident displeasure on account of it to the representatives of the two belligerent powers. He was displeased with England, whose extravagant pretensions and whose evident bad faith in the affair of Malta disturbed Europe afresh; he was displeased also with France, but from different motives. France had taken little heed of the demand so frequently repeated of an indemnity for the King of Piedmont; moreover, in granting to Russia an apparent influence in the Germanic affairs, she had but too plainly arrogated the real influence to herself. The young emperor had perceived it. Very anxious, young as he was, to make people talk of him, he began to view with a sort of displeasure the glory of the great man who swayed the West. The disposition of the court of Russia, therefore, was a general dissatisfaction with everybody. The emperor, deliberating with his ministers and his friends, decided on offering the mediation of Russia, called for plainly enough by France. It would strive thereby to prevent a universal conflagration; at the same time,

it would tell the truth to all; it would not fail to represent to England how illegitimate were her claims to Malta; and it would make the First Consul sensible of the necessity of at length acquitting himself towards the King of Piedmont, and of showing some civility to the petty powers composing the *clientèle* of the court of Russia.

In consequence, through the medium of M. de Woronzoff, speaking to General Hedouville, and through the medium of M. de Markoff, speaking to M. de Talleyrand, the Russian cabinet expressed its strong displeasure at the new disturbance of the general peace through the rival ambitions of France and England. It admitted that the pretensions of England to Malta were ill founded, but intimated that the continual enterprises of France might have generated, though not justified, those pretensions; and added, that France would do well to moderate her action in Europe if she would not render peace impossible with all the powers. It offered the mediation of Russia, painful as it was to her to intermeddle in differences which thus far were foreign to her, but which if she interfered might perhaps become personal to her. It concluded by saying that, if, in spite of his good-will, his efforts for re-establishing peace should prove unsuccessful, the emperor hoped that France would spare the friends of Russia, especially the kingdom of Naples, which had become her ally in 1798, and the kingdom of Hanover, guaranteed by her in quality of a German State. Such was the substance of the communications of the Russian cabinet.

Youth brought up in dissipation is generally volatile in its language; youth brought up in a serious manner is apt to be dogmatic: for nothing is more difficult for youth than moderation. Hence it was that the young rulers of Russia lectured the two most powerful governments of the world, the one under the guidance of a great man, the other of great institutions. The First Consul smiled, for he had long since discovered how inexperienced and presumptuous the Russian cabinet was. But restraining himself for the interest of his vast designs, he resolved not to complicate the affairs of the continent, and thus cause a war to break out upon the Rhine, which would have diverted him from that for which he was preparing on the coast of the Channel. Receiving the lessons addressed to him from St. Petersburg without appearing to notice them, he resolved to cut short all the reproaches of the young Czar, by constituting him absolute arbiter of the great quarrel which occupied the world. He therefore offered the Russian cabinet, through M. de Talleyrand and General Hedouville, to give a bond by which he would engage to submit to the award of the Emperor Alexander, whatever it might be, confiding entirely in his justice. This proposal was as wise as it was politic. If

England rejected it, she would acknowledge that she distrusted either the goodness of her cause or the Emperor Alexander; the whole blame would lie upon her, and she would authorise the First Consul to war with her to the last extremity. The closing of all the ports under the influence of France, the occupation of all the countries belonging to England, became a legitimate consequence of this war. Nevertheless, in regard to the kingdoms of Naples and Hanover, the First Consul, assuming the decided tone which was consonant with his plans, declared that he would do whatever was required by the war which had been raised against him, and which he had not begun.

Having taken that attitude which seemed to him at the moment to be the best in regard to the powers of the continent, the First Consul immediately proceeded to the occupation already prepared for and announced. General St. Cyr was at Faenza, in the Romagna, with a division of 15,000 men and a considerable *matériel* in artillery, such as would be requisite for arming the road of Tarento. He received orders, which he executed immediately, to march through the Roman States to the extremity of Italy, paying for everything by the way, to avoid offending his holiness. Agreeably to the convention concluded with the court of Naples, the French troops were to be subsisted by the Neapolitan administration. General St. Cyr, regarded, as he deserved to be, by the First Consul as one of the best generals of the time, particularly when he was acting alone, had an embarrassing position in the midst of a hostile kingdom; but he was capable of encountering any difficulties. His instructions left him, moreover, immense latitude. He was directed, on the first sign of insurrection in the Calabrias, to leave them and throw himself into the capital of the kingdom. Having already conquered Naples once, he knew better than any one else how to set about it.

The First Consul caused Ancona also to be occupied, after giving the Pope all the satisfaction which could mitigate that unpleasant proceeding. The French garrison was to pay punctually for what it consumed, not to give the least disquiet to the civil government of the Holy See, even to assist it, if needful, against disturbances, in case there were any.

Orders had been sent at the same time for the invasion of Hanover. The negotiations of Prussia had proved unsuccessful. England had declared that she would blockade the Elbe and the Weser if the dominions of the house of Hanover were touched, whether Prussians or French were employed. This was certainly one of the most unjust of pretensions. Were she to prevent the French flag from appearing upon the Elbe and the Weser, nothing could be more legitimate; but to stop the trade of Bremen and Hamburg because the French had invaded the

territory within which those cities were enclosed, to require all Germany to brave war with France for the interests of the house of Hanover, and to punish it for a compulsory inaction by destroying its commerce, was most iniquitous conduct. Prussia could do no more than complain bitterly of the injustice of such a proceeding, and at last make up her mind to suffer the British flag at the mouths of the two German rivers, as well as the presence of the French in the bosom of Hanover. She had no longer the same motive for undertaking the occupation, since, in any case, her commerce was to be interdicted. The First Consul caused his regret to be expressed to her, promised not to pass the boundary of Hanover, but excused himself for this invasion by the necessities of the war and the immense advantage which he should derive from closing the two great commercial channels of the continent against the English.

General Mortier had orders to march. He had proceeded with 25,000 men to the northern extremity of Holland, on the frontier of the lower part of the bishopric of Münster, belonging, since the secularisations, to the house of Aremberg. The French were sure of the consent of that house. From its territory they passed into that of the bishopric of Osnabrück, recently annexed to Hanover, and from the territory of Osnabrück into Hanover itself. They had thus no occasion to enter the Prussian territory; and this was an indispensable forbearance towards the court of Prussia. The First Consul had recommended to General Mortier to treat mildly the countries through which he should pass, and above all to pay particular attentions to the Prussian authorities whom he would meet with along the whole frontier of Hanover. That general, discreet and upright, as well as brave, was the fittest person who could have been chosen for that difficult commission. Marching across the barren sands and the swampy heaths of Friesland and Lower Westphalia, he entered Hanover at Meppen, and arrived in June on the banks of the Hunte. The Hanoverian army occupied Diepholz. After a few skirmishes of cavalry, it fell back behind the Weser. Though composed of excellent troops, it knew that resistance was impossible, and that it should only draw down calamities upon the country if it persisted in fighting. It offered, therefore, to capitulate honourably, to which General Mortier cheerfully consented. It was agreed at Suhlingen that the Hanoverian army should retire with arms and baggage behind the Elbe; that it should give its word of honour not to serve during the present war, unless exchanged for a like number of French prisoners; that the administration of the country and the collection of the revenues should belong to France, saving the respect due to individuals, to private property, and to the different religious professions.

This convention, called the convention of Suhlingen, was sent to the First Consul and to the King of England to receive their double ratification. The First Consul instantly gave his, unwilling to reduce the Hanoverian army to despair by imposing harder conditions. When the same convention was submitted to old George III., he was seized with so violent a fit of passion as, it is said, to fling it in the face of the minister who laid it before him. This old king, in his sombre reveries, had always considered Hanover as likely to be the last asylum of his family, the cradle of which it was. The invasion of his patrimonial dominions drove him to despair; he refused to sign the convention of Suhlingen, and thus exposed his soldiers to the cruel alternative of either laying down their arms or submitting to be slaughtered to the last man. His cabinet alleged, in excuse for so singular a determination, that the king would not have anything to do with matters arising out of the enterprise against his territories; that to ratify the convention would be adhering to the occupation of Hanover; that this occupation was a violation of the soil of Germany; and that he appealed to the Diet on account of the violence done to his subjects. This was a most extraordinary mode of reasoning, and the most unwarrantable in every respect.

When this intelligence reached Hanover, the brave army, commanded by Marshal de Walmoden, was thunderstruck. It was drawn up behind the Elbe, in the heart of the country of Luneburg, established in a strong position, and resolved to defend its honour. The French army, which for three years had not fired a shot, desired nothing better, on its part, than to fight a brilliant battle. More prudent sentiments, however, prevailed. General Mortier, who united humanity with valour, did all that lay in his power to mitigate the fate of the Hanoverians. He did not require them to surrender themselves prisoners of war; he was satisfied with their disbanding, and agreed with them that they should leave their arms in the camp, and retire to their homes, promising never to arm or to assemble. The *matériel* of war contained in the kingdom, which was very considerable, was given up to the French. The revenues of the country were to belong to them, as well as the personal property of the Elector of Hanover. To this property belonged the beautiful horses of the Hanoverian breed, which were sent to France. The cavalry dismounted and gave up 3500 superb horses, which were employed in remounting the French cavalry.

It was but in a very indirect manner that General Mortier possessed himself of the administration of the country, leaving the greater part of it in the hands of the local authorities. Hanover, if you meant not to fleece it, could well support 30,000 men. This was the force intended to be placed in the country,

and which the First Consul had promised the King of Prussia not to exceed. With a view to avoid the long circuit of Holland and Lower Westphalia, he had applied to that monarch to assent to the establishment of a route for troops through the Prussian territory, punctually paying contractors designated beforehand for the maintenance of troops going to Hanover or returning from that country. The King of Prussia complied in order to please the First Consul. Thenceforward direct communications were established, and advantage was taken of them to send a great number of horse-soldiers, who went on foot and returned with three horses, one which they rode and two others which they led. The possession of this part of Germany soon became very useful for our cavalry, and served to render it excellent in point of horses, as it was before in point of men.

While these different occupations were effecting, the First Consul prosecuted his preparations on the coast of the Channel. He caused naval stores to be purchased in Holland, and particularly in Russia, that he might be provided before the latter power, whose dispositions were not most satisfactory, should be induced to refuse supplies. Flat-bottomed boats of all sizes were building in the basins of the Gironde, the Loire, the Seine, the Somme, and the Scheld. Thousands of labourers were felling the forests on the coast. All the foundries of the Republic were at work casting mortars, howitzers, artillery of the largest calibre. The Parisians saw a hundred gunboats building on the quays of Bercy, the Invalides, and the Military School. It began to be evident that such a prodigious activity could not be a mere demonstration destined only to annoy England.

The First Consul had resolved to set out for the coast of the Channel as soon as the vessels everywhere begun should be somewhat more advanced, and when he had arranged the most urgent affairs. The session of the Legislative Body had been peacefully passed in giving the government entire approbation for its conduct towards England; in lending it the most complete moral support; in voting it the budget, the principal dispositions of which we have seen above; and lastly, in discussing noiselessly, but profoundly, the first heads of the Civil Code. From this period the Legislative Body was but a great council, having nothing to do with politics, and devoted exclusively to business.

By the end of June the First Consul found himself at liberty. He purposed to inspect the whole coast as far as Flushing and Antwerp, to visit Belgium, which he had not yet seen, the departments of the Rhine, which he was not acquainted with, to make, in short, a military and political tour. Madame Bona-

parte was to accompany him, and to share the honours which awaited him. For the first time, he applied for the crown jewels to the minister of the public treasury, in whose custody they were, to have them made up for his wife. He wished to exhibit himself to the new departments and even on the banks of the Rhine in nearly the style of a sovereign; for he had been considered as such since he became Consul for life and had a right to choose a successor. His ministers were appointed to meet him, some at Dunkirk, others at Lille, at Ghent, at Antwerp, at Brussels. The foreign ambassadors were invited to visit him in the same cities. As he was going to show himself to people who were staunch Catholics, he thought it right to appear among them accompanied by the papal legate. On the mere expression of this wish, Cardinal Caprara, notwithstanding his great age and infirmities, determined, after obtaining permission from the Pope, to swell the consular train in the Netherlands. Orders were immediately issued for giving this prince of the Church a magnificent reception.

The First Consul set out on the 23rd of June. He first visited Compiègne, where vessels were building on the banks of the Oise; Amiens, Abbeville, and St. Valery, where they were building on the banks of the Somme. He was hailed with transport, and received with absolutely royal honours. The city of Amiens presented him, according to ancient custom, with four swans of the purest white, which were sent to the garden of the Tuileries. His presence everywhere called forth manifestations of attachment to his person, hatred for the English, and zeal to combat and conquer those ancient enemies of France. He listened with extreme good-nature to the addresses of the authorities and the inhabitants; but his attention was evidently engrossed by the great object which occupied him at the moment. His anxious attention was exclusively directed to the dockyards, the magazines, the supplies of all kinds. He visited the troops which began to collect towards Picardy, caressed the old soldiers whose faces were known to him, and left them full of confidence in his vast enterprise.

No sooner had he finished these visits than he returned to his quarters, and though exhausted with fatigue, dictated a multitude of orders which still exist, for the instruction of governments engaged in great preparations. Here, the treasury had delayed sending funds to contractors; there, the minister of the marine had neglected to order naval stores to be furnished; elsewhere, the direction of the forests had retarded the felling of timber, on account of various formalities; yonder again, the artillery had not despatched the cannon or the ammunition required. The First Consul repaired these neglects, or removed these obstacles, by the power of his will. In this manner he

reached Boulogne, the principal centre to which his efforts converged, and the presumed point of departure of the great expedition planned against England.

This is the fit place for describing in detail the immense armament contrived for carrying 150,000 men across the Strait of Calais, with the number of horses and guns, and the quantity of ammunition and provisions proportionate to such an army. It is a vast and difficult operation to carry beyond sea twenty or thirty thousand men only. The expedition to Egypt, executed fifty years ago, the expedition against Algiers, executed in our days, are proofs of this. What an undertaking it must be to embark 150,000 soldiers, ten or fifteen thousand horses, three or four thousand pieces of cannon and their carriages! A ship of the line can carry on an average six or seven hundred men, in case the passage takes some days; a large frigate can contain half the number. For embarking such an army there would of course be required 200 sail of the line, that is to say, a chimerical naval force, which nothing but the concurrence of France and England in the same object could render barely conceivable. An attempt to throw 150,000 men into England, if England had been at the distance of Egypt or the Morea, would consequently have been an impracticable undertaking. But there was only the Strait of Calais to cross, that is to say, only eight or ten leagues to go. There was no necessity for employing large ships for such a passage. Neither could they have been employed if one had had them, for there is not a single port capable of admitting them from Ostend to Havre: neither is there, without going far out of the way, a single port on the other side where they could effect a landing. The idea of small vessels, considering the passage and the nature of the ports, had therefore at all times occurred to all minds. Besides, these small vessels were adequate to such marine circumstances as were liable to be met with. Long observations made on the coast had led to the discovery of these circumstances, and to the determination of the vessels best adapted to the purpose. In summer, for instance, there are in the Channel almost absolute calms, and long enough to enable one to reckon upon forty-eight hours of the same weather. It would take about that number of hours, not to cross, but for the immense flotilla in question to work out of harbour. During this calm, the English cruisers, being condemned to lie motionless, vessels built to go either with oars or sails, might pass with impunity even before an enemy's squadron. Winter has also its favourable moments. The dense fogs of the cold season, being attended with no wind, or scarcely any, offered another chance of crossing in presence of an enemy's force, either immovable or deceived by the fog. There was still a third favourable occasion, namely, that offered

by the equinoxes. It frequently happens that, after equinoctial storms, the wind suddenly subsides, and leaves sufficient time for crossing the Strait before the return of the enemy's squadron, which is obliged by the gale to stand off. Such were the circumstances universally fixed upon by the seamen living on the coast of the Channel.

There was one case in which, in all seasons and in any weather, excepting a tempest, one might always cross the Strait: it was when a strong squadron of the line could be brought for a few hours by skilful manœuvres into the Channel. Then the flotilla, protected by this squadron, could sail without being uneasy about the enemy's cruisers.

But the case of a great French squadron brought between Calais and Dover depended on such difficult combinations, that it could not be at all reckoned upon. It was requisite even to build the transport flotilla in such a fashion that it might, to appearance at least, dispense with any auxiliary force; for if it had been demonstrated by its construction that it was impossible for it to keep the sea without an assisting squadron, the secret of this great operation would have been immediately revealed to the enemy. Aware of this, they would have concentrated all their naval forces in the Strait, and prevented every manœuvre of French squadrons for the purpose of getting thither.

To the considerations arising from the nature of the winds and the sea were added considerations arising from the form of the coast: the French ports in the Strait were all left dry at low water, and had not a depth of more than eight or nine feet at high water. Vessels, therefore, were required, which, when laden, needed no more than seven or eight feet water to float, and which could not take injury from grounding. As for the coast of England, the ports situated between the Thames, Dover, Folkestone, and Brighton were very small; but whatever they might be, all that needed to be done to effect so vast a disembarkation was to run in close to shore, and for this reason vessels fit for grounding were required. For these various reasons, flat-bottomed boats had been adopted, capable of proceeding with oars, in order to cross either in calm or in fog; capable of carrying heavy cannon, without drawing more than seven or eight feet water, in order to move about more freely in the French ports in the Channel, in order to take the ground without going to pieces on the shores of England.

To comply with all these conditions, large gunboats, with flat bottoms, solidly built, and of two different kinds to answer two different purposes, were contrived. The first kind, properly called gun-brigs, were built in such a manner as to carry four pieces of large calibre, 24 to 36-pounders, two at the head, two

at the stern, capable, consequently, of returning the fire of ships of the line and frigates. Five hundred gun-brigs, armed with four pieces, would therefore equal the fire of twenty 100-gun ships. They were rigged like brigs, that is to say, with two masts, worked by 24 seamen, and could carry a company of infantry of 100 men, with its staff, arms, and ammunition.

The brigs of the second kind, which, to distinguish them from the others, were called gunboats, were less heavily armed, less manageable, but destined to carry field-artillery as well as infantry. These gunboats were provided with one 24-pounder at the head, and at the stern with one field-piece left upon its carriage, with the tackle necessary for hoisting it in or out in a few minutes. They carried, moreover, an artillery waggon, full of ammunition, and placed upon deck so as not to interfere with the working of the vessel, and to be put on shore in the twinkling of an eye. They contained, lastly, in the very centre of their hold, a small stable, in which were to be lodged two artillery horses, with forage for several days. This stable, placed in the centre, open above, crowned by a movable cover, was combined with the mast in such a manner that a horse, grappled on shore by a yard, was rapidly lifted up, and lowered into his stall with the greatest ease. These gunboats, inferior in their arming to the brigs, but capable of throwing large balls, and discharging grape by means of the field-piece placed upon their deck, had the advantage of carrying, besides a portion of the infantry, the whole artillery of the army, with two horses to draw it into line at the very moment of landing. The surplus of the teams was to be put on board transports, the organisation of which will be seen presently. Less adapted than the gun-brigs for manœuvring and fighting, they were rigged like the large coasting smacks, and had three great sails attached to three masts, without top or topgallant masts. Their crew consisted of no more than six sailors. They were capable of holding, like the gun-brigs, a company of infantry, with its officers, besides two artillery-drivers and some artillerymen. Supposing that there were three or four hundred of these vessels, they could carry, besides a considerable mass of infantry, three or four hundred field-pieces, with a waggon containing ammunition sufficient for one battle. The rest of the ammunition and the rest of the teams were to follow in the transports.

Such were the flat-bottomed boats of the first and second kind. It had been deemed necessary to build some of a third sort, still lighter and more movable than the preceding, drawing two or three feet water, and calculated for landing anywhere. These were large narrow boats, 60 feet long, having a movable deck, which could be taken up at pleasure, and distinguished from the others by the name of pinnaces. These

large boats were provided with about sixty oars, carried a light sail to be used when needed, and went with extreme swiftness. When sixty soldiers, trained to handle the oar as well as the sailors, set them in motion, they glided over the sea like the light craft dropped from the sides of our great ships, and astonishing the eye by the rapidity of their course. These pinnaces could take from sixty to seventy soldiers, besides two or three seamen to steer them. They had on board a small howitzer, and likewise a four-pounder, and they were not to have any other lading than the arms of their passengers and some camp provisions, stowed as ballast.

After numerous experiments, these three sorts of vessels had been definitively fixed upon: they answered all the purposes of the passage, and when drawn up in order of battle presented a formidable line of fire. The gun-brigs, easier to work and more heavily armed, occupied the first line; the gunboats, inferior in both those respects, were ranged in the second line, facing the intervals between the brigs, so as to leave none of those spaces without fire. The pinnaces, which carried only small howitzers, and which were chiefly formidable on account of the musketry, placed sometimes in front of the line of battle, sometimes in rear or on the wings, could pull up rapidly to board, if engaged with a fleet, or throw their men on shore if the intention was to land, or sheer off if exposed to the fire of heavy artillery.

These three species of vessels were to be collected to the number of twelve or fifteen hundred. They were to carry at least 3000 pieces of cannon of large calibre, besides a great number of pieces of small dimension, that is to say, discharge as many projectiles as the strongest squadron. Their fire was dangerous, because it was horizontal, and directed so as to take effect between wind and water. When engaged with large ships, they presented a mark difficult to hit, and, on the contrary, fired at a mark which they could scarcely miss. They could move about, divide, and surround the enemy. But if they had the advantages of division, they had also its inconveniences. The order to be introduced into this moving and prodigiously numerous mass was an extremely difficult problem, in the solution of which Admiral Bruix and Napoleon were incessantly engaged for three years. We shall see by-and-by to what a degree of precision in the manœuvres they contrived to attain, and to what point the problem was resolved by them.

What effect would have been produced by a squadron of large ships, dashing in full sail through this mass of small craft, running down, upsetting all before them, sinking those struck by their balls, but surrounded in their turn by this swarm of enemies, receiving on all sides a dangerous fire of

artillery, assailed by the musketry of 100,000 infantry, and perhaps boarded by intrepid soldiers trained to the manœuvre? It is impossible to say; for one cannot form any idea of so strange a scene, without any known antecedent, capable of assisting the mind to foresee the different chances. Admiral Decrès, a man of superior intelligence, but disposed to find fault, admitted that, by sacrificing 100 vessels and 10,000 men, one might probably get over an encounter with an enemy's squadron, and cross the Strait. One loses them every day in battle, replied the First Consul, and what battle ever promised the results which a landing in England authorises us to hope for? But the most unfavourable chance was that of meeting with English cruisers. There were still left the chance of crossing in a calm which should paralyse the enemy, in a fog which should conceal our flotilla from view, and lastly, the still more propitious chance of a French squadron appearing all at once in the Strait for a few hours.

Be this as it may, the vessels were strong enough to defend themselves, to approach a coast and sweep it, to remove from the mind of an enemy all idea of an auxiliary squadron, to give confidence to the soldiers and seamen destined to man them. They had inconveniences, however, attached to the very form of their construction. Having, instead of a deep-sunk keel, a flat bottom, and drawing but little water, and being, moreover, heavily masted, they had the disadvantage of being crank, liable to heel over in a stiff breeze, and even to capsize if caught in a sudden squall. This did once happen in Brest Harbour to a gunboat lightly ballasted, in the presence of Admiral Ganteaume, who, in affright, wrote immediately to the First Consul. But such an accident never occurred again. With precautions in the stowage of the ammunition, which served them for ballast, the vessels of the flotilla acquired sufficient steadiness to stand rough weather; and no other accident befell them but that of grounding, which was natural when navigating along the coast, and in general voluntary on their part, in order to escape the English. For the rest, whenever they were obliged to run aground, they were sure to float again with the next flood-tide.

A still greater inconvenience belonging to them was that of drifting with the current. This was owing to their clumsy build, which afforded more hold to the water than their masts did to the wind. This inconvenience was aggravated when, having no wind, they plied the oars, and had nothing but the strength of the rowers for overcoming the strength of the current. In this case, they were liable to be carried far away from their goal, or, what was worse, to reach it separately, for, being of different forms, they could not but drift unequally. Nelson

experienced the same thing when, in 1801, he attacked the Boulogne flotilla. His four divisions, being unable to act all together, made but unconnected efforts. This sort of inconvenience, troublesome in any sea, was particularly felt in the Channel, where there are two strong contrary currents every tide. When the tide is rising or falling, it produces alternately an ascending or descending current, the direction of which is governed by the configuration of the coasts of France and England. The Channel is very open to the west, between Cape Finisterre and the extremity of Cornwall; very narrow to the east, between Calais and Dover. The sea, in rising, rushes in more forcibly by the wider passage, producing with the incoming tide a current ascending from west to east, from Brest to Calais. The same effect is produced in a contrary direction when the tide is falling; the water then runs off more rapidly at the wider outlet, and hence results, with the outgoing tide, a current from east to west, from Calais to Brest. This double current, receiving various inflexions near the coast, and from the very form of it, must produce a certain perturbation in the course of these two thousand vessels, a perturbation more or less to be apprehended according to the lightness of the wind and the strength of the current. This greatly diminished the advantage of crossing in a calm, which was one of the most desirable. Still, the channel between Boulogne and Dover, being not only very narrow but also of no great depth, would admit of casting anchor at an equal distance between the two coasts. The admirals, therefore, considered it as possible to lie-to in case the current should drift too much, and wait at anchor for the return of the contrary current, which could not occasion a loss of more time than three or four hours. This was a difficulty, but not an insurmountable one.*

This inconvenience soon caused a species of boats called *prames* to be abandoned. These, absolutely flat, without any curve in their sides, and having three keels, were real floating pontoons, destined to carry a great number of cannon and horses. It had been at first resolved to build fifty of them, which would have furnished the means of transport for 2500 horses and a force of 600 pieces of cannon. But the inferiority of their navigating qualities caused them to be soon given up, and not more than twelve or fifteen were built. We shall say nothing of clumsy barks, short and wide, armed with one 24-pounder at the stern, which were called *caïques*, nor of cutters,

* All that I am here stating is extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the admirals, particularly that of Admiral Bruix, with the minister of the marine and with Napoleon. Be it understood that I introduce no conjectures of my own, but give the substance as nearly as I can, and with historical precision, of all that is essential in that correspondence, which I think most justly characterised by the epithet, admirable.

having a light draught of water, carrying about ten heavy cannon, both of them built by way of experiment, and the plan of which, on trial, was relinquished. The whole of the flotilla was composed almost exclusively of the three species of vessels which I have described above, that is to say, gun-brigs, gun-boats, and pinnaces.

Every brig and gunboat was capable of holding a company of infantry, every pinnace two-thirds of a company. If 500 brigs, 400 boats, and 300 pinnaces, that is to say, 1200 vessels were collected, they would afford the means of embarking 120,000 men. Supposing the Brest squadron to carry 15,000 or 18,000, and that at the Texel 20,000, there would be 150,000 or 160,000 men, who might be thrown into England, 120,000 in a single mass on board the flotilla, 30,000 or 40,000 in separate divisions, on board two large squadrons, sailing the one from Holland, the other from Bretagne.

Here would be sufficient to conquer and reduce that proud nation, which pretended to sway the world from the recesses of its inviolable asylum.

But to convey the men was not the only point: they would want *matériel*, that is to say, provisions, arms, horses. The war flotilla, as it was called, could take on board the men, the ammunition indispensable for the first engagements, provisions for about twenty days, field-artillery, with two horses for each piece. They would want, besides, the rest of the draught-horses, at least seven or eight thousand cavalry horses, ammunition for a whole campaign, provisions for one or two months, a large park of artillery, in case there should be walls to batter down. The horses were particularly difficult to transport, and it would require at least six or seven hundred boats to carry only from seven to eight thousand.

For this latter purpose there was no occasion to build. Coasters and vessels employed in the deep sea fisheries would furnish a very considerable naval resource, and which was quite ready. On all the coasts from St. Malo to the Texel, and even in the interior of Holland, there could be bought vessels measuring from 20 to 60 tons, engaged in the coasting trade and in the cod and herring fisheries, perfectly sound, excellent sea-boats, and capable of taking in whatever it might be thought fit to put on board them, with suitable alterations. A commission formed for this object was buying up, from Brest to Amsterdam, vessels costing on an average from twelve to fifteen thousand francs apiece. Several hundred were already procured; the remainder it would not be difficult to find.

Reckoning the war flotilla at twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, the transport flotilla at 900 or 1000, there were 2200 or 2300 vessels to be collected—a prodigious naval assemblage,

unexampled in past times, and that will probably continue to be so in future ages.

The reader will now comprehend how impossible it would have been to build at one or two points of the coast that immense quantity of vessels. Small as were their dimensions, neither the materials, nor the workmen, nor the yards required for building them could ever have been procured at a single spot. It was therefore indispensable to make all the ports and all the basins of the rivers concur in the same object. It was quite enough to reserve for the ports in the Channel, where they were to be collected, the duty of providing for and keeping these 2500 vessels.

But after building them at a considerable distance from one another, it was requisite to collect them at a single point, from Boulogne to Dunkirk, in spite of the English cruisers, intent on destroying them before they had assembled. It was then requisite to take them into three or four ports, as nearly as possible under the same wind, at but little distance, in order to weigh and to start together. It was finally requisite to lodge them without encumbrance, without confusion, protected from danger by fire, within reach of the troops, so that they could frequently run out and in, and learn to take on board and land expeditiously men, guns, and horses.

All these difficulties could be resolved only at the places themselves by Napoleon, seeing things with his own eyes, and surrounded by the ablest and the most special officers. He had summoned to Boulogne, M. Sganzin, engineer of the navy, and one of the ablest men of that distinguished body; M. Forfait, minister of the marine for a few months, possessing little talent for administration, but superior skill in the art of shipbuilding, full of invention, and devoted to an enterprise, of which, under the Directory, he had been one of the most ardent promoters; lastly, Decrès, the minister, and Admiral Bruix, whom I have already mentioned, and who deserve more particular notice here.

The First Consul would have been glad to possess rather fewer good commanders in his land armies and rather more in his naval armies. But war and victory only form good commanders. Of war at sea we had had enough during the last twelve years; unfortunately, our navy, disorganised by the emigration, becoming at once inferior to that of the English, had almost always been obliged to shut itself up in the ports; and our admirals had lost, not bravery, but confidence. Some were very old, others wanted experience. Four attracted at the moment the whole attention of Napoleon—Decrès, Latouche Treville, Ganteaume, and Bruix. Admiral Decrès was a man of extraordinary intelligence, but a fault-finder, looking only at the unfavourable side

of things, an excellent critic of the operations of another, and on this account a good minister, but not an active administrator, very useful, nevertheless, at the elbow of Napoleon, who made up by his own activity for the want of it in everybody else, and who needed advisers less confident than he was himself. For these reasons, Admiral Decrès was the one of the four who was most serviceable at the head of the navy office, and who would have been least so at the head of a squadron. Ganteaume, a brave officer, intelligent, well-informed, could lead a naval division into action; but, out of the fire, hesitating, irresolute, letting fortune slip past without laying hold of it, he was fit to be employed only in the least difficult enterprises. Latouche Treville and Bruix were the two most distinguished seamen of the time, and called certainly, had they lived, to dispute with England the empire of the seas. Latouche Treville was all ardour, all daring: he united intelligence and experience with courage, infused into the seamen the sentiments which he was full of, and in this respect he was the most valuable of all, since he possessed that in which our navy was deficient, self-confidence. Lastly, Bruix, mean in person, and infirm in health, worn out by indulgence in pleasure, endowed with vast intelligence, with a genius of rare organisation, never at a loss for resources, possessing great experience, the only man who had commanded forty sail of the line at once, as clever at conceiving as executing, would have been the very man for minister of the marine had he not been so fit for commanding. These were not all our naval chiefs: there was Villeneuve, afterwards so unfortunate; Linois, the conqueror of Algesiras, in India at the time of which we are treating; and others, whom we shall see figuring in their place. But the four to whom we are adverting were the principal.

The First Consul resolved to assign to Admiral Bruix the command of the flotilla, because there, everything was to be created; to Ganteaume the Brest fleet, which had only a transportation of troops to execute; lastly, to Latouche Treville the Toulon fleet, charged with a difficult, daring, but decisive manœuvre, which we shall notice hereafter. Admiral Bruix, having to organise the flotilla, was incessantly in contact with Admiral Decrès. Both were too clever not to be rivals, consequently enemies; their nature, moreover, was incompatible. To declare difficulties invincible, to find fault with the attempts made to overcome them—that was the disposition of Admiral Decrès. To see them, to study them, to seek to triumph over them, was the way of Admiral Bruix. It must be added that they mistrusted each other: they were continually apprehensive, Admiral Decrès lest the First Consul should be made acquainted with the inconveniences of his inactivity, Admiral Bruix with

those of his dissolute life. Under a weak master, these two men would have disturbed the fleet by their dissensions: under a master such as the First Consul, they were useful from their very diversity. Bruix proposed combinations; Decrès criticised them; the First Consul decided with the certainty of infallible judgment.

It was amidst these men and on the spot that Napoleon decided all the questions left in suspense. His arrival at Boulogne was urgent; for notwithstanding the energy and the frequency of his orders, many things remained undone. No building was going forward at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, but there the old flotilla was under repair, and they were preparing to make the alterations judged necessary in the vessels built or purchased, when they should be collected. They were in want of workmen, timber, artillery of long range to keep off the English, who were in the habit of employing incendiary projectiles.

The presence of the First Consul, surrounded by Messrs. Sganzin, Forfait, Bruix, Decrès, and a great number of other officers, soon imparted new activity to his enterprise. He had employed in Paris an expedient, which he resolved to apply in Boulogne and all the places that he visited. He ordered five or six thousand men, belonging to all the trades engaged in working up wood or iron, such as cabinetmakers, carpenters, sawyers, cartwrights, blacksmiths, locksmiths, to be selected from among the conscripts. High pay was granted to those who showed intelligence and willingness, and in a short time the yards were covered with a population of workmen, whose original profession it would have been difficult to guess.

Forests abounded about Boulogne. An order had assigned all those of the environs to the marine. The wood, employed the same day that it was cut, was green, but fit for posts, thousands of which were wanted in the ports of the Channel. Boards and planks might also be obtained from it. As for the wood destined to supply knees, that was brought from the north. Naval stores, such as hemp, masts, copper, pitch, carried from Russia and Sweden to Holland, to be brought by the inland waters from Holland and Flanders to Boulogne, were at this moment detained by various obstacles in the canals of Belgium. Officers were despatched immediately with orders and funds to hasten their arrival. Lastly, the foundries of Douai, Liège, and Strasburg, notwithstanding their activity, were behindhand. The scientific Monge, who accompanied the First Consul almost everywhere, was commissioned to speed their operations and to order large mortars and pieces of great calibre to be cast at Liège. Aides-de-camp were sent off daily by post to stimulate his zeal, and to bring an account of the guns or carriages that were in arrear. In fact, besides the artillery of the vessels,

there were wanted from five to six hundred pieces in battery, in order to keep the enemy at a distance from the building yards.

These first orders given, it was necessary to direct attention to the great question of the ports of rendezvous, and of the means of proportioning their capacity to the extent of the flotilla. It was requisite to enlarge some, to create others, to defend all. After conferring with Messrs. Sganzin, Forfait, Decrès, and Bruix, the First Consul decided upon the following arrangements.

The port of Boulogne had for a great length of time been indicated as the best point of departure for an expedition directed against England. The coast of France, advancing towards that of England, throws out a cape called Cape Grisnez. To the right of this cape it runs eastward towards the Scheld, faced by the vast extent of the North Sea. On the left it runs towards that of England, thus forming one of the two borders of the Strait; then descends abruptly from north to south towards the mouth of the Somme. The ports on the right of Cape Grisnez, such as Calais and Dunkirk, placed outside the Strait, are less favourably situated for points of departure; the ports on the left, on the contrary, in the Strait itself, have always been reckoned preferable. In fact, if we set out from Dunkirk or Calais, we must double Cape Grisnez to enter the Strait, encounter the gusts of the Channel winds, always experienced in doubling the cape, and work to windward of Boulogne, in order to make the land between Dover and Folkestone. On the contrary, in going from England to France, one is naturally more inclined towards Calais than Boulogne. For passing over to England, as in the case of the projected expedition, Boulogne and the ports situated to the left of Cape Grisnez were better than Calais and Dunkirk. Only they had the inconvenience of affording less extent and depth than Calais and Dunkirk, a circumstance accounted for by the accumulation of sand and gravel, which is always greatest in a narrow space like a strait.

Nevertheless, the port of Boulogne, consisting of the bed of a small marshy river, the Liane, was capable of being considerably enlarged. The basin of the Liane, formed by two plateaux, which separate in the environs of Boulogne, and leave a space of semicircular figure between them, might with great labour be converted into a very extensive port, dry at low water. The bed of the Liane had a depth of from six to seven feet at high water, in ordinary tides. It was possible by excavating to give it from nine to ten. It was, therefore, practicable enough to create in the swampy bed of the Liane, nearly facing Boulogne, a basin similar in form to the ground, that is to say, semicircular, capable of containing some hundreds of vessels, more

or less, according to the radius that should be given to it. This basin and the excavated bed of the Liane might be made to hold twelve or thirteen hundred boats, consequently more than half the flotilla. It was not enough to have a sufficient surface; very extensive quays were required, that these numerous boats might, if not all at once, at least in very great number, get to the margin of the basin to take in their lading. The extent of the quays, therefore, was as important as the extent of the port itself. None of these things had been thought of under the Directory, because no plans had ever gone the length of projecting the assemblage of 150,000 men and 2000 vessels. The First Consul, in spite of the magnitude of the work, hesitated not to give orders immediately for excavating the basin of Boulogne and the bed of the Liane. Those same 150,000 men, who by their number constituted the difficulty of the enterprise, were now employed to conquer it, by digging themselves the basin from which they were to embark. It was decided that the camps, originally placed at some distance from the coast, should be immediately moved nearer to the sea, and that the soldiers should themselves take away the enormous mass of earth which would have to be got rid of.

A sluice was ordered for excavating the bed of the stream and procuring the requisite depth of water. Ports which are not, like that of Brest, formed by the sinuosities of a deep coast, and which we call *ports d'échouage*, consist in general of the mouths of small rivers; these, swollen at high water, form a basin in which the vessels float, then decrease with the ebb tide, till they look like large rivulets running through a bed of mud, leaving the vessels aground upon their banks. The sand carried down by these rivers, stopped and swept back by the sea off their mouths, forms banks or bars, which are impediments to navigation. To remove this obstacle, sluices are constructed in the bed of the rivers, which open to the ascending tide, admit the abundance of water, and retain it by closing against the descending tide, and do not allow it to escape till the moment for clearing arrives. That moment, for which low water is generally chosen, being come, the sluice is opened: the water rushes into the river, and, driving the sand by this artificial torrent, clears a channel or passage. This is what engineers call *écluses de chasse*; and no time was lost in constructing such a sluice in the upper basin of the Liane.

Twenty thousand feet of timber, felled in the forests of Boulogne, served to line both banks of the Liane and the circumference of the semicircular basin with posts. Part of the trees sawed into thick planks, then laid like a floor upon the posts, formed spacious quays along the Liane and the semicircular basin. The numerous vessels of the flotilla could thus

lie alongside these quays, to embark or disembark the men, the horses, and the *matériel*.

The town of Boulogne was situated on the right of the Liane, the basin on the left, and nearly opposite. The Liane ran longitudinally between both. Bridges were built to facilitate the communication between one bank and the other, and placed above the point where the anchorage commenced.

These vast works were far from being sufficient. A great maritime establishment presupposes workshops, building yards, magazines, barracks, bakehouses, hospitals, in short, everything necessary for the preservation of large stores of various kinds, for the reception of seamen healthy or sick, for feeding, clothing, arming them. Only conceive what time and efforts such establishments as those of Brest and Toulon have cost! The point here was to create establishments of a different sort, magazines, hospitals, adequate to the wants of 30,000 seamen, 10,000 workmen, and 120,000 soldiers. Had even those creations not been destined to be but temporary, they would have been absolutely impossible. Still, though temporary, the difficulty of producing them, owing to the quantity of things to be brought together on one spot, was immense.

All the houses in Boulogne that could be converted into offices, warehouses, or hospitals were hired. The villas and farmhouses in the environs fit for the same purposes were likewise engaged. Cots were built for the shipwrights, and boarded sheds for the horses. As for the troops, they were obliged to encamp in the open field, in huts constructed with the timber of the neighbouring forests. The First Consul chose the spot which the troops were to occupy, on the right and on the left of the Liane, on the two plateaux, the separation of which formed the basin of Boulogne. Thirty-six thousand men were divided between two camps: one called the left, the other the right. The troops assembled at St. Omer, under the command of General Soult, came to occupy these two positions. The other corps were successively to remove nearer to the coast, when proper quarters had been prepared for them. The troops would there be in a fine air, exposed, it is true, to violent and cold winds, but provided with great abundance of wood for forming huts and for fuel.

Immense supplies of provisions were ordered from all quarters, and brought to these magazines so suddenly created. By inland navigation, which is carried to high perfection, as everybody knows, in the north of France, were brought flour to be converted into biscuit, rice, oats, salt provisions, wine, and spirits. From Holland were obtained great quantities of round Edam cheeses. These various alimentary matters were to serve for the daily consumption of the camps, and to supply the

cargo of provisions which the war and transport flotillas were to carry. The reader may easily figure to himself the quantities necessary to be collected if he considers that the army, the fleet, the numerous population of workmen drawn to the spot, were to be fed during the encampment, and then for two months of the expedition; which presupposes provisions for nearly 200,000 mouths, and forage for 20,000 horses. When we add that the allowances were on so liberal a scale as left nothing to be desired, the reader must be convinced that never was a more extraordinary creation executed by any nation, or by the chief of any empire.

But a single port was not sufficient for the whole expedition. Boulogne could not contain more than twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, and there were about 2300 to provide for. This port would have held the requisite number, but it would have taken too much time to make them all leave it by one and the same channel. In stormy or unsettled weather, it was a great inconvenience not to have a single place of refuge. If, for instance, a great number of vessels put to sea, and bad weather or the enemy obliged them to return suddenly, they might choke up the entrance, lose the tide, and be doomed to perdition. About four leagues to the south there was a small river, the Canche, the mouth of which formed a winding bay, much choked with sand, unluckily open to all winds, and affording a much less secure anchorage than that of Boulogne. A little fishing port, that of Etaples, had been formed there. On this same river Canche, about a league inland, was the fortified town of Montreuil. It would be difficult to excavate a basin there, but one might drive a series of piles, for the purpose of mooring the vessels, and construct on these piles wooden quays suitable for embarking and disembarking troops. It was a tolerably safe shelter for three or four hundred vessels. They could leave it with nearly the same winds as at Boulogne. The distance of Boulogne, which was from four to five leagues, was certainly productive of some difficulty in regard to simultaneousness of operations; but this was a secondary difficulty; and a harbour for 400 vessels was too important to be neglected. The First Consul formed a camp there, destined for the troops collected between Compiègne and Amiens, and reserved the command of it for General Ney, who had returned from his mission in Switzerland. This camp was called the camp of Montreuil. The troops were ordered to construct cots for themselves, like those who were encamped around Boulogne. Establishments were prepared for the reception of the provisions, for the hospitals, in short, for all the wants of an army of 24,000 men. The centre of the army was supposed to be at Boulogne; the camp of Montreuil was the left.

A little to the north of Boulogne, before you reach Cape Grisnez, there are two other bays, formed by two small rivers, the beds of which were much encumbered with mud and sand, but in which the water at flood-tide rose to six or seven feet. One was a league, the other two leagues, from Boulogne; they were, moreover, under the same wind. By excavating the ground, by constructing sluices, it would be possible to shelter several hundred vessels there; which would complete the means of lodging the entire flotilla. The nearest of these two little rivers was the Vimereux, discharging itself at a village of the same name. The other was the Selacque, emptying itself near the fishing village of Ambleteuse. In the time of Louis XVI., basins had been dug there; but the works executed at that period had been completely buried by mud and sand. The First Consul ordered the engineers to examine the localities, and, in case of their report being favourable to his views, troops were to be employed there, and encamped in cots, as at Etaples and Boulogne. These two ports were to hold, the one 200, the other 300 vessels: these made 500 more, which would be under shelter. The guard, the collective grenadiers, the reserves of the cavalry and artillery, and the different corps forming between Lille, Douai, and Arras, were there to find their means of embarking.

There was still left the Batavian flotilla, destined to convey the corps of General Davout, and which, according to the treaty concluded with Holland, was independent of the squadron of the line lying in the Texel. Unluckily, the Batavian flotilla was less effectively armed than the French flotilla. It was a question whether it should start from the Scheld for the coast of England, under the escort of a few frigates, or whether it should be taken to Dunkirk and Calais, and ordered to set out from the ports situated to the right of Cape Grisnez. Admiral Bruix was desired to solve that question. The corps of General Davout, which formed the right of the army, would thus be brought near the centre. One did not even despair that, by dint of enlarging the basins and contracting the camps, it might be transferred to the other side of Cape Grisnez, and established at Ambleteuse and Vimereux. Then the united French and Batavian flotillas, to the number of 2300 vessels, carrying the corps of Generals Davout, Soult, Ney, besides the reserve, that is to say, 120,000 men, might start simultaneously with the same wind from the four ports situated within the Strait, with the certainty of acting together. The two great war fleets, weighing at the same time, the one from Brest, the other from the Texel, were to carry the remaining 40,000 men, whose co-operation and destination were to be the exclusive secret of the First Consul.

To complete all the parts of this vast organisation, it was requisite to place the coast in security from the attacks of the English. Besides the zeal with which they would no doubt strive to prevent the concentration of the flotilla at Boulogne, by watching the coast from Bordeaux to Flushing, it was to be presumed that, in imitation of what they had done in 1801, they would endeavour to destroy it, either by setting it on fire in the basins, or by attacking it at the anchorage when it was going out to manœuvre. It was, therefore, necessary to render the approach of the English impossible, as well for the safety of the ports themselves as to ensure free egress and regress; for if the flotilla were doomed to continue motionless, it would be incapable of manœuvring and of executing any great operation.

This approach of the English it was not easy to prevent, owing to the form of the coast, which was straight without any re-entering or salient point, and consequently furnished no means of reaching to a distance. This deficiency, however, was remedied in the most ingenious manner. Off Boulogne, two points of rock ran out into the sea, the one on the right called *Pointe de la Crèche*, the other on the left called *Pointe de l'Heurt*. Between the two there was a space of 2500 fathoms, perfectly safe and very convenient for anchorage. From two to three hundred vessels might here lie at their ease in several lines. These points of rock, covered by the sea at high water, were dry at low water. The First Consul ordered two forts to be erected on them, of substantial masonry, of semicircular form, solidly casemated, presenting two tiers of guns, and capable of covering the anchorage extending from the one to the other with their fire. He ordered the works to be commenced immediately. The engineers of the navy and army, seconded by the masons taken out of the conscription, fell to work forthwith. The First Consul insisted that these forts must be finished by the beginning of winter. But such was his care to multiply precautions, that he resolved to defend the middle of the mooring line by a third *point d'appui*. This *point d'appui*, chosen in the middle of that line, was facing the entrance of the harbour; and as the ground there was a loose sand, the First Consul resolved to build this new fort of solid timber. Numerous hands immediately fell to work to drive at low water hundreds of piles, to serve as a foundation for a battery of eighteen 24-pounders. In general, they had to drive them under the fire of the English.

Independently of these three points, projecting into the sea, lying parallel to the coast of Boulogne, the First Consul had cannon planted on every slightly salient part of the cliff; and he left not a spot capable of receiving artillery unarmed with cannon of the largest calibre. Precautions of less magnitude,

but yet sufficient, were taken in regard to Etaples and the new ports which he was engaged in excavating.

Such were the vast plans definitively adopted by the First Consul, after surveying the places, with the concurrence of the engineers and officers of the navy. The building of the flotilla was proceeding rapidly, from the coasts of Bretagne to those of Holland; but, before it should be collected at Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples, it was requisite to have completed the excavation of the basins and the erection of the forts, brought the artillery *matériel* to the coast, concentrated the troops near the sea, and prepared the establishments necessary for their wants. He reckoned upon the completion of all these works by the winter.

On leaving Boulogne, the First Consul visited Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp. He was particularly desirous to see the latter port, and to ascertain with his own eyes whether there was any truth in the very different reports that had been addressed to him. After examining the site of the city with that rapid glance and unerring eye which belonged to none but him, he had no doubt of the possibility of making Antwerp a great naval arsenal. Antwerp possessed, in his estimation, quite peculiar advantages. It was seated on the Scheld, opposite to the Thames; it was in immediate communication with Holland, by the finest of inland navigations, and consequently within reach of the richest dépôt of naval materials. By the Rhine and the Meuse it could receive without difficulty the timber of the Alps, the Vosges, the Black Forest, Wetteravia, and the Ardennes. Lastly, Flemish workmen, naturally attracted by the proximity, would come hither to offer thousands of hands for shipbuilding. The First Consul, therefore, resolved to create at Antwerp a fleet whose flag should constantly float between the Scheld and the Thames. This would be one of the severest mortifications that he could inflict on his henceforth irreconcilable foes, the English. He ordered the ground necessary for the construction of vast basins, which still exist, and which are the pride of the city of Antwerp, to be immediately secured. These basins, communicating with the Scheld by a sluice of the largest dimensions, were to be capable of containing a whole fleet of ships of war, and to be continually provided with thirty feet water, whatever might be the height of the river. In this new port of the Republic the First Consul resolved to build 25 ships, and until new experiments relative to the navigability of the Scheld should be made, he ordered several seventy-fours to be put on the stocks, without renouncing the intention of building ships of a larger rate at a future time. He hoped to make Antwerp an establishment equal to Brest and Toulon, but infinitely better situated for disturbing the slumbers of England.

He proceeded from Antwerp to Ghent, from Ghent to Brussels. These Belgian populations, discontented under their former government, showed but little docility under the French administration. The fervour of their religious sentiments rendered the administration of the department of religion more difficult than anywhere else. There the First Consul at first met with some coolness, or, to speak more correctly, a less expansive cordiality than in the old French provinces. But this coldness soon disappeared when the young general was seen, surrounded by the clergy, respectfully attending the religious ceremonies, accompanied by his wife, who, notwithstanding her fondness for dissipation, had in her heart the piety of a woman, and of a woman of the old court. M. de Roquelaure was Archbishop of Malines: he was an old man full of suavity. The First Consul treated him with infinite respect, and even restored to his family considerable property still under the sequestration of the State, showed himself frequently to the people in company with this metropolitan of Belgium, and succeeded in allaying by his demeanour the religious mistrust of the country. Cardinal Caprara was waiting for him at Brussels. Their meeting produced the best effect. The stay of the First Consul in that city was prolonged. The ministers and Cambacérès, the Consul, repaired thither to hold consultation. Part of the members of the diplomatic body likewise went to Brussels to obtain audiences of the ruler of France. Surrounded thus by ministers, generals, numerous and brilliant troops, General Bonaparte held in that capital of the Netherlands a court which had all the appearances of sovereignty. One would have supposed that it was an Emperor of Germany come to visit the patrimony of Charles V. Time had flown faster than the First Consul had conceived. Numerous matters recalled him to Paris; there were orders to give for the execution of what he had resolved upon at Boulogne; there were also negotiations with Europe, which this state of crisis rendered more active than ever. He gave up, therefore, for the moment, the idea of visiting the provinces of the Rhine, and deferred that part of his tour till his next journey, which was to take place soon. But before he left Brussels he received a visit which was much remarked, as it deserved to be, on account of the personage who had come to see him.

This personage was M. Lombard, private secretary of the King of Prussia. Young Frederick William, in his distrust of himself and others, was accustomed to detain the work of his ministers, and to subject it to a fresh examination, which he made jointly with his secretary, M. Lombard, a man possessing intelligence and talent. Owing to this royal intimacy, M. Lombard had acquired very high importance in Prussia. M.

Haugwitz, skilful in seizing all influences, had contrived to acquire an ascendancy over M. Lombard, so that the king, in passing from the hands of the minister into those of the private secretary, was still under the guidance of the same inspirations, namely, those of M. Haugwitz. M. Lombard, coming to Brussels, represented, therefore, with the First Consul, both the king and the prime minister, that is to say, the whole Prussian government, excepting the court, ranged exclusively around the queen, and animated by a different spirit from that of the government.

The visit of M. Lombard to Brussels was a consequence of the agitation of the cabinets since the renewal of the war between France and England. The court of Prussia was in especial anxiety, increased by the recent communications of the Russian cabinet. This cabinet, as we have seen, diverted from its internal affairs by the affairs of Europe, would fain have compensated itself by playing an important part. It had at the very first endeavoured to induce the two belligerent parties to accept its mediation, and to recommend protégés to France. The result of these first steps was not of a nature to satisfy it. England had received its overtures very coldly; she had plumply refused to consign Malta to its keeping, and to suspend hostilities while the mediation was going on. Only, she had declared that she would not reject the interposition of the Russian cabinet if the new negotiation were to embrace the whole of the affairs of Europe, and consequently to take cognisance of all that the treaties of Luneville and Amiens had resolved. To accept the mediation on such a condition was to reject it. While England was answering in this manner, France, on her part, acceding with entire deference to the intervention of the young emperor, had nevertheless occupied without hesitation the countries recommended by Russia, Hanover, and Naples. The court of Petersburg was extremely mortified to find that it was so little heeded, when it pressed England to accept its mediation, and France to limit the field of hostilities. It had, therefore, cast its eyes on Prussia, for the purpose of prevailing upon her to form a third party, which should give law to the English and the French, but to the French in particular, who were far more alarming, though more polite, than the English. The Emperor Alexander, who had met the King of Prussia at Memel, who at that meeting had vowed everlasting friendship to him, who had discovered all sorts of analogies with the young monarch, analogies of age, of disposition, of virtues, sought to persuade him in a frequent correspondence that they were made for each other; that they were the only honest men in Europe; that in Vienna there was nothing but falsehood, in Paris nothing but ambition, in

London nothing but avarice; and that they ought to unite themselves closely in order to curb and govern Europe. The young emperor, showing a precocious shrewdness, had, in particular, sought to persuade the King of Prussia that he was the dupe of the caresses of the First Consul, and that for minor interests he made dangerous sacrifices of policy; that owing to his condescension Hanover was seized; that the French would not limit their occupations to this; that the reason which induced them to close the continent against the English would carry them farther than Hanover, and conduct them to Denmark, in order to possess themselves of the Sound; that then the English would blockade the Baltic as they blockaded the Elbe and the Weser, and close the last outlet left to the commerce of the continent. This apprehension expressed by Russia could not be sincere; for the First Consul had no idea of pushing his occupations as far as Denmark, and it was not possible that he should have. He had occupied Hanover as being English property, Tarento by virtue of the uncontested domination of France over Italy. But to invade Denmark, first passing over the body of Germany, was impossible, unless one began with conquering Prussia herself. And, fortunately, the policy of France at that time had not acquired such an extension.

The suggestions of Russia were, therefore, deceitful, but they excited uneasiness in the King of Prussia, who was already disturbed by the occupation of Hanover. This occupation had brought upon him not only the complaints of the German States, but severe commercial sufferings. The Elbe and the Weser being closed by the English, the exportation of Prussian produce had suddenly ceased. The linens of Silesia, usually bought by Hamburg and Bremen, the extensive commerce of which they fed, had become unmarketable the very day that the blockade commenced. The great merchants of Hamburg, in particular, had, out of a sort of spite, declined every kind of business, in order to stimulate the court of Prussia still more, to make it feel more keenly the inconvenience of the occupation of Hanover, the sole cause of the closing of the Elbe and the Weser. The Prussian grandees were now suffering immense losses. M. Haugwitz, in particular, had lost half his revenues; but this had not at all ruffled that composure which constituted one of the merits of his political genius. The king, beset by the complaints of Silesia, had been obliged to lend that province a million crowns (four millions of francs), a very great sacrifice for an economical prince, who was anxious to re-establish the hoard of the great Frederick. He was applied to at the time for double that sum.

Agitated by the Russian suggestions and by the complaints of Prussian commerce, King Frederick William was also appre-

hensive lest, if he suffered himself to be influenced by these suggestions and these complaints, he should be led into connections hostile to France; this would have deranged his whole policy, which for some years had been based on the French alliance. It was to extricate himself from this painful state of anxiety that he had sent M. Lombard to Brussels. He was instructed to observe the young general closely, to endeavour to penetrate his intentions, to ascertain if he designed, as it was alleged at Petersburg, to extend his occupations to Denmark; if, lastly, it was so dangerous, as it was further said at Petersburg, to trust to this extraordinary man. M. Lombard was to strive at the same time to obtain some concessions relative to Hanover. King Frederick William would have wished the corps occupying that kingdom to be reduced to a few thousand men, which would silence the apprehensions, sincere or affected, occasioned by the presence of the French in Germany. He would have wished, moreover, for the evacuation of a little port situated at the mouth of the Elbe, that of Cuxhaven. This little port, at the very entrance of the Elbe, was the nominal property of the Hamburgers, but in reality was used by the English for continuing their commerce. If it had been left unoccupied, as being Hamburg territory, the English commerce would have been carried on there as in time of profound peace. Of course, the object proposed by France would not have been attained; and this was so true that, in 1800, when Prussia had taken Hanover, she had occupied Cuxhaven.

In return for these two concessions, the King of Prussia offered a system of northern neutrality, copied from the ancient Prussian neutrality, which should comprehend, besides Prussia and the north of Germany, some new German States, perhaps even Russia; at least so King Frederick William flattered himself. This would be, according to that monarch, guaranteeing to France the harmlessness of the continent, thus leaving her the free employment of her means against England, and consequently deserving some sacrifices on her part. Such were the different points consigned to the prudence of M. Lombard.

This secretary of the king set out for Brussels, warmly recommended by M. Haugwitz and M. de Talleyrand. He was deeply sensible of the honour of approaching and conversing with the First Consul. The latter, apprised of the dispositions in which M. Lombard came, gave him the most brilliant reception, and took the best method of gaining access to his mind, which was to flatter him by unbounded confidence, and by revealing all his thoughts, even the most secret. For the rest, he could exhibit himself at that moment free from all disguise, without disadvantage, and he did so with a frankness and an exuberance

of language that were overpowering. He had no wish, he said to M. Lombard, to acquire a single territory more on the continent; he wanted nothing more than the powers had secured to France by treaties, patent or secret: the Rhine, the Alps, Piedmont, Parma, and the maintenance of the present relations with the Italian Republic and Etruria. He was ready to recognise the independence of Switzerland and Holland. He was firmly resolved not to interfere any more in the affairs of Germany, after the Recess of 1803. He was intent on one thing only—that was to curb the maritime despotism of the English, insupportable assuredly to others as well as himself, since Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark had united twice in twenty years, in 1780 and 1800, to put an end to it. It was for Prussia to assist him in this task, for Prussia, who was the natural ally of France, who had received for some years a multitude of services from her, and who had still such important services to expect. If, in fact, he were victorious, but signally victorious, what might he not have it in his power to do for her? Had he not in his hands Hanover, that so natural, so necessary complement to the Prussian territory? And was not that an immense and certain return for the friendship which King Frederick William should show him on this occasion? But to render him victorious and grateful, he must be seconded in an efficacious manner: an ambiguous good-will, a neutrality more or less extended, were trifling succours. It was requisite to assist him to close completely the coasts of Germany, to endure some momentary sufferings, and to connect himself with France by an open and positive union. What was called since 1795 the Prussian neutrality was not sufficient to ensure the peace of the continent. To render that peace certain, there must be a formal, public alliance, offensive and defensive, between Prussia and France. Then none of the continental powers would dare to form any plans. England would be manifestly alone, reduced to a struggle hand to hand with the army of Boulogne, and, if to the prospect of this struggle were added the closing of the markets of Europe, she would either be obliged to compromise, or crushed by the formidable expedition preparing on the coast of the Channel. But for this, said the First Consul repeatedly, were required the effective alliance of Prussia, and a serious and entire concurrence on her part in the projects of France. Then he should succeed; then he should have it in his power to heap benefits on his ally, to make her a present which she did not ask for, but for which in her heart she ardently longed, that of Hanover.

The First Consul, by the sincerity and warmth of his explanations, and the dazzling brilliancy of his mind, had not duped M. Lombard, as a hostile faction in Berlin soon asserted, but

fascinated and convinced him. In the end, he had persuaded him that he contemplated nothing against Germany, that all he wanted was to procure himself means of action against England, and that a magnificent aggrandisement would be the price of a frank and sincere concurrence on the part of Prussia. As for the concessions desired by M. Lombard, the First Consul made him sensible of the serious inconveniences attending them; for, to leave British commerce to act freely while he was engaged in a war, which, till the quite uncertain day of the descent, would be of no consequence to England, would be abandoning to her all the advantages of the contest. The First Consul even went so far as to declare that he was ready to indemnify the suffering commerce of Silesia at the expense of the French treasury. Still, in case Prussia consented to an alliance offensive and defensive, he was disposed, in such an interest, to make some of the concessions desired by King Frederick William.

M. Lombard, convinced, dazzled, enchanted by the familiarities of the great man, whose slightest attentions even princes appreciated with pride, set out for Berlin, disposed to communicate to his master and to M. Haugwitz all the sentiments with which his soul was filled.

The First Consul, after keeping a brilliant court at Brussels, having nothing further to detain him in Flanders, while the works ordered on the coast were not more advanced, set out on his return to Paris, where he had everything to do in the twofold departments of administration and diplomacy. He passed through Liège, Namur, and Sedan, was everywhere received with transport, and arrived in the beginning of August at St. Cloud.

While continuing to issue orders from Paris for the preparations for his great expedition, he was anxious to clear up and to fix definitively his relations with the great powers of the continent. In the uneasiness of Prussia he had clearly discerned Russian influence; he discerned that influence elsewhere, that is to say, in the ill-will shown him at Madrid. The Spanish cabinet refused, in fact, to explain itself respecting the execution of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and alleged that, as the Russian mediation yet afforded hope of a pacific termination, it was necessary to await the result of that mediation before taking a decided part. Other circumstances had disagreeably affected the First Consul: I allude to the evident partiality of Russia in the attempt at mediation which she had lately made. While the First Consul had accepted that mediation with entire deference, and England, on the contrary, had thrown difficulties of all sorts in its way, sometimes refusing to trust Malta to the hands of the mediating power, sometimes entering into endless arguments on the extent of the negotiation, Russian diplomacy

leaned rather to England than to France, and seemed to appreciate neither the deference of the one nor the ill-will of the other. The proposals recently forwarded from Petersburg revealed that disposition in the clearest manner. Russia declared that, in her opinion, England ought to give up Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; but that, in return, it would be right to grant to her the island of Lampedosa; that France ought, moreover, to give an indemnity to the King of Sardinia; to recognise and respect the independence of the States situated in her vicinity; to evacuate for good not only Tarento and Hanover, but the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian Republic, Switzerland, and Holland.

These conditions, acceptable in some respects, were wholly unacceptable on all the rest. To concede Lampedosa in compensation for Malta was giving the English the means of making with money, which they never were in want of, a second Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. The First Consul had well-nigh assented to it in order to preserve peace. Now, involved in war, full of hopes of success, he was no longer willing to make such a sacrifice. To indemnify the King of Piedmont was not a difficulty for him; he was disposed to devote Parma or an equivalent to this purpose. To evacuate Tarento and Hanover, on the re-establishment of peace, would be a natural consequence of peace itself. But to evacuate the Italian Republic, which had no army, Switzerland, Holland, which were threatened with an immediate counter-revolution if the French troops were withdrawn, was desiring that States, which France had acquired the right to dispose of by ten years' wars and victories, should be given up to her enemies. The First Consul could not consent to such conditions. What decided him still more powerfully not to suffer that mediation to continue was the form in which it was offered. The First Consul had assented to an arbitration, supreme, absolute, and without appeal, of the young emperor himself, for it was interesting the honour of that monarch to be just, and obtaining a certainty of a speedy conclusion. But to refer the matter to the partiality of Russian agents, all of them devoted to England, was subscribing to a disadvantageous and endless negotiation.

He declared, therefore, after discussing the proposals of Russia, after showing the injustice and the danger of some, that he was still ready to accept the personal arbitration of the Czar himself, but not a negotiation conducted by his cabinet in a manner not at all friendly to France, and so complicated that one could not hope to see the end of it; that he thanked the cabinet of St. Petersburg for its good offices, but declined to avail himself of them any further, leaving to war the task of restoring peace. The declaration of the First Consul concluded with these words,

deeply impressed with his character: "The First Consul has done everything to preserve peace; his efforts have been vain; he could not help seeing that war was the decree of Fate. He will make war, and he will not flinch before a proud nation, capable, for these twenty years, of making all the powers flinch from it." (August 29, 1803.)

M. de Markoff was coolly treated, and so he deserved to be, for his language and his attitude in Paris. The invariable approver of England, of her pretensions, of her conduct, he was the avowed detractor of France and of her government. When he was told that in this way he did not conform to the intentions, apparent, at least, of his master, who professed a strict impartiality between France and England, he replied that *the emperor had his opinion, but the Russians had theirs*. It was to be feared that he would draw upon himself some storm like that which Lord Whitworth had experienced, and even still more disagreeable, because the First Consul had not the consideration for M. de Markoff which he professed for Lord Whitworth.

The thread of this false mediation once cut, still without breaking with Russia, the First Consul resolved to oblige Spain to explain herself, and to say how she intended to execute the treaty of St. Ildefonso. The question was whether she would take part in the war, or whether she would remain neuter; paying France a subsidy, instead of furnishing succours in men and ships. Till this question was settled, the First Consul could not turn his whole attention to his expedition.

Spain felt extreme repugnance to come to a decision; and this feeling had produced sentiments most unfavourable to France. It was certainly onerous to have to follow a neighbouring power in all the vicissitudes of its policy; but in entering, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, into the engagements of an offensive and defensive alliance with France, Spain had contracted a positive obligation, the consequences of which it was impossible to contest. Independently of this obligation, that power must have unworthily degenerated to wish to keep aloof when the question of maritime supremacy was about to be discussed for the last time. If England proved victorious, it was evident that Spain had no longer either commerce, or colonies, or galleons, or, in short, anything that for three centuries constituted her greatness and her wealth. When the First Consul pressed her to act, he pressed her not only to fulfil a formal engagement, but to fulfil the most sacred duties towards herself. Bearing in mind her present imbecility, he left her neuter, and in thus allowing her to receive the piastres of Mexico, he asked her to devote part of them to a war waged for the common benefit, to pay, in short, in money when she could

not pay in blood, the debt incurred on account of the liberty of the seas.

Our relations with Spain, impaired, as we have seen, on occasion of Portugal, somewhat improved since, owing to the vacancy of the duchy of Parma, were again so changed as to have become absolutely hostile. They were complaining every day at Madrid of having ceded Louisiana for the royalty of Etruria, which was called nominal, because French troops guarded Etruria, incapable of guarding itself. It was said that, if France wanted to alienate that valuable colony, it was to the King of Spain that she ought to have addressed herself, not to the Americans, who would become dangerous neighbours for Mexico; that if France had restored that colony to Charles IV., he would have undertaken to save it from the hands of the Americans and of the English. It was ridiculous, in fact, for people who were about to lose Mexico, Peru, and all South America to pretend to be able to keep Louisiana, which was not Spanish either in manners, mind, or language. In Madrid, this alienation of Louisiana was made so serious a grievance, and one of such importance against France, that the government held itself released from all obligation towards her. The real motive of this humour was the refusal of the First Consul to add the duchy of Parma to the kingdom of Etruria; a compulsory refusal at the moment, for he was obliged to keep some territories to indemnify the King of Piedmont, since an indemnity was so urgently demanded for that prince; and, besides, the Floridas, after the cession of Louisiana, were not an acceptable object of exchange. In its conduct towards France, the cabinet of Madrid did not confine itself to the attitude of ill-humour; it had gone to much greater lengths. Our commerce was unworthily treated. Vessels had been seized upon pretext of smuggling, and their crews sent to the presidios in Africa. All the remonstrances of persons of our nation were unheeded, and the ambassador was no longer answered upon any subject. To crown this ill-usage, French vessels had been suffered to be taken in the roads of Algeiras and Cadiz, under the very fire of the Spanish guns: this, putting all alliance out of the question, constituted a violation of territory, which it was disgraceful to put up with. The squadron which had taken refuge in Corunna was, on a false allegation of quarantine, kept outside the harbour, in which it might have found itself safe. The crews were suffered to die on board for want of the most indispensable resources, and for want, in particular, of the salubrious air on shore. This squadron, blockaded by an English fleet, could not put to sea again without rest, without a considerable refit, and without a supply of provisions and ammunition. All this was refused it even for money. Lastly, out of a bravado, which crowned all these proceedings,

while the Spanish navy was left in a state of pitiable decay, extraordinary attention was paid to the army, and the militia was organised, as if to prepare for a national war against France.

What could thus drive into the abyss the stupid favourite whose sway debased the noble blood of Louis XIV. and reduced a brave nation to the most disgraceful impotence? Want of sequence of ideas, wounded vanity, indolence, incapacity, such were the miserable movers of that usurper of Spanish royalty. He had formerly leant to France; this was quite sufficient for his inconstancy now to incline to England. The First Consul could not dissemble his contempt, while the English and the Russian agents, on the contrary, overwhelmed him with flatteries; then, and above all, France required of him courage, activity, a good administration of the Spanish affairs; this was more than enough to make him detest so troublesome an ally. All this will end, said the First Consul, in "*a clap of thunder*." Thus did sinister flashes announce the lightning hidden in the bosom of that thick cloud, which began to gather over the ancient throne of Spain.

The sixth of the camps formed on the shores of the Ocean was at Bayonne. The preparations were accelerated and augmented so as to compose a real army. Another force was collecting towards the eastern Pyrenees. Augereau was appointed commander-in-chief of these different corps of troops. The ambassador of France was ordered to demand of the court of Spain the redress of all the grievances which it had to complain of, the release of the French who were confined, with an indemnity for the losses which they had sustained; the punishment of the commandants of the forts of Algesiras and Cadiz, which had suffered French ships to be taken within reach of their guns; the restitution of the captured vessels; admission for the squadron which had taken refuge at Corunna into the docks of Ferrol; its immediate refit and revictualling, to be charged to the account of France; the disbanding of all the militia; and lastly, at the option of Spain, either the stipulation of a subsidy, or the equipment of the fifteen ships and the 24,000 men promised by the treaty of St. Ildefonso. General Beurnonville was to communicate these express requisitions to the Prince of the Peace, and to say that, if the court of Madrid persisted in its silly and culpable conduct, it was on him that the indignation of the French government would fall; that, on entering the country, it would denounce to the king and the people of Spain the degrading yoke under which they were held, and from which they came to deliver them. If this declaration made to the Prince of the Peace had no effect, General Beurnonville was to apply for an audience of the king and queen, to repeat to them what he had said to the prince,

and if he did not obtain justice, to retire from court, and wait for further instructions from Paris.

General Beurnonville, impatient to put an end to intolerable insults, lost no time in calling upon the Prince of the Peace to tell him the harsh truths which he was instructed to communicate to him; and to leave no doubt of the seriousness of these threats, he placed before him several passages of the despatches of the First Consul. The Prince of the Peace turned pale, dropped a few tears, was alternately mean and arrogant, and concluded with declaring that M. d'Azara had instructions to adjust matters in Paris with M. de Talleyrand; that for the rest, this affair did not concern him, the Prince of the Peace; that in listening to the ambassador of France he was overstepping his part, for he was generalissimo of all the Spanish armies, and had no other function in the State; and that, if the ambassador had any declaration to make, it was to the minister for foreign affairs, and not to him, that it ought to be addressed. He even refused a note which General Beurnonville was to deliver at the conclusion of this conference. "Monsieur le prince," said the general in this dilemma, "there are fifty persons in your antechamber. I will call them to witness your refusal to receive a note of importance to the service of your king, and to attest that, if I am not able to do my duty, the fault rests with you alone, not with me." The prince, intimidated, received the note, and General Beurnonville withdrew.

Making a point of executing his instructions in their fullest extent, the ambassador desired to see the king and queen, found them surprised, dismayed, seeming not to comprehend what was passing, and repeating that the Chevalier d'Azara had received instructions to arrange everything with the First Consul. Our ambassador left the court, broke off all communication with the Spanish ministers, and hastened to inform his government of what he had done, and the trifling result which he had obtained.

M. d'Azara had, in fact, received a communication most singular, most indecorous, and most disagreeable to him. That clever and discreet Spaniard was a sincere partisan of the alliance of Spain with France, and a personal friend of the First Consul's ever since the war in Italy, during which he had performed a conciliatory part between the French army and his holiness. Unluckily, he was not careful enough to conceal the grief and disgust which the state of the Spanish court excited in him; and that court, in its displeasure, attributed the disesteem in which it was held to the ambassador who deplored it. He was, so it was said in the despatches just addressed to him from Madrid, he was the humble servant of the First Consul; he informed his court of nothing; he knew

not how to save it from any exigency. They went so far as to declare that, if the First Consul had not been so anxious to keep him in Paris, another representative would have been chosen. Thus, without dismissing him, the government provoked his resignation. It instructed him, as the only conclusion, to offer France a subsidy of two millions and a half per month, declaring that this was all Spain could do, and more than that sum it was absolutely impossible for her to pay. M. d'Azara transmitted this proposal to the First Consul, and then sent off a courier to Madrid with his resignation.

The First Consul sent for M. Hermann, secretary of embassy, who had had personal relations with the Prince of the Peace, and charged him with his orders for Madrid. M. Hermann was to intimate to the prince that he must either submit or expect an immediate downfall, prepared by means which M. Hermann had in his portfolio. The First Consul had written a letter to the king, in which he denounced to that unfortunate monarch the misfortunes and the disgrace of his crown, but in such a manner as, without offending, to awaken a sense of his dignity: he then gave him his choice between the removal of his favourite or the immediate entry of a French army. If the Prince of the Peace, after he had seen M. Hermann, did not instantly, without shuffling, without sending off to Paris, give complete satisfaction to France, General Beurnonville was to demand a solemn audience of Charles IV., and to put into his own hands the thundering letter of the First Consul. Twenty-four hours afterwards, if the Prince of the Peace were not dismissed, General Beurnonville was to leave Madrid, and to send Augereau directions to cross the frontier.

M. Hermann proceeded with all expedition to Madrid. He saw the Prince of the Peace, signified to him the demands of the First Consul, and this time found him not mean and arrogant, but mean only. A Spanish minister, intent on defending the interests of his country, or worthily representing his king and not covering him with ignominy, would have braved disgrace, death, anything rather than such a display of foreign authority. But the indignity of his position left the Prince of the Peace without any resource of energy. He submitted, and affirmed, upon his word of honour, that instructions had been sent to M. d'Azara, with power to consent to all that the First Consul demanded. This answer was brought to General Beurnonville. The latter, who had orders to require an immediate solution, and not to be put off with a new despatch to Paris, declared to the prince that he had express injunctions not to believe his word, and to require a signature in Madrid itself, or to deliver the fatal letter to the king. The Prince of the Peace repeated his sorry story that everything

was settled at the moment in Paris, and agreeably to the wishes of the First Consul. That wretched court conceived that it was saving its honour in leaving to M. d'Azara the pitiful part of submitting to the will of France, and moving the spectacle of its humiliation to the distance of four hundred leagues. General Beurnonville then deemed it his duty to deliver to the king the letter of the First Consul. The directors of the king, that is, the queen and the prince, would have refused the audience, but then a courier would have ordered Augereau to enter Spain. They devised a way of arranging matters. They advised Charles IV. to receive the letter, but persuaded him not to open it, because it contained expressions which might be offensive. They endeavoured to prove to him that, by receiving it, he would spare himself the entry of the French army, and that by not opening it he would save his dignity. Things were arranged accordingly. General Beurnonville was admitted at the Escorial into the presence of the king and queen, but not of the Prince of the Peace, whose exclusion he had orders to insist upon, and delivered to the Spanish monarch the overwhelming denunciation of which he was the bearer. Charles IV., with a cheerfulness which proved his ignorance, said to the ambassador, "I receive the letter of the First Consul since it must be so, but I will soon return it to you without opening it. You will know in a few days that you might have spared yourself the trouble, for M. d'Azara was directed to settle the whole business in Paris. I esteem the First Consul; I am disposed to be his faithful ally, and to furnish him with all the succours that my crown has at its disposal." After this official answer, the king, assuming a tone of familiarity quite unworthy of the throne and of the present occasion, spoke in terms of embarrassing vulgarity concerning the impetuosity of his friend General Bonaparte, and his determination to forgive him everything rather than break the union between the two courts. The ambassador withdrew confounded, painfully affected by such a spectacle, and considering it his duty to wait for another courier from Paris before he sent word to General Augereau to march.

This time the Prince of the Peace told the truth: M. d'Azara had received the necessary authority for signing the conditions imposed by the First Consul. It was agreed that Spain should remain neuter; that instead of the succours stipulated in the treaty of St. Ildefonso, she should pay to France a subsidy of six millions per month, one-third of which was to be reserved for the settlement of the accounts existing between the two governments; that Spain should discharge at a single payment the instalments due for the four months which had elapsed since the beginning of the war, that is, sixteen millions. An

agent named Hervas, who transacted financial business for the court of Madrid in Paris, was to go to Holland to negotiate a loan with the house of Hope, consigning to it dollars to be brought from Mexico. It was understood that if England declared war against Spain the subsidy was to cease. As the price of these succours, it was stipulated that, if the plans of the First Consul against Great Britain should succeed, France should restore to her ally Trinidad in the first place, and in the next, in case of a complete triumph, the celebrated fortress of Gibraltar.

This convention being signed, M. d'Azara persisted, nevertheless, in resigning his post, though without fortune and destitute of every resource for cheering a precocious age. He died in Paris a few months afterwards. The Prince of the Peace had, moreover, so little dignity as to write to his agent Hervas, and to order him to arrange, as he expressed it, all his personal affairs with the First Consul. All that had passed was, according to him, only a mistake, only one of those ordinary tiffs between persons who are attached to one another, and who are afterwards better friends than before. Such was this personage; such were the energy and elevation of his character.

It was now autumn: the unfavourable season was approaching, and one of the three occasions reputed to be the best for crossing the Strait was about to occur with the fogs and the long nights of winter. The First Consul was, therefore, unremittingly engaged with his grand enterprise. The end of the quarrel with Spain had come very seasonably, not only to supply him with pecuniary resources, but to give back to him part of his disposable troops. The assemblages formed towards the Pyrenees were dispersed, and the corps composing them marched towards the Ocean. Several of these corps were placed at Saintes, quite handy for the Rochefort squadron. The others were ordered to proceed to Bretagne to be embarked in the great Brest squadron. Augereau commanded the camp formed in that province. The plan of the First Consul was gradually matured in his mind: he thought that, to give the more annoyance to the British government, the attack ought to be made on several points at once, and that part of the 150,000 men destined for the invasion ought to be thrown into Ireland. Such was the aim of the preparations making at Brest. Decrès, the minister, had conversed with the fugitive Irish, who had already attempted to separate their country from England. They promised a general rising in case 18,000 men were landed, with a complete *matériel* and a great quantity of arms. They required that, in return for their efforts, France should not make peace without insisting on the independence of Ireland.

The First Consul assented to this, on condition that a corps

of 20,000 Irish should have joined the French army and fought along with it during the expedition. The Irish were confident, and prolific in promises, as all emigrants are; yet there were some among them who gave no great hopes, who would not even promise any effective aid on the part of the population. At any rate, according to these latter, one might expect to find them friendly; and this would be enough to afford a support to our army, to give serious embarrassment to England, and to paralyse perhaps forty or fifty thousand of her soldiers. The expedition to Ireland would have the further advantage of keeping the enemy in doubt respecting the real point of attack. But for this expedition, in fact, England would have believed that there was but one plan, that of crossing the Strait for the purpose of marching an army upon London. On the contrary, with the preparations at Brest, many people imagined that what was doing at Boulogne was a feint; and that the real plan consisted in a great expedition to Ireland. The doubts excited on this point were at first an extremely useful result.

The squadron lying at Ferrol was at last admitted into the docks, began to be refitted, and was supplied with refreshments, of which the crews had great need. That at Toulon was preparing. In Holland they began to equip the squadron of large ships, and to collect the mass of boats necessary to form the Batavian flotilla. But it was at Boulogne, in particular, that everything was carried on with wonderful ardour and rapidity.

The First Consul, full of the persuasion that one ought to see everything with one's own eyes, that the most trusty agents are often inaccurate in their reports, for want of attention or intelligence, if not from wilful falsehood, had created for himself at Boulogne a residence, where he purposed to sojourn frequently. He had hired a small château in a village called Port des Briques, and had fitted it up with everything necessary for lodging himself and his military household. Setting out from St. Cloud at night, and travelling the sixty leagues from Paris to Boulogne with the rapidity with which princes in general run after vulgar pleasures, he reached the theatre of his immense labours about the middle of the next day, and made a point of examining everything before he took a moment's sleep. He had required Admiral Bruix, worn out with fatigue, sometimes agitated by his quarrels with Decrès, the minister, to live not in Boulogne itself, but on the cliff, upon a height commanding a view of the port, the road, and the camps. Here had been erected a well-caulked hut, in which that man, so much to be regretted, ended his days, having incessantly before his eyes all the parts of the vast creation over which he presided. He made up his mind to an abode so dangerous to his declining health in order to satisfy the restless vigilance of the

head of the government.* The First Consul had even had a similar hut built for his personal use close to the admiral's, and there passed sometimes days and nights. He required Generals Davout, Ney, Soult, to reside without intermission in the camps, to be personally present at the operations and manœuvres, and to report daily on the most trifling circumstances. General Soult, who was distinguished by a valuable quality, that of vigilance, was in this respect of great and continual utility. When the First Consul had received the daily communication of his lieutenants, which he answered at the moment, he set out to verify himself the accuracy of the reports transmitted to him, never believing any but his own eyes in all matters whatever.

The English had done their best to impede the execution of the works destined to protect the anchorage of Boulogne. Their cruisers, consisting in general of about twenty vessels, three or four of them seventy-fours, five or six frigates, ten or twelve

* I subjoin an extract from the correspondence of Decrès, the minister, proving the devotedness of Admiral Bruix to the enterprise, and well depicting the nature of his character: only his sufferings were less imaginary than Decrès represents, for he died in the following year.

“The Minister of the Marine and Colonies to the First Consul.

“BOULOGNE, *January 7, 1804.*

“Citizen Consul,—Admiral Bruix had not disguised your dissatisfaction from himself, as it appeared to be a relief to him to find me disposed to talk over the subject in confidence with him. He fancies that he continually sees General Latouche* at the gates of Boulogne, and this idea is very far from agreeable to him.

“This affair, said he very nobly, is so great and so important that it cannot be entrusted to any but the man whom the First Consul shall think the most worthy. I am aware that no private consideration can be admitted, and if the First Consul thinks Latouche more capable, he will name him, and he will do right. For my part, at the point at which things have arrived, I cannot leave the game, but shall serve under Latouche.—But will your health permit you?—Yes, it must permit me; and I am almost sure I shall be able.—The First Consul requires so much activity, and what an extraordinary example he sets of it himself!—Yes, indeed, I plainly perceived that it was a lesson which he was giving me, and that lesson shall not be lost.—What! you mean to enter into all the details, to inspect every boat?—Yes, I will, because he desires it; though I am convinced that this method is not so good as mine, which is to let people go on and to show one's self but seldom.—But the First Consul?—Oh! he may always show himself, for he always subdues; but we who are not *he*, not even the Hephæstion of your Alexander, we ought, in my opinion, to show greater reserve. But he desires it, he expects it; and I will let him see that I can do all he wishes.

“Such, Citizen Consul, is the summary of part of my dialogue with him. He was wonderfully well, and, some generals having entered at the end of our conference and inquired how he did, he suddenly put on his dying look, and complained in a lamentable voice of the state of his health. Involuntary sacrifice to his old habit!

“From all he said, it results that he trembles lest you should take the command from him, that he has not concealed from me that he entertains that fear, and that he has promised me to do in the greatest detail all that you have set him an example of, and to begin this very day. DECRES.”

* Admiral Latouche Treville.

brigs and cutters, and a certain number of gunboats, kept up an incessant fire upon our workmen. Their balls, passing over the cliff, fell in the harbour and the camps. Though their projectiles had done very little damage, still this firing was extremely annoying, and when a great number of boats were crowded together, might cause great mischief, perhaps even a conflagration. One night even the English, advancing most daringly in their pinnaces, surprised the workshops in which the materials for the construction of the wooden fort were preparing, cut in pieces the machines used for driving piles, and did as much mischief to the works as it took several days to repair. The First Consul was greatly irritated at this attempt, and issued fresh orders for preventing the like in future. Armed boats, relieving one another like sentries, were to pass the night around the works. The workmen, encouraged, piqued in their honour, like soldiers whom one is leading against an enemy, were induced to work in presence of the English ships and under the fire of their artillery. It was at low water only that the works could be prosecuted. When the heads of the piles were left sufficiently uncovered by the water for driving, the men fell to before the tide was out, and continued, while it was returning, up to the middle in water, singing as they worked, while the balls of the English were flying around them. The First Consul, however, with his inexhaustible fertility of invention, contrived new precautions to keep off the enemy. He caused experiments to be made on the coast, to ascertain the range of heavy cannon fired at an angle of 45 degrees, nearly as mortars are fired. The experiment succeeded; 24-pound balls were projected to the distance of 2300 fathoms, and the English were obliged to keep at that distance. He did still more; thinking incessantly on the same subject, he first devised an instrument, which at this day occasions frightful ravages, and which appears destined to produce powerful effects in maritime warfare—hollow projectiles employed against shipping. He ordered large shells to be fired at the vessels; these, bursting in the timber-work or the sails, could not fail to produce fatal breaches in the hull, or large rents in the rigging. It is with projectiles which burst, he wrote, that timber must be attacked. It is not easy to introduce anything new, especially where there are old habits to be overcome, and he had to repeat frequently the same instructions. When the English, instead of those solid balls, which dash like lightning through everything before them, but limit their ravages to their own diameter, beheld a projectile, having it is true less impulsion, but which explodes like a mine, either in the hull of the ship or on the heads of her defenders, they were surprised, and kept at a great distance. Lastly, to obtain still more security,

the First Consul devised an expedient not less ingenious. He conceived the idea of establishing submarine batteries, that is to say, he had batteries of heavy cannon and large mortars placed at low-water mark, which were covered by the sea at high water, and left uncovered at ebb-tide. It cost great trouble to secure the platforms on which the pieces rested, so as to prevent them from sinking into the sand or being buried by it. This was accomplished, however, and at ebb-tide, which was the time for work, when the English approached to disturb the men, they were received with discharges of artillery, poured all at once from the low-water line: so that the fire advanced or receded in a manner with the sea itself. These batteries were employed only while the forts were building; as soon as they were finished they became useless.*

The wooden fort was first completed, owing to the nature of the construction. Solid platforms were laid on the top of the piles some feet above the level of the highest tides. This work was armed with ten pieces of large calibre and several mortars having a long range; and, as soon as it began to fire, the English ceased to appear off the entrance of the harbour. The whole line of the cliffs was protected by 24 and 36-pounders and mortars. About 500 pieces were placed in battery, and both French and English gave the coast the name of *Iron Coast*. During this interval, the forts of masonry were finished without any obstacle but from the sea. At the beginning of winter, in particular, the waves, lashed by the winds of the Channel, sometimes became so furious as to shake and to inundate the most solid and the loftiest works. Twice they carried away whole courses of building, and hurled the largest blocks from the walls commenced at the bottom of the sea. Those two important works, indispensable for the safety of the anchorage, were, nevertheless, continued.

During these operations, the troops, drawn nearer to the coast, had constructed their hovels and laid out their camps so as to resemble real military cities, divided into quarters, traversed by long streets. This business finished, they had gone back to the basin of Boulogne. The task was divided among them, and each regiment had to remove a certain portion of that prodigious bed of sand and mud, which lay at the bottom of the Liane. Some excavated the bed of the river itself, or the semicircular basin; the others drove the piles destined to form quays. The ports of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, the construction of which was ascertained to be practicable, were already commenced. The sand and the mud had begun to be removed, and sluices were constructing for the

* All the details here given are extracted from the original correspondence of Admiral Bruix and Napoleon, to which we have already adverted.

purpose of excavating an entrance channel by repeated discharges of the water. Other detachments were engaged in laying out roads to connect the ports of Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples with one another, and those ports themselves with the neighbouring forests.

The troops employed in these laborious operations recruited themselves after they had accomplished their task, and those which had done removing mould performed manœuvres of all kinds, suitable for completing their training. Clad in the coarse dress of labourers, protected by wooden shoes from the dampness of the soil, well lodged, abundantly fed, thanks to the wages for their labour added to their pay, living in the open air, they enjoyed perfect health amidst the sharpest weather and a most inclement season. Content, occupied, full of confidence in the enterprise for which they were preparing, they were daily acquiring that twofold force, physical and moral, which was to enable them to conquer the world.

The moment was come for concentrating the flotilla. The building of the boats of all kinds was almost everywhere finished. They had been taken down to the mouths of the rivers; they had been rigged and armed in the ports. The carpenters set at liberty in the interior had been formed into companies, and led, some to Boulogne, others to the neighbouring ports. It was proposed to employ them in jobbing and keeping the flotilla in repair, when once collected.

It was requisite, therefore, to proceed to those concentrations impatiently awaited by the English, who made sure of destroying even to the very last of our light vessels. Now it was that the resources of the mind of the First Consul were more particularly displayed. The divisions of the flotilla, which had to repair to Boulogne, were about to start from all points of the coast of the Ocean from Bayonne to the Texel, in order to rally in the Strait of Calais. They were to coast the shore, keeping constantly at a very short distance from land, and running aground when too closely pressed by the English cruisers. One or two accidents which befell boats belonging to the flotilla suggested to the First Consul the idea of a system of succour equally effective and ingenious. He had seen some brigs run ashore to escape the enemy, and successfully assisted by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Struck by this circumstance, he ordered numerous corps of cavalry to be distributed along the coast from Nantes to Brest, from Brest to Cherbourg, from Cherbourg and Havre to Boulogne. These corps of cavalry, divided by arrondissements, had with them batteries of horsed artillery, trained to manœuvre with extreme rapidity, and to gallop over the smooth sands left dry by the sea in receding. These sands are in general so solid as to be

capable of bearing horses and carriages. Our squadrons, drawing artillery after them, were to patrol the beach incessantly, to advance or retire with the sea, and to protect the boats in their course by their fire. In general, only pieces of small calibre are drawn by horses; the First Consul had carried the employment of all means so far as to have 16-pounders drawn by horses, and moving as rapidly as 4 or 8-pounders. He had insisted, and carried his point, that every horse-soldier, qualified for all the services, should submit to dismount to fire the pieces, or to run, carbine in hand, to the assistance of seamen aground on the coast. "The hussars," he wrote to the minister at war, "must be taught to recollect that a French soldier must be horseman, foot-soldier, artilleryman, that he must be competent to anything." (Sept. 29th.) Two generals, Lemarrois and Sébastiani, were charged with the command of all this cavalry. They had orders to be incessantly on horseback, to make the squadrons manœuvre every day with their pieces, and to keep themselves constantly informed of the movements of convoys, in order to escort them in their progress.*

This system produced, as we shall see, excellent results. The boats were formed into convoys of 30, 50, and even 60 sail. They were to begin about the end of September, to run out of St. Malo, Granville, Cherbourg, the river of Caen, Havre, St. Valery. There were not many beyond the point of Brest; but at any rate, the English watched that part of our coast too closely to risk that trip before making numerous experiments. It was not the same commanding officer who conducted convoys all the way from the point of departure to the point of arrival.

* The following letter, relative to a negligence committed, proves into what a state he had brought the coast:—

"To General DAVOUT.

"October 30, 1803.

"Citizen General Davout,—I have seen not without pain, from the report of the General of Brigade Seras, that the English had time to plunder and destroy the rigging of the boat which ran aground between Gravelines and Calais. In the present state of the coast, no such circumstance ever happened on this side of Bordeaux. Detachments of cavalry and movable pieces should have come up to prevent the English from plundering the vessel. This is the second time that boats aground on this coast have not been assisted. The fault lies with him whom you have appointed overseer of the coast. Give the inspection of the coast to two generals of brigade: one from Calais to Dunkirk, the other from Dunkirk to the Scheld. Let piquets of cavalry be so disposed as to cross each other incessantly, and let pieces, with horses, be so placed that, at the first signal, they may be able to reach in the least possible time the place where vessels have grounded. Lastly, these inspectors-general ought to be constantly on horseback, to make the land-batteries manœuvre, to inspect the coastguard artillerymen, to escort the flotillas along the strand whenever they put themselves in motion. Let me know the name of all the posts that you shall have established, and the places where you shall have stationed movable pieces."

It was conceived that a naval officer well acquainted with the coasts of Bretagne, for example, would not know the coasts of Normandy or Picardy so well. They had been distributed, therefore, according to their local knowledge, and, like coasting pilots, they never went out of the district assigned to them. They received the convoys at the limit of their district, directed them as far as the limit of the next district, and thus transmitted them from hand to hand to Boulogne. Troops were embarked in the boats, and even horses in those destined to receive them; they were laden, in short, precisely as they were to be during the passage from France to England. The First Consul had ordered the most minute attention to be paid to ascertain how they acted at sea under the load which they were destined to convey.

Towards the end of September (the beginning of Vendémiaire, year XII.) a first division, composed of brigs, gunboats, and pinnaces, left Dunkirk, to double Cape Grisnez and proceed to Boulogne. Captain St. Haouen of the navy, an excellent officer, who commanded this division, though a very bold man, advanced with great caution. When he was off Calais, he suffered himself to be intimidated by a circumstance in reality of little importance: he saw the English cruiser sheer off, as though she were going to fetch other vessels. Apprehensive of being soon attacked by a numerous squadron, instead of crowding all sail to reach Boulogne, he ran into the harbour of Calais. Admiral Bruix, apprised of this blunder, hastened in person to the spot to remedy it if possible. The English, in fact, had soon appeared in considerable number, and it was evident that they would stick close to the port of Calais, to prevent the division which had put into it from getting out again. The admiral repaired to Dunkirk, to hasten the organisation of a second division which was ready in that harbour, and to send it off to the assistance of the first.

The English were before Calais with a considerable force, including several bomb-vessels. On the 27th of September (4th Vendémiaire) they threw a great number of bombs into the town and harbour. They killed one or two men, but hit none of the vessels. The horse-batteries galloped up to the beach, answered them with a well-sustained fire, and obliged them to sheer off. They retired, quite confounded at having produced so little effect. Next day, Admiral Bruix ordered St. Haouen's division to sea in the teeth of the enemy's cruisers, to prevent a new bombardment, and, according to circumstances, to double Cape Grisnez and proceed to Boulogne. The second division from Dunkirk was to sail at the same time under the command of Captain Pevrieux, and to support the first. Rear-Admiral Magon, who commanded at Boulogne, had orders, on

his part, to run out of that port with everything that was disposable, and to keep under sail for the purpose of lending a hand to the divisions of St. Haouen and Pevrieux if they should double Cape Grisnez.

On the morning of the 28th of September (5th Vendémiaire, year XII.) Captain St. Haouen boldly ran out of Calais and advanced to within cannon-shot. The English made a movement to get to windward. Captain St. Haouen, skilfully taking advantage of this movement, which carried them from him, made all sail for Cape Grisnez. But he was overtaken by the English a little beyond the cape, and soon assailed by a violent fire of artillery. One would have supposed that a score of enemy's ships, some of them of large size, ought to have run down our light vessels; but nothing of the sort took place. Captain St. Haouen continued his progress amidst the English balls, without suffering much from them. A battalion of the 46th and a detachment of the 22nd, embarked in these vessels, worked the oars with admirable coolness, under a very brisk but fortunately not destructive fire. At the same time, the horsed batteries on the beach had hastened up and replied with advantage to the guns of the English ships. At length, in the afternoon, Captain St. Haouen came to an anchor in the road of Boulogne, joined by the detachment which had sailed from that port under the command of Rear-Admiral Magon. The second division from Dunkirk had advanced on its part to within sight of Cape Grisnez; but, detained by calm and tide, it was obliged to anchor off an uncovered coast. In this position it continued till the moment when the current changing should carry it towards Boulogne. It had no wind, and was obliged to use the oars. Fifteen English vessels, frigates, cutters, and brigs were waiting for it at Cape Grisnez. At that point the depth of water being greater, and the English cruisers able to approach the shore while our vessels had not the resource of running aground, it was natural that great fears should be entertained for them: but they passed like those of the preceding day; our soldiers working the oars with extraordinary intrepidity, and the English receiving from our batteries on shore more injury than they could do to our gun-brigs. The Boulogne flotilla and St. Haouen's division, which had entered the preceding day, had again left to go to meet the division of Pevrieux. They joined it at a height called the Tour de Croy, before Vimereux. The three united divisions there brought to; and ranging themselves in line, and presenting their head, armed with guns, made direct for them, keeping up a very brisk fire. This fire lasted two hours. Our light vessels sometimes hit the large English ships, but were rarely hit by them. In the end the English sheered off, some

of them so damaged as to be obliged to go to the Downs. One of our brigs, the only one to which this accident happened, perforated through and through by a ball, had time to get to the beach before running aground.

This action, followed subsequently by many others, much more important and sanguinary, produced a decisive effect on the opinion of the navy and army. It was seen that these light vessels would not be so easily sunk by large ships, and that they would oftener hit than be hit by their gigantic adversaries: it was seen what assistance might be derived from the co-operation of land-troops, which without any training had worked the oars and the marine artillery with extraordinary address, and above all shown no fear of the sea and great zeal in seconding the sailors.*

No sooner had this first experiment been made than the greatest ardour was shown to repeat it. Numerous convoys sailed successively from all the ports in the Channel for the general rendezvous of Boulogne. Several naval officers, Captains St. Haouen and Pevrieux, whose names have just been mentioned, and Captains Hamelin and Daugier, distinguished themselves by their courage and skill in these coasting expeditions. Our vessels, sometimes using the sails, sometimes the oars, kept close in shore at a very small distance from detachments of cavalry and artillery ready to protect them. They were rarely obliged to betake themselves to the beach, for they navigated almost always in sight of the English, supporting their fire, and sometimes lying-to, when they had time, to face the enemy, and to show their head armed with guns of large calibre. Frequently they obliged brigs, cutters, and even frigates to sheer off. If they foundered on some occasions, it was rather owing to bad weather than to the force of their adversaries. When this did happen, the English threw themselves into boats to take possession of the stranded gun-brigs or pinnaces. But our artillerymen, hastening with their pieces to the beach, or our horse-soldiers, all at once changed into foot, almost into seamen, rushed amidst the breakers to the assistance of the sailors, kept off the English boats by the fire of their carbines, and obliged them to sheer off without any prize, nay, frequently after losing some of their most intrepid seamen.

In the months of October, November, and December, nearly a thousand vessels, gun-brigs, gunboats, and pinnaces, sallying from all the ports, entered Boulogne. Out of this number the English took only three or four; and the sea destroyed no more than ten or twelve.

These short and frequent trips furnished occasion for many

* We find these sentiments expressed in all the letters written from Boulogne, the day after these two actions.

useful observations. They revealed the superiority of the gun-brigs to the gunboats. The latter were more difficult to work, made more leeway, and, above all, were defective in point of artillery. The defects of these gunboats were owing to their construction, and their construction to the necessity for placing field-artillery in them. There was no help for this. The pin-naces left nothing to be desired in regard to working and speed. For the rest, they all went tolerably, even without the assistance of the sail. There were divisions which came from Havre to Boulogne, almost all the way with oars, at an average speed of two leagues an hour. A few alterations were to be made in the mode of stowing the articles on board, in order to produce an improvement in their trim.

The experience of these trips led to a change in the disposition of the artillery, which was immediately adopted throughout the whole flotilla. The heavy cannon placed fore and aft ran in grooves, in which they could only move forward or backward in a straight line. Hence the vessels, when about to fire, were obliged to turn about and to present either the head or the stern to the enemy. It was, therefore, impossible for them, when going, to reply to the fire of the English, because these then turned only their broadside. When lying in the road, the currents obliged them to take a position parallel to the coast, that is, to present their unarmed side to the enemy. This position was changed, when the steadiness of those vessels had been put to the test, and when it was ensured by a better system of stowage. Carriages were built very like those of field-pieces, which allowed the gun to be pointed in any direction. With a little use, both landsmen and seamen became competent to practise this kind of firing with precision and without danger.

Particular care was taken to produce complete harmony between the seamen and the soldiers, by the constant appropriation of the same vessels to the same troops. The dimensions of the gun-brigs and gunboats had been calculated for them to carry a company of infantry, besides some artillery. This was the element employed to determine the general organisation of the flotilla. The battalions were then composed of nine companies; the demi-brigades of two war battalions, the third remaining at the dépôt. The gun-brigs and gunboats were arranged in conformity with this composition of the troops. Nine brigs or boats formed a section, and carried nine companies, or one battalion. Two sections formed a division, and carried a demi-brigade. Thus the boat or brig answered to the company, the section answered to the battalion, the division to the demi-brigade. Naval officers of corresponding rank commanded the boat, the section, the division. To produce a

perfect coherence of the troops with the flotilla, each division was appropriated to a demi-brigade, each section to a battalion, each brig or boat to a company; and this appropriation once made was invariable. Thus the troops were always to keep the same vessel, and to attach themselves to it, as a rider attaches himself to his horse. Land and sea officers, soldiers and sailors, would by these means learn to know and to have confidence in one another, and be the more disposed to render each other mutual assistance. Each company was to furnish the vessel belonging to it with a garrison of twenty-five men, forming a fourth of the company, always on board. These twenty-five men, forming a fourth of the company, remained on board about a month. During this time, they lodged in the vessel with the crew, whether the vessel went to sea to manœuvre or lay in harbour. There they did all that the sailors themselves did, assisted in working the vessel, and exercised themselves in particular in the management of the oars and in firing the cannon. When they had passed a month in this kind of life, they were succeeded by twenty-five other soldiers of the same company, who came to devote themselves for the same space of time to nautical exercises. Thus the whole company in succession took its turn on board the brigs or boats. Each man, therefore, was alternately land-soldier, sea-soldier, artilleryman, sailor, and even labouring engineer, in consequence of the works carrying on in the basins. The sailors likewise took part in this reciprocal training. They had infantry arms on board, and when they were in port they performed the infantry exercise in the daytime on the quay. They formed consequently an accession of 15,000 foot-soldiers, who, after the landing in England, would be capable of defending the flotilla along the coasts, where it would be lying aground. By giving them a reinforcement of about 10,000 men, they might await with impunity on the shore the victories of the invading army.

The pinnaces at first were left out of this organisation, because they were not capable of carrying a whole company, and were fitter for throwing the troops rapidly on shore than for meeting an enemy at sea. Subsequently, however, they were formed into divisions, and specially appropriated to the advanced guard, composed of the united grenadiers. In the interim, they were ranged in thirds of companies in port, and every day the troops to which vessels were not yet assigned went to practise, sometimes working them by oars, sometimes firing the light howitzer with which they were armed.

This settled, attention was directed to another not less important subject, the stowage of the vessels. The First Consul, in one of his journeys, caused some brigs, boats, and pinnaces to be several times loaded and unloaded before him, and imme-

diately decided upon their stowage.* Balls, shells, ammunition, were assigned them by way of ballast, in sufficient quantity for a long campaign. In their holds were stowed biscuit, wine, spirits, salt provisions, Dutch cheese, enough to subsist the whole mass of men composing the expedition for twenty days. Thus the war flotilla was to carry, besides the army and its 400 pieces of cannon drawn by two horses, ammunition for a campaign, and provisions for twenty days. The transport flotilla was to carry, as we have said, the surplus of the artillery horses, the horses necessary for half the cavalry, two or three months' provisions, lastly, all the baggage. With each division of the war flotilla corresponded a division of the transport flotilla; and in sailing one was to follow the other. In each vessel, a sub-officer of artillery had the care of the ammunition; a sub-officer of infantry that of the provisions. Everything was to be kept constantly embarked in the two flotillas, so that on the signal for departure there would be nothing to put on board but the men and the horses. The men, frequently exercised in getting under arms and on board the flotilla by demi-brigades, battalions, and companies, would take no more time than was required to go from the camps to the port. As for the horses, means had been contrived for simplifying and accelerating their embarkation in a surprising manner. How great soever might be the extent of the quays, it was not possible to range all the vessels alongside them. They were obliged to range them nine deep, the first only touching the quay. A horse, with harness grappling him tightly round the body, raised from the ground by means of a yard, transmitted nine times from yard to yard, was deposited in two or three minutes in the ninth vessel. In this manner men and horses might be put on board the war flotilla in two hours. It took three or four to embark the remaining nine or ten thousand horses in the transport flotilla. Thus, the heavy baggage being constantly on board, one would always be ready to weigh anchor in a few hours; and as it was not possible for so great a number of vessels to get out of the ports in the space of a single tide, the embarkation of the men and horses could never occasion any loss of time.

After incessantly repeated exercises, all these manœuvres came to be executed with equal promptness and precision. Every day, in all weathers, unless it blew a storm, from 100 to 150 boats went out to manœuvre or to anchor in the road

* "To Citizen FLEURIEU.

"BOULOGNE, Nov. 16, 1803.

"I have passed the day here in superintending the equipment of a brig and a gunboat. Here the stowage is one of the most important points in the plan of campaign, in order that nothing may be omitted, and the whole equally divided. Everything is beginning to take a satisfactory turn."

before the enemy. The operation of a sham landing along the cliffs was performed. The men first exercised themselves in sweeping the shore by a steady fire of artillery, then in approaching the beach, and landing men, horses, and cannon. Frequently, when the boats could not get close to the shore, the men were thrown into the water where it was five or six feet deep. None were ever drowned, such was the dexterity and ardour which they displayed. Sometimes even the horses were landed in the same manner. They were let down into the sea, and men in small boats directed them with a halter towards the shore. In this manner, there was not an accident that could happen in landing on an enemy's coast but was provided against and several times braved, with the addition of all the difficulties which could be thought of, even those of night,* excepting, however, the difficulty of the fire; but that would rather be a stimulant than an obstacle for these soldiers, the bravest in the world by nature and by the habit of war.

This variety of land and sea exercises, these manœuvres intermixed with hard labour, interested these adventurous soldiers, full of imagination and ambitions, like their illustrious chief. With considerably better fare, thanks to the earnings of their labour added to their pay, continual activity, the keenest and most salubrious air, all this could not but give them extraordinary physical strength. The hope of performing a prodigy added a moral force equally great. Thus was gradually trained that incomparable army, which was destined to achieve the conquest of the continent in two years.

The First Consul spent great part of his time among them. He was filled with confidence when he saw them so disposed, so alert, so animated with his own feelings. They in their turn received continual excitement from his presence. They saw him on horseback, sometimes on the top of the cliffs, sometimes at their feet, galloping over the sands, left smooth and hard by the receding tide, going in that manner by the strand from one port to another; † sometimes on board light pinnaces,

* "To the Consul CAMBACÉRES.

"BOULOGNE, November 9, 1803.

"I spent part of last night in making the troops perform night evolutions, a manœuvre which well-trained and well-disciplined troops may sometimes employ with advantage against levies *en masse*."

† On the 1st of January 1804, he thus wrote to the Consul Cambacérès: "I arrived yesterday morning at Etaples, where I am writing to you in my hut. A south-west wind is blowing tremendously. I am just going to mount my horse, to ride along the strand to Boulogne."

He wrote previously on the 12th of November: "I have received, Citizen Consul, your letter of the 18th (Brumaire). The sea here continues to be very rough, and the rain to fall in torrents. Yesterday I was on horseback and in boat the whole day. That is the same thing as telling you that I was constantly drenched. In such a season as this one would do nothing if one cared

going to be present at petty skirmishes between our gunboats and the English cruisers, pushing them upon the enemy, till he had made their cutters and frigates fall back by the fire of our frail vessels. Frequently he persisted in braving the sea, and once, having determined to visit the anchorage in spite of a violent gale, the boat in which he was returning sunk not far from the shore. Luckily the men had footing. The sailors threw themselves into the sea, and forming a close group to withstand the waves, carried him on their shoulders through the billows breaking over their heads.

One day, passing over the beach in this manner, he was animated by the sight of the coasts of England, and wrote the following lines to Cambacérès, the Consul: "I have passed these three days amidst the camp and the port. From the heights of Ambleteuse I have seen the coast of England, as one sees Calvary from the Tuileries. One could distinguish the houses and the bustle. It is a ditch that shall be leaped when one is daring enough to try." (16th November 1803. *Archives of the Secretary of State's Office.*)

His impatience to execute this great enterprise was extreme.*

about rain. Luckily, it does me no harm, and I never was so well in my life. —Boulogne, Nov. 12."

On the 1st of January 1804, he wrote also to the minister of the marine: "To-morrow morning at eight I shall inspect the whole flotilla; I shall see it by divisions. A commissary of the navy will call over all the officers and soldiers composing the crew. All will be at their post of battle, and in the greatest order. At the moment when I set foot in each vessel, the men will shout three times *Vive la République!* and three times *Vive la Premier Consul!* I shall be accompanied in this inspection by the engineer-in-chief, the commissary of equipment, and the colonel commanding the artillery. During the whole time of the inspection, the crews and the garrisons of the whole flotilla will remain at their posts, and sentinels will be placed to prevent anybody from passing over the quay facing the flotilla."

* The following letters sufficiently prove this impatience, and his desire to make the attempt in Nivôse or Pluviôse, that is, in January or February. One of them is addressed to Admiral Ganteaume, who for a moment commanded the Toulon fleet before he was removed to that at Brest. The figures contained in these letters do not agree exactly with those given in our text, because it was not till rather later that the First Consul fixed the definitive number of men and vessels. We have adopted the numbers that were finally resolved upon.

"To Citizen RAPP.

"PARIS, November 23, 1803.

"You will be pleased to proceed to Toulon. You will deliver the accompanying letter to General Ganteaume; you will make yourself acquainted with the state of the fleet, the organisation of the crews, and the number of ships in the road, or ready to move into it. Stay at Toulon till you receive further orders. Forty-eight hours after your arrival, send an extraordinary courier with General Ganteaume's answer to my letter. After the departure of this extraordinary courier, write to me every day what you have been doing, and enter into the minutest details respecting all the departments of the administration. Go every day to the arsenal for an hour or two. Learn by what route the 3rd battalion of the 8th light, coming from Antibes, with orders to repair to St. Omer to join the expedition, is to pass; go to the

He had at first thought of the conclusion of autumn; now he was for deferring it till the beginning, or, at latest, the middle of winter. But the labour was evidently increasing; and some new improvement daily occurring either to him or to Admiral Bruix, he sacrificed time in order to introduce it. The drilling

nearest point to Toulon through which it passes to inspect it, and let me know its condition.

"Visit the Hieres Islands to see in what manner they are guarded and armed. Let me have a detailed report about everything you see."

"To General GANTEAUME, Councillor of State, maritime prefect at Toulon.

"PARIS, *November 23, 1803.*

"Citizen General,—I am despatching to you General Rapp, one of my aides-de-camp; he will stay some days at your port, and will inform himself in detail of all that concerns your department.

"I sent you word two months ago, that in the course of Frimaire I depended upon having 10 sail of the line, 4 frigates, and 4 cutters ready to sail from Toulon, and that I wished this squadron to be supplied with four months' provisions for 25,000 men, good infantry troops, who were to go on board it. I desire that in forty-eight hours after the receipt of this letter by the extraordinary courier of General Rapp, you will let me know the precise day when a similar squadron will be ready to sail from Toulon, what you have in the roads, and ready to start at the moment of the receipt of my letter, and what you shall have on the 15th Frimaire and 1st Nivôse.

"I am just come from Boulogne, where great activity at this moment prevails, where I hope to have assembled by the middle of Nivôse 300 gun-brigs, 500 boats, 500 pinnaces, each pinnace carrying a 36-pounder howitzer, each brig 3 guns, 24-pounders, and each boat one 24-pounder. Let me have your ideas concerning that flotilla. Do you think that it will take us to the coast of England? It is capable of carrying 100,000 men. Eight hours of night favourable for us would decide the fate of the world.

"The minister of marine has extended his tour to Flushing, to inspect the Batavian flotilla, composed of 100 brigs, 300 gunboats capable of carrying 30,000 men, and the Texel fleet capable of carrying 30,000 men.

"I have no need to urge your zeal; I know that you will do whatever is possible. Be assured of my esteem."

"To Citizen DAUGIER, Captain in the Navy, commanding the battalion of sailors of the guard.

"PARIS, *January 12, 1804.*

"Citizen Daugier,—I desire you to leave Paris in the course of the day, and to proceed direct to Cherbourg. You will there give orders for the departure of all the vessels of the flotilla which are in that port, and stay the time necessary for removing all obstacles and hastening the despatch of the boats. You will go to all the ports out of your road where you know that there are vessels belonging to the flotilla; hasten their departure, and give them instructions that vessels may not lie whole months in those ports, particularly at Dielette.

"Perform the same errand at Granville and St. Malo as at Cherbourg. Write to me from both those ports.

"Fulfil the same mission at Lorient, Nantes, Rochefort, Bordeaux, and Bayonne.

"The season is advancing; whatever has not reached Boulogne in the course of Pluriôse would be of no use to us. You must, therefore, urge and arrange the operations accordingly.

"You will inform yourself whether the dispositions which have been made for furnishing garrisons are sufficient in every port."

of the soldiers and sailors was rendered more perfect by these inevitable delays, which thus brought along with them their own compensation. The projected expedition might, indeed, have been attempted after these eight months' apprenticeship; but it would require six more, if one were to wait till everything was ready, till the equipping and arming were completed, till the training of the landmen and seamen left nothing more to be desired.

But decisive considerations commanded a new delay; the principal being the backwardness of the Batavian flotilla, which was to form the right wing commanded by General Davout. On the wish expressed by the First Consul that a distinguished officer of the Dutch navy might be sent to him, Rear-Admiral Verhuel was despatched. Struck with the coolness and intelligence of this commander, he had begged that everything connected with the organisation of the Dutch flotilla might be entrusted to him: this was accordingly done, and the desired rapidity was soon communicated to the operations. This flotilla, prepared in the Scheld, was to be taken to Ostend, for one was aware of the danger of setting out from points so distant as the Scheld and Boulogne. By-and-by hopes were entertained that it might be brought from Ostend to Ambleteuse and Vimereux, when these two ports should be completed. This would ensure the immense advantage of weighing all together, that is, to despatch 120,000 men, 15,000 sailors, and 10,000 horses from four ports, all lying under the same wind, and contiguous to one another. But for this purpose it would take several months longer, both for the equipment of the Batavian flotilla and for the completion of the harbours of Vimereux and Ambleteuse.

Two other portions of the army of invasion were not ready—the Brest squadron, destined to throw Augereau's corps into Ireland, and the Dutch Texel squadron, destined to carry the corps of 20,000 men encamped between Utrecht and Amsterdam. These two corps, added to the 120,000 men in the camp of Boulogne, raised the total of the army of invasion to 160,000 men, exclusively of sailors. It would take some months longer before the Texel squadron and that at Brest were completely equipped.

A last condition of success was yet left to be secured, and this condition the First Consul considered equivalent to a certainty of the accomplishment of his enterprise. These vessels, now tried, were quite capable of crossing a strait ten leagues wide, since most of them had had one hundred or two hundred leagues to go to reach Boulogne, and had frequently by their scattered and horizontal fire replied with advantage to the downward and concentrated fire of the ships. They had a chance of passing, without being seen or attacked, either in the calms of summer

or in the fogs of winter; and, under the most unfavourable supposition, if they were to fall in with the twenty-five or thirty cutters, brigs, and frigates which the English had cruising, they must pass, were it necessary to sacrifice a hundred brigs or boats of the 2300 composing the flotilla.* But there was a case which appeared to be exempted from every unlucky chance, namely, when a strong French squadron, appearing suddenly in the Strait, should drive the English cruisers from it, keep possession of the Channel for two or three days, and cover the passage of our flotilla. With this case, there could exist no doubt: all the objections raised against the enterprise fell at once, excepting that of an unforeseen storm, an improbable chance if the season were judiciously chosen, and, moreover, at all times wholly beyond the reach of calculation. But it was requisite that the third of the squadrons of ships of the line, that of Toulon, should be completely equipped, and it was not so. The First Consul destined it to execute a grand combination, the secret of which he communicated to none, not even to his minister of the interior. This combination he matured by degrees, saying not a word about it to anybody, and leaving the English under the impression that the flotilla was to act independently, since it was armed so completely, and brought forward every day against frigates and ships of the line.

This man, so daring in his conceptions, was the most prudent of captains in the execution. Though he had 120,000 men assembled at his disposal, he would not stir without the

* Here is an extract from a letter of the minister Decrès, who had fewest illusions of any man about Napoleon, which proves that it was believed possible to pass with the sacrifice of about a hundred vessels:—

“The Minister of the Marine to the First Consul.

“BOULOGNE, *January 7, 1804.*

“People begin to believe firmly in the flotilla, and that its departure is nearer at hand than was imagined, and they have promised me to prepare very seriously for it. They shut their eyes to its dangers, and will not see in it anything but Cæsar and his fortune.

“The ideas of all the subalterns extend no further than the road and its current. They reason about the wind, the anchorage, the line of moorings, like angels. As for crossing, that is your affair. You know more about it than they, and your eyes are better than their glasses. In everything you do they have implicit faith.

“The admiral himself is at fault there. He has never submitted any plan to you, because, in fact, he has none. Indeed, you never asked him for any. It is the moment of execution that will decide. Very possibly one may be obliged to sacrifice a hundred vessels, which will draw the enemy upon them, while the rest, dashing off at the moment of the attack on the latter, will get over without obstacle.

“For the rest, a folio volume would not contain the development of the ideas which he has prepared on this subject. Which of them will he adopt? That circumstances must decide.”

co-operation of the Texel fleet carrying 20,000 men, without the Brest fleet carrying 18,000, without the fleets of La Rochelle, Ferrol, and Toulon, charged to clear the Strait by a profound manœuvre. He was anxious to have all these means ready for February 1804, and flattered himself that he should, when important events in the interior of the Republic suddenly withdrew his attention for a moment from a great enterprise, on which the eyes of the whole world were fixed.

BOOK XVIII.

CONSPIRACY OF GEORGES.

ENGLAND began to be alarmed at the preparations which were making within sight of her shores, and to which at the outset she had paid but little attention.

To an insular country, which takes part in the great contests of nations only with its commonly victorious navies, or, at the most, with armies performing the part of auxiliaries; to such a country, war causes but little anxiety, and does not disturb the public rest, or even obstruct the daily progress of business. The stability of credit in London, in the midst of the greatest bloodshed elsewhere, is a most striking proof of this statement. If to these considerations we add that the army is composed of mercenaries, and that the fleet is manned with sailors to whom it is of but small consequence whether they live on board merchant ships or men-of-war, and to whom, on the other hand, prizes hold out an infinite attraction, it will easily be perceived that for such a country war is a burden felt only in the way of taxation; a sort of speculation, in which so many millions are expended to procure so many additional markets. It is only for the aristocratic classes, who command those fleets and armies, who shed their blood in their duty as officers, and who aspire not only to conquer new markets for their country, but also to elevate her glory, that war reassumes all its gravity and perils; though even for those classes it does not present its greatest anxieties, as the danger of invasion does not seem to exist for their ocean-belted territory.

This was the kind of war that Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and the weak ministry whom they led in their train, imagined that they had drawn down upon their country. In the time of the Directory, they had heard mention made of flat-bottomed boats; but that mention had been made so often, and so vainly, that they at length had learned to give no credence to it. Sir Sydney Smith, possessing more experience, too, upon this subject, for he had seen by turns French, Turks, and English disembark in Egypt, sometimes in spite of the most efficient squadron; at other times in spite of excellent troops posted upon the shore—Sir Sydney Smith, in his place in

Parliament, gave it as his opinion that, strictly speaking, from sixty to eighty gunboats might be assembled in the Channel, not more than a hundred, even allowing for exaggeration; and that from twenty-five to thirty thousand men was the extreme limit of the force that could be landed in England. According to that officer, the next most serious danger was the descent upon Ireland of a French army, numbering twice, or even thrice, that which had formerly landed in that island—an army which, having to a greater or less extent disturbed and plundered the country, would surrender and lay down its arms, as the former expedition had done. Moreover, there were still smouldering enmities existing in Europe against France—enmities which would soon blaze up again, and recall the First Consul's forces to the continent. The most, then, that was to be feared was a renewal of the early wars of the Revolution, further distinguished by some victories of General Bonaparte over Austria, but with all the ordinary chances of civil strife in so mutable a country as France, which for fifteen years past had not supported any one government for three years, and with the permanent advantage to England of new maritime conquests. Thanks to numerous blunders and mishaps, these views of the case have been realised; but for several years, as we shall by-and-by perceive, the very existence of Great Britain was in great and imminent peril.

The news of the preparations that were in progress at Boulogne speedily dissipated the confidence of the English. They heard with surprise and anxiety of from a thousand to twelve hundred flat-bottomed boats (there were in reality upwards of two thousand), nevertheless, they consoled themselves by doubting whether they could be all collected, and, still more, whether they could be sheltered in the Channel ports. But the concentration of these flat-bottomed boats in the Strait of Calais, effected in spite of the numerous English squadrons; their excellent behaviour at sea and under fire; the construction of vast docks for their reception; the establishment of formidable batteries to protect them while at anchor; and the assemblage of 150,000 men ready for embarkation, destroyed in succession the illusions of a presumptuous confidence. It was quite clearly perceived that preparations so vast were not made by way of a mere feint, and that the ablest and the most daring of mankind had been far too carelessly or wantonly provoked. It is true, there were Englishmen of the old school who still held a traditional confidence in the inviolability of their islands, and gave no credit to the rumours of impending peril; but the government and the party leaders did not deem the peril so doubtful as to justify them in leaving the safety or the ruin of England to blind chance. Twenty or even thirty thousand

French, however brave and well officered and commanded they might be, would not have alarmed English statesmen; but 150,000 men, led by General Bonaparte, sent a shudder through all orders of the nation. Nor did that prove any lack of courage, for the bravest people in the world might well be anxious and alarmed in presence of an army which had accomplished such great things, and was about to accomplish more.

This situation of England was rendered still more serious by the apathy of the continental powers. Austria would not for one or two millions of subsidy draw down upon herself the blows intended for England; Prussia had a community of interests, though not of sympathies, with France; and Russia blamed both the belligerent parties and constituted herself judge of their proceedings, but without a formal declaration in favour of either. Unless the French were to carry their arms farther north than Hanover, there was no chance, for that time at least, of drawing Russia into the war; and it was evident that there was no intention of giving her that reason for taking up arms.

It was necessary, then, for England to make preparations co-extensive with the danger which threatened her. As far as her navy was concerned, England had but little to do to maintain her superiority to France. In the first instance, on the eve of the rupture with France, sixty ships of the line had been put into commission, and eighty thousand seamen raised; the number of ships was increased to seventy-five, and that of the seamen to a hundred thousand, subsequently to the declaration of war; a hundred frigates, and a whole host of brigs and cutters, completed this armament. Nelson, commanding a fleet of superior quality, both as to ships and men, was to cruise in the Mediterranean, blockade Toulon, and prevent any new attempt upon Egypt; Admiral Cornwallis, in command of a second fleet, was ordered to blockade Brest in person, and Rochefort and Ferrol by his senior captains; and Lord Keith, commanding the fleets of the Channel and the North Sea, was at once to protect the coasts of England, and to watch the coasts of France. With Sir Sidney Smith for his second in command, he cruised, with seventy-fours, frigates, brigs, cutters, and a few gunboats, from the mouth of the Thames to Portsmouth, and from the Scheld to the Somme, protecting the coast of England on the one hand, and blockading the ports of France on the other. A line of light craft, corresponding along all this extent of sea, by means of signals, were to give the alarm should the least movement be perceived in our ports.

The English imagined that they had thus secured the inactivity of our squadrons at Brest, at Rochefort, at Ferrol,

and at Toulon, and had secured a sufficiently strict surveillance in the Strait.

But something more was necessary to meet so novel a danger as that of an invasion of the British territory. The naval officers who were consulted had been almost unanimous in the opinion, formed on observation of the First Consul's preparations, that it was impossible to be secure against a descent on the English coast by the French forces, under favour of a fog, a calm, or a long winter night. The modern Pharaoh might, indeed, be hurled into the abyss of waters ere he could touch the shore; but should he once succeed in disembarking, not with a hundred and fifty thousand men, but with a hundred thousand, or even with eighty thousand, how could he be resisted? This haughty nation, which had displayed so little concern for the sufferings of the continent, and had been so reckless in renewing a war prosecuted by the blood of foreigners, blood which she purchased by a lavish expenditure of treasure, was now obliged to rely upon her own strength, and to arm in defence of her soil, instead of entrusting that defence to mercenaries. She, so proud of her navy, now learned to regret that she had not competent land forces to oppose to the formidable soldiery of General Bonaparte.

The formation of an army, therefore, was now the chief subject of debate in the House of Commons. And as it is the most perilous times that the spirit of party is ever the most ardently displayed, it was upon this question that the principal parliamentary personages met and combated each other.

The weak Addington administration remained in office, in spite of its blunders; it still, though but for a short time, had the direction of that war which it had so recklessly and criminally allowed to be renewed. The parliamentary majority knew this ministry to be unequal to the task which it had undertaken, but unwilling to overthrow the cabinet, supported it against its adversaries, even against Mr. Pitt, though they wished to see him once more at the head of the government. That powerful leader of his party had returned to Parliament, recalled thither alike by his secret impatience, the magnitude of his country's danger, and his detestation of France. More moderate, from the first, than his supporters, Wyndham, Grenville, and Dundas, a recent vote had warned him that still greater moderation was requisite; a vote of censure upon the ministry had been proposed, but only fifty-three voted in its favour. The great majority by which the censure was thus negatived entertained the desire very commonly felt in political bodies to place the most celebrated and able men at the helm of the State, without a preliminary overthrow and disgrace of the existing ministry.

While anticipating his speedy return to office, Mr. Pitt took part in all debates, almost as though he had been minister, but rather to support and carry out the government measures than to oppose and thwart them.

The principal of these measures was the formation of an army. England had one composed of Irish, Scotch, Hanoverians, Hessians, Swiss, and even Maltese; this army, which had been got together by the skill of the recruiting officers who were so numerous in Europe previously to the establishment of the conscription system, was dispersed in India, America, and divers stations in the Mediterranean. As we have already seen, it had behaved extremely well in Egypt. This army numbered about one hundred and thirty thousand men; now, it is well known that it requires very skilful management to have eighty thousand men perfectly fit for active service out of a force of one hundred and thirty thousand. To this force, a third of which was necessary for the protection of Ireland, there was added a militia, which had recently been increased from fifty to seventy thousand men; a national force which could not be sent to serve out of its own county, and which had never faced an enemy. It was commanded by half-pay officers, and by English nobles and gentlemen, full of patriotism, undoubtedly, but as undoubtedly quite inexperienced in warfare, and quite unfit to be opposed to the veteran legions that had smitten down the European coalition. How was this insufficiency of land forces to be remedied? The ministry, surrounded by the most experienced soldiers, conceived the idea of forming an army of reserve, fifty thousand strong, to consist of Englishmen, drawn by ballot, and only to be liable to service within the limits of the United Kingdom; thus forming, to that extent, a supplement and reinforcement to the troops of the line. Substitutes were to be allowed; but would necessarily, under the circumstances, be very expensive. This, it is true, was not doing much, but it was all that could be attempted on the instant. Mr. Wyndham, siding with the war party, attacked this proposal on the ground of its insufficiency. He proposed the formation of a great army of the line, to be formed on the French principle of conscription, to be at the absolute orders of the government, and liable to be despatched to any part of the world. He said that what the ministry had proposed was a mere increase of the militia; that it would be in no wise superior to that force, especially when in presence of the tried legions of France, and would obstruct the recruiting for the regular army by the proposed liberty of substitution, as individuals willing to serve would find it more advantageous to engage as substitutes for those drawn to serve in the army of reserve, than to enrol themselves in the regiments of the line;

that a regular army formed of the native population, liable to serve wherever their services were required, and, consequently, having the means of acquiring warlike experience, was the only fitting force to oppose to the troops of General Bonaparte. To cut diamond, argued Mr. Wyndham, you require a diamond.

England, already possessed of a navy, was anxious to have a land force too; a very natural ambition, for it is a rare thing for a nation to have one of those two powers without aspiring to the possession of the other. But Mr. Pitt replied to these proposals in a cold, dogmatical spirit. All Mr. Wyndham's ideas, argued Mr. Pitt, were excellent in the abstract, but how was an army to be formed in a few days? How seasoned to warfare? How fill up its ranks and provide it with competent officers? Such an army as Mr. Wyndham desired was not to be extemporised: what had been proposed by the ministry was, in fact, the only practicable course; and, indeed, even to organise, as proposed, 50,000 men, to drill them, and provide them with competent officers of all ranks, would be found to be quite sufficiently difficult. Mr. Pitt, therefore, entreated that his friend Mr. Wyndham would, for the present at least, give up his own plan and join with him in supporting that of the government.

Mr. Wyndham paid but little attention to the opinion pronounced by Mr. Pitt, persisted in his own plan, and supported it by new and more potent considerations. He even proposed a levy *en masse*, similar to that of France in 1792, and reproached the weak Addington ministry with not having turned its attention to this mighty resource of nations threatened in their independence. This enemy of France and of Napoleon, by a very common result of hatred, bestowed praises upon the objects of his detestation, and in his anxiety to convict the English ministry of want of forethought, almost exaggerated our greatness, our power, and the danger with which the First Consul menaced England.

The army of reserve was voted, notwithstanding the contempt and ridicule bestowed upon it by the Wyndham party, who termed it an augmentation of the militia. This force was reckoned upon for the increase of the troops of the line; it was hoped that men whom the ballot condemned to serve would rather enrol themselves in this army than in any other; twenty or thirty thousand recruits would probably be thus thrown into its ranks.

Nevertheless, as the danger hourly became more imminent, and, still further, as continental co-operation daily became less probable, recourse was had to the proposition of the most ardent party, and something like an approach was made to realising the notion of a levy *en masse*. Ministers required, and were allowed, the power to call to arms all Englishmen from the age of seventeen to that of fifty-five. Volunteers, or, in default of those,

the men legally selected, were to be formed into battalions, and drilled for a certain number of hours weekly. They were to be allowed pay in compensation for their loss of time; but this regulation applied only to those volunteers who belonged to the labouring classes.

Mr. Wyndham, who could not but admit that his views were at length adopted, now complained that the adoption was both tardy and insufficient, and he severely criticised many of the details of the proposed measure. But the measure was voted, nevertheless, and ere long, in every county and town in England, the population, called to arms, was to be seen every morning at exercise in the volunteer uniform, which was now worn by men of all ranks. Even the staid Mr. Addington went down to the House of Commons in this uniform, and drew down some little ridicule upon himself by a display so little in accordance with his character and manners. The aged king and his son, the Prince of Wales, reviewed the volunteers on Wimbledon Common; and the exiled French princes, with an unpardonable want of propriety and taste, were present at these reviews. There were some twenty thousand of these volunteers in London; this, it is true, was no very great number out of so vast a population, but in the whole extent of the country the number was sufficiently great to form an imposing force, had it only been sufficiently organised; but soldiers cannot be formed in a day, and still less can officers. If in France there was but little faith put in our flat-bottomed boats, there was still less faith in England in the value of their volunteers, who were shrewdly judged to be deficient, not, perhaps, on the score of mere courage, but assuredly in aptitude for actual war. To these measures was added a plan of field fortifications around London upon the roads terminating at that capital, and upon those points of the coast most exposed to attack. A part of the active force was stationed from the Isle of Wight to the mouth of the Thames. A system of signals was arranged for giving the alarm by means of beacon fires to be lighted up all along the coasts at the first appearance of the French; and carriages of a peculiar form were built for the rapid conveyance of troops to whatever point might be menaced. In a word, in England, as in France, invention was put to the rack for the discovery of new means of attack and defence to subdue the enemy, and to press them into the service as auxiliaries. The two nations, as though they had been irresistibly attracted to these opposite shores, presented there at this instant a most imposing spectacle to the gazing and anxious world. England, uneasy when she reflected upon the inexperience of her land forces, was cheered by the view of that ocean by which she was belted as with a protecting cestus; France, full of confidence in her courage, in her warlike experience and

aptitude, and in the genius of her great chieftain, measured with her glance that broad arm of the sea which interposed an obstacle to the progress for which she panted, and rapidly learned to view that obstacle as one too trifling to arrest her, led as she would be by the triumphant hero of Marengo and of the Pyramids.

Neither of the two nations suspected the existence of other preparations than those which were publicly and even ostentatiously made. The English, imagining that Brest and Toulon were strictly blockaded, did not dream that a squadron might suddenly make its appearance in the Channel. The French, daily exercised in manœuvring their gunboats, were on the other hand accustomed to look upon them as the sole means of crossing the Strait. No one suspected the existence of what was, in truth, the most important part of the First Consul's plan; though some hoped in France, and some feared in England, some new and sudden invention of his daring and fertile genius, and confidence and anxiety were thus to a very high degree excited on either side of the Channel.

It must be confessed that, supposing us fairly across the Channel, the preparations made to resist us were not very formidable. Supposing that, between the Channel and London, there could be concentrated 50,000 troops of the line, and from thirty to forty thousand of the army of reserve, and any conceivable number of volunteers added to them, the force thus formed would, even in actual number, have fallen short of the French army that was to cross the Straits. But even supposing the English force to be numerically twice or thrice as great as it was, what would such a force avail against the 150,000 veterans who, in eighteen months, led by Napoleon, combated and beat the armies of entire Europe at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland; veterans apparently equal to the English in courage, certainly more skilled and practised in warfare, and four or five times more numerous! The land force of England, then, was in reality very insufficient, and her chief protection was the ocean still. In any event, whatever might be the final result, the conduct of the English government was already signally punished by the general agitation of all ranks of the people, by the enforced withdrawal of the working classes from their labour, the merchants from their business, and the nobility and gentry from their leisure and their pastimes; the duration of such an agitation for any considerable period would in itself be a great calamity, and might even convulse the social system.

The British government, in its great and well-founded anxiety, adopted every means of averting the danger which threatened the country; and among those means some which morality repudiates. During the first war, the English cabinet had encouraged and suggested insurrections against every form

of government which had existed in France. Latterly, though the powerful and sagacious rule of the First Consul left but little scope for such insurrections, the rebel-staffs of La Vendée and the emigration were retained in London, and profusely subsidised, even during the continuance of peace; and the tenacity with which the guilty tools of an ungenerous warfare were kept at hand, ready for use, had greatly contributed, as we have seen, to rekindle animosity between the two nations. It is quite true that diversions are among the ordinary resources of war, and to produce the insurrection of one of an enemy's provinces is a diversion which, as it is one of the most effective, is also one the least hesitatingly made available. In return for the endeavours of the English to cause a rising in La Vendée, the First Consul had met them by a like attempt upon Ireland: the measure was at once customary and reciprocal. But at the period now spoken of, an insurrection of La Vendée was quite beyond the pale of probability. The employment, therefore, of the Chouans and their leader, Georges Cadoudal, could produce but one result, the endeavour to strike some abominable blow, such as that of the infernal machine. To urge an insurrection to the extent of overthrowing a government is a course of very disputable fairness; but to aim at overthrowing a government by personal attacks upon the members of it, is a flagrant departure alike from morality and the laws of nations.

The facts of the case will sufficiently indicate the extent to which the British ministers were concerned in the criminal projects of the French emigrants who found an asylum in London. It will not be forgotten that of all the Vendean chiefs who had been formerly presented to the First Consul, the only one who had not been propitiated by him was Georges Cadoudal, the formidable chieftain of the Chouans of Morbihan. He was now living in London in a state of actual opulence, distributing among the French refugees the aid allowed them by the British government, and associating with the emigrant princes, especially with the two most active of them, the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry. Nothing could be more natural than that these princes should desire to return to France; that they should wish to do so at the expense of civil war was a perversity common enough under such circumstances; but, unfortunately for their reputation, they could no longer reckon upon civil war—they could rely only upon conspiracies and assassins.

Princes or plebeians, all the exiled French were rendered desperate by the peace; war had restored them to hope, not only because it secured them the support of a part of Europe, but also because they anticipated that it would destroy the popularity of the First Consul. They had kept up a correspondence with La Vendée through the medium of Georges, and

with Paris by the medium of the returned emigrants. The day-dreams which they indulged in England, their partisans indulged in France, and the slightest circumstances which flattered their illusions sufficed to convert to their view those illusions into certainties. In their lamentable correspondence, they repeated to each other that war would prove ruinous to the First Consul; that his power, illegitimate as regarded the French who continued faithful to the Bourbons, and tyrannical as regarded the French who continued faithful to the Revolution, had but two claims to support—the re-establishment of peace and the preservation of order; that one of these claims had been completely annihilated by the rupture with England, and that the other claim was seriously damaged, as it must, of necessity, be very doubtful if public order could be maintained amidst the excitement and anxieties of war. The government of the First Consul, therefore, argued they, would become unpopular, like the various governments which had preceded it. The peaceful multitude would necessarily be irritated against the First Consul on account of the renewal of European hostility, and would lose their faith in his good fortune when difficulties seemed no longer to vanish at his approach. Moreover, the First Consul had a variety of enemies who could be made serviceable to the views of the conspirators; firstly, the revolutionists, and then those who envied his glory and ascendancy, who were so numerous in the army. The Jacobins were said to be exasperated, the French generals discontented, at perceiving that their achievements had assisted an equal to become their master. Of these divers malcontents, one united party was to be formed to overthrow the First Consul. The sum and substance of all missives, whether from France or from London, was this—Royalists, Jacobins, military malcontents, all who hated, or envied, or feared the First Consul, must be fused into one party to crush the usurper Bonaparte. Such were the ideas entertained by the French princes in London, and by them communicated to the British cabinet as a plea for asking it for funds, which it lavishly granted with, at least, a general knowledge of the use to which they were destined.

A vast conspiracy, then, was formed upon this plan, and conducted with the impatience common to emigrants; and it was communicated to Louis XVIII., then living at Warsaw. That prince, never agreeing with his brother, the Comte d'Artois, whose imprudent and inefficient activity he disliked, rejected the proposed plan. Strange contrast between the two princes! The Comte d'Artois was good-hearted, but imprudent; Louis XVIII. was prudent, but not good-hearted; the Comte d'Artois entered into schemes which were unworthy of his heart, which Louis rejected because they were unworthy of his judgment. Louis

XVIII. resolved to remain thenceforth a stranger to all the new intrigues to which the war might give birth. The Comte d'Artois, residing far from his elder brother, and urged on by his own natural ardour as well as by that of the emigrants, and, still worse, by that of the English themselves, took part in all the schemes to which the changing events of the day gave birth in minds disturbed by continual excitement. The communications of the French emigrants with the British cabinet were carried on through the medium of Mr. Hammond, the under-secretary of State, a prominent person in several negotiations; it was to him that, in England, the emigrants on all occasions applied; abroad they addressed themselves to three English diplomatic agents, viz., Mr. Taylor, minister to Hesse; Mr. Spencer Smith, minister to Stuttgart; and Mr. Drake, minister to Bavaria. These three agents, stationed close upon our frontiers, endeavoured to forward all sorts of intrigues in France, and thus to aid those which were carried on in London; they corresponded with Mr. Hammond, and had considerable sums at their command. It is impossible to mistake these proceedings for obscure police plottings and schemings, such as governments sometimes resort to as the readiest way of procuring information, and to which they devote trifling funds. These on the contrary were veritable political plans, acted upon by agents of the highest order, communicating with the most important department, that of foreign affairs, and costly to the amount of millions.

The French princes who were the most deeply concerned in these projects were the Comte d'Artois and his second son, the Duc de Berry. The Duc d'Angoulême was at that time residing at Warsaw with Louis XVIII.; the Princes de Condé were in London, but in no great intimacy with the princes of the elder branch, and in complete ignorance of their schemes. The Comte d'Artois, indeed, and the Duc de Berry looked upon the Princes de Condé as mere soldiers, always ready for battle, and fit for no other purpose. While the grandfather and father of the family were in London, the grandson, the Duc d'Enghien, was at Baden, wholly occupied by the pleasures of the chase and by the passionate affection he had conceived for a Princess de Rohan. All three of these princes were in the service of Great Britain, were under orders to be ready for active duty, and obeyed as soldiers obey the government which pays them: a melancholy position, no doubt, for the Condés; yet not so melancholy as that of being hourly engaged in hatching conspiracies!

Let us now look at the plan of the new conspiracy. There was no longer any chance of getting up an insurrection in La Vendée; on the other hand, to make a direct attack on the First Consul, in the very heart of Paris, seemed an equally sure and speedy means of attaining the desired end. The consular

government being once overthrown, no other government, according to the authors of this project, could succeed it but that of the Bourbons. Now, as the consular government was wholly vested in the person of General Bonaparte, it was necessary that he should be destroyed: this conclusion was inevitable. But he must be destroyed without chance of failure. The dagger, the infernal machine, and similar means left too much to chance; the firmness of the assassin's heart or the steadiness of his hand might fail him; the infernal machine might explode an instant too soon or an instant too late. But there was one mode which had not yet been tried, and upon which, consequently, no stigma of ill success rested; that of assembling a hundred resolute men, with the intrepid Georges as their leader; to waylay the First Consul's carriage on the road to St. Cloud or to Malmaison; to attack his guard, numbering only some ten or a dozen horse, disperse it, and kill the First Consul in a quasi battle. By this method success was deemed to be certain. Georges, who was brave, who had some military pretensions, and was unwilling to be considered an assassin, required that two of the princes, or at all events one of them, should accompany him, and thus regain his or their ancestral crown sword in hand. Is it credible? These men, perverted by exile, flattered themselves that thus to attack the First Consul while surrounded by his guards was not to assassinate him, but to give him battle! They seemed to be on a par with the gallant Archduke Charles, combating against General Bonaparte at Tagliamento or at Wagram; or only inferior to him as to number of troops! Wretched sophistry, to which even those who propounded it could have given but half credence, and which stigmatises those unfortunate Bourbons, not indeed with a natural perversity, but with a perversity acquired amidst the ferocities of civil war, and in the weariness and misery of exile. There was but one of these men whose part became him, Georges Cadoudal. He was a proficient in these surprises, which he had practised in the forest wilds of Brittany; and now that he was about to exert his science at the very gates of Paris, he did not fear being degraded into the mere herd of vulgar tools who are made use of and then disowned or denounced, for he anticipated having princes for his accomplices. He had thus far secured all the dignity which could comport with the part that he was about to play, and he subsequently showed by his bearing in the presence of his judges, that it was not he who was degraded by these events. But this was not all; it was necessary not only to prepare for the combat, but also to secure the fruits of the victory; it was necessary to provide for the certainty that France would throw herself into the arms of the Bourbons. Parties in France had been so reciprocally destructive, that, as to power,

they had, practically, been suicidal. The more violent revolutionists were detested, the more moderate revolutionists, taking refuge behind General Bonaparte, were impotent; the sole power that remained erect and unshaken was that of the army; and it was the army that it was necessary to gain. But it was devoted to the Revolution, for which it had poured forth its blood like water, and it looked with somewhat of horror and loathing upon those emigrants whom it had so often seen combating in the ranks of the Austrians and of the English.

The chief subject of conversation was the quarrel between General Moreau and General Bonaparte. We have already remarked elsewhere, that the general of the army of the Rhine, reflecting, prudent, firm on the battlefield, was in private life careless and weak, and governed by those who surrounded him; and that under this fatal influence he had not escaped from being tainted with that second-rate vice, Envy; that although attentions and favours had been showered upon him by the First Consul, he had allowed himself to cherish hostility to General Bonaparte, for no other reason than because that hero was the first man in the State, and General Moreau only the second; that in this temper Moreau had been guilty of the impropriety of refusing to attend the First Consul at a review, and that the latter, always alert in returning an affront, had consequently abstained from inviting Moreau to a banquet with which he celebrated the anniversary of the Republic; and that Moreau had committed the grievous error of dining on that very day in plain clothes with some malcontent officers, at one of those places of public resort where one is sure to be seen; a course of conduct as offensive to all prudent men, as it was pleasing to the enemies of the Commonwealth. We have spoken but of those pettinesses of wounded vanity, which commence among women in vulgar quarrels, and finish among men in tragical events. If it be difficult to prevent quarrels between eminent personages, still more difficult is it to stop them when they have fairly broken forth. From the day of the banquet above spoken of, Moreau had continually shown himself more and more hostile to the consular government. When the Concordat was settled, he declaimed against the domination of the priests; when the Legion of Honour was founded, he declaimed against it as the establishment of aristocracy; and, finally, when the consulate for life was settled, he denounced *that* as the re-establishment of royalty. At length he had ceased to present himself either at the Chief Consul's or at either of his colleagues. On the renewal of war, he might have availed himself of that opportunity of honourably, and without the shadow of personal submission, presenting himself at the Tuileries to offer his services, not to General Bonaparte, but to France. Moreau, drawn by degrees into an evil

track, that *facilis descensus Averni*, had looked upon this interruption of peace far less with reference to the suffering of his country, than with reference to the check which war would present to his detested rival, and stood aloof to watch how the difficulty would be solved by the enemy whom he had so wantonly provoked. He, Moreau, was now resident at Grosbois, enjoying his well-earned opulence like some eminent citizen, the victim of princely ingratitude.

The First Consul not only aroused envy in his own person; his family connections, too, aroused it against him. Murat, whom he had for a long time refused to elevate to the rank of his brother-in-law, and who with much natural talent, an excellent heart, and a perfectly chivalric courage, sometimes made an extremely bad use of those gifts; Murat, with a vanity which he carefully concealed from the First Consul, but very freely paraded when out of sight of that rigid master; Murat galled those who, being too humbly placed to be envious of General Bonaparte, felt themselves, at least, entitled to be envious of his brother-in-law. Thus, then, there were great and little foes aroused against General Bonaparte by that smallest of all possible causes of hatred, Envy. Both classes ranged themselves behind Moreau, as their natural and fitting leader. In Paris during the winter, at Grosbois during the summer, he held a kind of court, at which the malcontents spoke out without restraint. The First Consul was aware of all this, and avenged himself, not only by the onward march of his power and of his glory, but also by his emphatic contempt unreservedly expressed. At first, he had imposed upon himself an extreme reserve; but at length he answered the small sarcasms of mediocrity by the literally *flaying* sarcasms of genius; and these were to the full as generally made known as those of Moreau's party.

Party spirit makes use of quarrels which do *not* exist: of course, it is no less ready to make use of those which *do*. Moreau became a hero on the spot; if one might credit the malcontents, he was at once the military hero, the peaceful citizen, and the virtuous man; while General Bonaparte was the imprudent but lucky chieftain, the ungifted usurper, the presumptuous Corsican, who had dared to overthrow the French Republic and ascend the steps of that throne which the Revolution had demolished, and which he had reared again.

It would be well, said the emigrants and the malcontents, to allow Bonaparte to involve himself in an absurd and ruinous contest with England, and to withhold from him the aid of their courage, their experience, and their skill. And thus, treating the victor of Egypt and of Italy as a mere adventurer, they represented the patriotic expedition which he had so much at heart as the most extravagant of brain-feverish delusions.

In these unfortunate differences the London conspirators found new facilities for furthering the second portion of their scheme. Moreau was first to be won over, and through him the army; and then the First Consul was to be butchered on the road to Malmaison. Moreau, once won over, would lead the army, and reconcile that formidable portion of the nation to the Bourbons, whom he could represent as having bravely reconquered the throne at the point of the sword. But how was Moreau to be approached, surrounded as he was exclusively by republicans, while the London cabal was as exclusively surrounded by Chouans and ultra-Bourbonists? A mediator was absolutely indispensable, and one had just made his appearance from the far forests of America—Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, who had been transported by the Directory to Sinnamari. Though fallen far below his former greatness, he was still an illustrious character, endowed with splendid qualities, and influential alike with royalists and with republicans. He had made his escape at this juncture from his place of banishment, and was resident in London, where he lived in the hope of being enabled to return to France, under favour of that policy which recalled indifferently the victims and the guilty of all parties. But the war, suspended for a brief space, speedily broke out again, and with it once more sprang into life the wild delusions of the emigrants, from whom Pichegru had purchased his liberty at the expense of his honour. In spite of himself, he had been drawn into the conspiracy; and he was now empowered to confer with Moreau, and to gain him to the party of the Bourbons, and thus to fuse into one party both republicans and royalists of every shade of opinion and feeling.

The plan resolved upon was rendered sufficiently specious by the apparent posture of affairs; but even had it been far less so, it would have sufficed to lure on the impatient spirits to which every chance was a good chance, if it did but serve to vary with a new excitement the tedium and forced leisure of exile. The plan being determined upon, the next step was to arrange the details of its execution.

France must needs be the theatre of action. Though Georges required the presence of one or of two of the princes at the decisive moment, he did not insist upon such countenance until then; he allowed that it was necessary that he should make all arrangements previously to their entering France, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed to the risks of a prolonged residence in Paris under the eyes of an acute and vigilant police. He determined, therefore, to precede them to Paris, and get together a party of Chouans to attack the guard of the First Consul. In the meantime, Pichegru was to have a communication with Moreau, first through a third party, and afterwards

to go to Paris and have a personal interview with that general. Finally, when every preparation should have been made, when the Chouans should be ready to assail the First Consul, and Moreau should have engaged to secure the adhesion of the army, the princes were to arrive in France, on the eve, or on the very day of the execution of the project.

All details being thus far arranged, Georges, with a party of Chouans, upon whose fidelity he could rely, set out from London for France. He and his men were armed, like so many highwaymen; and he carried in a belt bills of exchange to the amount of a million. Not for an instant can it be supposed that the French princes, reduced to all sorts of expedients to supply their own wants, could furnish such sums as circulated among the wholesale speculators in conspiracy; those sums proceeded from the old source, that is to say, from the British treasury.

An officer of the English royal navy, Captain Wright, a bold and skilful seaman, in command of a light vessel, took on board at Deal or Hastings such emigrants as wished to make the French coast, and landed them at such point in France as they chose. Since the First Consul had discovered this, and had caused the coast of Brittany to be more strictly watched than ever, Captain Wright had chosen another track, and landed his passengers upon the coast of Normandy.

Between Dieppe and Tréport, in the side of the steep cliff of Biville, was a secret passage, formed in a cleft of the rock, and known only to smugglers. A cable, securely fixed to the top of the cliff, descended through this cleft, as far as the surface of the sea. At a certain cry, the concealed wardens of this passage let down the cable, the smugglers seized it, and by its aid climbed the precipice, two or three hundred feet in height, carrying heavy loads of merchandise upon their shoulders. The trusty followers of Georges had found out this path, and had readily enough purchased the use of it. To render their secret communication with Paris complete, they had established a chain of lodging places; some in solitary farms, some in the châteaux of Norman nobles, faithful and wary royalists, who rarely left their abodes. By these means it was easy to pass from the Channel coast right onward to Paris without once touching upon a highroad or entering an inn. Finally, that there might be the less risk of discovering this secret way to enemies, it was reserved for the exclusive use of the most important personages of the party and their immediate followers. The money lavished among some of the Norman royalists, whose shelter was thus secured, the fidelity of others, and, especially, the distance of this secret track from all frequented roads, rendered imprudences but little to be dreaded, and, for some time at least, the secret secure.

It was by this route that Georges entered Paris, disembarking from Captain Wright's vessel at the foot of the cliff of Biville on the 21st of August 1803, at the very time when the First Consul was inspecting the coasts. Following the track of the smugglers, and accompanied by some of his most trusty lieutenants, he proceeded from shelter to shelter till he reached Chaillot, in one of the suburbs of Paris. There a small lodging was prepared for him, whence he could nightly steal forth into Paris to see his associates, and make all ready to strike the blow for which he had returned to France.

Resolute and sensible, Georges partook of the passions but not the illusions of his party; he judged more correctly than his associates of what was practicable, and he was urged by his courage to those measures which his accomplices ventured upon only from blind infatuation. He had no sooner reached Paris, than he discovered that the reports of the First Consul's unpopularity, which were so current in England, were quite unfounded; that the royalists and republicans were far enough from the adventurous temper that had been attributed to them, and that now, as ever, action halted far behind profession. But Georges was not a man to be easily intimidated; still less was he the man to cool the zeal of his associates by communicating the discouraging truths which his sagacity revealed to him, and he went steadily forward with the work that he had undertaken. After all, the aid of public opinion was not required for a stroke of violence, and the First Consul being once slain, it would be easy enough to induce France to accept the Bourbons, for want of better rulers. From the depths of his mysterious lurking-place he despatched emissaries to La Vendée, to ascertain the feelings of that province as to the conscription; to inquire whether the conscripts there were not now, as formerly, of opinion that, if they needs must serve, it was better to serve against the revolutionary government than under it. But he found that La Vendée had sunk into the deepest apathy; his own name was the only one which still preserved some influence, because he was looked upon as an incorruptible royalist, who had preferred exile to the favour of the First Consul; and much sympathy was felt for the representative of a cause which was so dear to the secret hearts of the people, but no one was willing to infest the woods and highways as of old. Moreover, the priests, the real leaders and prompters of the Vendéan population, were attached to the First Consul; all that could be hoped for, therefore, was some very insignificant assemblages, which, to the grief of the conspirators, included fewer than ever of those daring and desperate Chouans, who were once ready to do everything rather than return to a peaceful course of life. But it was absolutely necessary that some such men should be found;

Chouans at once daring and prudent; and in the course of two months' stay in Paris, Georges had scarcely been able to get thirty such men together. These were not made acquainted with each other, or with the actual scope of the undertaking for which they were engaged; they knew only that their undertaking was to be in favour of those Bourbons, to whom they were devoted, and that they had liberal pay, to which they were not less devoted. Georges secretly prepared arms and uniforms for the day of action. From the depths of his concealment, and with infinite precautions, because his views differed from those of the republicans, he endeavoured to discover whether matters were more propitious on their part than on that of the royalists. He caused an attached Breton to sound Moreau's private secretary, Fresnières, who was also a Breton, connected with all parties, even with M. Fouché. This was running no small risk, for Fouché at this period was eagerly looking out for an opportunity of rendering himself serviceable to the First Consul. Fresnières held out but small hope as to the inclinations of Moreau; indeed, his information was so unimportant, that Georges paid but little attention to it. Resolved to venture everything, he urged his emissaries in London to press matters forward; for, perilled as he was in the heart of Paris, his danger was as useless as it was great.

While Georges was thus occupied, the agents of Pichegru, on their part, had sounded Moreau. Some clerks of the commissariat department, a class of men who occasionally became intimate with general officers, were employed to convey Pichegru's proposals to Moreau, who was asked whether he had quite forgotten his former brother-in-arms, or still cherished any animosity towards him. In truth, it was not for Moreau to feel rancour against Pichegru, whom he had formerly denounced to the Directory; moreover, his present hate was too intense to allow of his cherishing an older one, and he consequently spoke kindly and even sympathisingly of the wrongs of his old friend, and thus encouraged the inquiry whether he would not exert his influence to obtain Pichegru's recall to France. And, in truth, why should the amnesty that was granted to the Vendéans and to the soldiers of Condé be refused to the conqueror of Holland? Moreau replied, that he fervently wished for Pichegru's restoration to his country, considered that restoration to be due to his services; that he would gladly promote it, if his position with respect to the government were such as to allow of his interference, but that he had definitively broken off all connection with the rulers of France, and fully determined never again to present himself at the Tuileries. Having gone thus far, he was naturally led to speak of his own wrongs, of his hatred of the First Consul, and of his desire to see France delivered from the rule of Napoleon.

The inclinations of Moreau being thus far ascertained, one of his former officers, General Lajolais, was employed to communicate with him—a most dangerous connection for a man too weak for self-control. General Lajolais was diminutive and lame, but endowed with a most decided turn for intrigue, and urged onward in that direction by narrowness of fortune, almost amounting to downright destitution. A deserter from the republican army was sent to him with a considerable sum of money and letters from Pichegru; the deserter in question being disguised as a hawker of lace. He found it a task of but small difficulty to gain over Lajolais, who fastened himself upon Moreau, and drew from him a confession of his wounded feelings, and of his wishes for the destruction of the consular government, no matter by what means. Lajolais did not completely reveal his views, but, credulous as such speculators in conspiracy usually are, he fancied that to decide Moreau to take an active part in the conspiracy, it was only requisite to propose it to him; and if he fancied more than existed, he told his employers still more than he fancied. It is thus that the meshes of this sort of conspiracy are woven by agents who impose half upon themselves and half upon their employers. Lajolais, then, held out the greatest hopes to the emissaries of Pichegru, and in compliance with their importunities set out for London to make a personal report to the illustrious personages whose tool he had become.

Lajolais and his guide were obliged to go to London by the way of Hamburg, that they might travel the more safely, and considerable time was thus lost. On reaching England, they found that the British authorities had given orders for their immediate reception, and they proceeded without delay to London, to put themselves into personal communication with Pichegru and the other heads of the conspiracy, whose impatient spirits were thrown into an intoxication of delight by the arrival of Lajolais. At the conferences which were now held, the Comte d'Artois had the folly to be present, thus compromising alike his rank, his dignity, and his family. It is true that he was personally known only to the leading men among the conspirators, but the intensity of his sentiments and of his language speedily revealed him to the rest. When Lajolais, with a ridiculous exaggeration, reported what Moreau had said to him, and affirmed that the mere appearance of Pichegru would secure the adhesion of the republican general, the Comte d'Artois, unable to repress his delight, exclaimed, "Ah! let but our two generals agree together, and I shall speedily be restored to France!" This speech attracted the attention of the conspirators to the prince, and caused them to identify him. They discovered that he who thus expressed himself was a

prince of the blood, a descendant of kings, and destined to be himself a king; whom the demoralising influence of exile had urged to conduct so little consistent with his rank, and so little creditable to his heart. So great was the satisfaction, said one of the conspirators, who subsequently narrated all the particulars, that had the King of England been present he would fain have joined the party.*

It was agreed that, without further delay, the conspirators should proceed to France to put the finishing stroke to their designs. In truth, there was no time to be lost, for the luckless Georges, thrown forward, unaided, as an advanced guard, was exposed to terrible perils, living as he did beneath the very eyes of the keen-sighted consular police. Towards the end of December, lest he should fancy himself altogether deserted, a second party of emigrants was sent to join him. It was now resolved that Pichegru himself, accompanied by such illustrious persons as M. de Rivière and one of the Polignacs, should go to France and join Georges; and as soon as these new emissaries should have made all necessary preparations, and M. de Rivière, the coolest and most prudent of the conspirators, should announce that all was ripe † for action, the princes themselves, the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry, should land in France, to take their share in the pretended battle with the First Consul.

Pichegru, then, and other leading French emigrants set out upon this expedition, in which he was to sacrifice his already tarnished reputation, and that life which should have been more worthily employed. Early in January 1804 he embarked on board the vessel of Captain Wright, who on the 16th of the month landed him at the cliff of Biville. The conqueror of Holland, accompanied by some of the most illustrious members of the French aristocracy, climbed the smugglers' rope, met Georges, who had proceeded to the coast to await them, and proceeding from one secure lurking-place to another, reached Chaillot on the 20th of January.

Georges had not collected so large a force as he had proposed to be aided by, yet, daring as he was, he would willingly have led on the force that he had got together to make a deadly attack upon the First Consul; but previously to proceeding to this last extremity, it was necessary to have such an understanding with Moreau as would secure the safety of the conspirators subsequently to the death of the First Consul. The agents had a fresh interview with him, at which they informed

* The very letter, as well as the substance of this pitiable business, are literally extracted from the minutes of the inquiry which took place, part of which was published, the rest remaining in the government archives. We have adopted nothing as credible except what all parties unite in affirming, and what consequently bears the undoubted stamp of truth.

† See, further on, the deposition of M. de Rivière.

him that Pichegru had privately returned to France, and proposed that they should confer together, to which Moreau consented, but being unwilling to receive Pichegru at home, he made an appointment to meet him at night on the Boulevard Madelaine. Pichegru went accordingly; he wished to go alone, for he was cool and prudent, and greatly disliked the company of the restless and vulgar people whose companionship was the first punishment of his conduct. He arrived with too large a company, including Georges, who was for seeing everything with his own eyes, apparently that he might ascertain upon what sort of foundation he was about to risk his life in a desperate attempt.

On a dark and cold night in the month of January, Moreau and Pichegru approached each other at a preconcerted signal; it was the first time of their meeting since they had fought side by side in the army of the Rhine, while their conduct and character were still free from stain. Scarcely had they recovered from the emotion caused by so many reminiscences, when Georges appeared upon the scene and made himself known. Moreau, evidently amazed at the presence of Georges, suddenly became cold in his demeanour, and seemed angry with Pichegru for having subjected him to such a meeting. They were obliged to separate without having said anything of importance; they were to meet under other circumstances, and in a different place.

This first interview with Moreau produced a most painful impression upon the mind of Georges. "This will never do," were his first words. Pichegru himself began to fear that he had ventured too far; but the plotting agents communicated with Moreau, and, throwing aside all secrecy, plainly told him that they wished him to aid in overthrowing the consular government. Moreau had no objection to the destruction of that government by means which, though not expressed, were perfectly well understood, but he manifested the strongest unwillingness personally to conspire for the service of the Bourbons. What he wished was, to benefit both the Republic and himself by the downfall of the First Consul, but it was only between him and Pichegru that such a course could be treated of. This time Moreau received Pichegru in his own house, and, after many accidents which threatened to discover all, the former companions-in-arms had a long and serious conference, in which they spoke out. Moreau could not emerge from a certain circle of ideas; he maintained that he had a considerable party both in the Senate and in the army, and that it was in his hands that power would be placed should France be freed from the three Consuls; that power he would use for the protection of those who should free the Republic

from her tyrant; but that liberated Republic should not be delivered over to the Bourbons. As for Pichegru, the former victor of Holland, and one of the most illustrious of the French generals, far more than mere protection would be accorded to him; he should be restored to his rank and honours, and placed in the most important offices of the State. Moreau, obstinately fixed in these notions, expressed his surprise at finding Pichegru connected with such people; Pichegru needed not Moreau's opinion on that point to render the companionship of the Chouans extremely unpalatable to him; but Moreau himself furnished a proof of the sad society into which a conspirator is of necessity plunged. Pichegru was too acute and too well-informed to share the illusions of Moreau, and endeavoured to convince him that, the First Consul being put to death, the only government that could succeed him would be that of the Bourbons. But this view of affairs was far too extensive; Moreau, sagacious only on the field of battle, persisted in believing that, on General Bonaparte's death, he, General Moreau, should infallibly become First Consul. Although the murder of the First Consul was never directly mentioned, it was perfectly well understood as the means by which he was to be got rid of. Without endeavouring to find apologies for these sad negotiations, we may, however, remark, that the men of that day had seen so much of death upon the scaffold and upon the field of battle, and had issued, or been subjected to, so many terrible orders, that the death of an individual was not in their eyes of that horrible importance of which it has since been rendered in our eyes by the termination of civil war and the gentle influences of peace.

Pichegru was driven to despair by this interview, and said to the confidant who guided him to Moreau's house and thence back again to his obscure shelter, "And this man, too, has ambition, and wishes to take his turn in governing France! Poor creature! he could not govern her for four-and-twenty hours!"

Georges, when informed of what had passed between Pichegru and Moreau, exclaimed with his usual impetuosity of tone—"If we must needs have any usurper, I should prefer the First Consul to this brainless and heartless Moreau!"

Such was the tone in which they privately spoke of the man whom their hired scribes publicly held up as the model of all warlike qualities and public virtues!

The knowledge thus acquired of the actual views and feelings of Moreau threw the unfortunate and guilty emigrants into despair. Another meeting took place between him and Pichegru at Georges' retreat at Chaillot, probably without Moreau's knowledge of his host's identity. Georges was present at the commencement of this interview, but suddenly retired, saying to

the two generals, "I will leave you to yourselves, and then perhaps you will come to some understanding."

But their interview produced no such understanding between the republican generals, and it now became obvious to all the conspirators that they had imprudently ventured upon a scheme which could terminate only in ruin. M. de Rivière was driven to despair; he and his friends constantly repeated what is always said by those who cannot cause their feelings and passions to be adopted, "France is apathetic; no longer faithful to her former sentiments, she covets nothing but rest." In truth, France was not, as it had been represented, virulently disposed against the consular government, nor were all parties prepared to concur in its overthrow: it was only some envious men of mediocre ability who wished for its destruction, and even they were not prepared to go to the length of actual conspiracy. And though France grieved at the interruption of peace, and was, perhaps, somewhat suspicious of the First Consul's ambitious and warlike propensity, she yet did not the less look upon him as her saviour. Admiring his genius, she would on no account have been willing to see him and herself exposed to all the hazards of a new revolution.

Already some of the unfortunate and guilty conspirators were tempted to retire, some to Bretagne and others to England. Undeceived as to the actual state of things, the most eminent among them were, moreover, still further disgusted by the kind of company in which they were reduced to the necessity of living; and the most prudent of them all, M. de Rivière and Pichegru, confided to each other their vexations and disgusts.

One day, Pichegru calling some troublesome Chouans to order, one of them said, "But, general, you are one of us." "No!" said Pichegru, with biting contempt, "I am *among* you, but not *of* you!" by which he meant that though his life was in their hands, his will and intellect were not so.

All were now agitated by most painful doubts, but Georges was still ready to attack the First Consul, provided only that arrangements should be made for the future; while others inquired what good would be produced by a needless delay. Things were in this position when this plotting, after going on uninterruptedly for six months, at length attracted the attention of the police, but too tardily to do much credit to its vigilance. The First Consul's sagacity saved him, and ruined the imprudent foes who had plotted his ruin. It is the common fate of those who embark in such schemes to stop only when it is too late, and they are not unfrequently discovered, seized, and punished precisely at the moment when conscience, good sense, and terror have so far opened their eyes that they are preparing to abandon the evil of their ways.

These goings and comings continued from August to January, beneath the eyes of such a man as the ex-minister Fouché, so anxious to make discoveries, could not but be sooner or later detected. We have elsewhere mentioned that M. Fouché had been deprived of the portfolio of the police when the First Consul wished to inaugurate the consulate for life by suppressing a severe ministry; and the police authority was, as it were, merged into the ministry of justice. The Grand Judge Regnier, quite a novice in this sort of administration, turned it over to the Councillor of State Réal, a man of intellect, but credulous and flighty, and very far from equalling Fouché in sagacity. The consequence was, that the police was but poorly managed, and the First Consul was assured that there had never been a time when less plotting was going forward; a confidence which the First Consul was far from sharing, and which, indeed, Fouché took good care not to allow him to share. That acute observer had become a senator, and weary of idleness, and having kept up his connection with his old agents, he had correct intelligence, which he from time to time communicated to the First Consul, who, listening attentively to what was told him by Réal and Fouché, and carefully reading the reports of the gendarmerie, which are always of the greatest use, because they are faithful and accurate, felt convinced that some plot was in existence against his person. In the first place, circumstances led him to infer that the renewal of war would tempt the emigrants and the republicans to some new design, and in this inference he was confirmed by many indications, such as the arrest of Chouans and the information forwarded to him by Vendéan chiefs who were personally attached to him. On receiving information direct from La Vendée that refractory conscripts were forming themselves into troops, he sent to the departments of the west Colonel Savary, whose devotion was boundless, and whose intelligence and courage were alike well tried, to head some moving columns of picked gendarmerie to follow and disperse the insurgents. Colonel Savary carefully observed everything with his own eyes, and clearly perceived that a conspiracy was secretly afoot. This movement was that of Georges, who from his concealment in Paris endeavoured to excite insurrection in La Vendée. But nothing was yet discovered as to that terrible secret which Georges confined to himself and the chief of his associates. Having dispersed the refractory bands in the west, Colonel Savary returned to Paris without making any very important discovery.

There was another intrigue, a clue to which had fallen into the hands of the First Consul, who took something of pride and pleasure in following it up himself, and this clue promised to throw further light upon what was going on, though it had not

done so as yet. The three English ministers to Hesse, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, who were also charged to superintend intrigues in France, applied themselves to that task with an assiduous but clumsy zeal. Foreigners are but ill qualified to carry on such plots. The minister to Bavaria, Mr. Drake, was the most active of the three; he even resided out of Munich that he might be the more easily visited by agents from France, and to prevent his letters being opened, had a Bavarian postmaster in his pay. A restless and busy Frenchman, formerly a republican, with whom Mr. Drake had undertaken his schemes, and to whom that minister revealed the intrigues of the British, divulged all that he knew to the police. Mr. Drake was anxious in the first instance to get at the consular secrets as to the invasion, then to win over some eminent general, seize, if possible, upon some town, as Strasburg or Besançon, and there commence an insurrection. To get rid of General Bonaparte was constantly the object more or less explicitly insisted upon. The First Consul, delighted at having thus caught an English minister in the fact, caused a considerable sum of money to be paid to the man who thus deceived Mr. Drake, on condition that he should continue to impose upon that minister, and the First Consul himself furnished the drafts of letters to be written to Drake; in these letters he gave both numerous and correct details as to his personal habits, the manner in which he formed his plans and dictated his orders, and added that the whole secret of the consular operations and views was contained in a large black portfolio which was entrusted to M. de Meneval, or to a confidential person; that M. de Meneval was above being bribed, but that the other individual was corruptible, and would give up the portfolio for a million francs. The First Consul then proceeded to hint that there could be no doubt that other plots existed in France besides that directed by Mr. Drake, and that it was important to become acquainted with them all, so that no one might work to the injury of the rest, but that all should render mutual assistance. Finally, he added, as a most important piece of information, that the real object of the preparations for a descent was Ireland, that what was going on at Boulogne was a mere feint, to which it was sought to gain credence by the extent of the preparations, but that the only seriously meant expeditions were those of Brest and the Texel.* This at once

* The following curious passages are extracts from letters dictated by the First Consul himself:—

“To the GRAND JUDGE.

“*9th Brumaire, An. XII. (1st November 1803).*

“It is of consequence to have a secret agent to watch Drake at Munich, and notice all French who go to that place.

“I have read all the reports you sent me, and found them somewhat in.

guilty and awkward diplomatist, who committed the double error of compromising the most sacred of functions and of so clumsily conducting his intrigues, eagerly swallowed all those details, and no less eagerly requested additional information, especially such as related to the Boulogne expedition; and he announced that he would communicate with his government concerning the portfolio, for which so large a sum was demanded;

interesting. There must not be any hurry in making arrests; when our man has given all information, a plan of action must be settled with him. I wish him to write to Drake and tell him that, while awaiting an opportunity to strike the great blow, he thinks he can venture to promise that he will take from the First Consul's own table in his private study, and in the First Consul's own handwriting, his notes concerning the great expedition, and all other important papers; that this hope is founded upon the connivance of a confidential person who, having formerly been a member of the Jacobin club, and having at present the First Consul's confidence and the charge of his private study, belongs, nevertheless, to the secret committee, but that two things are indispensable to securing his aid, that he shall receive a hundred thousand pounds sterling on delivering the important documents in the First Consul's own writing, and that a French royalist agent shall be sent to provide means of concealment to this person, who would necessarily be arrested should documents so important be missed.

“Bonaparte scarcely ever writes; he walks up and down his study and dictates to a young man, twenty years of age, named Meneval, who is the only person who enters the First Consul's private study, or even the three adjoining rooms. This young man succeeded B  urienne, whom the First Consul had known from his childhood, but had dismissed.

“Nothing is to be hoped from Meneval; but the notes which are of the greatest importance are not dictated by Bonaparte, but written with his own hand. On his table there is a large portfolio, divided into as many compartments as there are ministries; this well-secured portfolio is fastened by the First Consul himself, and when he, for however brief a space, leaves his study, Meneval's duty is to place this portfolio in a cupboard which slides under his writing-table, and which is screwed down to the floor of the room.

“This portfolio being stolen, only Meneval and the confidential man who lights the fire and keeps the room in order can be suspected: means, therefore, must be provided for the escape of the latter. This portfolio must contain all that the First Consul has written during several years past, as it is the only one which he always carries on his journeys, and which is constantly on the road from Paris to Malmaison and St. Cloud. All his private memoranda of military arrangements must be in this portfolio; and as his authority can only be destroyed by thwarting his projects, there can be no doubt that the carrying off of this portfolio is the readiest way of attaining that end.”

“To the GRAND JUDGE.

“PARIS, 3rd *Pluvi  se*, An. XII. (24th January 1804).

“The letters of Drake seem very important. I should wish M  h  e in his next despatch to say, that the committee had been delighted with the idea that Bonaparte intended to embark at Boulogne, but that it is now perfectly ascertained that the demonstrations at Boulogne are mere feints, which though undoubtedly expensive, are far less so than they seem to be; that all the boats of the flotilla can eventually be made available for ordinary purposes, and that this very fact suffices to show that the demonstrations are merely illusive and temporary. That it must not be concealed that the First Consul is far too wary and believes himself far too well established to risk a doubtful attempt which might compromise a great force. His true design,

that in regard to other plots that were supposed to exist, he was quite ignorant of them (and here he stated strictly the truth), but that if any such did exist they should be forwarded, not opposed, for, added he, *it is a matter of right little consequence by whom the animal be stricken down provided you are all in the Hunt!** To so vile a course, and to such vile language, an agent invested with official importance could venture to descend. But all these proceedings failed to afford the information most wanted. Mr. Drake was unacquainted with the great conspiracy of Georges, whose secret was well kept, and consequently his ridiculous credulity had not caused him to furnish any really important information. The First Consul was still strongly persuaded that the men who had conceived the plan of the infernal machine were still more likely to strike some new blow under existing circumstances, and struck by some arrests effected in Paris, La Vendée, and Normandy, he said to Murat, then governor of Paris, and to M. Réal, who was at the head of the police: "The emigrants are certainly at their old tricks; there have been several arrests; let some of the prisoners be selected and sent before a military commission, and rather than be shot they will tell all that they know." What we here relate occurred between the 25th and the 30th of January, while inter-

as far as can be guessed from his foreign policy, is a descent upon Ireland, to be made at once by the Brest squadron and by that of the Texel.

"Nothing is said about the Texel expedition, though it is known to be ready, and there is considerable talk about the camps of St. Omer, Ostend, and Flushing. The great number of troops assembled in camps has a political end. Bonaparte is glad of a pretext for keeping them in hand upon a war establishment, and available for a new attack on Germany should he deem a continental war desirable.

"Another expedition is decidedly fixed upon: one to the Morea. Bonaparte has 40,000 men at Tarento, the Toulon squadron is to proceed thither, and he hopes to find a large auxiliary army of Greeks.

"The portfolio business must not be lost sight of, and mention must be made that, to prove himself deserving of confidence, the usher has produced many portions of letters in Bonaparte's own handwriting; that this man can render vast services, but that he must be largely paid. The portfolio must, in reality, be delivered, and care will be taken to provide it with precisely such information as we wish Drake and his employers to believe; but, in order to make them value it the more highly, it must be made to cost them at least £50,000 sterling."

"To Citizen RÉAL.

"MALMAISON, 28th Ventôse, An. XII. (19th March 1804).

"I beg that you will send to Citizen Maret the last letter written by Drake, that it may be printed in the appendix to the collected documents relative to this affair.

"I have also to request that you will add two notes, one to make it known that the supposed aide-de-camp of the general is only an officer sent by the prefect of Strasburg, and the other to explain that the faithless individual was a sheer invention of the agent, and that no person possessing the confidence of government could be tempted by the corrupting gold of England."

* These are Drake's actual expressions. His letters were deposited in the Senate, and exhibited to all diplomatists who chose to see them.

views were taking place between Pichegru and Moreau, and just as the conspirators were becoming disheartened. The First Consul had a list of the arrested individuals laid before him. In this list he discovered some of the agents of Georges, who had preceded or followed him into France, and among them an ex-doctor of the Vendéan armies, who had landed in Georges' company in August. After careful consideration of the individual cases, the First Consul pointed out five, and said, "Either I am greatly mistaken, or we shall find these men both able and willing to give us information." For some time past no use had been made of the laws formerly enacted for the establishment of military courts. During the peace, the First Consul had been desirous to let these laws fall into disuse, but on the renewal of war he thought it necessary to call them again into existence; and especially against those spies who entered France to watch the preparations making there against England, and some of whom had consequently been arrested, condemned, and shot. The five individuals whom the First Consul now selected were sent to trial; two of them were acquitted; two being convicted of crimes punishable with death, were condemned to be shot, and suffered that punishment without making any confession beyond a bold avowal that they had entered France to serve that legitimate king who would speedily become victorious over his republican foes. They also spoke in most hostile terms against the person of the First Consul. The fifth of these individuals, whom the First Consul had especially pointed out as being likely to make a clean breast, declared when on the way to execution that he had some important information to give; and he was immediately visited by one of the most astute and experienced agents of the police. He confessed everything, declaring that he had landed at Biville Cliff in company with Georges himself as far back as the month of August; that they had made their way through the woods from one hiding-place to another till they reached Paris, with the intention of murdering the Consul in an attack to be made upon his escort by open force; and he pointed out several persons, especially innkeepers, who were in the habit of harbouring Chouans. This confession threw a broad and bright light upon the subject; the presence of Georges in Paris was a fact of the utmost possible importance; it was not for any unimportant attempt that a person so important to his party had lain concealed in the heart of Paris with a band of hirelings. The point of disembarkation at the cliff of Biville was now known, as also was the existence of a secret road through the woods, and some, at least, of the secret lodgings which gave shelter to the conspirators. A most strange accident had revealed a name which put the First Consul and the police upon the track of some

very important circumstances. A short time before the period of which we are writing, a party of Chouans had landed at this same cliff of Biville, and had exchanged shots with the gendarmerie; a paper wadding which was found on that occasion was marked with the name of *Troche*. This Troche was a watchmaker at Eu, and he had a son, a very young man, employed as a corresponding clerk. This young man was privately arrested and conveyed to Paris, where he was examined and confessed all he knew. He confessed that it was he who had been employed to receive the conspirators at the cliff of Biville, and had guided them to the first stations at which they were to find shelter; he gave an account of those three disembarkations of which we have already spoken, viz., that of Georges in August, and those of December and January, including Pichegru, and Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac. He was unacquainted with the name and rank of the persons to whom he had acted as guide; but he was able to say that, early in February, a fourth disembarkation was to take place at Biville; he, in fact, being appointed to receive those who were to land.

Early in February, therefore, search was made in all the known and suspected hiding-places of the Chouans, from Paris as far as the coast; a strict watch was kept on the premises of those innkeepers who had been informed against by the agent of Georges, and in the course of a few days various important arrests took place; two of these, more especially, threw great light upon the business. In the first place, a daring young Chouan, named Picot, servant to Georges, was taken; being armed with dagger and pistols, he made a stout resistance to the police, and only yielded at the last extremity, loudly declaring that he was willing to die in the service of his king; at the same time Bouvet de Lozier, principal lieutenant to Georges, was taken, making less resistance, and bearing himself more calmly than Picot.

These men were armed in the style of brigands ready to commit the worst of crimes, and besides their arms they carried with them large sums in gold and silver. At first they were in a state of great excitement and enthusiasm, then they grew more cool, and at length confessed all they knew. Picot, arrested on the 18th Pluviôse (8th of February), would at first confess nothing, but was gradually led afterwards to speak out. He first confessed that he had landed from England with Georges, and that he had been six months with him in Paris; and he did not conceal the purpose of their abode there. There was, consequently, no longer any room to doubt that Georges was in Paris to strike a terrible and decisive blow, but this general knowledge was all that could be then obtained. Bouvet de Lozier had as yet confessed nothing: he was very

far superior to Picot in both education and manners. In the course of the night between the 13th and 14th of February, however, this Bouvet de Lozier suddenly summoned his gaoler. The prisoner had endeavoured to hang himself, and having failed in the attempt, had been attacked by a sort of delirium, under the influence of which he desired that his confession should be taken down.

The unfortunate man then declared that he wished before he should die for the cause of his legitimate king to unmask the treacherous person who, uselessly perilling brave men, had plunged them into ruin; and he then proceeded to tell the astonished and perplexed M. Réal a most strange story. The royalists, he said, were in London with the princes, when Moreau sent one of his officers to Pichegru, offering to head a movement on behalf of the Bourbons, and to influence the army to co-operate in that movement; and on receiving this offer, they had all set out with Georges and Pichegru himself to aid in the proposed revolution. On reaching Paris, Georges and Pichegru, continued he, had an interview with Moreau, who then, however, took a different tone, and proposed that he should succeed to the consular power on the overthrow of Bonaparte; that Georges, Pichegru, and their friends had refused to agree to such a proposal, and that it was owing to the fatal delays caused by Moreau's pretensions that the arrests had been made by the police. This sad revealer of sad secrets said that he had *escaped from the shades of death* that he might avenge himself and his friends upon the man who had ruined them.*

* I now subjoin the actual words of Bouvet de Lozier's confession. This document, and those subsequently quoted concerning the conspiracy of Georges, are taken from a collection in eight volumes octavo, under the title of *Examination before the Special and Criminal Court of the Department of the Seine, sitting at Paris, of Georges, Pichegru, and others, charged with Conspiracy against the person of the First Consul.* Paris: C. F. Patras, Printer to the Court of Criminal Justice. 1804. Copy in the Royal Library. (Vol. ii. p. 168.)

Confession made by ATHANASE-HYACINTHE BOUVET DE LOZIER before the GRAND JUDGE charged with the administration of justice.

A man just escaped from the gates of the tomb, and still covered with the shadows of death, calls for vengeance upon those whose treachery has plunged him and his party into ruin.

Despatched to support the cause of the Bourbons, he found himself obliged either to fight for Moreau, or to renounce the enterprise which was his sole object.

Monsieur the Comte d'Artois was to enter France to place himself at the head of the royalists, and Moreau had pledged himself to side with the Bourbons, but refused to do so when the royalists returned to France.

He proposed that they should labour for him, and raise him to the post of dictator.

Perhaps the accusation I bring against him is but partially borne out by proof.

The following are the facts on which you will form your own judgment :—

Thus from an interrupted suicide there sprang up a terrible charge against Moreau—an accusation exaggerated by despair, but still having all the characteristics of conspiracy. M. Réal, astounded at this confession, hurried away to the Tuileries, where, early as the hour was, he found, as usual, the First Consul risen from bed, and preparing for a long day of arduous toil. The First Consul was still under the hands of his valet, Constant, but as soon as M. Réal began to speak, he laid his fingers upon his lips and closeted himself with him to listen to his account. It did not seem to cause him much surprise, but he could not wholly credit the charge made against Moreau. He readily comprehended that all parties were to join against him, and that Pichegru was to unite the republicans and royalists; but before the guilt of Moreau could be credited, he wished that Pichegru's presence in Paris should be proved beyond all doubt. Should a clear light be thrown on this part of the business, the connection between Moreau and the royalists would be placed beyond all doubt, and he could be proceeded against directly. Nothing in the First Consul's tone announced anger or desire of vengeance; he seemed more curious and thoughtful than irritated.

It was determined to re-examine Picot, Georges' servant, in

Lajolais, a general who formerly served under Moreau, was sent by him to the prince in London; Pichegru was the mediator between them; Lajolais, on behalf and in the name of Moreau, agreed to the essential points of the proposed plan.

The prince prepared to leave England for France; the number of royalists in France was augmented; and at conferences in Paris between Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges, the first named avowed his design to act, not for a king, but for a dictator.

Thence the delays, the dissensions, and the consequent almost utter ruin of the royalist party.

Lajolais was with the prince at the commencement of January last past, as I have been informed by Georges.

What consists with my own knowledge is his arrival at La Poterie on the 17th of January, on the day after his landing with Pichegru by our way of communication, with which you are but too well acquainted.

Subsequently, on the 25th or the 26th of January, I saw this same Lajolais in a carriage, in which we were accompanied by Georges and Pichegru, on the way to the Boulevard Madeleine, close by which Moreau was waiting for them. A conference took place among them in the Champs Elysées, at which we had reason to anticipate the proposal made by Moreau in a subsequent meeting with Pichegru alone, viz., that the re-establishment of a king was not to be thought of; that he should be made dictator, leaving the royalists merely to play the part of his supporters and soldiers.

I know not what weight you will attach to the assertions of a man who but an hour ago was saved from self-destruction, and who still has before his eyes the death to which an outraged government consigns him. But I cannot withhold a cry of despair, or accusing the man to whom I owe my ruin.

At all events, you will find my statements borne out in the course of the trial in which I am involved.

(Signed) **BOUVET,**
Adjutant-General of the Royal Army.

order to discover whether he was aware of General Pichegru's presence in Paris. He was examined that very day, and by treating him with great mildness, they induced him to make full and free communication of what he knew. He avowed all that he knew about Pichegru and Moreau; and though he was less extensively informed than Bouvet de Lozier, his knowledge was more important, as it showed that the desperation produced by the conduct of Moreau had proceeded to the very lowest ranks of the conspirators. As to Pichegru, he strenuously affirmed that he had seen him in Paris not long previously, and, moreover, that he was still concealed there; as for Moreau, he affirmed, that he had heard Georges' officers express regret that Moreau had ever been applied to, as his ambitious pretensions perilled everything.*

These facts having been elicited in the course of the 14th of February (24th Pluviôse), the First Consul immediately summoned to the Tuileries a secret council, consisting of the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, the principal ministers, and M. Fouché, who, though no longer in the ministry, took a leading part in this investigation. This council was held in the night between the 14th and 15th. The matter was one which required the strictest examination; the conspiracy could not be doubted, any more than the design to attack the First Consul with a band of Chouans, headed by Georges; and the guilty union of all parties, republicans or royalists, was proved by the presence of Pichegru, who had mediated between them. It was not easy to say precisely how far Moreau had proceeded in criminality, but neither Bouvet de Lozier in his despair, nor Picot in his subordinate simplicity, could have invented that singular circumstance of the damage done to the royalist views by the personal ambition of Moreau. It was clear that if the inquiry went forward, and Moreau were left at liberty, he would be constantly mentioned in connection with the conspiracy, and

* Extract from the Second Declaration of Louis Picot, made on the 24th Pluviôse, An. XII. (14th of February), at one o'clock in the morning, before the Prefect of Police. (Vol. ii. p. 392.)

The said Picot declares :

That the leaders drew lots for the task of assassinating the First Consul.

That they were to carry him off if they could meet him on the Boulogne road, or assassinate him while presenting a petition to him at a review or at the theatre.

That he firmly believes that Pichegru is still not merely in France, but also in Paris.

Extract from the Third Declaration of Louis Picot, 24th Pluviôse (14th of February). (Vol. ii. p. 395.)

That Pichegru has constantly passed under the name of Charles, and that deponent has often heard him thus addressed.

That deponent has often heard General Moreau spoken of, and has heard the leaders frequently express their regret that Moreau had been applied to by the princes, but is not aware when Georges saw Moreau.

the government would appear either to be calumniating him or to be afraid to proceed against a great criminal, because he was the second person in the Republic.

This consideration determined the First Consul as to the course that ought to be taken; nothing could have been more trying to his pride as well as his policy than to allow the firmness of his government to be called into question. "They would say," exclaimed he, "that I am afraid of Moreau; that shall not be said; I have been one of the most merciful of men, but if necessary I will be one of the most terrible, and I will strike Moreau as I would any one else, as he has entered into a conspiracy odious alike for its objects and for the connections which it presumes." Thus reasoning, he did not hesitate about arresting Moreau. He had still another motive, and a most urgent one. Pichegru and Georges were not yet arrested; three or four of their tools had been taken, but the band of executioners still remained at liberty, and hidden from the police, and it was not unlikely that fear of being arrested might induce them to hasten the attempt for which they had landed in France. On this account it was especially necessary to hasten the proceedings, and to seize as many of the leaders as possible; new discoveries would thus infallibly be made. The immediate arrest of Moreau was therefore resolved upon, as well as that of Lajolais and other conspirators who had been denounced by name.

The First Consul was much irritated, but not directly or chiefly against Moreau; and he acted rather as a man who wishes to secure himself, than as one who wishes to take vengeance; he wished to have Moreau in his power, to convict him, get the requisite information from him, and then to pardon him, deeming that thus to terminate the business would be the very height of ability and good fortune.

It was necessary to determine now under what jurisdiction the guilty parties should be proceeded against. The Consul Cambacérès, profoundly skilled in law, pointed out the danger of trusting such a case to the ordinary tribunals, and proposed that Moreau should be sent before a court-martial, composed of the most eminent military officers; a course justified by the existing laws. But the First Consul opposed this proposition.* "It would be said," remarked he, "that I had aimed at getting rid of Moreau by causing him, under the form of law, to be murdered by my own partisans." He therefore proposed a middle course, that of sending Moreau before the criminal court of the Seine; but the constitution allowing of the suspension of juries under certain circumstances and within the limits of certain departments, it was determined that that suspension

* I here quote the testimony of M. Cambacérès himself.

should be immediately pronounced in regard to the department of the Seine: this was an error, though founded upon an honourable principle. The public considered the suspension of the jury as an act no less severe than sending the accused before a court-martial, and thus without gaining the merit of respecting the forms of justice, all their inconveniences were incurred, as we shall presently perceive.

It was resolved, then, that the Grand Judge Regnier should draw up a report upon the conspiracy that had been discovered, and the cause of Moreau's arrest, and that this report should be laid before the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribune. The council remained in deliberation during the whole night, and on the morning of the 15th of February the officers of justice, supported by a detachment of picked gendarmerie, went to Moreau's residence in Paris; not finding him there, they set out towards Grosbois, and met the general crossing the bridge of Charenton on his way to Paris. He was arrested quietly, and conveyed in the most respectful manner to the Temple: Lajolais and the commissariat clerks who had abetted the conspiracy were also arrested. The message containing Regnier's report was in the course of the same day presented to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribune; it caused a painful astonishment among the friends of government, and a malignant pleasure among its more or less open enemies, of whom there still remained a considerable number in the great assemblies of the State. According to these latter, the conspiracy was a mere machination of the First Consul's, aided by the ingenuity of the police, for the purpose of ridding Bonaparte of a rival of whom he was jealous, and of repairing his damaged popularity by creating fears for his life. Slander, as usual in such cases, had free vent, and instead of being called Moreau's conspiracy, it was called the conspiracy *against* Moreau! The general's brother, who was a member of the Tribune, addressed the assembly, declaring that his brother was calumniated, and that all he needed for the establishment of his innocence was to be sent before an ordinary, and not before a special court. All that he demanded on behalf of his brother was facility for showing his innocence. These words were listened to coldly, but with grief. The majority of the three great assemblies of the State were at once attached and afflicted. It seemed that since the renewal of war the First Consul's star, so proudly in the ascendant till then, had paled somewhat. His friends did not believe that he had invented the conspiracy, but they lamented that his life was again perilled, and that it could only be protected by the fall of some of the most illustrious heads of the Republic. A reply to the message of the government contained the usual expressions of sympathy and attach-

ment to the head of the State, and the warmest entreaties that justice might be promptly and strictly done.

The noise made by these arrests could not but be great; the majority of the public was disposed to be very indignant at whatever put the very precious life of the First Consul in danger; but some doubt was expressed as to the reality of the conspiracy. After the infernal machine, to be sure, anything might be deemed possible to be attempted by conspirators, but in that case the crime had preceded the examination, and had borne an aspect most odiously criminal; now, on the contrary, a plan of assassination was announced, and upon that mere announcement one of the most illustrious men of the Republic had been arrested—a man, too, of whom the First Consul was said to be jealous to the utmost degree. Where, it was asked, was Pichegru? where Georges? These persons, it was confidently asserted, were not at Paris; they would not be found there, for all that was said about them was merely a detestable and clumsy invention.

If the Consul was calm at the first aspect of this new danger which menaced his life, he was deeply stung by the foul calumnies of which that danger was made the occasion and the pretext. He asked whether it was not quite bad enough to be thus exposed to plots the most frightful, without being accused of being himself the inventor of those plots, of being jealous when the vilest jealousy pursued him, and of treacherous attempts upon the life of another, when the most treacherous attacks were levelled at his own life. Every new phase of the inquiry increased the violence of his indignation; he displayed a kind of enthusiasm in pursuing the investigation, not to protect his life—that he thought little about, so confident was he in his star—but he was to the greatest degree desirous of confounding and exposing the vileness of those who wished him to be deemed the inventor of the plots by which his life had been perilled, and might even yet be sacrificed.

This time it was not against the republicans that he showed himself the most enraged, but against the royalists. Ever since the affair of the infernal machine, though the guilt of that belonged to the royalists, Bonaparte had been violently irritated against the republicans, to whom he attributed the chief obstacles opposed to the good which he fain would have achieved. But now his anger took quite an opposite direction. Ever since he had attained power, he had rendered all possible service to the royalists; he had raised them from oppression, and recalled them from exile; he had restored them to their position as Frenchmen and citizens; he had, as far as possible, restored their property, and this, too, in opposition to the opinions and wishes of his own most trusty partisans. In

recalling the priests he had braved the most deeply rooted of the then popular prejudices, and to recall the emigrants he had braved the alarms of the most anxious of all ranks, the holders of the national property. Finally, he had bestowed some most important public trusts upon royalists, and had even begun to employ some of them about his own person. When, in fact, we contrast the condition in which he found them at the termination of the régime of the Convention and the Directory and that in which he had placed them, it is impossible not to perceive that he had rendered the greatest possible services to the men of that party, and been repaid by them with the greatest possible ingratitude. The First Consul, in rendering services to the royalists, had gone so far as to peril his own popularity, and still worse, to risk the loss of confidence of the men who were the most honestly and the most sincerely attached to the Revolution; for he had thus caused them to think and to say that he meditated the restoration of the Bourbons. In return for such services and exertions, the royalists had endeavoured to destroy him by means of a barrel of gunpowder in 1800, and now they wished to butcher him on the highway; and in their assemblies calumniated him as the inventor of the conspiracies of their own hatching. These were the considerations which filled his ardent mind, and suddenly inflamed his hatred to the party guilty of such dark ingratitude. And thus his vengeance now sought not after the republicans; no doubt he would have been well pleased to overwhelm Moreau with the crushing burden of his clemency; but it was upon the royalists that he desired to heap his vengeance, and he was, he now affirmed, resolved to show them no mercy. New revelations confirmed this feeling, and inflamed it into an absolute and controlling passion.

While the most careful search was being made after Georges and Pichegru, new arrests were effected, and Picot and Bouvet de Lozier were induced to make new and more complete confessions, of greater consequence than their former ones. These men, unwilling to be deemed assassins, hastened to state that they had returned to Paris in the highest company, including the first nobles of the Bourbon court, especially Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière, and finally, they most distinctly affirmed that they were to be headed by a prince, whose arrival they had hourly looked for, and that this prince, said to be the Duc de Berry,* was to accompany the final disembarkation announced to take place in February.

* Extract from the Fourth Declaration of Louis Picot before the Prefect of Police, 25th Pluviôse (15th of February):—

I disembarked with Georges between Dunkirk and the town of Eu. I am not aware whether there had been any prior disembarkations; there have subsequently. There was a report of a fourth and more consider-

On that point the depositions were to the highest possible degree precise, full, and consistent; and the conspiracy grew terribly clear to the eyes of the First Consul. He saw the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry surrounded by emigrants, connected by means of Pichegru with the republicans, and maintaining in their service a horde of mercenaries, whom they proposed to lead to his murder by means of an ambush, which they affected to look upon as an honourable and equal battle. Possessed by a kind of fury, the First Consul had now but one wish—the seizure of that prince who was to reach Paris from the cliff of Biville. The impassioned language in which Bonaparte frequently expressed himself against the Jacobins subsequent to the affair of the infernal machine was now bestowed exclusively upon the princes and nobles who could descend to play such a part. “These Bourbons fancy,” he exclaimed, “that they may shed my blood like that of some vile animal; and yet my blood is quite as precious as theirs. I will repay them the alarm with which they seek to inspire me; I pardon Moreau the weakness and the errors to which he is urged by a stupid jealousy, but I will pitilessly shoot the very first of these princes who shall fall into my hands; I will teach them with what sort of a man they have to deal.” Such was the language to which he was constantly giving utterance during this terrible investigation. He was thoughtful, agitated, threatening, and what was singular in him, he laboured less than usual; for the time he seemed to have entirely forgotten Boulogne, Brest, and the Texel.

Without losing time, he sent for Colonel Savary, upon whose devotedness he confidently relied. Savary was not a bad-hearted man, though he has been called so by the common detractors of every fallen power. He possessed an excellent intellect, but he had passed his life in camps, had no fixed principles upon any subject, and placed his sole morality in his fidelity to that master from whom he had received the greatest favours. He

able disembarkation; it was to consist of twenty-five persons, including the Duc de Berry. I do not know whether this has taken place: I know that Bouvet and one Armand were to meet the prince. (Vol. ii. p. 398.)

Extract from Bouvet's Second Examination, the 30th Pluviôse (20th of February):—

Question. At what time and by what means do you imagine that Moreau and Pichegru agreed upon the plan for the restoration of the Bourbons, which Georges had returned to France to put into execution?

Answer. I believe that Pichegru and Moreau had long correspondence, and that it was only through the assurances of the prince that Moreau was making his utmost efforts to their favour in France that the plan was vaguely settled of the Bourbons; the Councils to be gained over in Paris, aided by the presence of the prince; a persuasion of the First Consul, and the presentation of the prince to the public who was to prepare their minds beforehand. (Vol. ii. p.

had passed several weeks in the Bocage, in disguise, and exposed to the most imminent perils. The First Consul now ordered him to resume his disguise, and to take post at Biville Cliff with a body of picked gendarmes, who bore the same relation to the great body of the gendarmerie that the consular guard bore to the army in general, that is to say, they were the bravest and most trusty men in their arm of the service; men who might be sent upon the most difficult services without fear of a single error or neglect. Sometimes, on pressing emergency, two of them would set out in a post-chaise to convey millions in gold into Calabria or Bretagne, and they were never known to think of betraying their trust. They were not, then, as has been pretended, mere mercenaries, but soldiers who obeyed their orders with the strictest exactitude—a fearful exactitude, it is true, with the laws of that time, and under an arbitrary government. Colonel Savary was to take fifty of these tried men with him, well armed and in disguise, to Biville Cliff. No one of the deponents had expressed any doubt that a prince would accompany the announced disembarkation; they only differed as to whether the expected prince was the Comte d'Artois or the Duc de Berry. Colonel Savary had orders to watch night and day at Biville Cliff for the expected party, to seize every man of them, and to convey them to Paris. The First Consul was inflexibly resolved to send to military trial and execution whoever of the princes should fall into his hands. Sad and terrible resolution, of which we shall by-and-by see the frightful results! While issuing these orders against the royalists, the First Consul displayed very different sentiments towards General Moreau. He had him at his feet, compromised and degraded, and intended to treat him with the most unbounded generosity. On the very day of the general's arrest, the First Consul said to the grand judge: "All that relates to the republicans must be between Moreau and me. Go to his prison and question him, then bring him in your carriage to the Tuileries; let him settle everything with me, and I will forgive all the errors caused, perhaps, rather by the jealousy of his clique than by his own."

Unfortunately, it was easier for the First Consul to forgive than for Moreau to accept his forgiveness. To confess everything, in other words, to humble himself at the First Consul's feet, was a humility scarcely to be expected from a man whose calm soul was little liable to elation, and still less so to depression. Had M. Fouché still been chief of police, he was the man to whom the examination of Moreau should have been entrusted. His ingratiating manner rendered him precisely the man to impress a mind hardened and soured by pride and misfortune, and to soothe that pride by saying, as he better than

any other man could have said: "You wished to overthrow the First Consul, and you have failed; you are now in his power; but as he knows all, so he pardons all, and is anxious to restore you to your proper position. Avail yourself of his favourable disposition towards you; do not let a false pride mislead you into rejecting a clemency which you could scarcely have hoped for, and which is ready to replace you where you would have been had you never been so unwise as to mix yourself up with conspirators." But instead of this unscrupulous but accomplished mediator, an honourable but formal man was sent, who in parading his authority thwarted the intentions of the First Consul. The Grand Judge Regnier went to the prison in his robes, and attended by Locré, secretary to the Council of State, summoned Moreau before him, and questioned him at great length, and with something too much of official coldness, considering the sort of man with whom he was dealing. Lajolais, who had been arrested during the day, had confessed pretty nearly everything concerning the connection of Moreau and Pichegru. He confessed that he had mediated between those generals, that he had gone to London, brought Pichegru to France and thrown him into the arms of Moreau, with no other intention, as he averred, than that of procuring Pichegru's recall through Moreau's influence and intercession. Lajolais concealed nothing but his connection with Georges, the mere mention of which would have destroyed the rest of his statement. But this unfortunate man was unaware that the connection of Pichegru with Georges and with the emigrant princes was proved beyond doubt by other witnesses, and to confess the secret of the interviews of Moreau and Pichegru was fatally to prove the connection of Moreau, Georges, and the emigrant princes. The depositions of Lajolais, therefore, were in themselves sufficient to prove the guilt of Moreau. The first thing needful was to give the latter a friendly warning as to the other depositions, and thus save him from useless attempts at disguise: it was necessary to induce him to tell all, by proving to him that, in fact, all had already been revealed by others. If this had been done in the true language calculated to inspire him with confidence, perhaps the unfortunate general might have been led to a frankness that would have saved his life. But instead of acting thus, the grand judge questioned Moreau as to his connection with Lajolais, Pichegru, and Georges, and upon each of these points allowed him blindly to persist that he knew nothing, had conferred with no one, and was quite surprised that such questions should be put to him; the grand judge never once warned the general that he was involving himself in a labyrinth of denials which must be useless and might be fatal. This interview of Moreau and the

grand judge consequently failed of the effect which the First Consul had anticipated from it; an effect which would have led to an act of mercy alike noble and useful.

M. Regnier returned to the Tuileries to give an account of his interview with Moreau. "Well!" said the First Consul, "if he will not be frank with me, he must be left to the law!" Thenceforward the First Consul caused the affair to be strictly and zealously followed up, and displayed the utmost activity in searching for the guilty. He was especially anxious to save the character of his government, which would be seriously damaged unless the reality of the conspiracy should be proven by the double arrest of Georges and of Pichegru; an arrest indispensably necessary to save him from the imputation of a low and rancorous jealousy, which had prompted him to aim at the destruction of the second greatest general of the Republic. Every day fresh arrests were made, and the confessions of the prisoners left no room to doubt of the plot as a whole and as to its details, more especially as to the intended attack upon the First Consul's carriage between St. Cloud and Paris; as to the personal presence of a young prince; as to the arrival of Pichegru in Paris to confer with Moreau upon the antagonism of their views; and as to the consequent delays which had been so ruinous to them all. The facts, then, were ascertained, but it had not yet been found possible to capture any of those leaders whose mere presence would have convinced the most incredulous minds; nor had that expected prince arrived of whom the First Consul in his rage wished to make a terrible sacrifice. Colonel Savary, stationed at Biville Cliff, wrote thence that he had examined matters with his own eyes, and that he had found the most perfect authentication of the statements that had been made, alike as to the mode of disembarkation, the chain of secret hiding-places between Biville and Paris, and the existence of a small vessel which every evening coasted off the rock, her crew being apparently at once desirous to land, and yet afraid to do so. There was reason to believe that this hesitation arose from the absence of signals which some of the conspirators were to have made to the newcomers from the summit of the cliff (which signals Savary could not imitate, as he knew not their nature), or still more probably, that in obedience to warnings sent from Paris to London the final disembarkation was postponed, if not wholly given up. Colonel Savary was ordered to wait and watch with untiring patience. In Paris, new indications of the presence of Pichegru and Georges were daily discovered; more than once they had been nearly arrested, but their pursuers had always been a moment too late. The First Consul, shrinking from no means of attaining his end, resolved to propose a law, the nature of which will show what opinion

was at that time held upon the guarantees of individual liberty, now so carefully guarded. A law was proposed to the Legislative Assembly, enacting that any person who should shelter Georges, Pichegru, or any one of sixty of their accomplices, who were mentioned by name, would be punished, not by imprisonment or the galleys, but by DEATH; and whoever should see them, or be aware of their hiding-place, and yet fail to denounce them, should be punished with six years' imprisonment. This fearful law, which commanded, on pain of death, the commission of a barbarous act, was passed without opposition on the very day of its proposal.

Scarcely was this law passed, before it was followed up by precautions not less rigid. It was feared that, harassed as they were, and deprived of hope, the conspirators might endeavour to escape; Paris, consequently, was closed as to egress; all who chose might enter Paris, no one, during some days, was allowed to leave it. To secure the strict enforcement of this order, detachments of infantry were placed at all the gates of Paris, and the horse-guard continually patrolled from gate to gate, with orders to arrest any one who should venture to scale the wall, and to shoot any one who should persist in endeavouring to escape after being challenged to stand and surrender; finally, boats manned by coastguards rowed watch upon the Seine both by night and by day. No one was allowed to leave the capital, excepting the government messengers, and even they were first searched and recognised so as to render error or deception impossible.

For an instant, the worst times of the Revolution seemed to have returned; Paris was once more filled with a terror like that of the worst days of the Revolution. The enemies of the First Consul passed the most cruel censures on him on account of these measures, and attributed to him the guilt and cruelty which had formerly been attributed to the Committee of Public Safety. Directing the police in his own person, he was informed of all that was said against him, and his exasperation increased, till he seemed capable of the most violent acts; gloomy and harsh, he showed no consideration for any one. Since the recent events he had not dissembled his anger against M. de Markoff, and existing circumstances caused this anger to burst forth very mischievously. Among the persons arrested was a Swiss, attached in we know not what capacity to the Russian embassy; a confirmed intriguer, very unfit to be in the employment of a foreign legation; and to the impropriety of employing such a man M. de Markoff added the still greater impropriety of demanding the prisoner to be given up to him, the Russian ambassador. The First Consul gave instant orders that the Swiss should not only not be given up, but that he should be

more closely confined than ever, and M. de Markoff thus made sensible of the whole impropriety of his conduct. On this occasion the First Consul was struck by two circumstances to which he had previously paid no attention, that M. d'Entraigues, an ex-agent of the emigrant princes, was now at Dresden, on a diplomatic mission from the Emperor of Russia; and that another emigrant, named Vernègues, also connected with the Bourbons, and despatched by them to the court of Naples, was now at Rome in the quality of a Russian subject. The First Consul sent to require the court of Saxony to dismiss M. d'Entraigues, and to the court of Rome to immediately arrest and deliver over the emigrant Vernègues; and he demanded these decisive measures in terms so peremptory as to render a refusal scarcely possible. On the first subsequent diplomatic audience, he as severely mortified the pride of M. de Markoff as he formerly had the haughty rigidity of Lord Whitworth. He told the Russian ambassador that it was most strange that an ambassador should employ a conspirator against government, and even venture to claim the release of that person when he was arrested as a conspirator. Does Russia, continued he, suppose that she is so superior to us that she can act thus with impunity? Does she fancy that we have so utterly *laid aside the sword for the distaff* that we must needs bear such conduct? She is much deceived if she think this; I will suffer no affront from any prince upon the face of the earth.

Ten years earlier, the well-intentioned Revolution of '89 had become the sanguinary Revolution of '93, through the continued provocations of senseless enemies; and a similar effect was now produced upon the glowing soul of Napoleon. Those same enemies conducted themselves towards Napoleon as they had conducted themselves towards the Revolution, and turned from friendship to enmity, and from moderation to violence, that great man who had governed the State so wisely and so well. The royalists whom he had rescued from oppression; Europe, that he had aimed at winning over by his moderation, after conquering it by the sword; all, in short, towards whom he had shown most consideration, now showed an inclination to ill-treat him alike in word and in deed; and a tempest was aroused in his great soul by the ingratitude of party and the imprudent rancour of Europe.

The deepest anxiety prevailed in Paris. The terrible laws aimed at all who should shelter Pichegru, Georges, or their accomplices had not intimidated any one into the base resolution to betray them; but neither was any one inclined to shelter them. These unfortunates, whom we have seen disunited and discouraged by their differences, wandered by night from house to house, sometimes paying six or eight thousand francs for the

shelter granted them only for a few brief hours. Pichegru, M. de Rivière, and Georges lived thus in the most frightful perplexity; the last mentioned, however, courageously bearing a situation to which his experience in the chances and changes of civil war had accustomed him. Moreover, he was not oppressed by any sense of degradation; he was the partisan of the most august personages, and he only thought of saving himself now, as heretofore, by his own intelligence and courage. But the members of the French nobility, who had anticipated that France, or, at least, their own numerous party, would receive them with open arms, were plunged into despair on finding themselves met only by coldness, doubt, or censure. They now more clearly saw what odium was attached to their plans, which lost those flattering colours with which the prospect of success covers every project. They felt the degradation of having entered France with a band of Chouans. Pichegru, who to some deplorable faults added the high qualities of coolness, judgment, and keen sagacity, Pichegru now only too clearly saw that, far from recovering from his former fall, he had plunged into the depths of an abyss. A first fault of former years, that of having criminally connected himself with the Condés, had led him first to treason and then to proscription, and now he found himself among the guilty projectors of an ambush and an assassination. No ray of glory now remained to the former conqueror of Holland. On learning the arrest of Moreau, he at once anticipated his own fate, and exclaimed that he was utterly lost. The familiarity of the mere herd of Chouans was detestable to him; and he sought relief from it in the company of M. de Rivière, whom he found more sensible and prudent than the other friends of the Comte d'Artois who had been sent to Paris. One evening, reduced to a state of complete despair, he seized a pistol, and was about to shoot himself through the head, when he was prevented by M. de Rivière. On another occasion, destitute of even a temporary shelter, he was inspired with an idea that did honour to him, and still more honour to the man to whom he had recourse. Among the ministers of the First Consul was M. de Marbois, one of those who had been included in the proscription of the 18th Fructidor. Pichegru unhesitatingly presented himself to this minister, the exile of Sinnamari asking that other exile, now become a minister of the First Consul, to violate the law of his master; and M. de Marbois received him with grief, indeed, but without any fear on his own account. The honour done him by thus trusting to his generosity, he in his turn did to the First Consul, not doubting that he should find his conduct approved. It is some consolation for these melancholy scenes thus to see three men of such various character confidently relying each upon the other's

generosity; Pichegru relying upon M. de Marbois, and M. de Marbois upon the First Consul. Subsequently, in fact, M. de Marbois avowed what he had done, and the First Consul replied to that avowal in a letter, expressing the noblest approbation of his generosity.

But the position in which the conspirators were placed must soon end in a catastrophe; an officer who had served under Pichegru betrayed him into the hands of the police. At night, while the general was asleep, surrounded by his weapons, which he never laid aside, and by his books, of which he had been enjoying his customary perusal, his lamp being extinguished, his apartment was entered by a detachment of the select gendarmerie. Aroused by the noise they made in approaching, he endeavoured to grasp his weapons, and being prevented, still struggled stoutly for some time against his captors. Overpowered at length, he was conducted to the Temple, there to terminate most wretchedly a life formerly so brilliant.

The arrest of Pichegru was almost immediately followed by that of M. Armand de Polignac, M. Jules de Polignac, and finally, M. de Rivière, who had been so incessantly sought that, though not betrayed, they were discovered while on their way to a new shelter. These arrests made a deep and general impression upon the public mind; the great mass of just men, unswayed by the spirit of party, were now convinced of the reality of the plot. The presence of Pichegru and of the personal friends of the Comte d'Artois left no room for even the shadow of a doubt upon that point. It was evident that they had not been drawn into their country by the art of the police, anxious to get up a plot. The greatness of the danger to which the First Consul had been, and even yet was, exposed was now made evident, and a deeper interest than ever was taken in the safety of a life so precious. He was now no longer looked upon as the envious rival who wished to destroy Moreau, but as the saviour of France, incessantly exposed to the attacks of party. But the malignant and suspicious, though they were disconcerted, were not even yet quite silenced. According to them, the Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière were imprudent men, too restless to remain quiet, incessantly busied with the Comte d'Artois, and present in France merely for the sake of seeing whether circumstances were favourable or unfavourable to their party. But there was neither any serious plot nor any such threatening peril as could justify the anxiety which was intended to be excited for the safety of the First Consul.

Utterly to confound and silence these babblers, one more arrest was necessary; that of Georges: it would then be scarcely possible for any one to say that Messrs. de Polignac, de Rivière, Pichegru, and Georges had assembled together in Paris as mere

lookers-on. The terrible measures taken by the government were destined speedily to furnish this decisive proof. Georges, pursued by a whole host of police, compelled to seek a new shelter daily, and unable to escape from Paris, guarded as it was both by land and by water, must needs fall. Traces of him were obtained, but, to the honour of the times be it said, though his arrest was generally wished for, no one was found to betray him. Those who ventured to shelter him would do so only for a single day; every evening he was obliged to go to a new shelter. On the 9th of March, at nightfall, several officers surrounded a house to which suspicion had been attracted by the frequent arrival and departure of men of strange appearance. Georges, who had been sheltered here, endeavoured to get away to seek some other asylum. He quitted the house about seven o'clock in the evening, walked as far as the Pantheon, and there got into a cabriolet, the driver of which was a determined young Chouan, Georges' confidential servant. The officers in breathless haste followed the cabriolet as far as the cross-road of Bussy; Georges urged his servant to add to their already great speed, when the foremost of the police officers dashed forward and seized the horse's bridle. Georges presented a pistol, and stretched the officer stark dead upon the spot; then, leaping from the cabriolet to endeavour to escape on foot and under cover of the night, he fired a second shot, which seriously wounded a second of the officers; but surrounded by a crowd, he was secured in spite of all his struggles, and given into the hands of the officers. He was at once recognised as that formidable Georges, so long sought for, and at length laid hold of, and the news of his arrest excited a very general satisfaction in Paris, where, on his account and that of his accomplices, peaceable men had lived under a sort of oppression from which they were now released. With Georges, the servant who accompanied him was also arrested, having been able to run only a few paces.

Georges was taken to the prefecture of police; his first excitement over, this chieftain of conspirators had recovered the most perfect coolness. He was young and powerful; his shoulders were square, his features full, and rather mild and open than gloomy or ferocious, as they might have been supposed to be, from the part he had acted. On his person were found a dagger, pistols, and sixty thousand francs in gold and bank-notes. Examined on the instant, he unhesitatingly told his name, and the object of his presence in Paris. He had arrived, he said, for the purpose of attacking the First Consul, not by stealing into his palace with four assassins, but openly, by main force, and fighting in the open country against the consular guard. He was to have acted in conjunction with a

French prince, who was to have joined him in France for that purpose, but who had not arrived. Georges was in some sort proud of the new character of this plot, which he with much care distinguished from an assassination. "But," it was remarked to him, "you sent Saint-Rèjant to Paris to prepare the infernal machine."

"I sent him," replied Georges, "but with no detailed instructions as to the means which he was to employ."

A poor explanation, which but too clearly showed that Georges had been no stranger to that horrible crime. However, on every point that concerned others than himself, this bold conspirator preserved a resolute silence, repeating that there were victims enough already, and that he would not add to their number.*

After the arrest and declarations of Georges, the existence of the plot was verified, and the First Consul was justified. It

* Extract from the First Examination of Georges by the Prefect of Police, 18th Ventôse (9th March). (Vol. ii. p. 79.)

We, Councillor of State and Prefect of Police, have summoned Georges Cadoudal to our presence, and examined him as follows:—

Question. What was your purpose in coming to Paris?

Reply. To attack the French Consul.

Ques. What means had you for that attack?

Reply. But few; but I hoped to collect more.

Ques. Of what kind were your means?

Reply. Main force.

Ques. Had you many followers?

Reply. No, because I was not to attack the First Consul except in presence of a French prince, who has not yet arrived.

Ques. At the date of the 3rd Nivôse you wrote to Saint-Rèjant, reproaching him for his delay in executing your orders against the First Consul?

Reply. I directed Saint-Rèjant to assemble means at Paris, but I did not direct him to make the attempt of the 3rd Nivôse.

Extract from the Second Examination of Georges Cadoudal, 18th Ventôse (9th March).

Question. How long have you been in Paris?

Reply. I came about five months ago, but I have not actually remained in Paris a fortnight in the whole.

Ques. Where have you lodged?

Reply. I will not tell that.

Ques. Why did you come to Paris?

Reply. For the purpose of attacking the First Consul.

Ques. How?

Reply. By open force.

Ques. Where did you expect to find such force?

Reply. Throughout France.

Ques. Have you and your accomplices, then, an organised force at your disposal throughout France?

Reply. That is not to be inferred of the force to which I just now alluded.

Ques. What, then, did you mean?

Reply. An assemblage of force at Paris: that assemblage is not yet organised, but it would have been when the attack should have been finally resolved upon.

Ques. What was the object of yourself and your accomplices?

Reply. To substitute a Bourbon for the First Consul.

Ques. Which of the Bourbons?

could no longer be argued, as it had been a month earlier, that the police had invented the plots which they affected to discover; and a royalist could only cast down his eyes in shame on seeing a French prince presuming to enter France with a horde of Chouans, to fight a so-called battle on the highway. It might, indeed, be urged that the prince would not come, and that was likely enough; but this intended breach of promise to unfortunate men, whose faith in it had led them to risk their lives, was even a greater crime than the one for which it was urged as an excuse. Moreover, it was not Georges alone who announced the expected arrival of the prince; the friends of M. the Comte d'Artois, Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac, held the same language. They confessed the most important part of the plot; they repelled far from them the idea of being concerned in a project of assassination, but confessed that they had arrived in France for some purpose which they did not define; for some sort of movement which was to be headed by a French prince, whom they had preceded, in order to examine with their own eyes whether circumstances were favourable.*

Like Georges, these gentlemen endeavoured to apologise for

Reply. Charles Xavier Stanislas, formerly Monsieur, now recognised by us as Louis XVIII.

Ques. What part were you to take in the attack?

Reply. Such as should be assigned to me by the aforesaid French prince who was to come to Paris.

Ques. The plan was then formed, and was to have been executed with the concurrence of the aforesaid French princes?

Reply. Yes, citizen judge.

Ques. You have conferred with those princes, then?

Reply. Yes, citizen.

Ques. By whom were money and arms to be supplied?

Reply. I had the funds by me for some time; the arms I had not yet received.

* Extract from the First Examination of M. de Rivière by the Councillor of State Real, on the 16th Ventôse (7th March). (Vol. ii. p. 259).

Question. How long have you been in Paris?

Reply. About a month.

Ques. How did you come from London to France?

Reply. I was landed on the coast of Normandy by an English vessel, commanded, I believe, by Captain Wright.

Ques. How many passengers were there, and what were they?

Reply. I do not know.

Ques. You are aware that among those passengers were ex-Generals Pichegru and Lajolais, and also M. Jules de Polignac?

Reply. As that did not concern me, I know nothing about it.

Ques. Being landed on the coast, by what route, and how, did you travel to Paris?

Reply. By the Rouen road, sometimes on horseback and sometimes on foot.

Ques. What were the motives of your journey and of your stay in Paris?

Reply. To ascertain the state of affairs in this country, and to communicate my observations to the French princes, that they might judge whether to come to France or to remain in England. I should observe that at this time I had no special mission from them, but having before served them with zeal—

being found in such bad company, by pleading that a French prince was to be with them. As this prince had not arrived in France, and did not intend to do so, they felt that nothing that they could confess would injure him, protected as he was by the breadth of the Channel; and quite overlooked the fact that there were other French princes less securely situated,

Ques. What was the result of your observations upon political affairs, the government, and public opinion? What would you have noted for the guidance of the princes could you have communicated with them?

Reply. Generally speaking, I thought I saw in France a great deal of egotism, apathy, and a strong desire for peace.

Extract from the Second Examination of M. Armand de Polignac, 22nd Ventôse (13th March). (Vol. ii. p. 239.)

I disembarked on the coast of Normandy; after several temporary halts I lodged near the Isle Adam, in a place also inhabited by Georges, who was known by the name of Lerièrre.

We travelled to Paris together, accompanied by some officers under his orders.

When I left London this last time, I was aware of the plans of the Comte d'Artois; I was too much attached to him not to join him.

His intent was to come to France and propose to the First Consul to resign the reins of government to the Count's elder brother.

If this proposition were rejected by the First Consul, he was to be openly assailed by the Comte in the endeavours to recover what he deems the rights of his family.

When I set out, I was aware that the Comte was not prepared for an immediate descent in France; I preceded him, as I have already said, in my desire to see my wife, my family, and my friends.

When a second disembarkation was proposed, the Comte d'Artois said that on account of the zeal with which I had always served him, and his confidence in me, he wished me to make one of this expedition, and it was this expression of the prince's desire which determined me to pass over on board the earliest vessel.

I must not omit to observe that, at the instant of my setting out, I openly said that if any means were resorted to which did not bear the stamp of honour, I should at once withdraw and retire into Russia.

Ques. Are you aware of any interviews between General Moreau, Georges Cadoudal, and ex-General Pichegru?

Reply. I was informed that they had held a very serious conference at Chaillot, in the house No. 6, in which Georges Cadoudal lodged.

I was assured, too, that Georges, after several explanations and offers made to General Moreau, had said to him: If you like, I will leave you *tête-à-tête* with Pichegru, and then you can more easily come to an understanding; finally, I was informed that the conference terminated only in unpleasant doubts, Georges Cadoudal and Pichegru remaining faithful to the cause of the prince, but that Moreau was undecided, and gave reason to suspect him of personal views. I have since heard that there were other conferences between General Moreau and the ex-General Pichegru.

Extract from the Examination of M. Jules de Polignac, before State Councillor Real, on the 16th Ventôse (7th March), quoted in the indictment. (Vol. i. p. 61.)

Being questioned, M. Jules de Polignac replied that as it had seemed to both his brother and himself that what was proposed had not the honourable character which they had naturally been led to anticipate, they had spoken of retiring to Holland.

Questioned as to the cause of these fears, he replied that he suspected that, instead of fulfilling some mission respecting a change of the government, it was proposed to act against an individual, and that it was the First Consul whom Georges proposed to attack.

who, perchance, might be made to atone with their lives for the plots hatched in London.

Would to Heaven that the First Consul had remained contented with the means he already possessed of confounding his enemies! He could have struck awe into them by inflicting the punishments recognised by our laws; still further, he could have overwhelmed them with confusion; for he had obtained abundance of proofs of their guilt. He had in his hands even more than was needed for his safety and reputation. But, as we have already remarked, though he at this period was well disposed towards the republicans, the royalists had outraged and disgusted him with their ingratitude, and he was resolved that they should feel the full weight of his power. Besides the spirit of revenge, another feeling occupied his heart, a sort of pride. He openly said to all who approached him, that he cared as little, perhaps rather less, for a Bourbon than for a Moreau or a Pichegru; that these princes entertained a notion that they were inviolate, and that this notion led them to involve in their plots unfortunate men of all ranks, and then to shelter themselves beyond sea; that they were greatly mistaken in putting so much trust in that shelter; and that he should infallibly finish with seizing some one of them, and having him shot to death like a common malefactor; that it was requisite to let these princes feel the sort of man whom they provoked in attacking him; that he feared no more to put a Bourbon to death than to do the same by the merest scum of Chouannerie; that he would ere long show the world that all parties were on a level in his eyes; that whoever provoked him, no matter what their rank, should feel the whole weight of his hand; and that though he had hitherto been the most merciful of men, he would prove that when roused he could be one of the most terrible.

No one dared urge a contradiction; the Consul Lebrun was silent, so also was the Consul Cambacérès, but he gave to his silence that character of disapprobation by which he usually opposed the First Consul. M. Fouché, who wished to regain Napoleon's favour, and who, though generally disposed to lenity, was very anxious to embroil the government and the royalists, warmly approved the idea of making an example; and M. Talleyrand, not cruel, indeed, but incapable of opposing power, and possessed to a mischievous extent of a taste for flattering the wishes of those to whom he was attached, M. de Talleyrand, too, argued with M. Fouché, that too much consideration had already been shown to the royalists; that the lavish kindness shown to them had even excited mischievous doubts in the minds of the revolutionists, and that the time had now come when it was necessary to punish severely, and to punish without exception.

With the exception of the Consul Cambacérès, every one, either tacitly or in terms, encouraged that anger which needed no encouragement to render it terrible, perhaps even cruel.

This notion of heaping all the punishment upon the royalists, and reserving all mercy exclusively for the revolutionists, was so rooted in the mind of the First Consul, that he now attempted for Pichegru what he had previously attempted for Moreau. He was inspired with a profound pity, as he thought, of the terrible position of that illustrious general, mixed up with Chouans, and in danger of being deprived by a criminal trial not merely of life, but also of the last remnant of reputation.

“What an end!” exclaimed Bonaparte to M. Réal, “what an end for the conqueror of Holland! But the men of the Revolution must not thus destroy each other. I have long thought about forming a colony at Cayenne; Pichegru was exiled thither, and knows the place well, and of all our generals he is the best calculated to form an extensive establishment there. Go and visit him in his prison, and tell him that I pardon him; that it is not towards him, or Moreau, or men like them, that I am inclined to be severe; ask him how many men and what amount of money he would require for founding a colony in Cayenne, and I will supply him, that he may go thither and re-establish his reputation in rendering a great service to France.”

M. Réal took this noble message to the prisoner, who at first could scarcely credit what he heard, and doubted that it was a mere lure to induce him to betray his companions in misfortune. But speedily convinced by the persistence of M. Réal, who required no confession from him as all was already known, he became much affected; his heart was softened, he shed tears, and spoke much about Cayenne. He said that, by a strange forethought, he had often reflected during his exile upon what might be done there, and had even formed some plans with that view. We shall presently see by what a fatal coincidence the generous intentions of the First Consul were converted into the cause of a deplorable catastrophe.

The First Consul was still very anxiously expecting news from Colonel Savary, watching with fifty men at Biville Cliff. The colonel had now been on the look-out there for upwards of three weeks, but no disembarkation had taken place. Captain Wright's brig coasted the cliffs every evening, but never put any one ashore, either because Captain Wright's passengers expected a signal which was not made, or because they had been warned from Paris not to land. Colonel Savary was at length obliged to say that it was useless for him to remain any longer.

The First Consul, annoyed at not having been able to lay hold of one of those princes who had conspired against his life, now glanced around at the various parts in which they, respectively,

had found shelter. One morning, while in his study with Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, he inquired about the various members of that unfortunate family, as pitiable for its errors as for its misfortunes. He was told, in reply, that Louis XVIII. and the Duc d'Angoulême lived at Warsaw; the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry in London, where also were the princes of Condé, with the exception of the third, the youngest and most enterprising of them, the Duc d'Enghien, who lived at Ettenheim, very near Strasburg, in which neighbourhood it was that Messrs. Taylor, Smith, and Drake, the English diplomatic agents, busied themselves in fomenting intrigues. The idea that that young prince might make use of the bridge of Strasburg, as the Comte d'Artois had intended to make use of Biville Cliff, suddenly flashed across the mind of the First Consul, and he determined to send an intelligent sub-officer into that neighbourhood to obtain information. There was a sub-officer of gendarmerie, who in his youth had served under the princes of Condé, and he now received orders to assume a disguise, and to proceed to Ettenheim to make inquiries as to the connections of the young prince, and his way of life. The sub-officer accordingly repaired to Ettenheim. The young prince had lived there some time with a princess of Rohan, to whom he was warmly attached, and he divided his time between this attachment and enjoying the pleasures of the chase in the Black Forest. He had been directed by the British cabinet to repair to the banks of the Rhine, no doubt in anticipation of that movement of which Messrs. Drake, Smith, and Taylor had held out ill-founded hopes. This prince expected, then, that he should shortly have to fight against his country, a pitiable task to which he had for some years been accustomed, but nothing proves that he knew anything about the conspiracy of Georges; everything that is known about him tends on the contrary to the supposition that he was ignorant of it. He often left Ettenheim on sporting excursions, and sometimes, it was said, even to go to the theatre at Strasburg. Certain it is that these reports had so much of probability, that they induced his father to write to him from London a letter strictly cautioning him to greater prudence.*

* "The PRINCE DE CONDÉ to the DUC D'ENGHIEN.

"WANSTEAD, 16th June 1803.

"My dear Son,—For six months past a report has been current here that you have paid a visit to Paris; others say that you have only ventured to Strasburg. You must admit that this is most imprudently perilling your life or liberty. As for your principles, I am not at all alarmed about them; they are as deeply graven in your heart as in ours. It appears to me that you need no longer conceal the facts, and that if you have made such journeys you may tell us the result of your observations.

"Now, as to your safety, so dear to us on many accounts, it is true that I told you that you might render your position very useful. But you are very

In the personal suite of the young prince were certain emigrants, among them a Marquis de Thumery.

The sub-officer who was sent to make inquiries arrived at Ettenheim in disguise, and made his way even into the very household of the prince, and obtained a whole host of particulars, from which prejudiced judgments might easily draw the most fatal inferences. The young duke was said to be very frequently absent from Ettenheim; sometimes his absence lasted for days, and his journey extended to Strasburg. A person in his suite, who was represented as of far more consequence than he really was, bore a name which the Germans who gave these particulars to the sub-officer mispronounced in such a way that it sounded like that of General Dumouriez. The person in question was in reality the Marquis de *Thumery*, of whom we have already made mention, and the sub-officer, misled by the German pronunciation, quite honestly took that name to designate General Dumouriez, and this name he put into the report, written under this unfortunate mistake, and immediately despatched to Paris.

This fatal report reached Paris on the morning of the 10th of March. On the previous evening, at night, and on the very morning in question, a no less fatal deposition had been repeatedly made by Leridant, the servant of Georges, and arrested with him. At first this young man had resisted the most pressing interrogations, but at length he spoke out with an apparently complete sincerity; declaring that there was a conspiracy, that a prince was at its head, that this prince either soon would arrive, or had arrived already; and that his own opinion inclined to the latter state of the case, as he had frequently seen, as a visitor of Georges, a young and well-dressed man, of distinguished manners, to whom all seemed to pay great respect. This deposition repeatedly renewed, and each time with fresh details, was laid before the First Consul. The report of the sub-officer of gendarmerie was presented to him at the same time, and the coincidences struck his mind with a most lamentable force. The absences of the Duc d'Enghien from Ettenheim immediately connected themselves with the pretended presence of the young prince in Paris; and that young man to whom all the conspirators paid so much respect could not be a prince arrived from London, so strictly as Biville Cliff had been watched. This young man could be no other than the Duc d'Enghien, travelling from Ettenheim to Paris in eight and forty hours, and returning in the same space of time, after having a brief conference with his guilty accomplices. But

close to danger: take great care of yourself, and ensure timely warning to effect your retreat should it enter the Consul's mind to order you to be seized. Do not imagine that courage requires utter neglect on this score.

(Signed)

"LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON."

what rendered this lamentable demonstration conclusive in the eyes of the First Consul was the supposed presence at Ettenheim of General Dumouriez, whose presence there filled up the sketch in surprising perfection. The Comte d'Artois was to have arrived through Normandy with Pichegru, the Duc d'Enghien through Alsace with Dumouriez; the Bourbon princes, to return to France, had seduced two of the most eminent generals of the Republic to be their companions. The First Consul's mind, usually so strong and clear, could not resist so many appearances so well calculated to mislead. He was convinced. It is necessary to have witnessed minds under the bias of an inquiry of this sort, and more especially when passion, of whatever sort, disposes them to belief in what they suspect, to be able to understand how ready such minds are to jump to conclusions, and to learn how very precious are those delays and forms of law which save men from conclusions so quickly drawn from some merely accidental coincidences.

The First Consul, when he read the report which General Moncey, commanding officer of the gendarmerie, presented to him from the sub-officer sent to Ettenheim, was thrown into a state of violent agitation; and gave a very ill reception to M. Réal, who at this moment made his appearance, and whom he reproached for having so long allowed him to remain ignorant of such important particulars. He now firmly believed that he had detected the second and most dangerous party of the conspiracy. Now the sea was no longer to be a barrier to him; the Rhine, the Duke of Baden, the Germanic body were no longer anything to him. He instantly summoned an extraordinary council, consisting of the three Consuls, their ministers, and M. Fouché, who was, though not in name, minister again in reality. The First Consul at the same time sent for Generals Ordener and Caulaincourt, to attend him at the Tuileries; but while awaiting their arrival, he took up some maps of the Rhine to lay down a plan of seizure, and not finding the maps he was in search of, he threw all that came to hand in one confused heap upon the floor.

M. de Meneval, a mild-tempered, prudent, and thoroughly incorruptible man, whom the First Consul could not spare from his presence, as it was to him that he was accustomed to dictate his most private letters, was on this day absent for some time. He was sent for to the Tuileries: when he arrived, the First Consul addressed him in terms of unmerited reproach for his absence, and then continued his study of the map of the Rhine in a state of extraordinary excitement.

The council was at length complete; and an eye-witness gives in his *Memoirs* an account of the proceedings.

The idea of carrying off the prince and General Dumouriez

without hesitating about the violation of the German territory, but with an after-apology to the Duke of Baden for that mode of proceeding, was immediately proposed. The First Consul asked for the opinion of the council, but appeared to have formed a very decided resolution, though he listened patiently to the objections that were made. The Consul Lebrun seemed to be alarmed at the effect that such an abduction would produce in Europe, and the Consul Cambacérès had the courage openly to oppose the proposition. He strove to impress upon the council the dangerous nature of such a resolution, whether at home or abroad, and the violent character which it could not fail to impress upon the First Consul's government. He dwelt especially upon the fact that, if it were a serious thing to arrest, try, and shoot a prince of the blood, even if taken in an overt act of conspiracy—to go to a foreign territory to seize him was not merely to violate that territory, but also to seize him so as to give him all the appearances of innocence, and to bring down upon ourselves all the appearances of a detestable abuse of power; and he entreated the First Consul, alike for the sake of his policy and his personal reputation, not to allow of a proceeding which would throw his government back among the ranks of those revolutionary governments from which he had shown so much anxiety to distinguish it. He repeated his arguments with a fervour very uncommon to him, and proposed, as a middle course, to wait till this prince, or any other of the emigrant princes, should be apprehended in France, and then put the existing laws of the land rigorously in force against them. To this proposition it was replied, that it was not likely that the prince, who was to have entered by the Rhine or by Normandy, would venture to expose himself to the imminent perils of that course now that Georges and the other agents of the conspiracy were in custody; that, moreover, by going to Ettenheim to seize this prince, they would obtain possession of his papers and of his accomplices, as well as of his person, and thus acquire proofs of his guilt, and that those proofs would justify severity; that to allow a foreign territory to protect emigrants conspiring on the very frontiers of France was to grant the most dangerous of impunities; that the Bourbons and their friends had an inveterate tendency to these crimes of conspiracy; that by once making a stern and striking example, that one blow would be more effectual than ten punishments of minor tools, and the former merciful system of the Consul could be once more reverted to; that the royalists stood in need of warning; that as to the question of territory, a lesson was no less needed by the petty German princes than others; and that, moreover, to seize on the prince without first consulting the Duke of Baden was in reality to confer a favour on

the latter ; for should France call upon him for the expulsion of the Duc d'Enghien, the Duke of Baden would have no choice but to be crushed by France for refusal, or to be put under the ban of the empire for compliance. To these arguments it was added that the only question now was the seizure of the prince, with his accomplices and his papers ; that when this was effected, it would remain to be determined what should be done with him when the proofs and extent of his guilt should have been inquired into.

The First Consul, though he listened patiently to the arguments on either side, seemed to do so in the apprehensive and absent mood of a man whose mind is made up. No one could be said to have influenced his determination ; though he seemed to be not ill-pleased with the opposition of M. Cambacérès, to whom he said, " I know your motive for speaking—your devotion to me. I thank you for it ; but I will not allow myself to be put to death without defending myself. I will make these people tremble, and teach them to keep quiet for the time to come."

The idea of striking terror into the Bourbons, of teaching them that they had to do with a man who was not to be attacked with impunity, and of making them aware that the august blood of the Bourbons was of no more importance in his eyes than that of any illustrious person of the Republic ; this thought, and others compounded equally of calculation, vengeance, and the pride of power, had taken complete dominion of his mind.

He gave his orders on the instant. In presence of General Berthier he laid down the rules upon which Colonels Ordener and Caulaincourt were to proceed. Colonel Ordener, attended by 300 dragoons, some pontoniers, and several brigades of gendarmerie, furnished with four days' provision, and a considerable sum of money to prevent their being any burden to the Germans, was to repair to the bank of the Rhine, cross that river at Rheinau, dash forward to Ettenheim, surround that town, and carry off the prince and all the emigrants by whom they might find him surrounded. In the meantime another detachment, supported by some pieces of artillery, was to proceed by Kehl to Offenburg, and remain there in observation till the enterprise was effected ; and as soon as that was the case, Colonel Caulaincourt was to hasten to present himself to the Grand Duke of Baden with a note explanatory of the seizure effected. This explanation consisted in saying that by suffering these gatherings of emigrants the Baden government had compelled the French government to act for itself, and that, moreover, the necessity for being both prompt and secret had rendered it impossible to apply for a previous assent.

It need not be added that in giving these orders to the officers entrusted with their execution the First Consul did not trouble

himself to enter into any explanation as to his views in seizing the prince, or his intentions towards him when he should have been seized. He gave his orders as a general to men who obeyed them as soldiers. Colonel Caulaincourt, however, attached by consanguinity to the ex-royal family, and especially to the Condés, was deeply grieved, although he had only to be the bearer of a letter, and, moreover, was far from anticipating the horrible catastrophe which was at hand. The First Consul did not seem to perceive Caulaincourt's sadness, and gave orders that all should set out immediately on quitting the Tuileries.

His orders were punctually obeyed. Five days later, that is to say, on the 15th of March, the detachment of dragoons set out, with all the prescribed precautions, from Schelestadt, crossed the Rhine, and surprised and surrounded the little town of Ettenheim before any news of their advance could arrive there. The prince, who had previously been warned, but who at this critical moment had no positive information of his danger, was at his usual residence in Ettenheim. On finding himself assailed by an armed force, he was at first inclined to resist, but perceiving the hopelessness of doing so with effect, he surrendered, made his name known to those who were in search of him, but unacquainted with his person, and loudly expressed his vexation at being thus deprived of his liberty, for the full extent of his danger was even yet unknown to him, and allowed himself to be conveyed as a prisoner to the citadel of Strasburg. No important papers had been found, nor General Dumouriez, who had been described as being with the prince, nor any of those proofs of conspiracy, the finding of which had been so emphatically urged as a motive to the expedition. Instead of General Dumouriez, they had found only the Marquis of Thumery, and some other emigrants of no consequence. The report of the barren details of the arrest was immediately forwarded to Paris.

The result of the expedition ought to have enlightened the First Consul and his advisers as to the rashness of their conjectures. The mistake relative to General Dumouriez ought to have been especially significant. Let us see what fatal ideas now possessed the First Consul and those who agreed with him. They had possession of the person of one of those Bourbon princes who were so ready to order conspiracies, and who would never find themselves destitute of madmen and desperadoes ready to venture everything in their service. It was necessary to make a terrible example of that prince, if they would not expose themselves to the derision of the royalists by releasing the prince after having seized him; in the latter event, it would infallibly be said that after acting inconsiderately in seizing the prince they were alarmed by public opinion, afraid of the

indignation of Europe ; in a word, that they had the inclination to commit a crime, but not the courage. Instead of exciting contempt, their true course was to awaken terror. This Bourbon prince, after all, was at Ettenheim, so close to the frontiers, and under such circumstances, evidently for some purpose. Was it possible that, cautioned, as letters found upon him proved that he had been, was it possible that, thus cautioned, he braved so much danger without any motive ? that he was not in some degree an accomplice in the project of assassination ? At all events, he was at Ettenheim for the purpose of seconding some emigrant movement in the interior, of exciting civil war, and of bearing arms against France, as he had done before. All these were crimes punishable by the laws, and the laws should be put in force against this prince.

Such were the arguments of the First Consul, re-echoed by his advisers. No second council, like that we have spoken of, was held, but there were frequent consultations between the First Consul and those who encouraged his passion. This fatal notion constantly possessed him : "The royalists are incorrigible ; they must be intimidated." Orders, therefore, were given that the prince should be transferred from Strasburg to Paris, and taken before a military court, on the charge of having sought to excite civil war, and of having borne arms against France.

To state the case in these terms was, in fact, to anticipate a sentence of blood. On the 18th of March, the prince was taken under an escort from Strasburg to Paris.

At the approach of the moment of this terrible sacrifice, the First Consul desired solitude.

On the 18th of March, Palm Sunday, he set out for Malmaison, where, better than elsewhere, he could command quietness and solitude. With the exception of the Consuls, the ministers, and his brothers, he received no one. For hours together he walked about by himself, giving to his countenance an expression of calmness which he felt not in his heart. Even his inoccupation proves the agitation to which he was a prey, for during a whole week that he stayed at Malmaison, he dictated scarcely a single letter, an unique instance of idleness in his active life ; and yet only a few days earlier all the energies of his mind had been bestowed upon Brest, Boulogne, and the Texel ! His wife, who, in common with all his family, was acquainted with the arrest of the prince ; his wife, who, unable to help sympathising with the Bourbons, thought with horror of the shedding of royal blood ; his wife, with that foresight of the heart which is peculiar to women, perhaps anticipated that a cruel action would draw down retaliative cruelties upon her husband, her children, and herself, and spoke to him several times about the prince, shedding tears as she thought of his destruction, which

she feared was resolved upon, though her mind revolted from such a belief. The First Consul, who somewhat prided himself upon repressing the movements of his heart, naturally so generous and kind, whatever might be said to the contrary by those who did not know him, the First Consul repelled these tearful supplications of which he feared the effect upon his resolve, and replied to Madame Bonaparte in a homely style, which he strove to render harsh: "You are a woman, and know nothing about politics; your proper part is to hold your tongue."

The unfortunate prince, leaving Strasburg with his escort on the morning of the 18th of March, reached Paris about noon on the 20th, and was detained till five o'clock, his carriage guarded by the escort, at the Charenton gate.* On this fatal occasion there was some confusion in the orders given, arising, no doubt, from the agitation of those who gave them.

According to military laws, the military commission should have been formed by the military commandant of the district, who should have assembled the commission and directed the execution of the sentence. Murat was the governor of Paris and commandant of the district. When the order of the Consuls reached him, he was seized with grief. Murat was, as we have remarked, brave, and though sometimes unreflecting, extremely kind-hearted. Some days before, when the expedition to Ettenheim was ordered, he had applauded the vigour of the government; but now that he was to follow it out into its cruel consequences, his excellent heart revolted. Pointing to the facings of his uniform, he said to his friends in a tone of despair that the First Consul was about to stain them with blood; he proceeded to St. Cloud and expressed his painful feelings in person to his awe-inspiring brother-in-law. The First Consul, who was more inclined than he wished to be to sharing those feelings, concealed beneath a stern countenance the secret agitation of his heart. He dreaded lest his government should be weakened by appearing to fear to strike at a scion of the hostile race of Bourbons. He spoke in harsh language to Murat, reproached him in terms of contempt, and concluded by saying that he would conceal what he called the weakness of Murat, by signing with his own consular hand the orders of the day.

The First Consul had recalled Colonel Savary from Biville

* An excellent account of the catastrophe of the Duc d'Enghien has been published by M. Nougarede de Fayet, whose researches, characterised alike by sagacity and conscientiousness, entitle this piece of secret history to the full confidence of the public. Nougarede de Fayet states that the prince was taken direct to the gate of the ministry of foreign affairs. It is possible that this statement is correct; but not being able to ascertain it positively, I have kept to the more general tradition.

Cliff, where he had vainly been on the watch for the princes concerned in the conspiracy, and to him confided the superintendence of the sacrifice of the prince who had taken no part in that conspiracy. Colonel Savary was ready to give up both life and reputation to the First Consul. He offered no advice, but obeyed like a soldier who receives orders from a master to whom his attachment has no bounds. The First Consul had all the orders of the day drawn up, signed them, and then ordered Savary to deliver them to Murat, and to go to Vincennes to superintend their execution. These orders were full and precise; providing for the formation of the commission and designating the colonels of the garrison who were to compose it, naming General Hullin as president, enjoining the immediate assemblage of the commission, that all might be settled in the course of the night; and farther ordering that if, as could not be doubted, the sentence should be that of death, the prisoner should be executed on the spot. A detachment of select gendarmes was to proceed to Vincennes to protect the commission and execute the sentence. Such were the fatal orders that were signed by the First Consul's own hand: in strict legality they must be executed in the name of Murat, but in fact he had nothing to do with them, and Colonel Savary, in obedience to his orders, proceeded to Vincennes to see to their execution.

But even yet these orders were not quite irrevocable; there still remained one means of saving the unfortunate prince. M. Réal was to proceed to Vincennes, to question the prisoner minutely, and draw from him what he knew of the conspiracy of which they still believed him to be an accomplice, though they could find no positive and formal proof of the fact. M. Maret himself had in the course of the evening delivered at the house of the Councillor of State Réal a written order to proceed to Vincennes to enter upon this examination. If M. Réal had seen the prisoner, heard from his own lips a genuine explanation of the facts, been touched by his frankness, and by his urgent request to be allowed an interview with the First Consul, M. Réal could communicate his impressions to him who held the prince's life in his powerful hands. Even after sentence, then, there was still one means left of escaping from the frightful course upon which they had entered, by giving the Duc d'Enghien a pardon, at once nobly asked and nobly granted!

This was the last remaining chance of saving the life of the young prince, and of saving the First Consul from the commission of a grievous wrong. And the First Consul thought of this means, even after the strict orders he had signed. During this evil evening of the 20th of March, he was shut up

at Malmaison with no other company than his wife, his secretary, and a few officers and ladies. Absent, unsociable, yet affecting to be calm, he at length seated himself at a table to play at chess with one of the most distinguished ladies of the consular court,* who, knowing of the arrest of the prince and his transfer to Paris, trembled with dread of the consequences of this fatal day. She dared not raise her eyes to the First Consul, who, in his agitated absence of mind, murmured from time to time some of the most celebrated verses of our poets on the subject of clemency; those which Corneille puts into the mouth of Augustus, and then those which Voltaire gives to Alzire.

These muttered quotations could not be the indications of a sanguinary irony; that would be at once too vulgar and utterly useless. But this usually iron man was really much excited and shaken, and could not prevent his thoughts from wandering from projects of vengeance to the grandeur and nobleness of granting a pardon to a vanquished and disarmed foe. The lady was overjoyed, for she believed that the prince was saved: unfortunately such was not the case.

The commission was hastily assembled, the majority of the members of it not even knowing what prisoner they were to sit in judgment upon. They had been told that he was an emigrant, proceeded against for contravening the laws of the Republic. They were told his name. Some of the soldiers of the Republic, mere children when the great monarchy was overthrown, scarcely knew that the title of Duc d'Enghien was borne by the heir-presumptive of the Condés; nevertheless, their hearts were pained by such a task, for the condemnation of emigrants had ceased for some years past. The prince was taken before them; he was calm, almost haughty; even yet he did not expect the fate that awaited him. Questioned as to his name and his conduct, his replies were firm; he denied all complicity in the plot actually in question, but confessed rather too ostentatiously, perhaps, that he had served against France, and that he was upon the banks of the Rhine for the purpose of similarly serving against her again. The president dwelt upon this point in order to show him the danger of such an avowal, and he repeated what he had said with a boldness rendered noble by its peril, but offensive to the veteran soldiers who had poured out their blood in defence of their fatherland. The impression thus produced was mischievous. The prince repeatedly and earnestly demanded to be allowed to see the First Consul. He was remanded to his prison, and the court deliberated. Although his own reiterated avowals proved him

* The lady in question is Madame de Remusat, who gives this account in her as yet unpublished Memoirs, which are as interesting in substance as sparkling in style.

to be an implacable foe to the Revolution, these warrior hearts were touched by the youth and courage of the prince. Stated as the case was, it could have only a fatal termination. The laws of the Republic and of all times made it a capital offence to serve against France. Nevertheless, many laws had been violated against the prince, in seizing him upon a foreign soil, and depriving him of a defender, and these considerations ought to have influenced the decision of his judges. In their perplexity those unfortunate judges, unspeakably afflicted by their task, pronounced sentence of death; but the majority of them proposed to refer the case to the clemency of the First Consul, and to send before him the prince, who had so urgently desired to be allowed to see him. But the orders of the morning, to finish all during the night, were positive. A delay could only be procured by the arrival of M. Réal to interrogate the prince. M. Réal did not make his appearance; the night was far spent, day was at hand. The prince was taken down into a fosse of the château, and there, with a firmness worthy of his race, received the fire of those soldiers of the Republic whom in the ranks of the Austrians he had so often fought against. Melancholy reprisals of civil war! He was buried upon the very spot where he fell.

Colonel Savary immediately set out to report to the First Consul the execution of his orders.

On the road the colonel met M. Réal on his way to question the prisoner. This Councillor of State, exhausted with fatigue by the continued labour of several days and nights, had given orders to his servants not to disturb him; the order of the First Consul was not placed in his hands until five o'clock in the morning; he arrived, but too late. This was not, as it has been said to be, a scheme planned to force the First Consul into a crime; not at all, it was an accident, a pure accident, by which the unfortunate prince was deprived of the sole chance of saving his life, and the First Consul of a happy opportunity of saving his glory from a stain. A deplorable consequence of violating the ordinary forms of justice! When these forms, invented by the experience of ages to guard human life against the mistakes of judges, when these sacred forms are violated, men are at the mercy of chance, of mere trifles! The lives of accused people, and the honour of governments, are then sometimes dependent upon the most fortuitous coincidences! No doubt, the First Consul had formed his resolve; but he was much agitated; and could the voice of the unfortunate Condé, appealing for life, have reached his ear, that cry would not have been uttered in vain; he would have yielded, and proudly yielded, to his gentler feelings.

Colonel Savary arrived at Malmaison in a state of great

emotion. His presence gave rise to a painful scene. Madame Bonaparte guessed all as soon as she saw him, and burst into tears; and M. de Caulaincourt, in accents of despair, exclaimed that he was dishonoured. Colonel Savary proceeded to the First Consul's study, found him alone with M. de Meneval, and gave him an account of what had taken place at Vincennes. The First Consul asked, "Did M. Réal see the prisoner?" Colonel Savary had scarcely answered in the negative when M. Réal made his appearance, and tremblingly apologised for the non-execution of the orders he had received. Without expressing either approbation or anger, the First Consul dismissed these instruments of his will, went into an apartment of his library, and shut himself up in solitude there for several hours.

In the evening, there was a family dinner at Malmaison: all wore serious and saddened countenances, and no one ventured to speak, the First Consul himself being as silent as the rest. This silence at length became embarrassing, and on rising from table the First Consul himself broke it, addressing himself exclusively to M. de Fontanes, who had just arrived. He was alarmed at the event which was noised throughout Paris, but he could not express his feelings where he now was. He listened chiefly, and replied but little. The First Consul, speaking almost without interruption, and endeavouring to make up for the silence of his company, discoursed upon the princes of all times, upon the Roman emperors, upon the French kings, upon Tacitus, and the judgments of that historian, and upon the cruelties which were frequently attributed to the rulers of States, when these, in fact, only yielded to inevitable necessities. Having by this circuitous route approached the tragical subject of the day, he said:—

"They wish to destroy the Revolution in attacking my person; I will defend it, for I, I, *I* am the Revolution. They will be more cautious in future, for they will know *of what we are capable*."

It is not much to the credit of human nature to be obliged to confess that the terror inspired by the First Consul acted effectually upon the Bourbon princes and the emigrants. They no longer felt themselves safe, now that even the German territory had proved no safeguard to the unfortunate Duc d'Enghien, and thenceforward conspiracies of that kind ceased. But this sorry efficiency will not justify such deeds. Better would it have been for one danger more to threaten the First Consul, so often perilled upon the field of battle, than that his security from such a danger should have been purchased at such a cost. It was speedily rumoured in Paris that a prince had been seized, carried to Vincennes, and shot. The effect of these tidings

was great and melancholy. Ever since the arrest of Pichegru and Georges, the First Consul had been the object of universal anxiety. Indignation had been aroused against all who had joined the Chouans in threatening his life; this indignation extended to Moreau, whose guilt, though less conclusively proved as yet, was nevertheless beginning to seem very probable, and the most ardent wishes were expressed for the preservation of the man upon whom all looked as the tutelar genius of France. The sanguinary execution at Vincennes produced a sudden reaction. The royalists were much irritated, and still more alarmed; but worthy and reasonable men were filled with regret at seeing a government, hitherto so admirable, imbruing its hands in blood, like those who had put Louis XVI. to death, and imitating them, too, it must be confessed, without the excuse of the revolutionary passions which in 1793 had perverted the coolest heads and the kindest hearts.

None were satisfied with what had been done at Vincennes save those hot revolutionists, whose senseless rule the First Consul had brought to an end, and who now saw him in a single day reduced almost to their level. None of them any longer feared that General Bonaparte would act for the Bourbons.

Sad proof of the frailty of the human mind! This extraordinary man, of so great and accurate an intellect, and of so generous a heart, had lately been so stern in his judgment of the revolutionists and their excesses! He had pronounced upon their frenzy without qualification, and sometimes even without justice. He had bitterly reproached them with having shed the blood of Louis XVI., disgraced the Revolution, and irreconcilably embroiled France with Europe! Then he judged calmly; and now, his passions being excited, he had in a single instant paralleled the deed committed upon the person of Louis XVI., and had placed himself in a state of moral opposition to Europe, which speedily rendered a general war inevitable, and compelled him to go in search of peace—a magnificent peace, it is true—to Tilsit, to the other end of Europe! How well calculated are such contrasts to rebuke human pride of intellect, and to prove that the most transcendent genius is not safe from the most vulgar errors, if, even for a single instant, it is deprived of self-control and swayed by passion!

But, to be fully just, while deploring this fatal frenzy of passion, let us turn our eyes to those by whom it was provoked. What were they? Emigrants, those same emigrants who, after having roused to fury an as yet guiltless Revolution, left their country to raise up enemies to France throughout the world. That Revolution, recalled from its sad wanderings, and guided by a great man, now showed itself prudent, pacific, and humane. It had recalled these emigrants, re-established them in their

country and in their possessions, and was preparing to replace them in all the splendour of their former situation. How did they repay all this clemency? If not grateful, were they at least peaceable? No! They went to a neighbouring nation jealous of our greatness, and made use of the liberty of that nation to turn it against France. By dint of scandalous pamphlets they irritated the pride of both countries, only too easily excited, and after having contributed to arm them against each other, they had not merely made themselves soldiers of the enemies of France, but had lent them the aid of conspiracies. They had got up an infamous plot; they had disguised under wretched sophisms a project of assassination; they had sent Georges and Pichegru into France. If there was one heart envious of the First Consul's glory, to that heart they appealed. They misled, perverted, frenzied the weak Moreau; they deceived him, made him deceive himself; and then, when their imprudences revealed them to the vigilant eye of the man whom they sought to destroy, they had denounced each other, and fancied that they justified themselves in openly declaring that they were to be headed in their horrible exploits by a French prince! The great man against whom such horrible plots were directed, revolted and enraged at being made the object of such murderous attacks by those whom he had saved from persecution, at length yielded to a fatal anger. He had watched on the rocky coast for the prince whose coming had been announced; he had vainly watched for him, and while his mind was excited by the confessions of his enemies themselves, he saw on the banks of the Rhine another prince who was there awaiting the renewal of war. At this sight his judgment failed him; he mistook this prince for the intended leader of the conspirators who threatened the peace of France and the life of the First Consul; and then he felt a sort of pride in seizing that prince even upon the Germanic soil, and striking that scion of the Bourbons as he would have stricken the most vulgar individual; and he did strike him, in order to convince the emigration and all Europe that it was as dangerous as unreasonable to attack his person.

Painful spectacle! where all were wrong, even the victims; where Frenchmen were to be seen serving British greatness against French greatness; Bourbons, sons and brothers of kings, and destined in their turns also to be kings, herding with highwaymen; the last of the Condés atoning with his blood for a conspiracy in which he was not an accomplice, and that Condé, whom as a victim one would wish to find wholly irreproachable, incurring the guilt of stationing himself once more beneath the British flag against the French flag; and finally, a great man, misled by anger and by the instinct of

self-preservation and pride, losing on the instant the prudence which all Europe had admired, and imitating the sanguinary revolutionists whom his victorious hands had put down, and whom he had gloried in not imitating! Fatal cycle of human passions! He who is stricken wishes to return the blow; each blow received is returned at the instant; blood calls for blood, and revolutions thus become a succession of sanguinary reprisals, which would be eternal, did not a day arrive when men stop short and lay aside this mere brute struggle and cycle of vengeance to substitute a calm, impartial, and humane justice, and place even above this justice—if anything *can* be above it—a lofty and clear-sighted policy, which, selecting from the sentences of justice the most urgently necessary, allows only those to be executed, and remits the others to culprits, erring, indeed, but susceptible of repentance. To defend social order by conforming to the strict rules and forms of justice, without allowing any feeling of revenge to operate, is the great lesson to be drawn from these tragical events. Another lesson is to be drawn from them—to form an indulgent judgment of men of all parties who, preceding us in the career of revolutions, nurtured amidst the corrupting anxieties and excitement of civil war, and with bloodshed ever before them, showed not that respect for human life with which time, reflection, and a long peace have happily inspired us.

BOOK XIX.

THE EMPIRE.

THE effect which the sanguinary catastrophe of Vincennes produced in France was undoubtedly great; it was still greater in the rest of Europe. We do not depart from the strict truth in saying that that catastrophe became the principal cause of a third general war. The conspiracy of the French princes, and the consequent death of the Duc d'Enghien, were reciprocal blows by which the revolution and the counter-revolution goaded each other into a new and violent contest, which speedily extended itself from the Alps and the Rhine as far as the banks of the Niemen.

We have delineated the respective situations of France and the various courts, setting out from the renewal of the war with Great Britain; the pretensions of Russia to a supreme arbitration, received coldly by England, courteously by the First Consul, but speedily repulsed by him as soon as he perceived the partial disposition of the Russian cabinet; the apprehensions of Austria, fearing to see the war become general again, and seeking to escape from its anxieties by excesses of power in the empire; the perplexities of Prussia, by turns agitated by the suggestions of Russia, or attracted by the caresses of the First Consul, nearly seduced by his language to M. Lombard, and ready at length to terminate its long vacillations by throwing itself into the arms of France.

Such was the state of things a little previous to the deplorable conspiracy of which we have related the tragical phases. M. Lombard had returned to Berlin quite charmed with what he had heard at Brussels, and in communicating his own impressions to the youthful Frederick William, had determined him definitively to coalesce with us. Another circumstance had greatly contributed towards producing this happy result. Russia had shown herself unfavourable to the policy of Prussia, which consisted in a sort of continental neutrality, founded upon the ancient Prussian neutrality, and had endeavoured to substitute for that policy a project of a European triple league, which, under the pretext of restraining the belligerent powers, would speedily have terminated in a new coalition, directed against

France and subsidised by England. Frederick William, stung by the reception that had been given to his proposals, and by the evident consequences that might result from the Russian project, feeling that strength was on the side of the First Consul, offered him no longer a barren friendship, as he had done since 1800, through the enigmatical M. d'Haugwitz, but a genuine alliance. At first he had proposed, to France as to Russia, an extension of the Prussian neutrality, which should comprehend all the States of Germany, and be purchased by the evacuation of Hanover, which would infallibly have had the effect, as to us, of reopening the continent to English commerce, and closing against us the route to Vienna. The First Consul in conferring at Brussels with M. Lombard would not listen to this. Since the return of M. Lombard to Berlin, and the recent conduct of Russia, the King of Prussia made quite different proposals to us. By this new scheme, the two powers, France and Prussia, were to guarantee to each other the *status presens*; comprehending for Prussia all that she had acquired in Germany and in Poland since 1789; for France, the Rhine, the Alps, the annexation of Piedmont, the presidency of the Italian Republic, the acquisition of Parma and Plaisance, the maintenance of the kingdom of Etruria, and the temporary occupation of Taranto. Should peace be disturbed on account of either of these interests, that one of the two powers which should not be immediately threatened was to intervene to prevent war. Should its good offices prove ineffectual, the two powers engaged to unite their forces, and maintain the struggle in common. As the price of this serious engagement, Prussia demanded the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, the reduction of the French army in Hanover to the number of men necessary for the collection of the revenues of the country, that is to say, to 6000; and finally, if on the return of peace the successes of France should have been sufficiently great to allow of her dictating her own terms, the cabinet of Berlin required that the fate of Hanover should be determined in accordance with the views of Prussia. This was indirectly stipulating that Hanover should be given to her.

What determined Frederick William to enter thus far into the policy of the First Consul was the maintenance of the peace of the continent, which depended, in his opinion, upon a solid alliance between Prussia and France. He perceived, with a sagacity creditable to himself, and especially creditable to M. d'Haugwitz, by whose counsels he was here guided, that if Prussia and France were strongly united, no continental power would dare to disturb the general peace. He at the same time said that in enchaining the continent he would also enchain the First Consul; for the guarantee of the existing situation

of the two powers was a means of fixing that situation, and of interdicting the First Consul from any new enterprises. If Prussia had only adhered to such views, and if she had been encouraged to do so, the destinies of the world would have been changed.

The same reasons which had determined Prussia to make the proposal that we have recited should have determined the First Consul to accept it. What he definitively desired, at least at that period, was the Rhine and the Alps as the boundaries of France, besides an absolute domination in Italy, and a preponderating influence in Spain: in a word, the supremacy of the West. He would have secured all this in obtaining the guarantee of Prussia, and he would have secured it with a degree of certainty all but infallible. Doubtless, the continent would have been reopened to the English by the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser; but those facilities restored to their commerce would not have afforded them benefit at all proportionate to the injury they would have experienced from the immobility of the continent, thenceforward secured by the union of Prussia with France. And the continent at peace, the First Consul was certain, by applying his genius to the subject for some years, sooner or later to strike some grand blow against England.

True it is, that in the proposition of Prussia the title of *alliance* was wanting; the substance was unquestionably there, but the word was designedly left out by the policy of the young king.

That prince, in fact, had determined not to insert the word; he had even endeavoured to diminish the apparent importance of the treaty by terming it a convention. But of what consequence was the form when the substance was secured; when the engagement to join his forces to ours was formally stipulated; when that engagement, taken by a king, honest and faithful to his word, was one to be depended upon? This is the place in which to note one of the errors of judgment of not only the court of Prussia, but of all the courts of Europe of that day. They admired the new government of France, since it had been directed by a great man; they loved his principles as much as they respected his glory; and yet they wilfully held themselves aloof from him. Even when some object of importance compelled them to make advances to him, they were unwilling to meet him except upon terms of official formality; not that they either felt, or would have ventured to show towards him the aristocratic contempt of old dynasties towards new ones; the First Consul had not as yet exposed himself to comparisons of that sort by constituting himself the chief of a dynasty, and the military glory, which was his chief title, was

one of those merits before which disdain must ever prostrate itself. But each power feared, in proclaiming itself his ally, to pass in the eyes of Europe as a deserter of the cause of kingcraft. Frederick William would have felt himself embarrassed in presence of his young friend Alexander, and even in presence of his enemy the Emperor Francis. The young and lovely queen, surrounded by a coterie brimful of the passions and prejudices of the *ancien régime*, a coterie in which M. Lombard was satirised because he had returned from Brussels an enthusiastic admirer of the First Consul, and in which M. d'Haugwitz was detested because he was the champion of the French alliance; the young and lovely queen and her circle would have cried aloud and overwhelmed the king with their censure. That, to be sure, was a mere domestic annoyance, such as Frederick William was by no means unaccustomed to. But he would not have been able to reconcile a formal treaty of alliance with the equivocal language, destitute of frankness, which he habitually used with the other courts. He wished to be able to hold up the engagements entered into with the First Consul as a sacrifice that he had made, in spite of his own wishes, to the most urgent wants of his subjects. The evacuation of Hanover was, indeed, an object of the highest importance to his subjects, inasmuch as the Elbe and the Weser would thereby be reopened to their trade. To obtain from France the evacuation of Hanover, it was indispensable, he would have said, to yield her something, and he had found himself compelled to guarantee to her that which, moreover, all the powers, and especially Austria, had guaranteed to her either by treaties or by secret conventions. At this price, without any new concession, he had delivered Germany from foreign troops, and re-established her commerce. Add the word alliance to the proposed convention, and this representation would become impossible. It is true that the stipulation relative to Hanover was as compromising as the word alliance would have been, but it was consigned to an article which it was promised, on word of honour, should be kept secret. That court, as has been shown, was as weak as it was ambitious; but its promise, once written, could be relied upon. It was advisable, then, to deal with her such as she was, to make allowance for her weaknesses, and to hasten to profit by this rare opportunity of binding her to France.

In our time, since the breaking up of the old Germanic empire, there remain but few subjects of rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and a very important one exists between Prussia and France in the Rhenish provinces. But in 1804, Prussia, thrown at a considerable distance from the Rhine, had only congenial interests with France, and antagonistic interests with

Austria. The mutual hatred between Frederick the Great and Austria was still in full force. The reform of the Germanic Constitution, the secularisation of the ecclesiastical territories, the suppression of the immediate nobility, the partition of votes between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, were so many questions resolved or to be resolved, which animated the two courts with retrospective and anticipative resentment. Prussia, enriched with church property, representing the revolutionary principles of Germany, and thus possessing in the eyes of the old monarchies almost the bad odour of the Revolution, as well as its interests, was our natural ally; and unless we were desirous of having no friend in Europe, it was evidently with her that we should make common cause.

In fact, as an ally, Spain was not worthy of the name, and to regenerate her was to run the risk of being plunged at a future day into immense difficulties. Italy, torn into fragments, of which we possessed nearly the whole, could add nothing substantial to our strength; she could give us, at the most, some soldiers, capable, indeed, of being rendered good, but requiring for that purpose to have served for a long time with our own. Austria, abler and more astute than all the other courts combined, cherished the resolution, concealed from every one else and almost from herself, to spring upon us at the first opportunity, in order to recover what she had lost. Nor was there anything astonishing or reprehensible even in that resolution; all who have been vanquished seek to regain their place, and have a right to do so. Inasmuch as Prussia was, so to speak, the France of Germany, insomuch was Austria all that we can imagine of the opposite, for she was the perfect picture of the *ancien régime*. Moreover, there was a special reason for her being irreconcilable with France; Italy—the object of her liveliest desire, and of a no less lively desire on the part of the First Consul. From the moment that he aspired to the dominion of Italy, he could only hope for truces, of longer or shorter duration, with Austria. Between the two constantly opposed courts of Germany, then, it was impossible to choose that of Vienna. As for Russia, to pretend to the dominion of the continent was necessarily to have her for an enemy. The last ten years had abundantly proved that, even without having any interest in the war which we sustained against Germany, with an interest identical to our own in the war which we had sustained against England, she had, under Catherine, taken a hostile attitude; under Paul I. had sent forth her Suwarrow; and under Alexander had ended, under the pretext of protecting the lesser powers, by aiming at a continental protectorate incompatible with the continental influence that we sought to exercise. Continental jealousy made her our enemy, as mari-

time jealousy made us an enemy of England. Thus, then, Spain, in its abasement, having no strength to offer to us; Austria being implacable on account of Italy; Russia being our rival on the continent, as England was our rival upon the ocean; Prussia, on the contrary, having interests congenial to our own, and playing the part of an intruder and upstart among the old governments, Prussia was our natural and inevitable ally. To neglect her was to consent to be wholly isolated. To remain isolated permanently, and under whatever circumstances, was to invoke destruction as the consequence of our first reverse of fortune.

When alliances were in question, the First Consul was ill-advised by M. de Talleyrand. That minister, influenced by taste rather than by calculation, had a decided predilection for Austria. Filled with reminiscences of the old cabinet of Versailles, in which the great Frederick was detested on account of his sarcasms, and in which the court of Vienna was beloved on account of its cajoleries, he fancied himself at the Versailles of bygone days, when all went smoothly with Austria. For such insufficient cause he was cool, satirical, contemptuous towards Prussia, and dissuaded the First Consul from putting trust in her. His advice, however, had but little weight in the matter. The First Consul, from the time of his attaining power, had judged with his usual sagacity as to the quarters in which alliance was desirable or not, and he had leaned towards Prussia. At the same time, confident in his strength, he was in no hurry to choose his friends. He saw all the utility of having friends, and he appreciated all at their true respective value, but he believed that he would always have time to choose them, and he determined to do so at his leisure.

When M. de Lucchesini, in consequence of the interviews at Brussels, presented a letter from the king himself, and the project of alliance, wanting only the title, the First Consul was deeply stung. He rightly enough considered the connection with France to be honourable enough, and more especially profitable enough to be publicly avowed by Prussia. "I accept," said he, "the proposed basis, but I wish the word alliance to be inserted in the treaty. It is only Prussia's public profession of friendship with us which can intimidate Europe, and enable me to direct all our resources against England. Such a treaty once signed, I will reduce our land force and increase our marine, and devote myself wholly to maritime warfare. Without such a formal and public alliance, I could not, without danger, effect this modification of our forces, and I should sacrifice the blockade of the rivers without any adequate advantage."

There was much correctness in this reasoning. The complete avowal of our alliance would have given us a moral power, which

a half avowal could not have secured to us. But still the bare fact of a union of our strength was of immense consequence, and the substance should in this case have been preferred to the mere form. Prussia, allied with us merely to the extent of being bound to take up arms with us under certain circumstances, would speedily have been compromised in the eyes of Europe, exposed to the sneers and reproaches of the other cabinets, and thereby irritated, till at length she would have thrown herself, even despite herself, into our arms. A first step towards us would have rendered the second step inevitable. It was an error, therefore, not to meet her cordially. The First Consul, independent of the word alliance, upon which he laid the utmost stress, disputed some of the conditions demanded by Prussia. As respected Hanover, he was inclined to be very accommodating, and made no difficulty as to ceding it, should the opportunity offer, to Prussia, knowing that he would thus sow the seeds of perpetual discord between her and England. Nevertheless, he was still impracticable as to the opening of the rivers. He revolted at the idea of opening part of the continent to the English, to those English who blockaded every sea. He went so far as to say to the Prussian minister:

“What! for a mere pecuniary consideration, would you have me sacrifice one of the most effective means of annoying Great Britain? You have aided the cloth merchants of Silesia with three or four millions of crowns; you ought to aid them with as much more. Make your calculation: how much will it cost you? Six or eight millions of crowns? I am ready to supply you with that amount privately, provided that you give up the opening of the rivers.”

This proposition was not to the taste of Prussia, who wished to be able to say to the European courts that she had only gone thus far with the First Consul in order to secure the withdrawal of the French troops from the Elbe and the Weser.

When the proposal, thus modified, was returned to Berlin, the king was alarmed at the idea of an avowed and definite alliance. The Emperor Alexander and the German courts were incessantly present to his mind, making him a thousand reproaches for his perfidy. He was also apprehensive of the enterprising nature of the First Consul, and feared that in binding himself too completely to him he should be drawn into war, which was precisely that which he was most anxious to avoid. The court itself was divided and excited upon this question. Although the cabinet was secret to the utmost, some inklings got abroad of the matter which so gravely occupied it; and the court was loud in its wrath against M. d'Haugwitz, whom it accused of being the parent of such a policy. This eminent statesman, whom a certain seeming duplicity, springing rather from his position than from his

nature, caused to be ill spoken of in the courts of Europe, but who at that period understood better than any Prussian—nay, we would freely add, better than any Frenchman—the mutual interests of the two powers, made every effort to revive the courage of his alarmed sovereign, and at the same time to prevail on the First Consul not to be too excessive in his demands. But his efforts were unavailing, and in his disgust he formed the resolution of retiring from office, a resolution which he shortly afterwards put into execution. The Russian minister at Berlin, M. d'Alopeus, a Russian, as fiery and arrogant as M. de Markoff, disturbed all Potsdam with his outcry. The Austrian diplomatists filled it with their intrigues. Every passion was aroused against the idea of an alliance with France. Nevertheless, this interior agitation extended no further than the immediate circle of the court, and had not become the public rumour of Berlin.

Such was the state of affairs when the news arrived of the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic territory. It produced an immense effect. The excitement of the anti-French party overstepped all bounds. The embarrassment of the opposite party was extreme. The prediction of the Consul Lebrun, that that act would cause immense excitement in Europe, was now fully justified. However, to extenuate in some degree the effect of this intelligence, it was affirmed that this was purely a measure of precaution; that the First Consul had desired to secure a hostage, but that it had never entered his mind to destroy a young prince of a race so illustrious, and who besides was unacquainted with what had been plotted at Paris. Scarcely were these apologies made when the intelligence arrived of the sad event at Vincennes. Thenceforth the French party was compelled to be silent—it could not even proffer apologies. The French minister, Laforest, though he enjoyed a high personal reputation, suddenly found himself deserted by the society of Potsdam, and he even mentioned in his despatches that no one would speak to him. In one of his daily reports he repeats these actual words of a lady who, nevertheless, was extremely well disposed towards the French legation. “If we may judge of the exasperation of minds from the violence of language, I have no doubt that everything that is connected with the French government would be insulted—to say no worse—did not Prussia still possess protecting laws, and a king whose principles are well known.”

M. de Laforest, at the same date, added that these *yelpers*, after having, externally at least, displayed a lively sensibility, *could not conceal a sort of insulting joy, and congratulated each other, as though they had achieved an important victory.*

In point of fact, this terrible event was an important advantage

to the enemies of France, for it everywhere threw the French party into the background, and cemented alliances which could only be broken up at the cannon's mouth.

The blunders of a foe are but a sorry compensation for our own. England, however, had provided that compensation for us. She had committed an act not easily to be characterised, in furnishing pecuniary aid to a conspiracy, and in ordering, or permitting, three of her diplomatic servants, at Cassel, at Stuttgart, and at Munich, to engage in the most criminal intrigues. The First Consul despatched a thoroughly trustworthy officer, who, disguised, and giving himself out to be an agent of the conspiracy, wormed himself into the confidence of Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith. He received from them, for transmission to the conspirators, and by way of a slight instalment—seeing the difficulty of raising on the instant a sufficient amount in specie—upwards of a hundred thousand francs in gold, which he immediately handed over to the French police. The report of that officer, and the autograph letters of Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith, were placed together, and exhibited to the diplomatic corps, that their authenticity might be established. The fact was beyond denial. The report and the documents in question, inserted in the *Moniteur*, and forwarded to the courts of Europe, caused a severe censure of England to succeed to that passionate blame of which France had for some time been the exclusive object. It was quite evident to all impartial men that the First Consul had been provoked by detestable conduct, and it occasioned them regret, for the sake of his glory, that he had not contented himself with the legal punishment of Georges and his accomplices, and the disgrace which must have attached to the misconduct of the English diplomatic agents. Messrs. Drake and Smith, indignantly dismissed from Munich and from Stuttgart, passed hastily across Germany, not daring to show themselves anywhere. Mr. Drake especially, on reaching Berlin, received orders from the Prussian police not to stop there even for a single day. He merely passed through that capital, and hastened to embark for England, bearing with him the stigma which attaches to the profanation of the most sacred of functions.

The conduct of Mr. Drake and his colleague furnished something of counterpoise to the death of the Duc d'Enghien. Nevertheless, the Prussian cabinet, though perfectly civil in its tone, suddenly became cool, silent, and reserved towards M. de Laforest; no more mention was now made by it of alliance or of business affairs: not a word did it utter about the sad event which was everywhere so deeply deplored. It was known that Messrs. d'Haugwitz and Lombard were in despair about the occurrence which was so ruinous to their policy; M. d'Haugwitz

was known to have taken the resolution of quitting the helm of State, and retiring to his estates in Silesia, much impoverished by the war. But these personages preserved unbroken silence. M. de Laforest having endeavoured to bring about an explanation, M. d'Haugwitz listened attentively to him, and replied in these grave terms: "Be assured, sir, that throughout this affair the king has been especially anxious about all that concerns the glory of the First Consul. As to the alliance, that is no longer to be thought of. Too much was required of the king; moreover, a total change has suddenly taken place in his ideas, in consequence of an unforeseen event, the effects of which neither you nor I can prevent."

In fact, the dispositions of the King of Prussia were completely altered. He was now disposed to connect himself with Russia, and hoped to find in that power the support which he had formerly anticipated from France. He had desired to obtain from the First Consul some reduction in the army of Hanover, and the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, by undertaking to share whatever dangers might menace France. Now, determined to have nothing in common with France, he made up his mind to endure the occupation of Hanover, and the consequent closing of the rivers; and sought in a closer connection with Russia the means of preventing, or at the least limiting, the inconveniences which might arise from the presence of the French in Germany. He therefore without delay made overtures to the Russian ambassador. It was an easy matter to conduct such a negotiation to a successful termination, for it was wholly congenial to the wishes of the Russian court.

While the effect of the tragical event which occupied the attention of all Europe grew weaker at Berlin, it developed itself at St. Petersburg. It was still greater there than elsewhere. At the court of a young, mercurial, and rash sovereign, freed by its remote locality from the necessity of being prudent, no restraint was put upon the manifestation of feelings. It was on a Saturday that the courier arrived at St. Petersburg. The following day, Sunday, was the diplomatic levee day. The emperor, annoyed by the hauteur of the First Consul, and little inclined to restrain himself in order to please him, listened on this occasion only to his resentment, and the outcries of an impassioned mother. He caused all his household to go into mourning, without even consulting his cabinet. When the hour for the levee arrived, the emperor and his court made their appearance in mourning, to the great astonishment even of the ministers, who had not been made aware of that intention. The representatives of all the courts of Europe joyfully beheld this testimony of grief, which was a virtual insult to France. Our ambassador, General Hédouville, present in common with the

other foreign ministers at this levee, was for some instants placed in a most painful situation. But he displayed a coolness and dignity which had a striking effect upon all the witnesses of this strange scene. The emperor passed by without addressing a single word to him. The general proved himself to be neither embarrassed nor disturbed, but with a look of the utmost tranquillity, inspired, by his dignified bearing, respect for the French nation, compromised though it was by a great misfortune.

After this imprudent display, the emperor deliberated with his ministers as to the course to be pursued. This young monarch, sensible indeed, but no less vain than sensible, was impatient to play a conspicuous part. He had already played a part in German affairs; but he had speedily perceived that he had rather been permitted to play that part by the policy of the First Consul than conquered it for himself. He had interceded for Naples and Hanover without being attended to; and he had been mortified by the lofty tone in which the First Consul had reproved the conduct of M. de Markoff, although he himself disapproved of that conduct. In such a temper, the slightest opportunity would have sufficed to provoke him to an outbreak; and in yielding to wounded vanity, he imagined that he only obeyed the most honourable feelings of humanity. If to this we add a temper to the utmost degree susceptible, and an utter want of experience, we shall fully explain his sudden resolutions.

To the affront of which we have spoken he wished to add a political step, which was somewhat more serious than a court demonstration. After having vainly opposed his wishes, his ministers imagined a very hazardous means of gratifying him—that of protesting, in quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, against the invasion of the territory of Baden. This, as we shall presently see, was an extremely rash step.

The quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, which was here assumed by the court of Russia, was very disputable, for the recent mediation, exercised in conjunction with France, had not been followed by a formal act of guarantee. And so necessary was this act to the existence of the guarantee, that the ministers of France and Russia had frequently consulted with the German ministers upon the necessity for drawing up such a document, and upon the form which it would be expedient to give to it. The act, however, had not been drawn up. In its absence, there remained whatever claim could be founded upon the treaty of Teschen, by which in 1779 France and Russia had guaranteed the arrangement entered into by Prussia and Austria relative to the succession of Bavaria. Did that engagement, limited to a special object, confer the right of interfering

in a question of the domestic police of the empire. The point was doubtful. At all events, if the empire had occasion to complain of a violation of its territory, it was for the injured sovereign, that is to say, for the Grand Duke of Baden, or at most for a German power, but assuredly not for a foreign power, to complain. In raising this question, therefore, Russia acted wholly without title. She was about to embarrass Germany, even to do her a disservice, for notwithstanding that she was affronted, she had no inclination to commence a quarrel, of which the issue was easy to foresee. Finally, it was the greatest of levities to make this disturbance. Scarcely four years had elapsed since the commission of a crime, which calumniators called a parricide, which had stained St. Petersburg with blood, and raised the young monarch to the throne. The assassins of the father still surrounded the son, and not one of them had been punished. Was not this, then, to provoke a crushing reply from the most hardy of adversaries? M. de Woronzow was ill, and replaced by the young Prince Czartoryski, and it must be mentioned to the praise of the latter that, young as he was, he made strong objections. But the aged ministers showed no more prudence in this conjuncture than the youthful monarch himself; for, as regards prudence, the passions level all ages. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, then, determined that a note should be addressed to the Germanic Diet, to arouse its anxiety, and to provoke its consideration of the violation of territory recently committed in the grand duchy of Baden. A corresponding note was to be addressed to the French government.

The manifestations inspired by this affair did not end here. It was resolved to evince to the court of Rome an emphatic disapprobation of the condescension it had recently manifested to France in delivering up to her the emigrant Vernègues. The Russian minister at Rome was recalled on the instant. The Pope's nuncio was dismissed from St. Petersburg. There could not be a more misplaced or more affronting censure of the proceedings of a foreign court, however blamable they might be. Saxony, alarmed at the displeasure felt by the First Consul at the presence of M. d'Entraigues at Dresden, had solicited the cabinet of St. Petersburg to recall him. The cabinet of St. Petersburg replied that M. d'Entraigues should remain at Dresden, as Russia needed not to consult the convenience of other courts in the selection of her agents.

After taking these very imprudent steps, they busied themselves in providing against the consequences by forming alliances. A willing and favourable ear was naturally lent to the language of Prussia, who, after having abandoned Russia for France, had now abandoned France for Russia, and sought to unite herself to

the north. It would have gratified Russia to induce Frederick William to join in a sort of continental coalition, independent of England, but inclining towards her. However, it was necessary to be contented with what was offered by the King of Prussia. That prince, obliged to leave Hanover in the hands of the French, since he had broken off negotiations with them, sought to provide against the ill consequences of their presence by means of an understanding with Russia. He wished no more than this, and it was impossible to lead him further.

Consequently, each party having endeavoured to bring about the result which it preferred, they agreed upon a sort of engagement, consisting of a reciprocal declaration of Prussia and Russia, drawn up in varied terms, and impressed with the spirit of the two courts. The purport of this engagement was as follows:—As long as the French should confine themselves to the occupation of Hanover, and their forces should not exceed the number of thirty thousand men in that part of Germany, the two courts were to remain passive and maintain the *status quo*. But should the French troops be augmented in number, or should other States of Germany be invaded, the two powers were to combine and resist such fresh invasion; and should their resistance to that progress of the French towards the north lead to a war, they were to unite their forces and sustain the struggle in common. The emperor, in such a contingency, placed all the resources of his empire unreservedly at the disposal of Prussia. This deplorable engagement, signed by Prussia on the 24th of May 1804, was accompanied, however, by a multitude of restrictions on the part of that power. The king, in his declaration, said that he did not intend to be lightly led into a war, that consequently it would not be merely the addition of some hundreds of men to the French army in Hanover, sent for the annual and regular recruiting of that army, nor would it be a chance collision with one of the small German powers which would lead him to risk a rupture with France, but her design, formally manifested by a real and considerable augmentation of her forces in Hanover, to aggrandise herself in Germany. The young emperor, on his part, laid no such restriction upon his engagement. He bound himself unconditionally to join his troops to those of Prussia in the event of war.*

This treaty, so unusual in form, was to remain secret, and in

* This treaty, in the form of a mutual declaration, must not be confounded with the secret treaty of Potsdam concluded on the 3rd of November 1805, while Napoleon was on his march from Ulm to Austerlitz, and which was wrung from Prussia in consequence of the violation of the territory of Anspach and of Baruth. The treaty of which we here speak has never appeared in any published collection of diplomatic documents; it has even remained unknown in France. Having procured a copy of it, I here publish it, to

fact did remain unknown to us. Scarcely was it concluded when the King of Prussia, continually oscillating from side to side to ward off all danger of war, feared, after making himself safe on the side of Russia, that he had laid himself too open on the side of France. The suddenness with which he had ceased to speak of alliance with us, the grave and stern silence pre-

throw a light upon an important fact, the abandonment of the French alliance by Prussia.

Declaration of the Court of Prussia.

WE, Frederick-William III., &c. &c.

The war which is rekindled between England and France having exposed the north of Germany to foreign invasion, the consequences which have already resulted from it to our monarchy and to our neighbours have excited our utmost anxiety; but above all, the further consequences which may result from it have required us to devise and to mature a timely remedy for them.

However much the occupation of Hanover, and its indirect consequence, the closing of the rivers, are to be deplored, we have resolved, after making every effort short of war with a view to the cessation of this state of things, to make to peace the sacrifice of not challenging that which has been already consummated, and of abstaining from active measures so long as no fresh usurpations shall oblige us to adopt them.

But if, notwithstanding the solemn promises given by the French government, it should extend beyond the *status quo* of the present time its enterprises against the safety of any Northern State, we are resolved to oppose it with the forces which Providence has placed in our hands.

We have made a solemn declaration to this effect to France, and France has accepted it; but it was especially towards his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias that confidence and friendship rendered it our duty to explain ourselves, and we have had the satisfaction of ascertaining that our resolutions were in precise conformity with the principles of our august ally, and that he himself was resolved to join us in maintaining them. We have accordingly agreed with his Imperial Majesty upon the following points:—

1stly. We shall make common cause against any new encroachment by the French government upon the Northern States unconcerned in her war with England.

2ndly. To this end, we shall bestow a rigorous and sustained attention upon the preparations of the Republic. A vigilant eye will be kept upon her troops stationed in Germany; and if their number should be augmented, we shall, without loss of time, put ourselves into an attitude to uphold and give effect to the protection intended to be bestowed upon the weaker States.

3rdly. Should a new usurpation actually take place, we feel that half measures against so dangerous an adversary would be worse than useless. It would, consequently, be with forces proportioned to the vast power of the Republic that we should march against it. Accordingly, while we accept with gratitude the offer of our august ally instantly to support our troops with an army of forty or fifty thousand men, we do not the less reckon upon the previous stipulations of the treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia; stipulations which so closely connect the destinies of the two empires, that when the existence of one of them is in peril, the duties and sacrifices of the other should have no bounds.

4thly. To determine when a *casus fœderis* will exist, events and circumstances must be looked at in their true spirit and full scope. The small States of the empire, situated beyond the Weser, may temporarily present scenes revolting to principle, whether from their being perpetually traversed by French troops, or from their sovereigns being sold to France, like the Comte de Bentheim, or dependent upon her, from other causes, like the Comte d'Aremberg. There the insignificant deviations that a representation suffices,

served about the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, seemed to him to put peace in peril. He therefore ordered M. d'Haugwitz to make to the French minister a solemn declaration of neutrality, an absolute neutrality on the part of Prussia, so long as the French troops occupying Hanover should not be augmented. Accordingly M. d'Haugwitz, suddenly quitting his reserved

as in the case of Meppen, to redress, and that do not endanger the safety of any State, are foreign to a compact formed solely with a view to safety. It is upon the banks of the Weser that our interests begin to be essentially affected, because from that line Denmark, Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic towns, &c., are exposed, and, consequently, the *casus fœderis* will arise at the first attempt of the French upon a State of the empire situated on the right of the Weser, and especially upon the Danish provinces of Mecklenburg, anticipating, as we justly may, that the King of Denmark will then make common cause with us against the enemy.

5thly. The immense marches which the Russian troops would have to make in order to join ours, and the difficulty of their arriving in time to bear their part in decisive operations, make us deem it expedient that a different mode of transport be adopted for the different arms of the service. Thus, while the Russian cavalry and artillery horses will march through our provinces, it would seem preferable that the infantry and the guns should be transported by sea, and disembarked in some part of Pomerania, of Mecklenburg, or of Holstein, according to the operations of the enemy.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier still if the two contracting courts see fit, Denmark and Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to the compact, to lend their co-operation, and furnish means proportionate to their power, as also will the other princes and States of the north of Germany, who from the proximity of their territories must participate in the benefits of this arrangement.

7thly. Thenceforth, we bind ourselves not to lay down our arms, or enter into any accommodation with the enemy, unless with the consent and agreement previously obtained of his Imperial Majesty, relying with confidence upon our august ally, who has taken the like engagements towards us.

8thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Imperial Majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the north of Germany from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and we pledge our royal troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagement we have herein taken.

In witness whereof, we have signed these presents with our hand, and have caused our royal seal to be affixed thereto.

Done at Berlin this 24th of May, in the year of our Lord 1804, and the eighth year of our reign.

(Signed)

FREDERICK WILLIAM.

(Countersigned)

HARDENBERG.

Counter-declaration on the part of Russia.

The critical situation of the north of Germany, and the impediments to which its commerce, as well as that of the whole of the north of Europe, is subjected by the presence of the French troops in the electorate of Hanover; further, the imminent danger which may be anticipated to the peace of the States in that part of the continent which have not as yet been subjected to the yoke of France, having excited our utmost anxiety, we have applied ourselves to the discovery of means calculated to calm our apprehensions upon this subject.

As the invasion of the electorate of Hanover could not be foreseen, and as

silence towards M. de Laforest, declared to him that his sovereign had pledged his word of honour that he would remain neuter under all circumstances if the number of French troops in Hanover should not exceed 30,000. He added that this was almost equal to the alliance that had been broken off, as the inactivity of Prussia, assured upon the condition she thus set

circumstances unfortunately prevented its deliverance at the time from the presence of the French troops, we have deemed it expedient for the moment not to take any active measures, so long as the French government shall confine itself to the occupation of his Britannic Majesty's German possessions; but at the same time, not to suffer the French to overstep in Germany the line behind which they at present remain.

His Majesty the King of Prussia, whom in full confidence we have made acquainted with our alarms, and with the measures which seemed to us to be indispensable to the warding off of the dangers that we anticipated, having expressed his concurrence in our views, as well as his desire to aid in precautions so salutary, and to oppose all further encroachments of the French government upon the other States of the empire unconcerned in its quarrel with England, we have agreed with his said Majesty upon the following points:—

1stly. As the well-known audacity and activity of the French government enables it to undertake and to execute its plans on the instant, it is absolutely necessary to keep watch over the preparations it may make for furthering its designs upon the north of Germany. A vigilant eye, therefore, will be kept upon the French troops stationed in those parts, and in the event of their number being increased, we shall lose no time in assuming a position calculated to give full effect to the protection proposed to be extended to those States which, from their weakness, are unable to protect themselves from the dangers which threaten them.

2ndly. To obviate all uncertainty as to the period at which shall commence the active employment of the means before specified and destined on either side for preserving the north of Germany from all foreign invasion, it is agreed, at the outset, between us and his Prussian Majesty, to define the *casus fœderis* of the present engagement. Accordingly, we have agreed to consider it to exist at the first encroachment which the French troops, stationed in the electoral territories of his Britannic Majesty, shall make upon the adjacent States.

3rdly. Should the *casus fœderis* occur, his Majesty the King of Prussia, being nearer to the scene of action, will not wait for the junction of the respective forces hereinafter specified, but will cause operations to be commenced immediately on receiving tidings that the French troops have overstepped the line they at present occupy in the north of Germany.

4thly. All the means which we ourselves propose to employ to the same end being by that time ready for active employment, we engage, in the most formal manner, to march to the assistance of his Prussian Majesty at the first warning, and with the greatest possible despatch.

5thly. The forces which we shall employ in the defence of the rest of the north of Germany will amount to forty thousand regular troops, and will be augmented, if need be, to fifty thousand. His Majesty the King of Prussia, on his part, engages to employ for the same object an equal number of regular troops. Military operations once commenced, we undertake not to lay down our arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with the consent of his Prussian Majesty, and after preliminary agreement with him; it being distinctly understood that his Majesty the King of Prussia equally obliges himself not to lay down his arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with our consent, and after preliminary agreement with us.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier if it shall seem expedient to the two contracting courts, the King of Denmark and

upon it, secured the inactivity of the continent. The earnestness of this declaration, which seemed so uncalled for at that juncture, surprised M. de Laforest, but revealed nothing to him; nevertheless, it appeared very singular to him. Frederick William supposed that he had now safely regulated his position with every one. Nothing is more pitiable to look upon than weak incapacity plunging into political perplexities, and compromising itself by aiming at too much, as the weak bird fastens itself in the fowler's net by the very struggles that it makes to regain its liberty.

Thus, by the double policy of the King of Prussia, and under the deep impression made by the event of Vincennes, the foundation was laid of the third coalition. Russia, delighted at having secured Prussia, now began to direct her efforts towards Austria, and laid herself out rather more than she had previously done to ingratiate herself with that power. She had a ready means of doing this in opposing France, and siding with the court of Vienna on the still undecided questions of the Germanic empire.

We must now show what effect had been produced at Vienna by the event which had so deeply disturbed the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. If there was any one court more than another to which the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic soil might naturally occasion concern, that one most assuredly was the court of Vienna. Nevertheless, the only ministers who evinced moderation on that occasion were the ministers of the emperor. They uttered not a word that could wound the French government, took not a step of which it could complain. And yet the head of the empire, the natural guardian of the safety and dignity of the German territory, was bound, or no one was, to complain of the act committed in the grand duchy of Baden. In truth, it must even be remarked,

the Elector of Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to this compact, and to co-operate with it by means proportioned to their power, as will also be invited all the other princes and States of the north of Germany, who from the proximity of their territories will participate in the benefits of the present arrangement.

7thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Prussian Majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the soil of the Germanic empire from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences which she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed by his Majesty the King of Prussia, and we pledge our imperial troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagements we have herein taken. In witness whereof we have signed these presents with our own hand, and have caused the seal of our empire to be affixed thereto. Given at St. Petersburg, on this
* * * * * 1804, and fourth year of our reign.

that everything would have been right and consistent if the affected indifference of the court of Austria had been displayed at St. Petersburg, and the Russian promptitude in complaining had been manifested at Vienna. No one could have been surprised if the emperor had temperately but firmly demanded explanations from the First Consul in respect of a violation of territory which must necessarily cause great anxiety in Germany. But nothing of the sort occurred; precisely the contrary was the case. At St. Petersburg they were young, inexperienced, and above all, they were far from France; at Vienna they were prudent, dissimulating, and above all, very close to the conqueror of Marengo. They were silent. M. de Cobentzel, urged by M. de Champagny, rather than urging him, to explanation, said that he understood the hard necessities of policy, that he certainly regretted an event that was calculated to give rise to new perplexities in Europe, but that, as far as he was concerned, the cabinet of Vienna would only guard, even more anxiously than ever, against the disturbance of the continental peace.

Fully to appreciate the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna on this occasion, it must be known that while awaiting a favourable opportunity to regain what she had lost, an opportunity which she did not wish imprudently to create, that cabinet watched with eager curiosity what was passing at Boulogne, cherishing very naturally the hope that the French armies might be overwhelmed by the ocean, but by no means wishing to attract their irresistible superiority towards the banks of the Danube. In the interval, the cabinet of Vienna availed itself of the occupation afforded to France by the maritime war, to settle in its own way the questions which had been left unsettled by the recess of 1803. These questions, left unsettled for want of time, it will be remembered, were the following:—The proportion to be established between the Catholic and the Protestant votes in the College of Princes; the maintenance or the suppression of the immediate nobility; the new division of the territory into circles for the police, and preservation of order in Germany; the reorganisation of the Germanic Church; the sequestration of real and personal property belonging to the secularised ecclesiastical principalities, and other matters of minor consequence. The gravest of these questions in its results was the delay made in the new organisation of the circles, as it produced an absence of police, which left everything in the power of the stronger party. France being at this time wholly bent upon maritime war, and, moreover, separated from Russia, there was no longer any foreign influence capable of aiding the oppressed States, and the whole empire was a prey to anarchy.

At the close of the negotiation of 1803, Austria had sequestered those dependencies of the secularised principalities which were within her grasp. It will be remembered that some of these ancient ecclesiastical principalities possessed funds deposited in the bank of Vienna; others, territories surrounded by various German States. These funds and territorial possessions naturally belonged to the indemnified princes. Austria, alleging some obscure maxim of the feudal law, had sequestered upwards of thirty millions of capital, which was lodged in the bank of Vienna, or invested in the public funds. The heaviest loss had fallen on Bavaria and the house of Orange. Austria did not stop here in her aggressions. She treated with a number of the petty princes to wring from them certain possessions which they held in Suabia, for the purpose of securing to herself a position on the lake of Constance. She had purchased the town of Lindau from the Prince of Bretzenheim, having ceded to him in exchange certain territories in Bohemia, with the promise of a vote in the Diet as formerly. She had treated with the house of Koenigseck, with the view of obtaining on similar terms other lands situated in that country. Finally, Austria had advocated in the Diet the creation of new Catholic votes, so as to equalise the strength of the Catholic and Protestant parties. The majority of the Diet not appearing disposed to gratify her, she threatened to put an end to all deliberation until this question of the proportion of votes should be decided in conformity to her wishes.

The Germanic princes, injured by the violences of Austria, avenged themselves by committing similar violences upon States weaker than their own. Hesse and Wurtemberg had caused the States of the nobility to be invaded, making no secret of their designs of incorporation. The immediate nobility of Franconia having addressed the imperial chamber of Wetzlar to obtain an inhibition against the usurpations with which they were threatened, the Hessian government everywhere caused the placard of the decision of the imperial chamber to be torn down, thus showing an example of signal contempt for the tribunals of the empire. Their violences did not end here; they refused to pay the pensions of the clergy, who had been despoiled of their property by the secularisations. The Duke of Wurtemberg would not pay any of them. Amidst this reciprocity of violence, each was silent as to the proceedings of others, in the hope of thus securing impunity for his own conduct. They did not complain of the sequestrations of Austria, in order that she might wink at the wrongs done to the immediate nobility, and to the unfortunate pensioners who were deprived of their bread. Bavaria, the worst treated by Austria, avenged herself upon the prince arch-chancellor, whose

electorate had been transferred from Mayence to Ratisbon. Annoyed at seeing him upon the territory of Ratisbon, which she had long coveted, she pursued him with her threats, took from him a quantity of lands that were surrounded by her own, and caused him to feel a thousand anxieties for his existence. Prussia followed a like course of action in Westphalia, and was not behindhand with either Bavaria or Austria in the way of usurpation.

Only two States conducted themselves honestly; firstly, the prince arch-chancellor, who, owing his existence to the arrangements of 1803, endeavoured to make them respected by the members of the confederation; secondly, the Elector of Saxony, who, disinterested amidst these various pretensions, remained unmoved in his ancient principality, had neither lost nor gained anything, and voted uselessly in favour of the rights of each, in sheer prudence and honesty.

All the culpable concessions that had been made to Austria, in permitting her to oppress some in order that she might tolerate the oppression of others, failed to disarm her, especially as regarded Bavaria. Believing herself strong enough to be able to act openly as she pleased, she took up the cause of the immediate nobility, of which she was the natural and interested protectress, for the sake of the recruiting of her armies.

We have already seen that the immediate nobility, holding from the emperor, and not from the territorial princes, by whom their possessions were wedged in, did not owe military contingent to these latter. Those inhabitants who were of a military turn enrolled themselves in the Austrian corps, and Franconia alone thus supplied more than two thousand recruits annually, who were still more valuable for their quality than for their number. They were, in fact, true Germans, far superior to other Austrian soldiers as to intelligence, courage, and all warlike qualities. They furnished all the sub-officers of the imperial armies, and formed in some sort the German *cadre* into which Austria drafted the subjects of all sorts that she possessed in her vast dominions. In consequence, she was resolved to brave everything except a war with France rather than yield. Without troubling herself about the reproaches that might be made her for excess of power, she brought before the Aulic Council, as an act of violence cognisable exclusively by the police of the emperor, the encroachments committed upon the immediate nobility; and with a promptitude very uncommon in Germanic proceedings, had an interlocutory decision pronounced, called *conservatorium*, in the constitutional language of the empire, and entrusted its execution to four confederated States—Saxony, Baden, Bohemia, and Ratisbon. By Bohemia on the one side, by the Tyrol on the other, she put eighteen battalions in motion,

and threatened Bavaria with an immediate invasion should she not withdraw her troops from the various lordships which she had invaded. It will easily be understood that Austria, thus situated, was extremely anxious to conciliate the First Consul, for though much occupied towards the ocean, he was not the man to recoil in any point. Moreover, the irritation to which he had been roused rendered him more susceptible and more redoubtable than ever. This it is that explains the reserve of the Austrian diplomatists upon the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and the real or affected unconcern which they displayed at the occurrence of so grave an event.

We have already described the effect produced upon the First Consul by the attacks directed against his person. The benefits which he had taken a pleasure in heaping upon the emigrants had not disarmed their hatred. The consideration which he had shown to Europe had not calmed its jealousy. Irritated to the highest degree at being so ill requited, he felt a sudden revolution take place in his soul, and he was more inclined to ill-treat all whom previously he had the most caressed. The reply to the manifestations of which we have spoken had not to be waited for; and after having deplored his having been misled by his passions, we shall again have occasion to admire the grandeur of his character.

The court of Prussia had become reserved, and no longer spoke of alliance. The First Consul was silent, too, towards her; but sharply reprimanded M. de Laforest for having in his despatches too faithfully reported the public impression at Berlin. As regarded the court of Russia, the reply was instantaneous and merciless. General Hédouville had orders to quit St. Petersburg within eight and forty hours, without alleging any other reason for his departure than the state of his health; the customary reason by which diplomatists leave room for guessing at what they do not care to say. He was to leave it unknown, too, whether he left only for a short time or for good and all. M. de Rayneval alone was to remain in quality of chargé-d'affaires. Since the dismissal of M. de Markoff, only an agent of that rank, M. d'Oubril, had remained at Paris. The First Consul then returned to the despatch of the Russian cabinet a reply which must have been bitter indeed to the emperor. He was reminded in that note that France, after behaving in the handsomest manner towards Russia, and after conceding to her a half voice in all the great affairs of the continent, had met with no good return; that she had found the Russian diplomatic agents, without an exception, hostile and malevolent; that, in contravention of the late treaty which bound the two courts not to embarrass each other, the cabinet of St. Petersburg had accredited French emigrants to foreign

courts, and covered conspirators with the pretext of Russian nationality to shelter them from the police of France; that this was violating alike the letter and spirit of treaties; that if they wished for war, they had only frankly to express that wish; that though the First Consul did not wish for war, he assuredly did not fear it; for there was nothing alarming in his reminiscences of the last campaign (allusion was here made to Suwarow's disaster); that, as regarded what had taken place at Baden, Russia showed great officiousness in constituting herself the guarantee of the Germanic soil, as her titles to interfere were extremely disputable; that, at all events, France had exercised a legitimate right of defence against plots carried on upon her frontiers, under the eyes and with the knowledge of certain German governments, upon whom she had heaped benefits which had been repaid only with the blackest ingratitude; that she, moreover, had explained to them, and would explain to them only; and that Russia, similarly circumstanced, would have acted as France had acted, for had she been informed that the assassins of Paul I. were assembled at a march from her frontier, would she not have seized them there?

This was pitiless irony to address to a prince who was reproached with not having punished any one of the murderers of his father, and who was, therefore, accused, though unjustly enough, of complicity in that horrible crime. It must have convinced the Emperor Alexander of his extreme imprudence in interfering in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, when the tragical death of Paul I. rendered the retort so easy and so terrible.

Relatively to Germany, Russia having recently approved the conduct of Austria, and the pretension publicly avowed by that power to refer constitutional questions to the Aulic Council, the First Consul plainly declared that France thenceforth separated herself from Russian policy as regarded the future regulation of Germanic affairs; that she did not admit that questions left in suspense were to be settled by the Aulic Council, a simple tribunal of the emperor, rather than by the empire; that these questions, like all others, ought to be decided in the Diet, the supreme body, the sole depositary of the German sovereignty. The breach, then, was complete in all points, the resolutions as decisive as the language was plain.

As to Austria, the First Consul could not but congratulate himself upon the indifference which she had manifested for the victim of Ettenheim. But he plainly perceived that advantage was taken at Vienna of the difficulties which the maritime war seemed to cause him. He wished Austria to be thoroughly undeceived upon that point. There were two ways in which he could combat England, the one by actually grappling with her in the Strait of Calais, the other by crushing her allies upon

the continent. All things considered, the second plan was both more easy and more certain than the first, and though less direct, would not fail to be effective. Should Austria provoke him, he was determined, without the loss of an instant, to raise his camp at Boulogne, and to enter Germany, as he was unwilling to cross the sea until he should have disarmed all the allies, open or concealed, of Great Britain. He caused it to be intimated to the two Cobentzels, as well to the one who was ambassador at Paris as to him who was minister at Vienna, that Bavaria had for ages been the ally of France, and that he would not sacrifice her to the ill-will of Austria; that if she had done wrong in too roughly dealing with the property of the immediate nobility, Austria, by her unjust sequestrations, had forced all the German princes to indemnify themselves by violence for the violences to which they had been subjected; that Bavaria might have acted wrongly, but that he would not allow her to be crushed with impunity; and that unless Austria recalled the battalions which she had despatched into Bohemia and the Tyrol, he was resolved to march an army of forty thousand men upon Munich, where they should keep garrison until the retreat of the imperial troops.

This precise and positive declaration threw the de Cobentzels and the cabinet of Vienna into unspeakable embarrassment. They endeavoured to escape from it by new complaints of the incessant enmity of France to Austria, and of the deep despair to which the latter would be reduced. However, M. de Talleyrand and M. de Champagny were firm, and it was agreed on both sides that Bavaria should evacuate the territories of the immediate nobility, but that the Austrian troops, halting at first in their then positions, should afterwards retrograde, so as not to compromise the dignity of the emperor by too precipitate a retreat. The cabinet of Vienna again made known that if its wishes were gratified with regard to the proportion of Protestant and Catholic votes in the Diet, the support of Austria might be reckoned upon under all circumstances, and especially in the question which was about to present itself on account of the note addressed by Russia to the Germanic Diet.

That note had arrived at Ratisbon by the same courier who took to Paris the despatches of St. Petersburg. It painfully embarrassed the German princes, for it was a foreign court that invited them to mark their sensitiveness to a violation of the Germanic territory, and should they display that sensitiveness, they would to the highest degree incur the resentment of France. There had not been time to send instructions to the ministers at the Diet, but they, anticipating the dispositions of their respective courts, had appeared inclined rather to neglect the note than to attach any great importance to it. The Prussian

minister, M. de Goëtz, already conspicuous in Germanic negotiations, was in favour of hushing the business up altogether. But owing to the proximity of Vienna the Austrian ministers had already received their instructions, and playing, as was their custom, a double part, disapproving of the note when they were in presence of the French agents, and promising to secure its reception when they were in presence of the Russian agents, hit upon a middle course. The note was taken into consideration, but each minister was to refer it to his court, ultimately to decide upon its contents. "You see," said M. de Hugel to the Russian minister, "that we have got your note admitted." "You see," said he to the French minister, "that by adjourning the discussion for two months, we have rendered it harmless, for in two months the proceeding of the Emperor Alexander will no longer be remembered."

Such, in fact, was to be the fate of that rash and inconsiderate proceeding. But to secure that result, more than one embarrassment still remained to be surmounted. The German governments were unwilling to offend either France, whom they feared, or Russia, of whom they might eventually have need. Their ministers, therefore, exerted themselves at Paris to find the solution of the difficulty. "Settle the matter as you find most convenient to you," said the First Consul to them; "if the discussion take place in two months, so as to be officially brought to the consideration of France, my reply will be so lofty and so harsh, that the Germanic dignity will be cruelly humiliated. You will have no choice but to endure that reply, or to take up arms, for I am resolved, if need be, to commence on the continent my war with Great Britain."

M. de Talleyrand, faithful to his habitual love of peace, endeavoured to find expedients for preventing the rupture. The foreign ministers, fearing the First Consul, and finding in M. de Talleyrand, on the contrary, extreme courtesy, an affability not, however, destitute of dignity, diligently courted him. Among the most assiduous and intelligent of them was M. le Duc de Dalberg, nephew of the prince arch-chancellor, and at that time minister of Baden at Paris. M. de Talleyrand made use of him to influence the court of Baden. After reminding that court of all that it owed to France, who had so greatly aggrandised its territories in the arrangements of 1803, it was also reminded of how much it had to fear should the war break out again. It was urged to declare at Ratisbon that it had received satisfactory explanations from the French government, and that it, consequently, wished that no proceedings should be taken upon the Russian note. While M. de Talleyrand required it to give a written note to this effect, the cabinet of St. Petersburg, relying upon the relationship between the house of Baden

and the imperial family of Russia, endeavoured to modify this declaration, so far as to render it ineffective. But France was both nearer and more powerful, and could not but prevail. Moreover, two months were to elapse before the opening of the discussion; from Paris to Carlsruhe, and from Carlsruhe to Paris, drafts of the proposed note were exchanged and incessantly modified, and it was impossible to fail in hitting at last upon a solution of the difficulty.

The First Consul gave himself but little concern about these goings and comings, and left the matter to his minister for foreign affairs. He had affronted Russia, and had compelled Austria to remain quiet. He had alarmed Prussia by his coldness, and as for the Diet of Ratisbon, he treated it as the representative of an institution falling into decrepitude, in spite of all the efforts he had made to give it a new youth; and he was prepared to remain utterly silent towards it, or to return it some humiliating reply. All these questions, to which the catastrophe of Vincennes had given birth abroad, scarcely sufficed to turn his attention from affairs at home, which had now reached an actual crisis.

Although in a few days the impression produced by the death of the Duc d'Enghien underwent that diminution which the weakening power of time effects upon all impressions, however vivid, there still remained a permanent cause of excitement in the proceedings against Georges, Moreau, and Pichegru. In truth, it was a sad though inevitable necessity, that of putting upon their trial so many persons of so different a caste; some, as Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac, dear to the ancient French aristocracy; others, as Moreau, dear to all who loved the glory of France; nothing could be more untoward and embarrassing while public curiosity was highly excited, and while the malevolent, ever ready to put the most subtle or the most absurd constructions upon the smallest circumstance, were in an unusual state of exasperation. But it was absolutely necessary that justice should be done, and this trial was still for a month or two more to disturb the usual calm of the First Consul's government.

An accident, wholly unforeseen, occurred to add to the dark and sinister aspect of that situation. Pichegru, prisoner of the First Consul, at first suspecting his generosity, and putting but little faith in the offers of clemency conveyed to him by M. Réal, had soon become reassured, and had given himself up with confidence to the idea of preserving his life, and of recovering his honour by founding a grand colony at Cayenne. The offers of the First Consul were sincere, for in resolving to strike none but royalists, he wished to pardon Moreau and Pichegru. M. Réal, incapable of a bad feeling, experienced in

the progress of this important prosecution a second misfortune. He had arrived too late at Vincennes; he went too rarely to the cell of Pichegru, where the interests of the prosecution but little required his presence, seeing that nothing was likely to be drawn from a man so firm and self-possessed as that ex-general of the Republic. Absorbed by a thousand cares, M. Réal neglected Pichegru, who, hearing no further mention of the First Consul's proposals, and being informed of the sanguinary execution of Vincennes, supposed that he could not rely upon the clemency which had been offered and promised to him. Death would have been of comparatively little consequence to this warrior; it was the almost inevitable dénouement of the culpable intrigues in which he had been engaged since his first lapse from the straight path in 1797; but he would have to appear between Moreau and Georges, the one of whom he had compromised, and to the other of whom he had delivered up his honour by joining in a royalist conspiracy. All the denunciations to which he had been exposed at the epoch of the 18th Fructidor, and which he had repulsed with a feigned indignation, were now about to be justified. With his life he would lose the poor remnants of his already compromised honour. The unfortunate man preferred instant death, but death free from the disgrace which must result from his public trial. This sentiment proves that he was somewhat better than his recent conduct indicated. He had borrowed from M. Réal the works of Seneca. One night, after reading for several hours, and leaving the book open at a passage treating of suicide, he strangled himself by means of his silk cravat and a wooden peg, of which he made a sort of tourniquet. Towards morning, the keepers, hearing some noise in his chamber, entered, and found him suffocated, his face being red, as though he had been seized with apoplexy. The medical men and magistrates who were called in left no doubt as to the cause of his death, and made it abundantly evident for all candid men.

But no proof is sufficiently clear for partisans who are resolved to believe a calumny, or to propagate without believing it. On the instant it was believed among the royalists, who were naturally well pleased to attribute all sorts of crimes to the government, and among idlers who, without malice, are yet delighted to discover in all events more complications than really exist, it was believed that Pichegru had been strangled by the hirelings of the First Consul. This catastrophe, termed that of the Temple, was the completion of the catastrophe termed that of Vincennes; the one was the sequel of the other. The character of the new Nero was thus rapidly developed. After the example of the Roman prince, he passed from good to evil, from virtue to crime, almost without interval. And as those who took the trouble to

argue their falsehoods required some ostensible motive for such a crime, they said that, despairing of convicting Pichegru, they assassinated him that his presence might not aid his fellow-prisoners on their trial.

This was at once the most absurd and most odious of inventions. If there was any one of the accused whose presence at the trial was peculiarly necessary to the interests of the First Consul, that one was Pichegru. Pichegru, personally, could not be considered a rival of any moment, since his proven affiliation to the royalist party had destroyed him in the public opinion; moreover, the depositions of the accused of all parties alike overwhelmed him. The man to be feared, if there was one, on account of his still intact glory, and of the difficulty of convicting him, was Moreau; and if any one of the accused could be serviceable against him, it was Pichegru, who had been the connecting link between the royalists and the republicans. Pichegru, in fact, brought to trial, unable to deny either his connection with Georges or his connection with Moreau, and being as unable to explain away as to deny those connections, would inevitably have served to connect Moreau with the royalists—in other words, to cover him with merited confusion. Pichegru, then, was an immense loss to the accusation. In a word, if a crime was to be committed in order to get rid of a dangerous rivalry, it was Moreau and not Pichegru who should thus have been kept from public trial. The supposition, then, was as stupid as it was atrocious. But it was none the less assumed by the gossips of the royalist coteries that the First Consul, to disembarrass himself of Pichegru, had caused him to be strangled. This unworthy accusation could not but speedily fall to the ground; but in the meantime it caused much excitement, and the hawkers of false news, by repeating it, aided the perfidy of the inventors. This new misfortune renewed for some days the sad impressions already produced by the conspiracy of the emigrant princes. Those impressions, however, could not be durable. If enlightened men, friends of the First Consul, and jealous of his glory, could not but feel in the depths of their hearts inconsolable regret, the multitude were well convinced that they could fearlessly repose under the protection of a firm and a just hand. No one seriously feared the renewal of executions, exiles, and spoliations. It must even be confessed that the men personally concerned in the Revolution, whether they had acquired public property, public functions, or an embarrassing celebrity, were secretly well pleased to see General Bonaparte separated from the Bourbons by a fosse stained with royal blood.

However, the sensations produced by political events were then confined to a small number of persons, which every day became more and more limited. The extraordinary participation

of the people in public affairs during the Revolution had given place to a sort of inattention, partaking at once of lassitude and of confidence. In the earlier days of the consulate, the government was still watched with some degree of anxiety; but soon, perceiving it to be at once so able and so fortunate, men gave themselves up to security and repose, and directed their attention to private affairs, long neglected during a stormy Revolution, which had thrown property, commerce, and industry alike into confusion. Of those aroused masses, there now only remained attentive to passing events those classes which possess sufficient leisure and enlightenment to concern themselves with State affairs; and interested men of all parties, emigrants, priests, acquirers of national property, soldiers, and placemen.

Now in the circles thus composed, opinions were divided. If some termed the death of the Duc d'Enghien an abominable crime, others considered that the plots incessantly renewed against the person of the First Consul were no less abominable. These latter argued that in order to repossess themselves of power, the royalists risked the destruction of all government in France; that supposing the First Consul killed, there would remain no one who could hold the reins of power with a sufficiently strong hand; that anarchy and bloodshed would resume their ascendancy; that, after all, it had been wisely done to act sternly, in order that villains and dupes should be discouraged; that the royalists were incorrigible; that though the First Consul had heaped kindness upon them, they were incapable of being grateful or even resigned; and that to deal efficiently with them, it had been necessary to make them tremble, at least once. These were the arguments which were repeated in the circles formed around the government, and consisting of the chiefs of the army, of the magistracy, of the administration, the members of the Senate, the Tribune, and the Legislative Body. And as the impression made by the death of the Duc d'Enghien abated, nearly the same things were repeated even among those peaceful and disinterested men, who demanded that they should at length be left in repose, under the protection of the powerful arm that now governed France.

From that conflict of spirits there suddenly sprang up an idea which was soon propagated with the rapidity of lightning. The royalists, considering the First Consul to be the sole obstacle to their projects, had desired to strike at him, in the hope that the whole government would perish with him. Well! it was now exclaimed, their criminal hopes must be baffled. This man whom they would fain destroy must be made king or emperor, that hereditary right being added to his power, he may be provided with natural and immediate successors, and that crime against his person thus becoming useless, there might be the

less temptation to commit it. As we have seen, the reaction towards monarchical principles had been rapid during some years. For five directors named for five years, there had been substituted the scheme of three Consuls named for ten years; then the scheme of three Consuls had been followed by that of one Consul, holding power for life. Having entered upon such a course, there was no stopping short of taking the last step; in other words, returning to hereditary power. The slightest impulse given to the public mind sufficed for that. This impulse the royalists had taken it upon themselves to give, in wishing to assassinate the First Consul; and in acting thus they only presented a very ordinary spectacle, for it most frequently occurs that it is the enemies of a government who, by their imprudent attacks, enable it to make its most rapid progress.

All at once, alike in the Senate, in the Legislative Body, in the Tribune, not only in Paris, but in the principal towns of the departments where the electoral colleges were assembled, in the camps distributed along the coasts, everywhere and almost simultaneously, monarchy and hereditary succession were extolled. This movement of opinion was natural; it was also in some degree excited by the manifestations of assemblies desirous of paying their court, by prefects who wished to display their zeal, by the generals who wished to attract the notice of an all-powerful master; all well knowing that in advocating monarchy they were in accord with that master's as yet unspoken thought, and that they assuredly would not offend him should they perchance anticipate the moment fixed by his ambition.

Though undictated, the language was everywhere uniform. It was high time, it was said, to put an end to hesitations and to false scruples, and adopt the only stable institution, that is to say, hereditary monarchy. As long as the royalists could hope to destroy the government and the Revolution at a single blow, they would renew their crimes, and perhaps would at length be successful. They would not recommence, or at least they would be the less tempted to do so, should they see beside the First Consul his children, or his brothers, ready to succeed him, and the new government, like the old one, thus possessed of the property of surviving itself. To place a crown upon that precious and sacred head on which reposed the destinies of France, was to furnish it with a buckler which would protect it against the blows of assassins. To protect it was to protect all the interests of the Revolution, to save from a sanguinary reaction the men who were compromised by their errors; it was also to preserve to the acquirers of the national domains their property, to the military their rank, to all the members of the government their position, to France that

government of equality, justice, and grandeur which she had secured. Moreover, every one, it was added, had returned to sound ideas. Every one now wondered how senseless theorists had persuaded the nation into making of that vast and antique France a republic like that of Sparta and of Athens. Every one now perceived that in replacing the monarchy by a republic, the destroyers had exceeded the original and legitimate objects of the Revolution, which contemplated only the reform of abuses, the abolition of the feudal system, the modification of the royal authority but not its destruction; that if, in 1802, at the institution of the consulate for life, a false shame restrained the legislators of France, now that this false shame had passed away, now that the crimes of the royalists had completely opened all eyes, it was necessary to come to a determination, and settle the form of government by a complete and definitive act; that, after all, this would be merely adding the *de jure* to the *de facto*, as in reality General Bonaparte was king, and an absolute king; while in decreeing him royalty, under its real form, they could treat with him, could limit that royalty, and thus, at one stroke, give durability to the government and guarantees to liberty.

Such was the general language a few days after the painful scenes of which we have spoken above.

What a spectacle was here presented by that nation which, after essaying a sanguinary republic under the Convention, a moderate but inert republic under the Directory, suddenly disgusted with this collective and civil government, loudly demanded to be governed by the hand of a soldier, and was so eager to have one, as to be on the point of selecting the unfortunate Joubert in the absence of General Bonaparte; hailed the latter on his return from Egypt, and entreated him to accept of a power which he was only too impatient to seize, made him Consul for ten years, then for life, and finally hereditary monarch, and all this that it might be guaranteed by the strong arm of a warrior against that anarchy whose frightful spectre incessantly pursued it! What a lesson for the theorists who, in the delirium of their conceit, thought to make France a republic because circumstances had made her a democracy! What had been required to dissipate these ideas? Merely four years, and an abortive conspiracy against an extraordinary man, the object of the love of some, of the hatred of others, and of the intense attention of all! And admire, too, the profundity of this lesson! That man had been the object of a criminal attempt, but he, in his turn, had committed a sanguinary act; and at that very moment men feared not to raise him on the buckler to the throne, so necessary did they feel him to be! They accepted him not less glorious, but less pure. They

accepted him with his genius, they would have selected him without it; they would have taken him whatever he was, provided he was powerful; so precious was mere strength so soon after such great disorders! Have we not in our own day seen alarmed nations throw themselves into the arms of indifferent soldiers, because they presented at least the appearances of strength?

In Rome, that old republic, it required the want, long felt, of a single chief, the inconvenience often repeated of the elective transmission of power; it required many generations, Cæsar first, then Augustus after Cæsar, and even Tiberius after Augustus, to habituate the Romans to the idea of monarchical and hereditary power. It did not require so many precautions in France for a people fashioned to monarchy during twelve centuries, and only during ten years to a republic. It required only a simple accident to return from the dream of some generous but mistaken spirits to the living and indestructible souvenirs of a whole nation.

In every country torn by factions or threatened by an external enemy, the necessity of being governed and defended will sooner or later lead to the triumph of a powerful personage, powerful as Cæsar at Rome, rich as the Medicis at Florence. If such a country has for a long time been a republic, it will require many generations to fashion it to monarchy; but if that country has always been a monarchy, and the follies of factions have for an instant wrenched it from its natural condition to convert it into an ephemeral republic, it will require some years of troubles to inspire it with a horror of anarchy, fewer years still to find the soldier capable of putting an end to that anarchy, and the wish of that soldier, or a dagger thrust of his enemies, to make him king or emperor, and thus restore the country to its habits, and dissipate the dream of those who supposed it possible to alter human nature by vain decrees and by still vainer oaths. Rome and Florence, after having long been republics, tended the one towards the Cæsars and the other towards the Medicis, and were more than half a century in giving themselves to them. England and France, republics of ten years, tended in three or four years to their Cromwell and Napoleon.

Thus the Revolution in those days of rapid reaction was obliged in the face of Heaven to confess its errors one after the other, and exhibit the most startling contradictions. Let us discriminate, however: when it sought the abolition of the feudal system, equality in the eyes of the law, uniformity of justice, administration, and taxation, and the regular intervention of the nation in the State government, it did not deceive itself; on these points it had exhibited no inconsistency, no

contradiction, and it had no errors to confess. When, on the contrary, it aimed at a barbarous and chimerical equality, the absence of all social hierarchy, the continual and tumultuous presence of the multitude in the government, the Republic in a monarchy of twelve centuries, and the abolition of all worship, it was at once senseless and guilty, and could not but have one day to confess its errors before the whole world! But of what consequence are some fleeting errors compared to the immortal truths which, at the expense of its blood, it bequeathed to the human race! Even those errors themselves contained useful and grave lessons, given with an incomparable grandeur. If France, in her return to monarchy, obeyed the immutable laws of human society, perhaps her course was too rapid, as is the custom of revolutions. A dictatorship, under the title of protector, sufficed Cromwell. The dictatorship, under the form of a perpetual consulate, with a power extensive as his genius, and durable as his life, should have sufficed General Bonaparte for the accomplishment of all the good that he meditated, to reconstruct that annihilated ancient society, to transmit it, after having reorganised it, either to his heirs, if he were to have such, or to those who, more fortunate, were some day to enjoy the fruit of his toils. In sooth, it was decreed in the councils of Providence that the Revolution, in retrograding, should go beyond the re-establishment of the monarchical form to the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty itself. To accomplish the noble task of General Bonaparte, the dictatorship, under the form of the consulate for life, should, in our opinion, have sufficed, and in making him an hereditary monarch, that was attempted which was hurtful alike to his moral greatness and to the grandeur of France. Not that they were without full right who wished to convert a soldier into a king or an emperor: the nation incontestably could transmit to whom it chose, and to a sublime soldier still more than to any one else, the sceptre of Charlemagne and of Louis XIV. But that soldier, in his natural and proper position of the first magistrate of the French Republic, had no earthly equal, even upon the loftiest thrones. In becoming an hereditary monarch, he was to be put in comparison with kings, little or great, and ranked as their inferior in one point—that of blood. Even though it were only to the eyes of prejudice, he was to be below them in something. Received among them and flattered, because feared by them, he would in secret be disdained by the puniest among them. But, what is graver still, when he should have become king or emperor, what would he not attempt in order to become king of kings, chief of a dynasty of monarchs, holding from his new throne! What stimulants for an ambition already too much excited, and which could perish only by its own excesses.

In our humble opinion, at least, the institution of the consulate for life was a wise and politic measure, and the indispensable completion of the dictatorship, which had become necessary : the re-establishment of the monarchy in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte was not a usurpation (a word borrowed from the language of the emigrants), but an act of vanity on the part of him who too readily lent himself to it, and of imprudent avidity on the part of new convertites, eager to devour that reign of an instant. If it be only considered as a lesson to mankind, we must confess that of all the lessons that Providence bestows upon nations, the most instructive and the most profound was given by this heroic soldier, and by these republicans recently converted to monarchy, all alike eager to invest themselves in the purple upon the ruins of that Republic of ten years, to which they had taken a thousand oaths. Unhappily France, who had paid with her blood for their republican delirium, was to pay with her grandeur for their new-born monarchical zeal ; for it is for the sake of having French kings in Westphalia, in Naples, and in Spain, that France has lost the Rhine and the Alps. Thus, in all things, France was destined to instruct the universe : what glory and yet what calamity for a nation !

At every change there are needed men to realise the ideas which are in all minds ; in other words, instruments. For the revolution that approached there was a man very singularly fitted for the purpose. Hitherto M. Fouché, with a remnant of sincerity, had blamed the rapidity of the reaction which reconducted France towards the past ; he had even obtained the good opinion of Madame Bonaparte by appearing to partake her perplexed fears ; but he had, on the same account, incurred the censure of her husband. By playing this unthankful part of a secret disapprover, M. Fouché had lost his post, and he was not the man to play so losing a part much longer. Accordingly, he chose the very opposite course. Spontaneously directing the police in the inquiry into the recent conspiracy, he had restored himself to office. Seeing that the First Consul was much embittered against the royalists, he had humoured his anger, and had urged him on to the immolation of the Duc d'Enghien. If the idea, which has often been attributed to the First Consul, of making a sanguinary compact with the revolutionists, and of thus obtaining the crown at the price of a frightful gage, if this idea ever entered the mind of any man of that day, assuredly it entered the mind of M. Fouché. Approving the death of the Duc d'Enghien, he also was among the most ardent of the new partisans of hereditary succession. In his zeal for monarchy he surpassed Messrs. de Talleyrand, Roederer, and Fontanes.

Doubtless, the First Consul needed no encouragement to

aspire to the throne. He wished for the supreme rank, but without it having been, as the mere herd of narrators have supposed, his constant aim, from the time of his campaigns in Italy, or even from the 18th Brumaire; no, he had not conceived such desires at once. His ambition, like his fortune, had grown up by degrees. Arrived at the command of armies, he from that lofty position perceived loftier positions still in the government of the Republic, and aspired to them. Having gained those, he saw still above him that of the perpetual consulate, and similarly aspired to that. From that eminence he saw the throne, and aspired to mount it. Such is the march of human ambition, nor was that to be called a crime. But to clear-seeing minds this incessantly excited and never satisfied ambition was a danger; for still to gratify was still to excite it.

But at the moment of seizing upon a power which does not naturally belong to him, even the most daring genius hesitates, if he does not tremble. In such situations, an involuntary shame seizes upon the most ardent ambition, and prevents it from avowing its whole desire. The First Consul, who consulted but little with his brothers upon State affairs, found in them, when his personal grandeur was in question, confidants to whom he loved to open his whole thought, and confidants more ardent than he himself was, for they burned to become princes. It will be remembered that they looked upon the consulate for life with no pleased eye, considering it an abortive attempt. At the period to which we now refer, Lucien was absent, and Joseph was about to quit Paris. Lucien, in one of his headstrong fits of indiscretion, had married a widow, handsome indeed, but very inferior in position to the Bonaparte family. Having quarrelled with his brother on account of this marriage, Lucien had retired to Rome, playing the part of an exile, and seeking in the enjoyments of the arts consolation for fraternal ingratitude. Madame Lætitia Bonaparte, who, beneath the humility of a woman born poor, and affecting to remember that fact, concealed some of the passions of an empress-mother, constantly and unjustly complained of Napoleon, and showed a marked preference to her son Lucien, whom she had followed to Rome. The First Consul, full of affection for his relatives, even when he had reason to be displeased with them, had accompanied his mother and brother with his all-powerful protection, and had recommended them to the kindness of Pius VII.; stating that his brother went to Rome to indulge his taste for the arts, and his mother for the benefit of a mild climate. Pius VII. paid his illustrious guests the most delicate and anxious attentions.

Joseph also was discontented, but wherefore one would never guess, did not history take the trouble to relate it. He was

offended because the First Consul had wished to name him President of the Senate, and he had refused that high office in the tone of an insulted man when it was offered to him by M. Cambacérès, on the part of the First Consul. The latter, who detested idleness, then caused him to be told to go and seek greatness where he himself had found it, in the army. Joseph, named colonel of the fourth regiment of the line, set out for Boulogne at the moment the great question of the re-establishment of monarchy was mooted. The First Consul, therefore, was deprived of two confidants, to whom he would gladly have unbosomed himself on what concerned his personal grandeur. M. de Cambacérès, to whom he usually spoke out upon all subjects, whether general or personal—M. Cambacérès, at the epoch of the institution of the consulate for life, had spared him the embarrassment of avowing his wishes, by taking the initiative, and becoming the instrument of a change which was universally approved. But now M. Cambacérès was silent for two reasons, one of them good, the other bad. The good reason was that, with his rare sagacity, he feared the flights of an unlimited ambition. He had heard mention made of the Empire of the Gauls, of the Empire of Charlemagne, and he trembled to see the solid grandeur of the treaty of Luneville sacrificed to gigantic enterprises in consequence of the elevation of General Bonaparte to the imperial throne. The less worthy reason was his clashing interest, for he was about to find himself separated by all the height of the throne from the First Consul, and from being a co-partner in the sovereignty, small as might be his share in it, to become the simple subject of the future monarch. The Third Consul, Lebrun, perfectly devoted, but never interfering in anything but the administration, could not be of any use.

M. Fouché, in the ardour of his zeal, made himself the spontaneous instrument of the approaching change. He approached the First Consul, whose secret desires he had discerned, represented to him the necessity for taking a prompt and decisive step, the urgency of putting an end to the anxieties of France, by placing the crown upon his head, and thus definitively consolidating the work of the Revolution. He described all classes of the nation as being animated by the same sentiments, and impatient to proclaim Napoleon Emperor of the Gauls, or Emperor of the French, as might best suit his policy or his taste. He returned often to the charge, endeavouring to enforce the advantages of the opportunity now presented, when all France, alarmed for the life of the First Consul, was disposed to grant whatever he might ask. He passed from exhortations almost to reproaches, and sharply twitted the hesitations of General Bonaparte. The latter had not quitted his retreat at

Malmaison since the affair of Vincennes. M. Fouché repaired incessantly to Malmaison, and when he could not join the First Consul while walking out, he seized upon his private secretary, M. de Meneval, and demonstrated to him at full length all the advantages of hereditary monarchy, and not only of monarchy but of aristocracy, as the support and ornament of the throne; adding, that if the Consul would re-establish it, he was ready to defend the wisdom of that new creation, and if necessary, even to become a noble himself.

Such was the zeal of this ex-republican, so completely convinced of his past errors. His restless activity, more excited on this occasion than was usual, led him to move even further than there was need. He bustled about, like those people who would fain have the merit of urging forward that which goes by itself.

In fact, there was no one who was not disposed to second the wishes of the First Consul. France, having long witnessed the rise of a master, who, moreover, had heaped benefits and glory upon her, would not refuse him whatever title might be most agreeable to his ambition. The bodies of the State, the chiefs of the army, who knew how impossible all resistance had become, and who in the ruin of Moreau had seen the danger of an ill-timed opposition, threw themselves eagerly before the new Cæsar, that they might at least be distinguished for their zeal, and profit by an elevation which there was no longer time to prevent. It is the common disposition of mankind to profit by the ambition which they cannot combat with success, and to console their envy by their avidity. There was but one embarrassment felt by all, namely, to resume the use of words which had been proscribed, and to repudiate others which had been adopted with enthusiasm. A slight precaution in the choice of a title for the future monarch could facilitate the object. Thus, in calling him emperor, and not king, the difficulty was much diminished. Moreover, no one was better fitted to relieve the existing generation from such an embarrassment than an ex-Jacobin like M. Fouché, taking upon himself the task of giving an example to all, master and subjects, and hastening to be the first to speak words which others as yet dared not have on their lips.

M. Fouché arranged everything with some leaders of the Senate; the First Consul seeing and approving all that he did, but feigning to have no hand in anything. They feared to take the initiative in the French journals, for their absolute dependence upon the police would have given their opinion the character of a forced one. We had secret agents in England, and they contrived to have it stated in certain English journals that since the last conspiracy Bonaparte was anxious, gloomy, and threatening; that every one in Paris was in a state of

anxiety; that it was the natural consequence of a government in which everything depended upon one head; and that, consequently, all peaceable men wished that hereditary succession, established in the Bonaparte family, should give the existing order of things that stability of which it was destitute. Thus the English press, usually employed in calumniating the First Consul, was now employed in serving his ambition. These articles, copied and commented upon, caused a very lively sensation, and gave the signal that was waited for. At this period there were several electoral colleges assembled in l'Yonne, the Var, the Upper Pyrenees, the Nord, and the Rôer. It was easy to obtain addresses from them. Addresses were also suggested to the municipal councils of the great towns, such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris. Finally, the camps scattered along the coast were in their turn thrown into fermentation. Military men, in general, were of all classes the most devoted to the First Consul. With the exception of a certain number of officers and generals, some of whom were sincere republicans, and others animated by the old rivalry which divided the armies of the Rhine and of Italy, most of the chiefs of the army saw their own personal elevation in the elevation of a warrior to the throne of France. They were consequently quite ready to take the initiative, and as had often been done in the Roman empire, to make an emperor themselves. General Soult wrote to the First Consul that he had heard generals and colonels demanding the establishment of a new form of government, and expressing their readiness to give the First Consul the title of Emperor of the Gauls. The general asked for orders on this point. Petitions were circulated in the divisions of dragoons that were encamped at Compiègne; these petitions were covered with signatures, and were about to arrive in Paris.

On Sunday, 4th Germinal (25th of March), some days after the death of the Duc d'Enghien, numerous addresses from the electoral colleges were presented to the First Consul. Admiral Ganteaume, one of his most devoted friends, himself presented the address of the college of the Var, of which he was president. It said, in formal terms, that it was not sufficient to *seize* and to *punish* conspirators, but that it was necessary by a large system of institutions, which should consolidate and perpetuate power in the hands of the First Consul and his family, to secure the repose of France, and terminate its long anxieties. Other addresses were read at the same reception, and immediately after these manifestations came one of a more elevated order. M. Fontanes had received the presidency of the Legislative Body, and thus, by the favour of the Bonaparte family, had obtained a place that he had merited by his talents alone. It

devolved on him to congratulate the First Consul upon the completion of an immortal work, the Civil Code. That Code, the fruit of so many studious vigils, a monument of the strong will and comprehensive intellect of the chief of the Republic, had been terminated in the present session, and the grateful Legislative Body had determined to consecrate that souvenir by placing in its hall a marble bust of the First Consul. It was this determination that M. de Fontanes announced at this reception, and certainly, of all the services of the man whom it was intended to honour, there was not one that more merited remembrance at the moment when he was about to be made hereditary sovereign of a country organised by his genius. M. de Fontanes expressed himself as follows:—

“CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL,—For four years an immense empire has reposed under the shelter of your powerful administration. The wise uniformity of your laws is about still more to unite all its inhabitants. The Legislative Body wishes to consecrate this memorable epoch: it has decreed that your bust, placed in the centre of its hall of deliberations, shall eternally remind it of your services, and of the duties and the hopes of the French people. The double right of conqueror and legislator has always imposed silence on all others; you have seen it confirmed in your person by the national suffrage. Who could again nourish the criminal hope of dividing France against France? Will she divide herself for some reminiscences of the past, when she is united by all the interests of the present? She has but one chief, yourself; she has but one enemy, England.

“Political tempests may perhaps have thrown even some wise men into unforeseen routes. But as soon as your hand raised the standard of the country, all good Frenchmen recognised and followed it; all passed over to the side of your glory. Those who conspire in the bosom of a hostile country, irrevocably renounce their natural soil; and what can they oppose to your ascendancy? You have invincible armies, they have only libels and assassins; and while the voice of religion is raised in your favour at the foot of those altars which you have restored, they cause you to be insulted by some obscure organs of rebellion and superstition. The impotence of their plottings is proven. They daily render destiny more severe by struggling against its decrees. Let them yield at length to that irresistible movement which sways the universe, and meditate in silence on the causes of the ruin and elevation of empires.”

That abjuration of the Bourbons, made in presence of the designated new monarch, and with that solemnity of language, was, though indirect, the most significant of all the manifestations. However, it was determined to publish nothing until the most elevated body in the State, the Senate, charged by

the Constitution with taking the initiative, had made a first movement.

In order to provoke this movement, it was necessary to come to an understanding with M. Cambacérès, who presided over the Senate. For this purpose it was necessary to confer with him, and secure his co-operation; not that any resistance on his part was to be feared, but his mere disapproval, even if a silent one, would have been a real inconvenience in a case in which it was necessary that the impulse should seem to be universal.

The First Consul sent for Messrs. Lebrun and Cambacérès at Malmaison. M. Lebrun, as being the easier to persuade, was the first sent for. No effort was necessary in his case, for he was a decided partisan of monarchy, and more especially under the sovereignty of General Bonaparte than of any one else. M. Cambacérès, discontented with what was in progress, arrived when the conference with his colleague Lebrun was already far advanced. The First Consul, after having spoken of the movement which had arisen in the public mind, asked the opinion of the Second Consul upon the question, then so much canvassed, of the re-establishment of monarchy.

“I shrewdly suspected,” replied M. Cambacérès, “that that was what was to be spoken of. I see that everything tends to that end, and I am very sorry for it.” Then ill concealing the personal vexation which mingled with his prudent views, M. Cambacérès stated to the First Consul the grounds of his opinion. He depicted the republicans as being discontented that they were to be deprived of even the name of the phantom which they had pursued; the royalists revolted at seeing the throne re-erected without a Bourbon being seated upon it; he pointed out the danger of pushing the return to the old system so far, that very soon it would only require the substitution of one person for another to re-establish the old monarchy. He repeated the remarks of the royalists themselves, who boasted that in General Bonaparte they had a precursor charged with paving the way for the return of the Bourbons. He pointed out the inconveniences of a new change, productive of no advantage beyond a vain title, for the power of the First Consul was already unlimited; and he observed that frequently it was more perilous to change the name of things than to change the things themselves. He alleged the difficulty of obtaining from Europe the recognition of the monarchy that it was proposed to found, and the still greater difficulty of obtaining from France the effort of a third war, in order to wring the recognition from the old monarchies; in short, he put forth a variety of reasons, some good, some middling, and tinged with an ill-temper by no means usual to so staid a personage. But he

dared not mention the best, though he well knew them ; namely, that if this new gratification of an immense ambition were granted, there was no point at which they could stop short, for in decreeing to General Bonaparte the title of Emperor of the French, they would prepare him to desire that of Emperor of the West, to which he secretly aspired, and which was by no means the least of the causes which urged him to go beyond all the limits of the possible, and to perish in so doing. Like every annoyed and constrained man, M. Cambacérès did not put forth his best arguments, and was beaten by his interlocutor. The First Consul, so dissimulating at the time of the institution of the consulate for life, now made that step which was not made towards him. He frankly confessed to his colleague that he wished to take the crown, and he declared why. He maintained that France desired a king ; that this was evident to any one capable of observation ; that she daily receded from the follies which had been put into her head, and that of all those follies the Republic was the most signal ; that the eyes of France were so completely opened to her defects, that she would take a Bourbon if they would not give her a Bonaparte ; that the return of the Bourbons would be a calamity, for that would be a pure counter-revolution, and that, for himself, without wishing for more power than he already possessed, he yielded on this occasion to the public will and to the interests of the Revolution itself ; that, for the rest, it was necessary to come to a resolution, for the excitement was such in the army that they would probably proclaim him emperor in the camps, and that then his elevation to the throne would resemble the act of Prætorians, which was above all things to be avoided.

These reasonings had but little weight with M. Cambacérès, who had no inclination to allow himself to be convinced, and each remained of his own opinion, vexed at having advanced too far. This unforeseen opposition of M. Cambacérès embarrassed the First Consul, who, feigning to feel less impatience than he really did feel, told his two colleagues that he would not interfere at all, but leave the public excitement to take its own course. They parted in mutual discontent, and M. Cambacérès returning to Paris with M. Lebrun, towards the middle of the night, addressed these words to him : “ All is finished, the monarchy is re-established, but I have a presentiment that what is being plastered up will not be durable. We have made war upon Europe to give her republics, daughters of the French Republic ; henceforth we shall make war to give her monarchies, sons or brothers of our own, and exhausted France will end by sinking beneath those silly enterprises.

But this disapprobation of M. Cambacérès was the most silent

and inactive of all resistances. He allowed M. Fouché and his assistants to act as they pleased. An excellent opportunity presented itself to them. According to the custom of addressing to the Senate communications upon important events, there had been presented to it a report of the grand judge, relative to the intrigues of the English diplomatic agents, Drake, Spencer Smith, and Taylor. It was necessary to reply to this communication of the government. The Senate had named a committee to prepare the draft of a reply. The leaders, seeing a favourable occasion, exerted themselves to persuade the Senators that the time had arrived for taking the initiative on the subject of re-establishing monarchy; that the First Consul hesitated, but that it was necessary to overcome his hesitations by denouncing to him the gaps in the existing institutions, and by indicating to him how they could be filled up. They hinted cautiously at the unpleasantness to which, two years previously, the Senate was exposed through halting behind the wishes of General Bonaparte. They plainly advanced a very specious reason for the Senate not allowing itself to be outstripped. The army, argued they, excited to the highest pitch in favour of their chief, was ready to proclaim him emperor, and then the empire, as at Rome, would be the gift of the Prætorians. It was necessary to make haste, that France might be spared such a scandal. They would only imitate in this the example of the Roman Senate, which, more than once, hastened to proclaim certain emperors, in order to avoid receiving them from the hands of the legions. Then came a reason which needed not to be spoken aloud or whispered; it was, that there still remained for distribution a great part of the senatorships instituted at the same time as the consulate for life, which procured an endowment of land, in addition to the pecuniary salary allowed to each Senator. There would also be a profusion of new places to distribute. It was necessary, therefore, as they could not resist the elevation of a new master, not to run the risk of displeasing him. It must be added that to these baser reasonings some better ones were joined. Except a by no means numerous opposition, of which M. Sieyès was the original founder, but with which, as with everything else, he had become disgusted, and which he had abandoned to subaltern leaders; with the exception of this opposition, the mass saw in monarchy the port in which the Revolution must seek its safety.

These reasons, so various in character, gained over the majority of the Senate, and it was determined to make a significant reply to the message of the First Consul. The following is the substance of that reply.

The institutions of France are incomplete in two respects. Firstly, there is no tribunal for great crimes against the State,

which must be referred to an insufficient and weak jurisdiction. (What passed at the tribunal of the Seine, during the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, inspired every one with this opinion.) Secondly, the government of France rests upon a single head, which is a continual temptation to conspirators, who imagine that by striking at that head they can destroy everything. Here is a double gap which it is necessary to point out to the wisdom of the First Consul, to awaken his solicitude, and induce him, if need be, to take the initiative.

On the 6th Germinal (27th March), the second day after the audiences reported above, the Senate was summoned to deliberate upon this draft of reply. M. Fouché and his friends had prepared everything, without giving notice to M. Cambacérès, who usually presided in the Senate. It appeared that they had not even apprised the First Consul, in order that they might give him an agreeable surprise. That surprise was by no means so agreeable to M. Cambacérès, who was stupefied on hearing the draft of the committee read. However, he preserved an unruffled countenance, and allowed nothing to be perceived by the numerous eyes that were fixed upon him, for it was desired to know how far all this was agreeable to the First Consul, whose confidant and accessory Cambacérès was supposed to be. During the reading of the draft of the committee, a very slight but still perceptible murmuring was heard in a part of the Senate; nevertheless, the draft was adopted by an immense majority, and it was determined that it should be communicated to the First Consul on the very next day.

Scarcely had M. Cambacérès left this sitting of the Senate when, offended at not having been advertised, he wrote to the First Consul at Malmaison instead of going thither in person, and in a very cool letter communicated to him all that had taken place. The First Consul returned on the following day to receive the Senate, and wished to have a previous explanation with his two colleagues. He appeared astonished at the precipitation of the procedure, and in some sort taken by surprise. "I have not sufficiently reflected," said he to M. Cambacérès; "I need to consult further with you and many others before I determine. I will reply to the Senate that I will deliberate. But I will neither receive it publicly, nor publish its message. I will not let anything be noised abroad until my resolution shall be definitively taken." This was what was agreed upon, and executed that same day.

The First Consul received the Senate as he had announced, and replied verbally to its members that he thanked them for their testimonies of devotion, but that he must maturely deliberate upon the subject submitted to his attention previous to making a public and definitive reply.

Although he witnessed, and was a silent accessory to all that had taken place, the First Consul was almost outstripped in his wishes. The impatience of his partisans had surpassed his own, and he evidently was not ready. The address of the Senate, therefore, was not published; for although absolute secrecy was impossible, yet as long as no official and avowed proceedings were taken, it was always possible to recede should any unforeseen obstacle be encountered.

Previous to advancing too far to retrograde, the First Consul wished to be secure of the army and of Europe. In the main, he did not doubt either, for he was dear to the first, and dreaded by the second. But it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon his companions-in-arms, who had poured out their blood for France, and not for one man; it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon them, to wish them to accept him for their sovereign. And considering the effect produced on Europe by the death of the Duc d'Enghien, it was a singular act of condescension to ask of all the legitimate princes, to ask them to recognise as their equal a soldier who, but a few days before, had imbrued his hands in the blood of the Bourbons. However much ground there might be to expect that the power of the soldier would extort assent, it was wise to be assured of it beforehand.

The First Consul wrote to General Soult, and to those of the generals in whom he had the most confidence, to ask their opinion as to the proposed change. He said that he had not come to any fixed determination, sought nothing but that which was best for France, and wished, previous to coming to any decision, to have the opinion of the chiefs of the army. Assuredly the reply was not doubtful; but to ask it was, at the least, to fish for protestations of devotion, which would serve for example, and urge forward lukewarm or refractory spirits.

As regarded Europe, the complaisance, though probable in the main, yet presented some doubt. We were at war with Great Britain; in that quarter, therefore, nothing needed to be done, the consent of that power being wholly out of the question. The recent relations with Russia rendered it a point of dignity not to address her. There remained Spain, Austria, Prussia, and the smaller powers. Spain was too weak to refuse anything, but the outpoured blood of a Bourbon made it imperative to allow some weeks to pass before having recourse to her. Austria had appeared the least sensible of all the powers to the violation of the Germanic territory, and in her profound indifference to everything but her own interest, there was nothing that might not be expected from her. But in matters of etiquette she was rigid, punctilious, sensitive, as that court might well be whose antiquity and whose titles were unequalled. An emperor (for that title was decided upon as at once newer,

greater, and more military than that of king), an emperor to add to the list of sovereigns was not a very easy thing to make acceptable to the head of the holy Roman empire.

Prussia, notwithstanding her recent coolness, was still the power most easy to render favourable. A courier, therefore, was immediately despatched to Berlin with an order to M. de Laforest to see M. d'Haugwitz, to learn from him whether the First Consul might hope to be recognised by the King of Prussia in quality of hereditary Emperor of the French. This was to be asked in such wise as to place the young king between a lively gratitude or a bitter resentment on the part of France. M. de Laforest was ordered to leave no trace of this step in the archives of the legation. As for Austria, without writing to M. de Champagny, and without risking a direct overture, means of acting were at hand, namely, to sound M. de Cobentzel, who professed to M. de Talleyrand an immoderate desire to gratify the First Consul. M. de Talleyrand was the very minister for such a negotiation. He obtained very gratifying assurances from M. Cobentzel, the most satisfactory language, but nothing positive. It was necessary to refer to Vienna for positive instructions.

The First Consul was therefore obliged to wait for a fortnight before he could reply to the Senate, and allow the architects of his new grandeur to pursue their work. However, addresses were still allowed to arrive from the great towns and the principal authorities. They were not, however, inserted in the *Moniteur*.

The King of Prussia was found in the best possible dispositions. That prince, after having reverted towards Russia, and secretly allied himself to her, feared that he had gone too far in that direction, and that he had too plainly manifested his censure of what had taken place at Ettenheim. He wished, therefore, for nothing better than an opportunity of doing something personally agreeable to the First Consul. M. de Laforest had scarcely begun to broach the subject to M. d'Haugwitz when the latter, preventing him from concluding, hastened to declare that the King of Prussia would not hesitate to acknowledge the new Emperor of the French. Frederick William fully expected to encounter new censure from the restless coterie that surrounded the queen, but he knew how to brave that censure for the interests of his kingdom, and he considered a good understanding with the First Consul to be the first among those interests. It must be added that he experienced a feeling which all the other courts were equally to experience, that of satisfaction at seeing the Republic abolished in France. Monarchy alone could render them secure, and the Bourbons appearing for the time being impossible, General Bonaparte was the new monarch whom all the princes expected to behold on the throne

of France. This is a new proof, among a thousand others, of the brief duration that certain impressions have among men, especially when they have an interest in effacing them from their hearts. All the courts were about to recognise as emperor that personage whom in their wrath they had but a fortnight before called an assassin and a regicide.

The King of Prussia himself wrote to M. de Lucchesini a letter which was communicated to the First Consul, and which contained the most friendly expressions.

“I unhesitatingly authorise you,” said the king, “to seize the earliest possible opportunity to make known to M. de Talleyrand that after having seen the supreme power conferred for life upon the First Consul, I should see with still greater interest the public order, established by his wisdom and his great actions, consolidated by the hereditary establishment of his family, and that I should not hesitate to acknowledge it. You will add, that I indulge the hope that this unequivocal testimony of my sentiments will be equivalent, in his opinion, to all the securities and guarantees that could be offered to him by a formal treaty, of which the bases substantially exist; and that I hope that I, in my turn, may reckon upon his freely reciprocating that friendship and confidence which I should wish to see constantly maintained between the two governments.” (23rd of April 1804.)

This language, though sincere in the main, was not, however, altogether consistent with the spirit of the treaty signed with Russia, but the immoderate desire of peace led this prince into equivocations most unworthy of his character.

Matters proceeded differently at Vienna. There no engagement had been entered into with Russia; they did not wish to redeem concession made to one party by concession made to another; they were guided solely by the closest calculations of their own interest. The death of the Duc d'Enghien, and the violation of the Germanic territory, were considered to be of minor importance. The only subject of consideration was the return to be exacted for the sacrifice that was to be made in recognising the new emperor. In the first place, notwithstanding the inconvenience of disobliging Russia by conceding a point so eminently agreeable to the French government, it was necessary to make up their minds to recognise Napoleon, for to refuse would be to cause war, or nearly so, with France, and that, at least for the moment, was above all things to be avoided. But it was requisite to derive advantage from the recognition in question, to defer it for a short time, to sell it for certain advantages, and to represent to Russia as the effect of ill-will towards France the delay employed in negotiating the advantages desired. Such was the Austrian policy, and it must be

confessed that it was natural enough among powers which were in a state of perpetual suspicion of each other.

The Austrian party in the empire being so much weakened, it might happen that at the next election the house of Austria would lose the imperial crown. There was a means of warding off this inconvenience by securing to the house of Austria itself, for its hereditary States, not a royal but an imperial crown, in such wise, that the head of that house would remain Emperor of Austria in the event of any future election causing him to cease to be Emperor of Germany. This is what M. de Champagny at Vienna, and M. de Cobentzel at Paris, were charged with demanding from the First Consul as the price of what he demanded for himself. For the rest, they were to assure him that, saving the discussion of conditions, the principle of the recognition was at once admitted by the Emperor Francis.

Although the First Consul had entertained but little doubts as to the dispositions of these powers, their replies filled him with satisfaction. He lavished testimonies of gratitude and friendship upon the court of Prussia. He no less warmly thanked the court of Vienna, and added, that he consented without hesitation to recognise the title of emperor, when assumed by the head of the house of Austria. Only, he would not wish to publish that declaration immediately, lest he should appear to purchase the recognition of his own title at any price whatever. He preferred to engage himself, by a secret treaty, to recognise at a future time the successor of Francis II. as Emperor of Austria should he lose the quality of Emperor of Germany. Further, if the court of Vienna insisted, he was ready to give way upon this difficulty, which was not one in fact, as all these titles had ceased to have any real importance. From Charlemagne down to the eighteenth century there was but one single sovereign who bore the title of emperor, at least in the west. Since the eighteenth century there were two, the Czar of Russia having taken that qualification. In consequence of what was passing in France there were going to be three. Some day there would be four, if at a future Germanic election any other prince than the head of the house of Austria should be chosen as emperor. It was even supposed that the King of England, having called the united Parliament of England, Scotland, and Ireland the *IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT*, might be tempted to style himself emperor. In that case there would be five. All this did not merit to be paused upon. They were mere appellations which no longer had the value which attached to them when Francis I. and Charles V. disputed for the suffrages of the Germanic electors.

Independently of these tranquillising assurances of the

principal courts, the First Consul had received the strongest testimonials of adhesion from the army. General Soult especially had written him a letter full of the most satisfactory declarations, and during the fifteen or twenty days which had been devoted to corresponding with Vienna and Berlin the important cities of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris had sent energetic addresses in favour of the re-establishment of monarchy. The impulse was general, the *éclat* as public as it could be; it was necessary, therefore, to proceed to official steps, and explain to the Senate the posture of affairs.

The First Consul, as has been seen, had not publicly received the Senate, and had made only a verbal reply to the message of the 6th Germinal. He had deferred his official answer for nearly a month. He made it on the 5th Floréal (25th April 1804), and it brought about the expected *dénouement*.

"Your address of the 6th Germinal," said the First Consul, "has not ceased to occupy my attention. . . . You have judged the right of inheritance of the supreme magistracy necessary to shelter the French people from the plots of our enemies, and from the agitations which might spring from rival ambitions; many of our institutions have also seemed to you to need perfecting, in order to secure, undecayingly, the triumph of equality and of public liberty, and to afford to the nation and to the government the double guarantee of which they stand in need. In proportion as I have fixed my attention upon these grave objects, I have felt more and more deeply how important to me are the counsels of your wisdom and experience under circumstances at once so novel and so important. I therefore invite you fully to explain your views and wishes."

This message was not yet published any more than that to which it served as a reply. The Senate immediately assembled to deliberate. The deliberation was smooth, and the conclusion known beforehand: it was the proposal to convert the consular Republic into an hereditary empire.

However, it was not advisable that everything should pass in silence; it was requisite that there should be a debate somewhere, in a body whose discussion was public, of the grand resolution that was contemplated. The Senate did not discuss. The Legislative Body heard official orators, and voted in silence. The Tribune, though narrowed and converted into a section of the Council of State, still preserved the right of speech. It was resolved to make use of it, that there might be heard in the only Tribune which had preserved the privilege of expressing its opposition aloud some speeches having the appearance of being independent.

The Tribune was then presided over by M. Fabre de l'Aude, a personage devoted to the Bonaparte family. It was agreed

with him to choose a tribune, whose anterior opinions had been frankly republican, and to charge him to open the proceedings. The Tribune Curée, the compatriot and personal enemy of M. Cambacérès, was selected to play this part.

It was publicly believed that this personage, the supposed creature of the Second Consul, had been named and put forward by him. Such was not the case. It was without his knowledge, and rather in opposition to him, that M. Curée had been named. The latter, formerly an ardent republican, and now, like many others, completely reconciled to monarchical ideas, submitted a motion in which he proposed the re-establishment of hereditary succession in favour of the Bonaparte family. M. Fabre de l'Aude carried the motion to St. Cloud, to submit it to the approbation of the First Consul. He seemed not to be very fully satisfied with it, and thought the language of the converted republican neither sufficiently dexterous nor sufficiently elevated. However, it would have been inconvenient to choose another member of the Tribunate. He had the copy that was submitted to him retouched, and returned it immediately to M. Fabre de l'Aude. The text had undergone a singular alteration at St. Cloud. Instead of the words *hereditary succession in the Bonaparte family*, were inserted the words *hereditary succession in the descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. M. Fabre de l'Aude was a particular friend of Joseph, and one of the members of his private circle. Evidently the First Consul, displeased with his brothers, would not take any constitutional engagement towards them. The sycophants of Joseph busied themselves around M. Fabre de l'Aude, and the draft of the motion was taken back to St. Cloud, to have the words *Bonaparte family* replaced instead of the words *descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. The draft was returned with the word *descendants* retained without any explanation.

M. Fabre resolved not to make any stir about this circumstance, and to give M. Curée the text of the motion as it had come from the hands of the First Consul, but after inserting the version preferred by Joseph. He imagined that if the motion were once presented and copied into the *Moniteur* no one would venture to alter it again, and he prepared himself, if need should be, to have a painful explanation with the First Consul. It was a proof that the party surrounding the Consul's brothers were strongly enough combined to brave, in their interest, even the displeasure of the head of the family. All these proceedings were communicated day by day to Joseph, who had already proceeded to the camp of Boulogne.

On Saturday, the 8th Floréal (28th of April 1804), the motion of M. Curée was deposited at the Tribunate, and the discussion of it adjourned to Monday, the 10th Floréal. A

crowd of orators pressed forward to the tribune to support it, and vied with each other for the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by a dissertation upon the advantages of monarchy. The substance, which, moreover, was correct, was as follows:—

The Revolution of 1789 sought the abolition of feudality, the reform of our social state, the reform of abuses introduced under an arbitrary rule, and the diminution of the absolute power of royalty by the intervention of the nation in the government. Those were its real objects. All which exceeded that limit had gone beyond the mark, and produced nothing but misfortunes. France had been taught this by bitter experience. It was necessary to profit by that experience, and to undo what had been overdone. Monarchy, then, was to be re-established upon the new bases of constitutional liberty and civil equality. Re-establishing the monarchy there was but one monarch possible, Napoleon Bonaparte, with remainder to the members of his family.

The most zealous orators of the Tribunate seasoned their harangues with invectives against the Bourbons, and the solemn declaration that the restoration of those princes to France was for ever impossible; that it was the duty of every Frenchman, at the cost of his blood, to oppose their return. It would appear that the inconsistency which these orators now exhibited in advocating monarchy, after having taken so many oaths to the Republic, indivisible and imperishable, should have been a lesson to teach them to speak less positively as to the future. But there is no lesson which can prevent ordinary men from plunging into the torrent which rushes before them: all go readily with it, especially when they hope to find honours and fortune in its course.

In the number of these zealots the most zealous were the men who had formerly been distinguished for their republican spirit, or those who at a later period were to distinguish themselves by their zeal for the Bourbons. One personage alone in the midst of this outburst of abject adulation displayed real dignity. He was the Tribune Carnot. Undoubtedly he deceived himself in his general theories, for after what had occurred during ten years, it was difficult to conceive that, for a country like France, the Republic was preferable to monarchy, but the champion of error was more noble in his attitude than the champions of truth, because he had the advantage over them of a courageous and disinterested conviction. What renders his courage the more honourable to him is, that he expressed himself not as a demagogue, but, on the contrary, as a wise and moderate citizen and a lover of order. He declared that he would on the next day submit docilely to the sovereign whom the law should have instituted, but that while

it was under discussion, and until it had passed, he would express his opinion upon it.

He commenced by speaking in noble terms of the First Consul, and of the services that he had rendered to the Republic. If to secure order and a reasonable liberty in France an hereditary ruler were necessary, it would be madness, said he, to choose any other than Napoleon Bonaparte. No one had dealt more terrible blows to the enemies of the country; no one had done so much for its civil organisation. Had he conferred nothing else on the nation but the Civil Code, his name would deservedly descend to posterity. It could not, then, be doubted that if it was necessary to raise up the throne again, it was he who ought to be set upon it, and not that blind and vindictive race, who would re-enter France only to shed the blood of the best citizens, and to re-establish the reign of the narrowest prejudices. But since, in fact, Napoleon Bonaparte had rendered such great services, was there no other recompense that could be offered to him than the sacrifice of the liberty of France?

The Tribune Carnot, without plunging into endless dissertations upon the advantages and disadvantages attached to different forms of government, endeavoured to show that at Rome the times of the empire had been as much disturbed as those of the Republic, and that the former had less of masculine virtues and heroism; that the ten centuries of the French monarchy had not been less stormy than those of all the known republics; that under the monarchy the people attached themselves to families, identified themselves with their passions, their rivalries, and their hatreds, and agitated themselves as much for those causes as for any others; that if the French Republic had had its days of bloodshed, such troubles were inseparable from its origin; that this, at the utmost, only proved the necessity for a temporary dictatorship, as at Rome; that that dictatorship had been conferred on Napoleon Bonaparte; that no one disputed it with him; that it depended upon himself to make the noblest and most glorious use of it, in preserving it only during the time necessary to prepare France for liberty; but that if he would convert it into a perpetual and hereditary power, he would renounce a matchless and immortal glory; that the new States founded twenty years since on the other side of the Atlantic were a proof that repose and happiness were to be found under republican institutions; and that, as regarded himself, he should for ever regret that the First Consul would not employ his power in securing such a felicity for his country. Examining the often used argument that there would be more chance of a durable peace by assimilating the form of government to that generally received in Europe, he demanded whether

the recognition of the new emperor would be so easy as was imagined; whether they would resort to arms in case of a refusal; whether France, converted into an empire, would not be as likely as France maintained as a Republic to offend Europe, excite its jealousies; in a word, provoke war?

Glancing backward, and bidding a noble adieu to the past, the Tribune Carnot exclaimed:

“Was liberty, then, shown to man that he might never enjoy her? Was she incessantly presented to his wishes as a fruit to which he could not stretch out his hand but to be stricken with death? No; I cannot consent to look upon this benefit so universally preferable to all others, and without which all others become valueless—I cannot consent to look upon it as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, that its régime is easy, and more stable than any arbitrary or oligarchical government.

He concluded with these words, worthy of a good citizen:

“Ever ready to sacrifice my dearest affections to the interests of our common country, I shall content myself with having this one more time raised the accents of a free soul, and my respect for the law will be all the more secured because it is the fruit of long convulsions and of that reason which imperatively commands us now to unite firmly against the common enemy, that enemy who is ever ready to foment discords, and to whom all measures are legitimate that will aid him towards his end of universal oppression and the dominion of the seas.”

The Tribune Carnot evidently confounded liberty with the Republic, and that is the common error of those who reason as he did. The Republic is not necessarily liberty, any more than monarchy is necessarily order. Oppression is to be met with under a Republic, as disorder is to be met with under a monarchy. But for good laws, both the one and the other would be met with under all governments. But the question to be decided was whether, with wise laws, a monarchy would not give, in a higher degree than any other form of government, the utmost possible liberty, and, besides, the force of action necessary to great military States: and especially whether the habitudes of twelve centuries had not rendered it inevitable, and thence desirable, in a country like ours. If that were the case, would it not have been better to admit it and to organise it wisely, than to flounder about in a false position which harmonised neither with the ancient manners of France nor with the want which was then experienced of a stable and permanent government? The illustrious tribune was right, in our opinion, only upon one point; perhaps a temporary dictatorship was all that was necessary to enable Napoleon to pave the way at a future time to the Republic, according to M. Carnot; to a repre-

sentative monarchy, according to us. Napoleon was marvellously chosen by Providence to prepare France for a new régime, and to deliver her up, aggrandised and regenerated, to those, be they whom they might, who were to govern her after him.

The Tribune Carim de Nisas undertook to reply to M. Carnot, and acquitted himself of that task to the great satisfaction of the new monarchists, but with a mediocrity of language equal to the mediocrity of his ideas. However, it was a mere pretence of discussion. Fatigue and the conviction of its profound inutility speedily put an end to it. A committee of thirteen members was appointed to examine the motion of the Tribune Curée, and convert it into a definitive resolution.

In the sitting of the 13th Floréal (3rd of May), that is to say, on the Tuesday, M. Jard-Pauvillier, the reporter of that committee, proposed to the Tribunate to pass a vote which, by the constitutional rules then in force, would have to be addressed to the Senate, and carried to that body by a deputation.

The vote was as follows:—

First, That Napoleon Bonaparte, now Consul for life, be named emperor, and in that capacity invested with the government of the French Republic.

Secondly, That the title of emperor and the imperial power be made hereditary in his family, in the male line, according to the order of primogeniture.

Thirdly, That in introducing into the organisation of the constituted authorities the modifications rendered necessary by the establishment of hereditary power, equality, liberty, and the rights of the people shall be preserved in all their integrity.

This vote, adopted by an immense majority, was carried to the Senate on the following day, 14th Floréal (4th of May 1804). It was M. François de Neufchateau who, as vice-president, occupied the chair at that sitting. After hearing the deputation, and having officially registered the vote it had brought up, he said to the tribunes: "I cannot remove the veil which conceals for a time the proceedings of the Senate. I may inform you, however, that since the 6th Germinal we have directed the attention of the chief magistrate to the same subject as you have. But observe your advantages; that which we for two months have meditated in silence, your constitution has enabled you to discuss in presence of the people. The happy developments that you have given to a grand idea have procured for the Senate, which opened the Tribune to you, the gratification of congratulating itself on its choice and applauding your labour.

"In your public discourses we have recognised the substance of all our opinions. Like you, citizen tribunes, we do not wish the return of the Bourbons, because we do not wish counter-

revolution, the only present that could be made to us by those unfortunate exiles, who have carried away with them despotism, nobility, feudal tyranny, slavery, and ignorance.

“Like you, citizen tribunes, we wish to raise up a new dynasty, because we wish to secure to the French people all the rights which they have reconquered. Like you, we wish that liberty, equality, and enlightenment may be prevented from retrograding. I speak not of the great man called by his glory to give his name to the age in which he lives. It is not to himself but to us that he devotes his energies and genius. What you propose in the ardour of enthusiasm, the Senate will consider with cool deliberation.”

It is evident from these words of the vice-president that the Senate wished to take the lead, and not to expose itself this time to be anticipated or surpassed in the matter of devotion to the new master. The secret directors of the change that was in progress had well foreseen the influence which the discussion of the Tribune would exercise upon that body. They had made use of it to hasten the resolution of the Senate, urging that that resolution ought to be pronounced on the very day when the vote of the Tribune should be communicated to the Senate, so that the two assemblies should appear to agree together, but the more considerable of the two should not seem to follow the other; and, consequently, the greatest haste was made to bring all to a conclusion. The mode was hit upon of a memorial addressed to the First Consul, a memorial in which the Senate should express its views, and should propose the basis of a new organic *Senatus Consultum*. This memorial, in fact, was already cut and dried at the moment when the deputation from the Tribune was introduced. Its form and style were approved of, and the presentation to the First Consul immediately resolved. It was determined that that presentation should take place the same day, 14th Floréal. Accordingly, a deputation composed of the bureau, and of the members of the committee which had prepared the work, waited on the First Consul, and presented him with the message of the Senate, together with the memorial containing its ideas upon the new monarchical organisation of France.

It was now necessary to put those ideas into the shape of constitutional articles. A committee was named, consisting of several senators, of the ministers, and of the three Consuls, which committee was charged with the drawing up of the new *Senatus Consultum*. As no further precaution was needed as to publicity, they on the following day inserted in the *Moniteur* all the proceedings of the Senate, the communications it had made to the First Consul, those which it had received from him, and all the addresses which for some time past had demanded the re-establishment of monarchy.

The committee named proceeded to the work on the instant. It assembled at St. Cloud, in the presence of the First Consul and his two colleagues. It examined and resolved in succession all the questions to which the establishment of hereditary power had given birth. The first which presented itself was the title of the new monarch. Should he be called king or emperor? The same reason which in ancient Rome induced the Cæsars not to revive the title of king, and to take the wholly military title of Imperator—this same reason decided the framers of the new constitution to prefer the title of emperor. It presented at once more novelty and more grandeur; it avoided, to a certain extent, the souvenirs of a past which they wished to restore in part, but not entirely. Moreover, in this qualification, there was something of the unlimited which suited the ambition of Napoleon. His numerous enemies in Europe, daily attributing to him designs which he had not at all, or not as yet, by repeating in a host of journals that he contemplated the reconstitution of the Empire of the West, or at least that of the Gauls—his enemies had prepared all minds, and even his own, for the title of emperor. This title was in the mouths of all, whether friends or foes, before it had been adopted. It was chosen without opposition. Accordingly it was decided that the First Consul should be proclaimed Emperor of the French.

The hereditary succession, the object of the new revolution, was naturally established upon the principles of the Salic Law, that is to say, from male to male in the order of primogeniture. Napoleon having no children, and not seeming destined to have any, it was proposed to give him the faculty of adoption, such as it existed in the Roman institutions, with its conditions and its solemn forms. In default of adoptive descent, the transmission of the crown was permitted in the collateral line, not to all the brothers of the emperor, but exclusively to Joseph and Louis. They were the only two who had acquired real public consideration. Lucien, through his habits of life, and by his recent marriage, had rendered himself improper to succeed. Jerome, but little more than a youth, had married an American, without the consent of his family. Only Joseph and Louis, therefore, were admitted to the succession. In order to prevent the inconveniences which might result from misconduct in a numerous family so recently raised to the throne, an absolute power over the members of the imperial family was attributed to the emperor. It was settled that the marriage of a French prince, contracted without the consent of the head of the empire, should deprive both the prince and his children of all right to succession. Nothing short of the dissolution of the marriage so contracted could enable him to recover the rights lost by it.

The brothers and sisters of the emperor received the rank of princes and princesses as well as the honours attached to that title. It was resolved that the Civil List should be established on the same principles as that of 1791; that is to say, that it should be voted for the whole reign; that it should consist of the still existent royal palaces; of the produce of the domains of the Crown, and of an annual revenue of twenty-five millions. The allowances of the French princes were fixed at a million francs per annum for each. The emperor had the right of fixing by imperial decrees (corresponding to what we call *ordonnances*) the interior government of the household and the court etiquette suitable to his imperial dignity.

On entering so completely into monarchical ideas, it was necessary to surround this new throne with grand dignities, which should serve it both for ornament and support. It was further necessary to remember those secondary ambitions which had voluntarily ranked themselves below a superior ambition, had aided it to obtain its grandeurs, and were entitled, in their turn, to receive from it the price of their private and public services. All had their eyes upon the two Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who, though far inferior to their colleague in every respect, had nevertheless shared the supreme power, and rendered incontestable services by the wisdom of their counsels. Both of them were members of the senatorial committee, which drew up at St. Cloud the new monarchical constitution. The Consul Cambacérès, probably for the first time in his life, unable to conceal a displeasure, showed himself cold and little communicative. He was as reserved on this occasion as M. Fouché was the contrary, and was no longer able to disguise his vexation and the contempt that he felt for the constructors of the new monarchy. This state of affairs produced several quarrels, which were speedily terminated by the authority of Napoleon. There was a general feeling of the necessity of satisfying the two Consuls who were going out of office, and especially M. Cambacérès, who in spite of certain failings enjoyed an immense political consideration. It had at first been proposed, in order to render the imitation of the Roman empire complete, to allow the two Consuls to remain beside the emperor. Every one is aware that after the elevation of the Cæsars to the empire they preserved the institution of the consuls, that one of the mad members of the family gave that title to his horse, that others gave it to their slaves, or their eunuchs, and that in the Empire of the East, very near the time of its fall, there were still two annual consuls charged with the regulation of the calendar. It was this anything but flattering remembrance that inspired otherwise well-meaning friends with the idea of preserving the two Consuls in the new French empire. M. Fouché, repelling this proposal,

urged that there was but little need to care about those who might lose somewhat by the new organisation; the mainly important point was to do away with every trace of a régime so decried as that of the Republic had now become.

"Those who are superseded by the new régime," replied M. Cambacérès, "can console themselves, for they will carry with them what men do not always carry out of office, the public esteem."

This allusion to M. Fouché and to his first retirement from office caused the First Consul to smile an approval of the retort, but he hastened to put an end to these disputes, which had become painful. The Second and Third Consuls were not summoned any more to the sitting of the committee.

M. de Talleyrand, the most ingenious of inventors when the object was to gratify ambition, proposed to borrow from the Germanic empire certain of its grand dignities. In that ancient empire each of the seven electors was marshal, cup-bearer, treasurer, or chancellor of the kingdom of Arles, or of Italy, &c. &c. With the idea, but vague as yet, of the possible future re-establishment of the Empire of the West in favour of France, it was to prepare the way for that measure, to surround the emperor with grand dignitaries, chosen for the nonce from the French princes or the great personages of the Republic, and destined at a future time to be kings themselves, and to form a cortège of vassal monarchs around the throne of the modern Charlemagne.

M. de Talleyrand, in concert with the First Consul, devised six grand officers, corresponding not to so many offices of the imperial household, but to so many departments of the government. In that constitution, in which there still remained many elective functions, in which the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunate were to be elected, and in which the emperor himself was to be elected in the event of a failure of collateral issue, a grand elector, entrusted with certain honorific duties relating to elections, might be conceived. A grand elector, then, was proposed as the first grand dignitary. For the second, an arch-chancellor of the empire was proposed, charged with duties of pure pomp, of general surveillance with reference to the judicial order. For the third, an arch-chancellor of State, charged with similar duties with reference to the diplomatic service; for the fourth, an arch-treasurer; for the fifth, a constable; for the sixth, a high-admiral. The title of each of the latter sufficiently indicates to what part of the government his dignity related.

The titularies of these grand officers were, as we have said, dignitaries and not functionaries, for they were intended to be irresponsible and irremovable. They were to have purely

honorific privileges, and only the general surveillance of the department of government to which, respectively, their titles had reference. Thus, the grand elector convoked the Legislative Body; the Senate and the electoral colleges administered the oath to the members elected to the various assemblies, and took part in all the formalities attendant upon the convocation or the dissolution of the electoral colleges. The arch-chancellor of the empire received the oath of magistrates, or presented them when sworn before the emperor, attended to the promulgation of laws and *Senatus Consulta*, presided over the Council of State and the High Imperial Court (of which we shall speak by-and-by), suggested desirable reforms of the laws, and, finally, exercised the functions of civil officer of State for the births, marriages, and deaths of the members of the imperial family. The arch-chancellor of State received the ambassadors, introduced them to the emperor, and signed and promulgated treaties. The arch-treasurer was custodian of the great book of the national debt, gave the guarantee of his signature to all the papers delivered to the creditors of the State, audited the accounts of the accountant-general's office previous to submitting them to the emperor, and gave his advice as to the management of the finances. The constable with reference to the war administration, and the high-admiral with reference to that of the marine, had precisely similar duties. But Napoleon laid it down as a fixed principle that a grand dignitary should never be a minister, in order that the department of display might be kept distinct from the real function. There were in each department of government dignities modelled upon royalty itself, inactive, irresponsible, and honorific as it, but, like it, charged with a general and superior superintendence.

The titularies of these dignities could supply the place of the emperor in his absence, whether in the Senate, in the councils, or at the army. They formed with the emperor the grand council of the empire. Finally, in case of the extinction of the natural and legitimate heirs they elected the emperor, and in case of minority they watched over the future sovereign, and formed the council of regency.

The idea of these grand dignitaries was accepted by all the framers of the new constitution. Each titulary, provided that he was not at once a grand dignitary and an imperial prince, was to receive a salary equal to one-third of that of the princes, that is to say, the third of a million (£13,333 sterling). Here were the means of providing for the two brothers of the emperor, his superseded colleagues, and the eminent personages who had rendered important services, military or civil. After the two brothers, Joseph and Louis, every one thought of the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, Eugène Beauharnais, the adopted

son of the First Consul, Murat, his brother-in-law, Berthier, his faithful and invaluable companion-in-arms, and M. de Talleyrand, his medium of communication with the European powers. To his own will alone was left the distribution of these high favours.

It was natural at the same time to create in the army elevated posts, to re-establish that dignity of marshal which existed in the old monarchy, and which is adopted by all Europe as the most brilliant sign of military command. It was settled that there should be sixteen marshals, besides four honorary marshals, selected from veteran generals, become senators, and, therefore, precluded from active functions. The posts of inspectors-general of artillery, of engineers, and of cavalry were also re-established. To the grand military officers were added grand civil officers, such as chamberlains, masters of the ceremonies, &c., and of both was composed a second class of dignitaries under the title of grand officers of the empire, holding their appointments for life like the grand dignitaries themselves. To give them all a sort of root in the soil, they were charged with the presidencies of the electoral colleges. The presidency of each electoral college was permanently assigned to one of the grand dignitaries and to one of the class of civil or military grand officers. Thus the grand elector was to preside over the electoral college of Bruxelles; the arch-chancellor over that of Bordeaux; the arch-chancellor of State over that of Nantes; the arch-treasurer over that of Lyons; the constable over that of Turin; the high-admiral over that of Marseilles. The grand officers, civil or military, were to preside over the electoral colleges of minor importance. Human artifice could invent nothing more skilful to imitate an aristocracy with a democracy; for this hierarchy of six grand dignitaries, and of forty or fifty grand officers placed upon the steps of the throne, was at once an aristocracy and a democracy: an aristocracy by the position and the honours which, thanks to our conquests, it was to have; a democracy by origin, as it consisted of lawyers, soldiers of fortune, and sometimes of peasants, become marshals, and was to remain constantly open to any man who could rise by his genius or by his courage. These creations have disappeared with their creator, with the vast empire which served as their base; but it is possible that they would finally have succeeded had time sanctified them with that dust of antiquity which engenders respect.

While raising the throne and ornamenting its steps with this social pomp, it was indispensably necessary to secure some guarantees to the citizens, and to compensate them by some little real liberty for that apparent liberty of which they were deprived by the abolition of the Republic. For some time past

it had been emphatically argued that under a well-regulated monarchy the government would be stronger, and the citizens at the same time more free. It was necessary to keep a part of these promises, if one of the kind could be kept, at a time when every one putting forward his wishes for an energetic power would, for want of using it, allow liberty to perish, how strongly soever written in the laws. It was proposed, then, to give to the Senate and to the Legislative Body some prerogatives of which they were destitute, and which were calculated to become useful guarantees to the citizens.

The Senate, composed in the first place of eighty members elected by itself, then of citizens whom the emperor judged worthy of that elevated position, and finally of the six grand dignitaries and the princes having attained the age of eighteen, was still the first body in the State. It formed the others by the faculty of election which it had preserved; it could annul any unconstitutional law or decree, and could reform the constitution by means of an organic *Senatus Consultum*. Amidst the successive transformations to which it had been subjected within four years, it had remained quite as powerful as M. Sieyès had desired it to be. The restorers of monarchy, deliberating at St. Cloud, proposed to add two new prerogatives of the highest importance. They confided to it the guardianship of personal liberty and of the liberty of the press. By Article XLVI. of the first consular constitution, the government could not detain an individual in prison without bringing him, within ten days, before his natural judges. By the second consular constitution, that which established the consulate for life, the Senate, in the case of conspiracy against the safety of the State, had the power to decide whether the government should exceed the delay of ten days, and if so, by how long a period. It was now determined to regulate in a popular manner the arbitrary power thus given to the government over the liberty of the citizens. A senatorial commission was formed, consisting of seven members chosen by ballot, and to be continually renewed by the retirement of one of the members every four months. It was to receive the petitions and complaints of prisoners or their families, and to declare whether the detention was just and required by the interest of the State. When such was not the case, if, after having addressed a first, second, and third request to the minister who had ordered the arrest, that minister did not cause the claimed individual to be released, the minister could himself be cited before the imperial high court for violation of personal liberty.

A similar commission, organised in the same manner, was charged to watch over the liberty of the press. It was the first time of this liberty being named in the consular constitutions,

so little was it thought of so shortly after the saturnalia of the press during the Directory. As for the periodical press, it was left under the authority of the police. It was not for it that any interest was expressed. It was only for books that any concern was evinced, they alone being deemed worthy of the liberty that was refused to the journals. They were not to be subjected, as they were before 1789, to the arbitrary power of the police. Every printer or bookseller having any publication restrained by public authority had the power to apply to the senatorial commission charged with this duty; and if, after examining the interdicted or mutilated book, the senatorial committee disapproved of the rigour of the public authority, it made a first, second, and third application to the minister, and after the third, in case of refusal to yield to its repeated opinion, it could cite the minister before the high imperial court.

Thus besides the powers which we have already enumerated, the Senate had the duty of watching over personal liberty and the liberty of the press. These two last guarantees were not without their value. Nothing, it is true, had any instant efficiency under a despotism which was accepted by all. But under the successors of the depository of this despotism, should there be any such, such guarantees could not fail to acquire a real power.

Something in the same direction was done for the organisation of the Legislative Body. The Tribune, as we have observed several times, alone discussed the laws, and after having formed its opinion, deputed three orators to sustain it against three Councillors of State before the mute Legislative Body. This dumbness, corrected, in the opinion of M. Sieyès, by the loquacity of the Tribune, had speedily become absurd in the eyes of a satirical nation, which, though fearing oratory and its excesses, laughed nevertheless at the compulsory silence of its legislators. The dumbness of the Legislative Body had become more ridiculous than ever, since the Tribune, deprived of all vigour, had also become silent. It was determined that the Legislative Body, after having heard the Councillors of State and the members of the Tribune, should retire and discuss in secret committee the bills which had been submitted to it; that there each member could speak, and that then the Legislative Body would resume its public sitting, and vote in the ordinary way by ballot.

The right of speech, then, was restored to the Legislative Body—in secret committee.

The Tribune had become, since the institution of the consulate for life, a sort of Council of State; reduced from that epoch to fifty members, and having acquired the habit of only examining bills in private conference with the Councillors of

State who approved those bills, it received in the new constitution an organisation conformable to the habits it had adopted. It was divided into three sections, the first of legislation, the second of home affairs, the third of finance. It was only to discuss laws in the sections, and never in general assembly. Three orators were to go, in the name of the section, to support its opinion before the Legislative Body. This was definitively to perpetuate by a constitutional regulation the new form which the body had only imposed upon itself in deference.

The term of service of its members was extended from five to ten years, a favour to the individual members, but a restriction of the power of the body itself, by less frequently renewing its spirit.

Finally, to all this was added an institution, necessary alike for the safety of the government and that of the citizens; it was that of a high court, which in England, and now in France, exists in the House of Peers. The want of such a court had been felt in the prosecution of those implicated in the Georges conspiracy, and in the lamentable execution of Vincennes. It would be still more felt under a dictatorial government, whose agents offered only a nominal responsibility, since they could not be summoned before any body of the State. There was not then, as now, the means of summoning them before one of the two chambers. It was very requisite, therefore, to furnish the government with a guarantee against conspiracies, and the citizens against the agents of public authority.

It was desired to give to the institution of this high court the outward advantage which was sought for all the new monarchical institutions, that of adding as much to the liberty of the citizens as to the power of the government. Accordingly, its seat was placed in the Senate, without, however, its being entirely and solely composed of senators. It was to consist of sixty senators, out of a hundred and twenty; of six presidents of the Council of State; of fourteen Councillors of State; of twenty members of the Court of Cassation; of grand officers of the empire; of six grand dignitaries, and of princes having acquired deliberative votes. Its president was to be the high chancellor. It was charged with taking cognisance of plots formed against the security of the State and the person of the emperor; of arbitrary acts imputed to the ministers and their agents; of magisterial derelictions or extortions; of errors imputed to land and sea generals in their commands; of offences committed by members of the imperial family, by grand dignitaries, grand officers, senators, Councillors of State, &c. &c. It thus was not only a court of justice charged with the repression of great crimes, but also a political jurisdiction as to the ministers and the agents of the public authority; a tribunal of

marshals as to generals and admirals; and a court of peers as to the great personages of State. A procureur-general, permanently attached to this extraordinary jurisdiction, had the duty of prosecuting, *ex officio*, in the event of complainants not themselves commencing proceedings.

The only modification made in the ordinary form of justice was the title of *Court* being substituted for that of Tribunal for the tribunals of high rank. The Tribunal of Cassation was to take the title of *Court* of Cassation, and the Tribunals of Appeal were to be called Imperial Courts.

It was determined that an act of deference should once more be made towards the national sovereignty, and that registers in the usual manner should be opened to receive the suffrages of the citizens as to the establishment of the imperial hereditary succession in the male line of Napoleon Bonaparte and his two brothers Joseph and Louis.

The emperor was within the space of two years to take a solemn oath to the constitutions of the empire, in presence of the grand dignitaries, the grand officers, the ministers, the Council of State, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Court of Cassation, the archbishops, the bishops, the presidents of the courts of justice, the presidents of electoral colleges, and the mayors of thirty-six principal towns of the Republic. This oath was to be taken, said the text of the new constitutional act, to the French people, upon the Testament. It was conceived in the following terms: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the empire, to respect and to cause to be respected the laws of the Concordat, and of the liberty of worship; to respect and to cause to be respected the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the national property; to raise no impost and to establish no tax except by virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour, and to govern solely with the view to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."

Such were the conditions adopted for the new monarchy in a draft of a *Senatus Consultum*, written like all the laws of that period in a clear, simple, and precise manner.

This was the third and last transformation undergone by the celebrated constitution of M. Sieyès. We have elsewhere explained what was the idea of that legislator of the French Revolution. The aristocratic system is the haven in which those republics have found shelter which have not ended in despotism. M. Sieyès, perhaps without suspecting it, had sought to pilot into the same port the French Republic, as much disgusted with agitations after ten years as the republics of antiquity and of the middle age were after many centuries; and he had composed his aristocracy of the leading and experienced men of the

Revolution. To this end he had invented a Senate, inactive, but armed with immense influence, electing its own members and those of all the State bodies out of the rarely renewed lists of notables, naming the heads of the government, revoking them, ostracising them at will, taking no part in the making of laws, but having the power to annul them on account of unconstitutionality; in a word, not exercising power, and yet conferring it, and having always the faculty of arresting it. To this he added an equally inactive Legislative Body, which silently admitted or rejected the laws which the Council of State was entrusted to make and the Tribunate to discuss; and lastly, a supreme representative of the executive power, called grand elector, elective, and for life, like a doge, and inactive as a king of England, named by the Senate, and, in his turn, naming the ministers who alone were active and responsible. In this manner M. Sieyès had everywhere separated influence and action; influence, which delegates power, then controls and arrests it; action, which receives and exercises it. He had given the former to an aristocracy indolent and exalted, the latter to elective and responsible agents. He had thus approached a sort of aristocratic monarchy, but still without hereditary succession, resembling Venice rather than Great Britain, and adapted rather to an exhausted country than to a free one.

Unfortunately for the labour of M. Sieyès, beside this aristocracy without root, composed of disabused and unpopularised revolutionists, was a man of genius whom France and Europe called a saviour. There was but small chance of this aristocracy defending itself like that of Venice against usurpation, and still less that in a time of rapid revolutions the struggle could be very long. At the outset, previous to accepting this constitution of M. Sieyès, General Bonaparte arranged his own place in it by making himself First Consul instead of grand elector. Scarcely had he begun to govern when the ill-timed resistance of the Tribunate restraining him from the good that he wished to accomplish, he had crushed them, amid the loud applause of the public, wearied with revolutions, and had himself made Consul for life by the Senate. On the same opportunity he had added the constituent power to the previous powers of the Senate, not fearing to render all-powerful a body that he dominated; he had annihilated the Tribunate by reducing it to fifty members, and by dividing it into sections, which discussed the laws proposed, *tête-à-tête* with the sections of the Council of State. Such was the second transformation of the constitution of M. Sieyès, that which took place in 1802, at the epoch of the consulate for life. A vigorous hand had thus in two years caused that aristocratic Republic to terminate in a sort of aristocratic monarchy, to which nothing more was needed than hereditary succession.

Consequently, many had asked themselves in 1802 why all was not finished at once, and why hereditary succession was not given to this so evident monarch? A conspiracy directed against his life awakening in greater force than ever the desire of more stable institutions had at length brought about the last transformation, and the definitive conversion of the Constitution of the year VIII. into a monarchy, representative in form, absolute in fact. There were almost as many remains of republicanism beside a despotic power as in the empire founded by the Cæsars. It was not representative monarchy such as we now understand it. That Senate, with the faculty of electing all the bodies of the State out of the electoral lists, with its constituent power, with its faculty of annulling the law—that Senate with so much power and yet subject to a master, did not resemble an Upper Chamber. That silent Legislative Body, although speech was restored to it in secret committee, did not resemble a Chamber of Deputies. And yet that Senate, that Legislative Body, that emperor, all might one day have become a representative monarchy. We must not, then, judge of the Constitution of M. Sieyès, altered by Napoleon, by the mute obedience which reigned under the empire. Our Constitution of 1830, with the press and the chambers, would probably not have produced results sensibly different, for the spirit of the times does more than written laws. It would have been necessary to judge of the Imperial Constitution under the following reign. Then opposition, the inevitable sequel of a long submission, would have sprung up even in the Senate, for a long time so docile, but armed with an immense power. It would probably have come to an understanding with the electoral colleges to make choices conformable to the new spirit; it would have broken the fetters of the press; it would have opened the doors and windows of the palace of the Legislative Body, that the voices of its members might be heard afar off. It would have been representative monarchy as we now have it, with this difference, that the resistance would have come from above instead of from below. That is no proof that it would have been less enlightened, less constant, or less courageous. This, however, is a problem which time has borne away without solving, as it has borne away so many others. But those institutions were far from deserving the contempt which has so often been expressed for them. They composed an aristocratic Republic, diverted from its end by a powerful chief, temporarily converted into an absolute monarchy, and destined at a later day to become a constitutional monarchy, strongly aristocratical, it is true, but founded upon the basis of equality; for under it every fortunate soldier might become constable, every able jurisconsult might become arch-chancellor, after the example

of its founder, who became, from a simple officer of artillery, hereditary emperor and ruler of the world.

Such was the work of the constituent committee assembled at St. Cloud. During the last days of its sitting Messieurs Cambacérès and Lebrun had not attended. The altercations that had been provoked by the monarchical zeal of M. Fouché on the one hand, and by the ill-humour of M. Cambacérès on the other, were the cause of the Second and Third Consuls ceasing to be summoned. The wisest and the most prudent of the senators who were included in the committee regretted their absence, and pointed out to Napoleon how important it was to gratify his colleagues by treating them handsomely. He did not require to be advertised of that, for he well knew the value of the Second Consul Cambacérès, appreciated his unostentatious devotedness, and was anxious to attach him to the new monarchy. He therefore sent for him to St. Cloud, entered into a new explanation with him upon the last change, listened to his opinions, stated his own, and terminated the debate by the expression of his will, thenceforth irrevocable. He had determined upon the crown, and he did not conceal it. Moreover, he had a splendid compensation to offer to Messrs. Cambacérès and Lebrun. To the first he destined the dignity of arch-chancellor of the empire, to the second that of arch-treasurer. He treated them precisely as his own brothers, who were to be comprised in the number of the six grand dignitaries. He announced this resolution to M. Cambacérès; to that announcement he added that seductive language which no one at that time resisted, and succeeded in entirely regaining him.

"I am," said he to M. Cambacérès, "and I shall be, more than ever surrounded by intrigues, and by false or interested counsels; you alone will have the judgment and the sincerity to tell me the truth. I wish, then, to bring you closer than ever to my person and to my ear. You will remain with me to possess all my confidence, and to justify it." These compliments were well merited. M. Cambacérès, having nothing more to desire or to fear in that elevated position, would be, and in fact was, the truest and the most influential of the counsellors of the new emperor.

Joseph Bonaparte was named grand elector, Louis Bonaparte constable. The nomination to the two dignities of arch-chancellor of State and high-admiral were deferred. Napoleon still hesitated among the various members of his family. He had thought of Lucien, who was absent and in disgrace, but whose recent marriage there was some hope of dissolving; of Eugene Beauharnais, who solicited nothing, but with a perfect submission awaited all from the tenderness of his adoptive father; of Murat, who solicited, not personally, but through his wife,

who, young, lovely, ambitious, and very dear to Napoleon, availed herself most skilfully of the tenderness he felt for her.

M. de Talleyrand, the principal inventor of the new dignities, experienced on this occasion a first disappointment, which had a very mischievous influence on his disposition, and threw him at a later period into an opposition which was ruinous to himself and troublesome to Napoleon. The post of arch-chancellor of the empire, which had reference to judicial functions, having fallen to the Second Consul Cambacérès, M. de Talleyrand had hoped that the post of arch-chancellor of State, which had reference to the diplomatic functions, would naturally have devolved upon him. But the new emperor expressed himself quite resolutely upon that point. He did not admit the possibility of grand dignitaries being ministers: he would have for the latter only removable and responsible agents, whom he could revoke and punish at will. General Berthier was an instrument fully as valuable to him as M. de Talleyrand. He chose, nevertheless, to leave him minister, like M. de Talleyrand, compensating them both with grand endowments. The pride of M. de Talleyrand was singularly wounded, and though a courtier, still he displayed somewhat of that attitude of a discontented courtier, which he then kept much in control, but which he subsequently kept far less so, thereby incurring some bitter disgraces.

There still remained both in the army and at court posts fitted to satisfy all ambitions. There were four posts of honorary marshals to give to generals who were enjoying repose in the Senate, and sixteen for those who, still full of youth, were still figured at the head of our soldiers. Napoleon reserved the four first-named for Kellerman, in remembrance of Valmy; Lefebvre, for his tried bravery and a devotion which dated from the 18th Brumaire; and Periguin and Serrurier for the respect in which they were deservedly held by the army. Of the sixteen posts of marshals destined for generals in active service, he determined to confer fourteen immediately, and to reserve two as the reward of future merits. These fourteen batons were given to General Jourdan for the splendid achievement at Fleurus; to General Berthier for his eminent and sustained services on the staff; to General Masséna for Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa; to Generals Lannes and Ney for a long series of heroic deeds; to General Augereau for Castiglione; to General Brune for the Helder; to Murat for his chivalric valour at the head of the French cavalry; to General Bessières for the command of the guard which he had had since Marengo, and of which he was worthy; to Generals Moncey and Mortier for their warlike merits; to General Soult for his services in Switzerland, at Genoa, and in the camp of Boulogne; to General

Davoust for his conduct in Egypt, and for a firmness of character of which he shortly afterwards gave brilliant proofs; and finally, to General Bernadotte for a certain renown acquired in the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine, and especially for his relationship, and in spite of an envious hatred that Napoleon had discerned in the heart of that officer, and which already inspired him with a presentiment, often plainly expressed, of a future treason.

A general who had not as yet commanded in chief, but who, like Generals Lannes, Ney, and Soult, had directed considerable corps, and who merited the marshal's baton as much as the officers just mentioned, was not included in the list of the new marshals. The general in question was Gouvion St. Cyr. If he did not equal the warrior's nature and the battlefield glance of Masséna, he surpassed him in science and military combinations. Since Moreau had been lost to France by his misconduct, and since Kléber and Desaix were dead, he or Masséna was the man most capable of commanding an army; Napoleon, be it understood, being above parallel with any one. But the jealous and unsociable character of St. Cyr had begun to procure him the frowns of the supreme dispenser of favour. With sovereign power came its foibles: and Napoleon, who had pardoned Bernadotte his petty treacheries, the presage of a greater one, knew not how to forgive General St. Cyr his disparaging spirit. Nevertheless, General St. Cyr was ranked among the colonels-general, and became colonel-general of the cuirassiers. Junot and Marmont, the faithful aides-de-camp of General Bonaparte, were named colonels-general of hussars and chasseurs, and Baraguay d'Hilliers of dragoons. General Marescot received the post of inspector-general of engineers, and General Sougis that of inspector-general of artillery. In the navy, Vice-Admiral Bruix, the chief and the organiser of the flotilla, obtained the baton of admiral, and was made inspector-general of the coasts of the ocean; and Vice-Admiral Decrès was named inspector-general of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

The court also furnished grand posts for distribution. It was formed with all the pomp of the ancient French monarchy, and with more éclat than the imperial court of Germany. It was to have a grand almoner, a grand chamberlain, a grand huntsman, a grand equerry, a grand master of the ceremonies, and a grand marshal of the palace. The post of grand almoner was given to Cardinal Fesch, uncle of Napoleon, the post of grand chamberlain to M. de Talleyrand, and that of grand huntsman to General Berthier. The court posts bestowed upon the two last-named were intended as a compensation for not having obtained two grand dignities of the empire. The post of grand equerry was granted to M. de Caulaincourt, to avenge him for the

calumnies of the royalists, who had been outrageous against him since the death of the Duc d'Enghien. M. de Ségur, formerly ambassador from Louis XVI. to Catherine, a man eminently calculated to teach the new court the usages of the old one, was named grand master of the ceremonies. Duroc, who had governed the consular, now become the imperial, household, was still to govern it, under the title of grand marshal of the palace.

We shall not mention either the inferior posts or the subaltern aspirants who disputed for them. History has nobler matters to deal with. She only descends to such details when they are important to a faithful painting of manners. We shall only say that the emigrants who, previous to the death of the Duc d'Enghien, tended towards a reconciliation, and after his death had again withdrawn for an instant, but who, forgetful like the rest of the world, already began to think less of a catastrophe two months old, began to figure among the number of aspirants who were eager to find berths at the imperial court. Some of them were admitted. A lady of very old family, Madame de la Rochefoucauld, destitute of beauty but not of wit, distinguished for her education and her manners, formerly a zealous royalist, but who now laughed gracefully enough at her departed opinions, was destined to be principal lady of honour to Josephine.

All these appointments were known before they were announced in the *Moniteur*, published from mouth to mouth amidst the inexhaustible gossip of those who approved and those who disapproved, who had enough to do to express all that they felt at witnessing so singular a spectacle, each applauding or censuring according to his friendships or his enmities, or his pretensions gratified or disappointed, and scarcely any one according to his political opinions; for there were no political opinions then, except among hot-headed royalists or implacable republicans.

To these nominations there was added another, and a far more serious one, that of M. Fouché, who was called to the ministry of police, re-established on his account to recompense him for his services during the recent events.

It was necessary to give to these choices, and to the greatest of them all, that which made a general of the Republic an hereditary monarchy, the character of official acts. The *Senatus Consultum* was agreed upon and drawn up. It was arranged to present it on the 26th Floréal (16th of May 1804) to the Senate, that it might be there decreed in the accustomed form. That presentation having taken place, a commission was immediately appointed to make its report. The drawing up of the report was entrusted to M. de Lapepède, the savant and the

senator most devoted to Napoleon. He had completed it in forty-eight hours, and presented it to the Senate on the 28th Floréal (18th of May). That day was appointed for the solemn proclamation of Napoleon as emperor. It had been decided that the Consul Cambacérès should preside over the sitting of the Senate, that his adhesion to the new monarchical establishment might be the more striking. M. de Lacedépède had scarcely finished his report when the senators, without a single apparent dissent, and by a sort of unanimous acclamation, adopted the *Senatus Consultum* in its entirety. They even evinced a visible impatience during the formalities indispensable to such an act, so eager were they to depart for St. Cloud. It was agreed that the Senate should go in a body to that residence to present its decree to the First Consul, and to salute him as emperor. Scarcely was the adoption of the *Senatus Consultum* terminated ere the senators tumultuously put an end to their sitting and hurried to their carriages, each striving who should be earliest at St. Cloud.

Arrangements had been made at the palace of the Senate, upon the roads, and also at St. Cloud, for this unheard of scene. A long line of carriages, escorted by the cavalry of the guard, conveyed the senators to the residence of the First Consul on a lovely spring day. Napoleon and Josephine, pre-informed, expected this solemn visit. Napoleon, standing in military costume, calm as he well knew how to be when men's gaze was fixed upon him, and his wife at once gratified and agitated, received the Senate, with Cambacérès at its head. He, respectful as a colleague, still more respectful as a subject, bowed low and addressed the following speech to the soldier whom he was about to proclaim emperor:—

“SIRE,—Four years ago the affection and the gratitude of the French people entrusted the reins of government to your majesty, and the constitutions of the State had already left to you the choice of a successor. The more imposing title which is now decreed to you, therefore, is but a tribute that the nation pays to its own dignity and to the necessity it experiences of daily offering you new proofs of its daily increasing respect and attachment.

“How, indeed, can the French people reflect without enthusiasm upon the happiness it has experienced since Providence prompted it to throw itself into your arms?

“Our armies were vanquished, the finances in disorder; public credit was annihilated; the remnants of our ancient splendour were disputed by factions; the ideas of religion, and even of morality, were obscured; the habit of giving and resuming power left the magistrates without consideration.

“Your majesty appeared. You recalled victory to our

standards, you restored order and economy in the public expenditure; the nation, encouraged by the use that you made of them, took confidence in its own resources; your wisdom calmed down the fury of parties; religion saw her altars raised again; finally, and that is doubtless the greatest of the miracles worked by your genius, that people whom civil ferments had rendered indocile to all restraint and inimical to all authority, have been by you taught to cherish and respect a power exercised only for its repose and glory.

“The French people does not pretend to set itself up as a judge of the constitutions of other States; it has no criticism to make, no examples to follow; experience henceforth becomes its lesson.

“For centuries it tasted of the advantages attached to the hereditary succession of power; it has had a short but painful experience of the contrary system; as the effect of a free and mature deliberation, it returns to a régime conformable to its spirit. It freely uses its rights to delegate to your imperial majesty a power that its interest forbids it to exercise for itself. It stipulates for generations yet unborn, and by a solemn compact it entrusts the happiness of its posterity to the scions of your race.

“Happy the nation which after so many troubles finds in its own bosom a man capable of stilling the storms of passion, of conciliating all interests, and of winning the suffrages of all ranks.

“If it be in the principles of our constitution to submit to the sanction of the people the part of the decree which concerns the establishment of an hereditary government, the Senate has deemed that it ought to beseech your imperial majesty to permit that the organic dispositions should forthwith be put in force, and for the glory as well as for the happiness of the Republic, at this very instant the Senate proclaims NAPOLEON EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.”

Scarcely had the arch-chancellor pronounced these words, ere the cry of *Vive l'Empereur* resounded beneath the roofs of the palace of St. Cloud. Heard in the court and gardens, that cry was repeated joyfully and with loud cheers. Confidence and hope beamed in every countenance, and all present, carried away by the exciting scene, felt that they had for a long time secured their happiness and that of France. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, himself carried away, seemed always to have wished for that which at this moment was accomplished.

Silence being restored, the emperor addressed the Senate in the following terms:—

“Everything which can contribute to the weal of the country is essentially connected with my happiness.

"I accept the title, which you believe to be useful to the glory of the nation.

"I submit to the people the sanction of the law of hereditary succession. I hope that France will never repent of the honours with which she shall invest my family.

"At all events, my spirit will no longer be with my posterity on that day when it shall cease to merit the love and confidence of the Grand Nation."

Reiterated acclamations drowned these noble words; then the Senate, through its organ, M. Cambacérès, addressed a few words of congratulation to the empress, who, according to her custom, listened to them with perfect gracefulness, but replied to them only by her deep emotion.

The Senate then retired, after having conferred on that man, born at so vast a distance from the throne, the title of emperor, which he never lost, even after his fall and in exile. We shall designate him henceforth under that title, which was his from the day of which we speak. The will of the nation, so certain that there was something puerile in the care that was taken formally to establish it—the will of the nation was to decide if he should be hereditary emperor. But in the meantime he was Emperor of the French, by the power of the Senate, acting within the limits of its prerogatives.

As the senators retired, Napoleon detained the High-Chancellor Cambacérès, and pressed him to remain to dine with the imperial family. The emperor and the empress overwhelmed him with attentions, and endeavoured to make him forget the distance which henceforth separated him from his former colleague. Sooth to say, the arch-chancellor might readily console himself; in reality he had not at all fallen; only his master had ascended, and had made every one ascend with him.

The emperor and the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès had to converse on some important subjects connected with the events of the day. These were, the ceremony of the coronation and the government to be given to Italy, which could not remain a republic beside France, that had now become a monarchy. Napoleon, who loved the marvellous, had conceived a bold idea, the accomplishment of which would strike men's minds, and render still more extraordinary his accession to the throne; this was, to have himself crowned by the Pope himself, brought from Rome for that purpose. The thing was without precedent in all the eighteen centuries of the Church. All the emperors of Germany, without an exception, had gone to Rome to be crowned. Charlemagne, proclaimed Emperor of the West in the Basilick of St. Peter, in some sort by surprise, on Christmas Day 800, had not seen the Pope leave his abode on his account. Pepin, it is true, was crowned in France by Pope Stephen, but the

latter had repaired to France to ask aid against the Lombards. It was for the first time that a pope was about to quit Rome to consecrate the rights of a new monarch in that monarch's own capital. What resembled the past was, the Church recompensing with the title of emperor the successful warrior who had succoured her; a marvellous resemblance to Charlemagne, and one which abundantly supplied the place of that legitimacy which was so vainly boasted by the Bourbons, and which their defeat, their misconduct, and their co-operation in shameful plots had sunk into disrepute.

Scarcely had Napoleon conceived this idea ere he converted it into an irrevocable resolution, and he promised himself that he would bring Pius VII. to Paris by any means, persuasion or fear. It was one of the most difficult of negotiations, and one in which no one but himself could succeed. He determined to make use of Cardinal Caprara, who had incessantly written to Rome, that but for Napoleon religion would have been lost in France, and perhaps even in Europe. He imparted his project to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and planned with him the method of setting about making the first attack upon the prejudices, the scruples, and the indolence of the Roman court.

As regarded the Italian Republic, it would for two years past have been a scene of confusion but for the presidency of General Bonaparte. In the first place, M. de Melzi, an honourable and tolerably sensible man, but morose, a martyr to gout, constantly on the eve of giving in his resignation as vice-president, and destitute of the firmness to support the heavy cares of government, was a very inefficient representative of the public authority. Murat, commanding the French army in Italy, threw difficulties in the way of the Italian government which greatly added to the chagrin of M. de Melzi. Napoleon was incessantly obliged to interfere to make the two authorities agree. To these personal difficulties were added those which arose out of the state of affairs itself. The Italians, but little moulded as yet to the constitutional régime, which allowed them to participate in their own government, were either of an entire indifference or of an extreme vehemence. To govern there were only the moderates, few in number, and embarrassed with their part, placed as they were among the nobles devoted to Austria, the liberals inclined to Jacobinism, and the masses sensible only to the weight of the imposts. These masses complained of the expenses of the French occupation. *We are governed by foreigners—our money goes across the mountains;* this grief, so common in Italy, was still heard under the new Republic, as it had been under the house of Austria. There was only a small number of enlightened men who felt that,

thanks to General Bonaparte, the greater part of Lombardy, united in a single State, governed in reality by natives, and placed only under an external and distant surveillance, was thus called into a real existence, the commencement of Italian unity; that if it were necessary to pay twenty millions per annum for the French army, that was a very moderate indemnity for the support of an army of thirty or forty thousand men, indispensable if Italy would not return to the yoke of the Austrians. However, notwithstanding the gloomy colours with which the distempered spirit of M. de Melzi charged the picture of Italian affairs, those affairs after all went on peaceably enough, directed as they were by the hand of Napoleon.

To convert that Republic into a monarchy vassal to the empire, and to give it to Joseph, for instance, was to commence that Empire of the West which Napoleon, in his henceforth boundless ambition, already dreamed of; it was to ensure to Italy a more fixed régime; it was probably to gratify her, for she would be delighted to have a prince of her own; and were it only a mere change, it was possible that upon that sole ground it would satisfy unquiet and restless imaginations. It was agreed that the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who was closely connected with M. de Melzi, should write to him and make the fitting overtures upon this subject.

Napoleon, after having agreed with his former colleague upon all that was to be done, sent for the cardinal legate to St. Cloud, and spoke to him in an affectionate tone, but so positively, that it did not enter the mind of the cardinal to venture upon a single objection. Napoleon told him that he charged him expressly to request the Pope to repair to Paris to officiate in the ceremony of the coronation; that he would make a formal demand to the same effect at a future time, when he should be assured that he would not be refused; that, moreover, he did not doubt of the success of his desires; that the Church owed him that success, and owed it also to herself, for nothing would be more serviceable to religion than the presence of the sovereign pontiff in Paris, and the union of religious pomps and civil pomps upon so solemn an occasion. Cardinal Caprara despatched a courier for Rome, and M. de Talleyrand on his side wrote to Cardinal Fesch, to inform him of this new project, and to engage him to support the negotiation.

It was spring. Napoleon would have wished the journey of the Pope to take place in autumn. He proposed for that epoch to add another marvel to that of a Pope crowning at Paris the representative of the French Revolution—this was the expedition to England, which he had postponed on account of the royalist conspiracy and of the institution of the empire, but the preparations for which he had so perfected, that he no

longer entertained a doubt of success. He required but a month at the most, for it was a lightning stroke that he wished to strike. He destined July or August for that grand operation. He hoped, therefore, to have returned victorious, secure of definitive peace, and possessed of European omnipotence towards October, and to be able to be crowned at the commencement of winter, on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire (9th of November 1804). In his ardent imagination he revolved all these projects at once, and it will soon be perceived by the latest combinations he arrived at, that all was not mere phantom here.

The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, on his part, wrote to the Vice-President Melzi about the affairs of the new kingdom of Italy. M. Marescalchi, minister from the Italian Republic at Paris, was also to support the overtures of M. Cambacérès to M. de Melzi.

The following days were employed in taking the oath to the new sovereign of France. All the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunate were introduced in succession. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, standing beside the emperor, who was seated, read the form of the oath; the person admitted then swore, and the emperor, half rising from his imperial chair, slightly saluted him whose homage he had received. This sudden difference introduced into the relations between subjects and a sovereign, who on the previous day was their equal, produced some sensation among the members of the State bodies. After having been in some sort hurried away to bestow the crown, they were surprised at seeing the first consequences of what they had done. The Tribune Carnot, faithful to his promise to submit to the law when once enacted, took the oath with the other members of the Senate. He gave to that act the dignity of obedience to the laws, and even seemed less sensible than others to the changes that had taken place in the outward forms of power. But the senators, especially, perceived them, and more than one satirical dialogue was held upon the subject. One circumstance, especially, contributed to cause these remarks. Of the thirty and odd senatorial appanages instituted at the epoch of the consulate for life, fifteen still remained to be given; those of Agen, Ajaccio, Angers, Besançon, Bourges, Colmar, Dijon, Limoges, Lyons, Montpellier, Nancy, Nismes, Paris, Pau, and Riom. They were given on the 2nd Prairial (May 22nd). Messrs. Lacepède, Kellermann, François de Neufchâteau, and Berthollet were among the favoured. But among a hundred senators, more than eighty of whom were still to be provided for, fifteen gratified did not form a sufficient majority. However, those who had failed in their pursuit of senatorial appanages had other

positions in view, and as yet there was no cause to despair. But in the meantime some ill-humour discovered itself in the language held. The *Moniteur* was daily filled with nominations of chamberlains, equerries, ladies of honour, and ladies in waiting. If the personal greatness of the emperor caused everything that he did to be forgiven, it was not the same with those who rose in his suite. The eager activity of those republicans impatient to become courtiers, of those royalists in haste to serve him whom they had called a usurper, presented a strange spectacle; and if we add to the natural effect of that spectacle the hopes disappointed or deferred, which were avenged in evil speaking, we shall easily comprehend that they must have criticised, satirised, sneered—in a word, gossiped immensely. But the masses, delighted with a government as glorious as it was beneficent, struck with so unheard of a scene, of which they perceived the whole but not the details, the result but not the process, neither knowing nor envying those fortunates of a day who had succeeded in making their children pages, their wives ladies of honour, and themselves prefects of the palace, or chamberlains, the masses were attentive, and seized with a surprise, which ended by changing itself into admiration. Napoleon, from a sub-lieutenant of artillery, become emperor, accepted and welcomed by all Europe, and borne upon the buckler to the throne amidst a profound calm, covered with the splendour of his fortune the littlenesses that were mingled with this prodigious event. There was not experienced, it is true, that sentiment of eagerness which in 1799 had led the alarmed nation to rush towards a saviour; there was no longer experienced that sentiment of gratitude which in 1802 led the delighted nation to decree to its benefactor a perpetuity of power; in a word, men were less eager to pay with gratitude a man who paid himself so largely with his own hands. But men judged him worthy of the hereditary sovereignty; they admired him for having dared to take it, they approved of its being re-established, because it was a more complete return to order; in a word, they were dazzled by the marvel which they looked upon. Accordingly, although with sentiments somewhat different from those which filled their breasts in 1799 and in 1802, the citizens eagerly flocked to all the places at which registers were opened to record their votes. The affirmative suffrages were counted by millions, and scarcely were the few negative suffrages, placed there in proof of the liberty enjoyed, perceptible amidst the immense multitude of favourable votes.

Napoleon had but one last annoyance to encounter previous to being in full possession of his new title. It was necessary to finish the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, which

had in the first instance been engaged in with an extreme confidence. As to Georges and his accomplices, and even as to Pichegru himself had he lived, the difficulty was not great. The trial was sure to cover them with confusion, and prove the participation of the emigrant princes in their plots. But Moreau was included in the cause. It had been expected at the commencement to find more proofs than did in reality exist against him; and although his error was evident to men of good faith, yet the evil-minded were not without the means of disputing it. Moreover, there existed an involuntary sentiment of pity at the aspect of this contrast between the two greatest generals of the Republic; one mounting the throne, the other in a dungeon, and destined not to the scaffold but to exile. All considerations, even of justice, are set aside on such occasions, and men more willingly pronounce the fortunate party in the wrong, even when he is in the right.

Those who were accused with Moreau, by the advice of their defenders, had agreed together to exculpate him altogether. They were greatly irritated against him at the outset of the procedure; but interest overcoming passion, they had promised to save him if possible. In the first place, it was the greatest moral check to give to Napoleon to set his rival free from prison, victorious against the accusation made against him, clad in the colours of innocence, aggrandised by persecution, and henceforth an implacable enemy. Moreover, if Moreau had not conspired, it could be maintained that there had been no conspiracy, if no conspiracy no crime, if no crime no criminals.

The bar, always partial towards the accused, the commonalty of Paris, always independent in its judgment, and willingly opposing when great events did not connect it with power, were impassioned on behalf of Moreau, and expressed their wishes in his favour. Even those who without any ill-will towards Napoleon saw in Moreau only an illustrious and unfortunate warrior, whose services might still be useful, wished that he might come forth innocent from this ordeal, and be restored to the army and to France.

The trial opened on the 28th of May (8th Prairial, year XII.), before a crowded auditory. The accused were numerous, and were ranged on four rows of seats. The bearing of all was not alike. Georges and his band displayed an affected assurance: they felt at their ease, for after all they could call themselves devoted victims of their cause. However, the arrogance of some of them gained them no public favour. Georges, although exalted in the eyes of the crowd by the energy of his character, provoked some cries of indignation. But the unfortunate Moreau, overwhelmed by his very glory, deploring at that moment the celebrity which drew upon him the eager gaze

of the multitude, was deprived of that calm assurance which formed his principal merit in the battlefield. He evidently asked himself what he had to do among those royalists, he who was one of the heroes of the Revolution; and if he did himself justice he could make but one reply, that he had merited his fate by having yielded to the deplorable vice of jealousy. Among those numerous accused the public looked only for him. Some applauses even were heard from old soldiers hidden in the crowd and despairing revolutionists, who imagined that they saw the Revolution itself seated upon that bench where the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine was seated. That curiosity, those homages, embarrassed Moreau. While the others pronounced with emphasis their names, obscure or sadly celebrated, he pronounced his glorious name in so low a tone that he was scarcely audible. Just punishment for having tarnished a splendid reputation!

The trial was tedious. The system of defence which it had been determined to adopt was exactly followed. Georges and Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière had only come to Paris because it had been represented to them that the new government had become wholly unpopular, and the public mind completely favourable to the Bourbons. They did not conceal their attachment to the cause of the legitimate princes, or their inclination to co-operate in a movement if a movement had been possible; but, added they, Moreau, whom intriguers had represented as quite ready to receive the Bourbons, had no thought of doing so, and refused to listen to any of their proposals. From that time they had not even dreamed of conspiring. Georges, interrogated upon the grounds of the project, and confronted with his first declarations, in which he had avowed having come for the purpose of attacking the First Consul on the Malmaison road with a French prince by his side, Georges in confusion replied, that would have been thought of afterwards if an insurrectionary movement had appeared opportune, but that nothing being possible at the moment they had not even occupied themselves about a plan of attack. His attention was directed to the daggers, the uniforms intended for his Chouans, and those Chouans themselves seated beside him on the bench of the accused: he was not precisely disconcerted, but he then became silent, seeming to avow by his silence that the system invented for his co-accused and for Moreau was neither plausible nor dignified.

There was but one point upon which they all remained in conformity with their first declarations; the presence of a French prince in the midst of them. They felt, in fact, that in order not to be classed among assassins it was necessary to be able to say that a prince was at their head. Little mattered it to them

that they compromised the royal dignity ; a Bourbon gave them the appearance of soldiers fighting for the legitimate dynasty. However, when these imprudent Bourbons saved their lives at London without troubling themselves about their unfortunate victims, those victims might well endeavour to save at Paris, if not their lives, at least their honour.

As for Moreau, his system was more specious, for he had never varied. That system he had already exposed to the First Consul in a letter which was unfortunately written too late, a long time after the fruitless interrogatories of the grand judge, and when the government, engaged in the procedure, could not recede without seeming to be afraid of public debate. He admitted having seen Pichegru, but with a view to being reconciled with him, and procuring him the means of returning to France. After the civil troubles were appeased he had deemed that the conqueror of Holland was worth the pains of being restored to the Republic. He had not chosen to see him openly, nor directly to solicit his recall, owing to his own quarrel with the First Consul. The mystery of his proceedings had no other motive. It is true that advantage was taken of this opportunity to speak to him about projects against the government, but he had repulsed them as absurdities. He had not denounced them because he believed them to be without danger, and, moreover, because the occupation of an informer did not become a man like him.

This system, specious enough, if irrefragable evidence had not rendered it inadmissible, gave rise to very animated debates, in which Moreau displayed almost as true a presence of mind as was his wont when the fight was at the fiercest. He even made some noble replies, which were rapturously applauded by the auditory. "Pichegru," said the president to Moreau, "was a traitor, and was even denounced by you to the Directory. How, then, could you think of being reconciled with him and of restoring him to France?" "At a time," replied Moreau, "at a time when the soldiers of Condé swarmed in the saloons of Paris and of the First Consul, I might very well interest myself in restoring to France the conqueror of Holland." On this point he was asked why, under the Directory, he was so tardy in denouncing Pichegru, and some suspicion seemed to be raised even as to his past life. "I cut short," replied he, "the interviews of Pichegru and the Prince of Condé in putting, by the victories of my army, eighty leagues of ground between that prince and the Rhine. The danger being past, I left to the Council of War the care of examining the papers that had been found, and of sending them to the government if it deemed it expedient to do so."

Moreau being questioned as to the nature of the plot to which

it had been proposed to him to associate himself, persisted in affirming that he had repulsed it.

"Yes," it was replied, "you repulsed the proposal to replace the Bourbons upon the throne, but you consented to make use of Pichegru and of Georges to overthrow the consular government, and you did so in the hope of receiving the dictatorship from their hands."

"That," replied Moreau, "is a ridiculous project to attribute to me, that of making use of the royalists in order to make myself dictator, and of supposing that if they were victorious they would entrust the power to me. For ten years I made war, and I am not aware that in all those ten years I was guilty of absurdities."

That noble retort upon his past life was drowned with applause. But all the witnesses were not in the secret of the royalists; all were not prepared to give the lie to their first depositions, and there remained an individual named Roland, formerly in the army, who with grief, but with a persistence that nothing could shake, repeated what he had advanced from the first day. He said that, being the medium of communication between Pichegru and Moreau, the latter had directed him to declare that he would not have the Bourbons, but that if the Consuls were disposed of he would use the power which would inevitably be conferred upon him to serve the conspirators and to restore Pichegru to honours. Others still confirmed the evidence of Roland. Bouvet de Lozier, that officer of Georges who had escaped from suicide to hurl a terrible accusation against Moreau, could not retract it, but repeated it, though with some attempt at weakening it. In that accusation, made in writing, he had stated only the things that he had been told by Georges himself. The latter replied, that Bouvet had imperfectly heard, ill understood, and, consequently, made an incorrect report. But there remained that night interview near the Madeleine, in which Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges were all together, a circumstance irreconcilable with a simple project of restoring Pichegru to France. Why should he give a night meeting to the chief of the conspirators, a man whom no one except a royalist could innocently meet? Here the depositions were so precise, so consistent, and so numerous, that, with the best possible will to do it, the royalists could not contradict what they had formerly said, and when they attempted to do so, they were straightway confounded.

Moreau this time was overwhelmed, and the sympathy of the auditory at length became evidently diminished. However, the clumsy reproaches of the president somewhat awakened that sympathy just as it was becoming extinct. "You are at least guilty of concealment," said the president to Moreau; "and although you pretend that such a man as yourself could not

become an informer, your first duty was to obey the law, which enjoins every citizen, whatsoever or whomsoever he may be, to denounce the plots of which he may have cognisance. You still further owed that to a government which has heaped benefits upon you. Have you not large salaries, a mansion, an estate?"

The reproach was an unworthy one to address to one of the most disinterested generals of the time. "Monsieur le President," replied Moreau, "do not weigh my services against my fortune; there is no possible comparison between such things. My pay amounts to forty thousand francs, I have a house, and an estate worth (to the best of my belief) three or four hundred thousand francs. I should be possessed of fifty millions if I had used victory as so many others have." Radstadt, Biberach, Engen, Mæsskirch, Hohenlinden, those glorious souvenirs weighed against some paltry money aroused the auditory, and called forth those applauses which the improbability of the defence had begun to render unfrequent.

The trial had lasted for twelve days, and the public excitement was very great. In our own time we have often seen a trial entirely absorb the attention of the public. The same thing now occurred, but under circumstances calculated to produce an emotion quite independent of curiosity. Opposed to a triumphant and crowned general, another general in misfortune and in bondage, offering by his defence the last possible resistance to a power that was every day becoming more absolute; amidst the silence of the national assemblies, the voice of the bar resounding as in the most free land; illustrious heads in peril, some of them belonging to the emigration, others to the Republic; here, assuredly, were circumstances to stir men's hearts. People yielded to a just pity, perhaps also to that secret sentiment which wishes for checks to fortunate power; and even those who were not inimical to the government put up their wishes for Moreau. Napoleon, who felt himself exempt from that base jealousy of which he was accused, and who well knew that Moreau without favouring the Bourbons had wished for his death that he might seize his position, believed and openly said that the condemnation of a general guilty of a State crime was due to him, Napoleon. He desired that condemnation as his own justification; he desired it, not to bring to the block the head of the victor of Hohenlinden, but to have the honour of pardoning him. The judges knew this, and the people also.

But the law, which enters not into political considerations, and which is right in not entering into them, since if policy is sometimes humane and wise it sometimes is also cruel and imprudent, the law amidst that conflict of passions, the last

which was to disturb the profound repose of the empire, remained unmoved, and decided with equity.

The 21st Prairial (10th of June), after a trial of fourteen days, while the court had retired to deliberate, certain of the accused royalists perceiving that they had been deceived, and that their efforts to exculpate Moreau had been of no service to them, asked for the juge-instructeur, that they might at length make more explicit declarations to him. They now no more spoke of three interviews with Moreau but of five, and M. Réal being made aware of this hastened to the emperor, who instantly wrote to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès to find some means of communicating with the judges. But that was difficult, and would have been useless, and without having received any new communications they on the same day, the 10th of June, gave a decision which no influence had dictated. They pronounced sentence of death upon Georges and nineteen of his accomplices. As for Moreau, finding his physical complicity insufficiently made out, but his moral conduct reprehensible, they inflicted disgrace upon him by sentencing him to two years' imprisonment. M. Armand de Polignac and M. de Rivière were condemned to death. M. Jules de Polignac and five others of the accused to two years' imprisonment. Twenty-two were acquitted.

This decision, approved of by all impartial men, gave deadly offence to the new emperor, who flew into a violent passion at the weakness of that justice which others were accusing of barbarity. He even broke through that restraint which power should habitually impose upon itself, and especially in so grave a matter. In the state of exasperation into which he was thrown by the unjust reports of his enemies, it was difficult to obtain any acts of clemency from him. But he was so prompt in calming himself, and so clear-sighted, that access was very soon reopened to his reason and to his heart. In the few days employed in appealing to the Court of Cassation he took proper resolutions, remitted Moreau's two years' imprisonment, as he would have remitted him the capital punishment had it been awarded, and consented to his departure for America.

That unfortunate general wishing to sell his property, Napoleon gave orders for it to be immediately purchased at the highest price. As for the condemned royalists, always severe towards them since the last conspiracy, he at first would grant no mercy to any of them. Georges alone, by the energy of his courage, inspired him with some interest, but he looked upon him as an implacable enemy, whom it was necessary to destroy in order to secure public tranquillity. However, it was not for Georges that the emigrant party was anxious. It was greatly so for Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière; it blamed

the imprudence which had placed these personages of exalted rank and superior education in a society so unworthy of them ; but it could not resign itself to see their heads fall ; and it is true that the enthusiasm of party, rightly appreciated, might render their fault excusable and themselves worthy the indulgence even of the head of the empire.

The beneficence of Josephine was proverbial : it was known that, though lapped in unheard of grandeur, she had preserved a truly affecting benignity and kindness of heart. It was also known that she lived in continual terror of the daggers that were constantly raised against her husband. An introduction to her was obtained by means of Madame de Rémusat, who was in personal attendance upon her, and Madame de Polignac was conducted to her at St. Cloud, to bathe the imperial robe with her tears. She was affected, as with so impressionable a heart she could not fail to be, at the sight of a wife in tears nobly soliciting the life of her husband. She hastened to make a first attempt with Napoleon. He, according to his custom, concealing his emotion beneath a harsh and stern countenance, roughly repulsed her. Madame de Rémusat was present.

“ You still interest yourselves for my enemies,” said he to them both ; “ they are all of them as imprudent as they are guilty. If I do not give them a lesson they will begin again, and will be the cause of there being new victims.”

Josephine being thus repulsed, knew not to what other means to have recourse. Napoleon would in a few moments leave the Council Chamber and pass along one of the galleries of the château. She determined to place Madame de Polignac in his way, that she might throw herself at his feet as he appeared. And, in fact, at the moment when he was passing Madame de Polignac presented herself to him, and with tears begged the life of her husband. Napoleon, surprised, darted a stern glance on Josephine, whose complicity he readily guessed. But subdued in the instant, he replied to Madame de Polignac that he was surprised at finding in a plot against his person M. Armand de Polignac, the companion of his boyhood at the military school ; that, however, he would grant his pardon to the tears of a wife ; and that he only trusted this weakness on his part might not have evil effects in encouraging fresh acts of imprudence. “ They are deeply culpable, madame,” added he, “ those princes who thus compromise the lives of their most faithful servants without partaking their perils.”

Madame de Polignac, transported with joy and gratitude, flew to recount amidst her alarmed emigrant friends this scene of clemency, which procured a moment of justice to Napoleon and Josephine. The life of M. de Rivière was still in peril. Murat and his wife sought access to Napoleon, moved him to

compassion, and wrung from him a second act of mercy. The pardon of M. de Polignac involved that of M. de Rivière. It was immediately granted. For the magnanimous Murat eleven years afterwards there were no such generous intercessors.

Such was the termination of that sad, detestable, but blundering scheme which had for its object the annihilation of Napoleon, but resulted in elevating him to the throne; which procured a tragical death to a French prince who had not conspired, and impunity to those who had, although certainly with signal disgrace as the chastisement of their faults; and finally, exile to Moreau, the only general of that period in whom, by exaggerating his glory and lowering that of Napoleon, a rival could be found for the latter. A striking lesson by which parties should profit! To employ criminal means against government, party, or man is ever to aggrandise and not to destroy.

Thenceforth all resistance was vanquished. In 1802 Napoleon had surmounted civil resistance by annulling the Tribunate; in 1804 he surmounted military resistance by baffling the conspiracy of the emigrants with the republican generals. While he ascended the steps of the throne, Moreau retired into exile. They were destined once more to catch a glimpse of each other within cannon-shot under the walls of Dresden, both of them guilty, the one in returning from a foreign land to make war upon his native country; the other in abusing his power so far as to provoke a universal reaction against France; there the one was to be laid low by a French bullet; the other to gain a last victory while tottering on the verge of that abyss which has swallowed up his prodigious destiny.

However, those great events were still distant. Napoleon seemed then all-powerful and for ever. Doubtless he had recently felt some sorrows; for independently of great calamities, Providence ever alloys the joys of prosperity with some anticipative bitterness, as if to warn the human soul and prepare it for startling misfortunes. That fortnight had been trying to him, but it was soon past. The clemency he had shown threw a mild radiance upon his incipient reign. The death of Georges saddened no one, although his courage, worthy of a better fate, inspired some regret. Soon all were absorbed by that wondering curiosity attendant on an extraordinary spectacle.

Thus expired after twelve years' duration, not the French Revolution, still vigorous and indestructible, but that Republic which had been styled imperishable. It expired beneath the hand of a victorious soldier, as all republics do save those which slumber in the arms of oligarchy.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

THE conspiracy of Georges, the proceedings that resulted from it, and the change that it brought about in the form of government, occupied the whole winter of 1803-4, and postponed the grand enterprise of Napoleon against England. But it had not ceased to occupy his mind, and he now with redoubled care and activity prepared for its execution about the middle of the summer of 1804. In truth this delay was by no means to be regretted, for in his impatience to achieve this vast design Napoleon had greatly exaggerated the possibility of being ready at the close of 1803. The continual experiments daily discovered new precautions to be adopted and new improvements to be introduced, and it was but of little consequence to strike six months later if the postponement gave the means of striking a surer blow. It was not the army, be it distinctly understood, that caused this loss of time, for at that epoch the army was always ready for action; it was the flotilla and the naval squadrons. The construction of flat-bottomed boats, and their assemblage in the four channel ports, was all that had been effected. But the Batavian (Dutch) flotilla had not arrived: the Brest and Toulon squadrons, the aid of which was deemed indispensable, were not ready, eight months not having sufficed for their completion. The winter of 1803 had been devoted to completing them. Thus the time apparently lost had been most profitably employed. Above all, the delay had permitted the adoption of financial arrangements, which are always closely connected with military measures, and were more so now than ever. If in exposing oneself to great inconveniences one can succeed in carrying on war on land with but little money by quartering upon the enemy, maritime warfare is not to be carried on without money, for on the immense solitude of ocean nothing is to be had but what we take with us on leaving our own ports. The financial measures, then, were not the least important part of the immense preparations of Napoleon, and they deserve our attention for a moment.

We have related with what resources the struggle had been commenced after the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The

budget of the year XI. (1803), voted with a still uncertain foresight of events, had been fixed at 589 million francs (£23,560,000 sterling), exclusive of the charges of collection, that is to say, at 89 million francs above the budget of the preceding year, which had been squared with 500 million francs. But the expenditure had naturally exceeded the amount sanctioned by the Legislative Body; it had exceeded it by 30 million francs, and had reached 619 million francs. Certainly the excess was not great when we reflect upon the preparations of an expedition like that of Boulogne. This moderation in the increase of the budget is explained by the epoch which separated the financial years. The financial year XI. finished at the 21st of September 1803, and the same day commenced the financial year XII. Accordingly, the principal expenses of the flotilla could not be included in the budget of the year XI. It was thus that they had been able to limit the amount to 619 million francs, which with the charges of collection amounted to about 710 million or 720 million francs. The budget of the year XII. would necessarily be much higher, for it would have to cover all the items which that of the year XI. had left unpaid. This last had been provided for with the ordinary contributions, the produce of which, notwithstanding the war, continued greatly to increase, so great was the security under the wise and vigorous government which then ruled France. The stamp and register duties had increased by 10 million francs, the customs by 6 million or 7 million francs; and notwithstanding an alleviation of 10 million francs in the land tax, the ordinary imposts had risen to 573 million francs. The balance had been found in the 22 million francs of the Italian subsidy, and 24 million francs borrowed from the extraordinary resources, which, as we have said, consisted of the Spanish subsidy, fixed at 4 million francs per month, and of the price of Louisiana, ceded to the United States. These resources, scarcely touched, remained almost entire for the year XII., which was a fortunate circumstance, for all the expenses of the war were about to press at once upon that financial year (September 1803 to September 1804). The expenditure of the year XII. could not be estimated at less than 700 million instead of 619 million francs; making with the costs of collection and some supplemental percentages not included in the estimates a total of 800 million francs. Moreover, in that amount the new civil list was not included. It will be seen that the budgets were rapidly progressing towards the figure which they have since reached.

It was necessary to be prepared for a slight falling off in the revenue of the domains, in consequence of the alienations of the national property, and of the landed endowments conferred

on the Senate, the Legion of Honour, and the Sinking Fund. The ordinary contributions would but little exceed 560 million francs unless through increased production, which was probable enough, but from a scrupulous regard to accuracy this was not relied on. There was required, then, no less a sum than 140 million francs of extraordinary means to provide for the 700 million francs, the supposed amount of expenditure exclusive of the charges of collection and some supplemental percentages. Italy contributed 22 million francs for the three States in which our army did protective duty. The 48 million francs of the Spanish subsidy, the 60 million francs of the American subsidy, reduced to 52 million francs by bankers' charges, made the extraordinary receipts amount in all to 122 million francs. There consequently remained 20 million francs still to be found. The funds deposited as securities by public officers were, as on former occasions, to supply this amount. Securities in money had already been required from the receivers-general, paymasters, receivers of the registry dues, customs, &c. These sums had been paid into the Sinking Fund, which placed the same to the credit of the depositors. The Sinking Fund, in its turn, had handed over the sums to government, which had undertaken to refund them at the rate of 5 million francs per annum. It was a sort of borrowing from the officers of the revenue, perfectly legitimate, since the State was entitled to some security from these persons for their fidelity and good management. This system of securities was susceptible of extension, because there were still revenue officials who had not as yet been subjected to the common rule. In fact, there existed a second category of receivers of the public revenue whose position required regulating: these were the receivers of the direct taxes. Hitherto in the country and in the towns, instead of collectors appointed by the State for collecting the direct taxes, the collection was entrusted to the contractor bidding lowest. This system had been changed in the great towns, where receivers had been permanently appointed as public servants, and were allowed by the treasury a commission on the amount of their collections by way of salary. This new system having answered well, it was proposed for the year 1804 to establish in all the communes, whether urban or rural, receivers nominated by government, and to require from them securities estimated in the whole at 20 million francs. That sum, handed over to the treasury, was to be refunded by the government by instalments, as had been agreed upon for the previous deposits.

To this resource was added the sale of some national property, to be taken from what remained disposable, since endowments had been provided for the Senate, the Legion of Honour,

Public Education, and the Sinking Fund. This afforded a fresh resource of 15 millions for the year XII. over and above the amount deemed to be necessary. This property was made over to the Sinking Fund, which, selling it little by little, procured from day to day better prices. It was agreed that the Sinking Fund should retain the proceeds, in order to repay itself the 5 million francs which were annually due to it by the government in reimbursement of the deposits lent for the public service.

Such were the financial means created for the year XII.: 560 million francs of ordinary contributions; 22 million francs of Italian subsidy, 48 million francs of Spanish subsidy, 52 million francs of the price of Louisiana; 20 million francs of moneys lodged as security, besides several millions from national property. The whole exceeded the 700 million francs deemed to be necessary for that financial year, September 1803 to September 1804.

But they were at the close of the financial year XII., as it was now the summer of 1804. It was necessary to make arrangements for the year XIII. (September 1804 to September 1805), which would not have the benefit of one very considerable item, the American subsidy, which was entirely appropriated to the year XII. It was indispensably necessary to supply this deficiency without delay.

Napoleon had long been convinced that the Revolution, although it had created great resources by equalising taxation, had nevertheless dealt too severely with landed property in throwing upon it alone the burden of public charges by the suppression of indirect taxes. What the Revolution had done is only too common in disturbed times. At the first outbreak the populace, especially that of the towns, take advantage of it to refuse to pay the tax imposed upon articles of consumption, and particularly upon liquors, which constitute its chief enjoyment. This was the case in 1830, when the taxes of this sort were refused during more than six months; in 1815, when the deceptive promise of their suppression obtained for the Bourbons a momentary popularity; and in 1789, when the first popular attacks were directed against the barriers. But these imposts, the most detestable to the populace of the towns, are, nevertheless, those which characterise truly prosperous countries, which really bear more upon the rich than upon the poor, and are the least injurious to production; while taxation imposed upon the land deprives agriculture of capital, of cattle, and manure, impoverishes the soil, and thus dries up the most abundant source of wealth. In the eighteenth century a prejudice found favour, which at the time, it must be confessed, rested on incontestable ground. Landed property, accumulated

in the hands of the aristocracy and the clergy, and unequally taxed according to the rank and quality of its possessor, was an object of aversion to those generous spirits who sought to relieve the poor. It was at that period that they devised the theory of an unique tax, bearing exclusively upon the land, and supplying the entire expenditure of the State. By this means they could suppress the excise and the gabelles, taxes which appeared to press upon the populace alone. But this theory, generous in intention, false in practice, was to fall before experience. Subsequent to 1789, landed property, divided among thousands of hands, and subjected to equal burdens, no longer deserved the animadversion which had formerly been bestowed upon it, and it was necessary, above all, to consider the paramount importance of agriculture. It was to be considered that in burdening it beyond measure the country population was injured and deprived of the means of cultivation to the profit of the sellers and consumers of spirituous liquors. It was to be considered that it was absolutely necessary that the revenues should equal the expenditure as the only safeguard against a recurrence to paper money and bankruptcy, and that to equalise the revenues and the expenditure it was indispensable to vary the sources of taxation in order not to exhaust them. It well became the man who had restored order in France, who had drawn the finance from chaos by re-establishing a regular collection of the direct taxes, to complete his work by re-opening the closed source of the indirect taxes. But for this it required great authority and great energy. Faithful to his character, Napoleon feared not, the very day on which he sought the throne, to re-establish, under the title of Consolidated Taxes, the most unpopular but the most useful of burdens.

He first proposed it to the Council of State, and he there supported the correct view of the question with a marvellous sagacity, as though finance had been the study of his life. To the theory of the unique tax, imposed exclusively upon the land, exacting from the farmer and the landowner the total sum necessary for the wants of the State, or at the least obliging them to advance it even upon the supposition most favourable to them, that of the increased price of agricultural productions compensating them for that advance; to this absurdly exaggerated theory he opposed the true and simple theory of taxation skilfully diversified, resting at once upon all descriptions of property and industry, demanding from no one of them too considerable a portion of the public revenue, producing consequently no compulsory variation of prices, drawing wealth from every channel through which it abundantly flows, and drawing from each in such wise as to exhaust none. This system, the

offspring of time and experience, is open only to one objection : that objection is, that the diversity of impost brings with it a diversity of collection, and consequently an augmentation of expenses ; but it presents so many advantages, and the opposite system is so violent, that this slight augmentation of expense should not be a serious consideration. When he had caused his views to be adopted by the Council of State, Napoleon sent his project to the Legislative Body, where it was not the object of any serious difficulty, owing to the preliminary conferences between the corresponding sections of the Tribunal and of the Council of State. The following were the arrangements :—An establishment was created, under the title of the Board of Consolidated Taxes. That board was to levy the new taxes by means of revenue officers, as they alone were found to be efficient in seeking out taxable commodities in the places where they were grown or manufactured. These commodities consisted of wines, brandy, beer, cider, &c. A uniform and very moderate duty was laid upon their first sale, according to a tariff formed at the epochs of the harvest of manufacture. The amount of the duty was to be paid at the instant of the first removal. The principal commodity taxed, after beverages, was tobacco. There was already a customs duty upon foreign manufactured tobacco, and a manufacture duty upon French tobaccos (for a government monopoly had not yet been devised) ; but the produce of this latter duty was lost to the treasury, in consequence of deficient inspection. The creation of a Board of Consolidated Taxes supplied the means of collecting the whole of this duty, trivial then, but destined to become considerable. Salt was not included in the taxed commodities, from fear of reviving the remembrance of the ancient gabelles. Nevertheless, in Piedmont a Board of Salt Tax was established, which was a measure at once of police and of finance. Piedmont, obtaining its salt at Genoa, or at the mouths of the Po, and being frequently exposed to cruelly high prices by the interested speculations of merchants, had never been able to dispense with the intervention of government. By creating a Board of Salt Tax, charged with purchase and sale at a moderate price, an end was put to the danger of scarcities and dearness, and at the same time there was secured a ready and certain means of collecting a tax which was tolerably productive in the aggregate, though very moderate with reference to the tariff.

These various combinations could not bring anything into the exchequer during the year XII., the year of their creation (1803–4), but they afforded ground for reckoning on 14 or 18 million francs in the year XIII., 30 or 40 million francs in the year XIV., and for the following years amounts difficult

to estimate, but nevertheless presumably sufficient for all the necessities of a war, even a prolonged one.

By means of these arrangements the expenditure of the year XII. (1803-4) would be met by the 700 million francs of ordinary and extraordinary receipts, and certain resources were secured for future years. But still, at the commencement of the system some serious practical difficulties were experienced. The two chief existing resources consisted of the price of Louisiana and the monthly subsidy furnished by Spain. The unavoidable delay occasioned by the vote of the American funds had prevented the payment of that resource into the treasury. However, the firm of Hope & Co. had agreed to advance a portion of it towards the end of 1804. As to Spain, upon the 44 million francs (£1,760,000) due in Floréal for the eleven previous months, she had only discharged in sundry payments about 22 million francs, that is to say, one-half the amount due. The finances of that unfortunate country were more than ever embarrassed, and although the seas were open to her galleons, thanks to the neutrality which France had allowed her, the specie that reached her from America was squandered in idle dissipations.

To supply the place of these deferred payments recourse was had to paper. The English have exchequer bills, and we now possess *bons royaux* payable at three, six, or nine months, which, negotiated on 'Change, constitute a temporary loan, by the aid of which the State is enabled, during a longer or a shorter period, to anticipate the revenues in course of collection. Notwithstanding that Napoleon had laboured hard and successfully in the re-establishment of the finances, the treasury had not yet sufficiently gained the confidence of the commercial world successfully to issue any paper whatever in its own name. The bills of the receivers-general, bearing the acceptance of responsible parties, and repayable at the office of the Sinking Fund in case of protest, had alone obtained confidence. They were, as we have already said, subscribed at the commencement of the financial year to the whole amount of the direct taxes, and successively payable from month to month. The latest were at fifteen or eighteen months' date. In order to realise the revenues of the State in advance, these were discounted in sums of 20 or 30 million francs, at the rate of a half per cent. per month (six per cent. per annum) during the short peace of Amiens, and since the war at three-quarters per cent. per month (nine per cent. per annum). Notwithstanding the confidence that was felt in the government, that confidence was so little shared by the treasury that the most eminent banking houses declined this sort of operations. These discount transactions were gone into by adventurous speculators,

former contractors to the Directory. M. de Marbois, wishing to emancipate himself from their co-operation, applied to the receivers-general themselves, who, having formed themselves into a committee at Paris, discounted their own paper, either with their own funds or with funds which at a lower interest they procured from the hands of the capitalists. But these government officers were limited in their speculations, and possessed neither the requisite capital nor the requisite boldness to furnish the treasury with any great assistance. There were at that time in Paris a banker who was much experienced in this kind of operation, M. Desprez; M. Vanlerberghe, an active contractor, very skilful in the art of provisioning armies; and lastly, one of the most inventive and ingenious of speculators in enterprises of every kind, M. Ouvrard, celebrated at that time for his immense fortune. All three had entered individually into connection with the government, M. Desprez for the discounting of treasury bills; M. Vanlerberghe for the supply of provisions; and M. Ouvrard for all grand operations, whether of provisioning or banking. M. Ouvrard formed a co-partnership with Messrs. Desprez and Vanlerberghe, placed himself at the head of that association, and gradually became, as he had been under the Directory, the principal financial agent of the government. He succeeded in gaining the confidence of M. de Marbois, minister of the treasury, who, feeling his own incompetence, was glad to have the aid of an inventive spirit capable of finding the expedients which he knew not how to find for himself. M. Ouvrard, on behalf of himself and partners, offered to undertake the discounting of the treasury bills. He entered into a first contract in Germinal, year XII (April 1804), by which he undertook to discount not only a considerable amount of the bills of the receivers-general, but even of the subsidy of Spain, who, being unable to pay her subsidy in cash, paid it in bills at long dates. M. Ouvrard made no difficulty about taking these bills for money, and paying over the amount. M. Vanlerberghe and he had claims on the State for heavy sums on account of former contracts. They were now authorised, in discounting the bills of the receivers-general and of Spain, to reckon part of the sums due to them as so much cash. Thus in the very act of discounting they paid themselves with their own hands. Under the firm of Associated Merchants, then, this association began to possess itself of the business of the State. Its origin is worthy of attention, for it soon took part in immense operations, and played a very considerable part in the financial world. To render the operation it had undertaken with the treasury good, and even excellent, it was only requisite that Spain should fulfil her engagements, for the bills of the receivers-

general, composing part of the security, were in the highest degree safe. These bills had only the inconvenience of being long dated, as the treasury employed in its payments those of two or three months' date, and discounted those which were at six, twelve, and fifteen months. But excepting the length of time that they had to run, they were unexceptionably good. As for the bills signed by Spain, their value depended upon the conduct of a sadly imbecile court, and on the arrival of the galleons from America. On this basis M. Ouvrard constructed vast schemes, succeeded in dazzling the credulous mind of M. de Marbois, and set out for Madrid in order to realise his bold conceptions. Napoleon looked with suspicion upon this fecund but rash spirit, and had warned M. de Marbois also to be on his guard. But M. Ouvrard discounted through M. Desprez the treasury bills, and he himself discounted those of Spain, and provisioned the army through M. Vanlerberghe. Thanks to him all necessities were provided for at once, and the evil, if any existed, did not seem likely to extend far, since, after all, M. Ouvrard seemed always in advance to the treasury, and never the treasury to him.

Such were the means employed immediately to provide for all the expenses of the war, without having recourse to loans. The speculators were required to anticipate by means of discounts the receipt of the State revenues, and that of 122 million francs furnished by the allied countries, Italy, America, and Spain. As regarded the future, the long announced creation of indirect taxes, at length decreed this year, would completely provide for it.

Napoleon had resolved very speedily to execute his grand enterprise. He wished to cross the Straits towards the month of July or August 1804; and if the incredulous who have questioned the reality of his project could read his private correspondence with the minister of marine, the infinite number of his orders, and the secret communication of his hopes to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, they would no longer entertain any doubt as to the reality of that extraordinary resolution. All the vessels composing the flotilla were assembled at Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, always excepting those which had been built between Brest and Bayonne, for the sort of craft intended for the assemblage could never have doubled Ushant. But nearly the whole being built between Brest and the mouths of the Scheldt, no considerable number were absent. There were sufficient to convey the hundred and twenty thousand men intended to pass over in the gunboats. The remainder, as will be remembered, were always intended to embark in the fleets of Brest and the Texel.

The Dutch flotilla, built and assembled in the Scheldt, was

behindhand. Napoleon had given the command of it to Admiral Verhuell, who possessed his high esteem, and deserved it. The Dutch, but little zealous, and especially having but little confidence in this singular project, far too bold for their cold and methodical spirit, threw but little ardour into their co-operation. Nevertheless, the zeal of the admiral, and the urgings of our minister at the Hague, M. de Sémonville, had accelerated the armament for which Holland had engaged. A fleet of seven ships of the line, attended by numerous merchantmen, was ready to transport the twenty-four thousand men of the camp of Utrecht, commanded by General Marmont. At the same time, a flotilla, consisting of some hundreds of gunboats and large fishing-boats, had completed its formation in the Scheldt. It remained to leave those moorings and clear the mouth of the Scheldt, which was far more accessible to the enemy than the coasts of France. Admiral Verhuell, personally commanding his detachments, had fought some brilliant battles between the Scheldt and Ostend. Notwithstanding the loss of some boats, five or six at the most, he had baffled all the efforts of the English, and converted the incredulity of the Dutch sailors into confidence. The Dutch flotilla succeeded in the spring of 1804 in assembling at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais, and held itself in readiness to embark the corps of Marshal Davoust, encamped at Bruges. Napoleon would have wished for more; he would have wished that the two flotillas, Dutch and French, united into one in the ports lying to the westward of Cape Grisnez—that is to say, at Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples—should have all had the same wind for departure. An effort was made to gratify his wish by concentrating the encampments of the troops and the stations of the flotillas.

The works of the armament along the coast of Boulogne were finished, the forts constructed, and the basins dug. The troops having completed their task, had now returned to their military exercises. They had acquired a truly admirable discipline and precision of movement; and they presented an army not only inured to war by numerous campaigns and hardened by rude labours, but as perfect in manœuvres as though they had spent whole years upon the parade ground. That army, perhaps the finest that prince or general ever commanded, impatiently expected the arrival of its chieftain, newly raised to the throne. It burned to congratulate him, and to follow him to the theatre of a new and prodigious glory.

Napoleon was no less impatient to join it. But an important question had arisen among the professional men as to whether the gunboats composing the flotilla, *nutshells*, as they were called, could brave the English fleet. Admiral Bruix and Admiral Verhuell had the utmost confidence in those boats.

Both of them had exchanged cannon shots with the English frigates, had gone out of port in all weathers, and had acquired the conviction that these light craft were sufficient for clearing the Strait. Admiral Decrès, inclined to contradict every one, and especially inclined to contradict Admiral Bruix, thought the reverse. Those of our marine officers who were not employed on the flotilla, whether from prejudice or from the ordinary inclination to criticise what we have no part in doing, inclined to the opinion of the minister Decrès. Admiral Ganteaume, transferred from Toulon to Brest, had witnessed an accident which we have mentioned above, and which had caused him much anxiety for the fate of the army and of the emperor, to whom he was sincerely devoted. The sight of a gunboat capsized before his eyes in Brest roadstead, almost keel upwards, had filled him with anxiety, and he had instantly written upon the subject to the minister of marine. That accident, as we have said, was of no importance. The boat had been unskilfully ballasted, the artillery had been ill-arranged, the men were not sufficiently practised, and the ill-distributed weight, added to the confusion of the crew, had led to the shipwreck.

It was not want of stability that Admiral Decrès apprehended. The flotilla of Boulogne, manœuvring for two years in the heaviest squalls, had done away with all uncertainty on that head. But he addressed the following objections to the emperor and to Admiral Bruix.*

“Undoubtedly,” said he, “a twenty-four pound shot has the same force whether discharged from a gunboat or from a ship of the line. It causes the same damage, often even more, when discharged from a slight vessel, which it is difficult to hit, and whose horizontal fire takes effect between wind and water. Add to this the musketry, destructive at a short distance, and the facility for boarding, and the value of the gunboats cannot be doubted. They carry above three thousand guns of large calibre, that is to say, as many as a fleet of from thirty to thirty-five

* The private correspondence of M. Decrès with the emperor, so private that M. Decrès wrote the whole of it with his own hand, is extant in the private archives of the Louvre; it is one of the finest productions of that time, after the correspondence of the emperor. It does equal honour to the patriotism of the minister, to his sound sense, and to the piquant originality of his mind. It contains very precious views upon the organisation of the marine of France: it should be unceasingly studied by seamen and all connected with the administration of the navy. It is in that correspondence that I have been able to study that profound conception of the emperor, and to acquire a new proof of his extraordinary foresight and the certainty of the sincerity of his projects. One of these letters contains Admiral Decrès' opinion of the flotilla, an opinion which at that time was rather suspected than known, for Napoleon ordered every one to observe silence alike upon the strong and upon the weak side of his plans. Operations were not then, as they since have been, decried by the indiscretion of the very agents entrusted with their execution.


sail of the line, a fleet which it is not often easy to assemble. But where have these boats been seen to measure themselves with the large vessels of the English? In but one situation, that is to say, close in shore, in shallows, amidst which those large craft dared not trust themselves to follow an enemy which, numerous though individually weak, was prepared to riddle them with balls. It is similar to an army enclosed in a defile, and assailed from the summit of inaccessible positions by a cloud of adroit and intrepid sharpshooters. But," continued Admiral Decrès, "suppose those gunboats in mid channel, out of reach of shoals and sandbanks, and in presence of ships no longer afraid to bear down upon them; suppose, still further, a stiff breeze, which would render manœuvring easy to the ships and difficult to your gunboats, would not these latter be in danger of being sunk in great numbers by the giants with which they would be obliged to contend?"

"Perhaps," replied Admiral Bruix, "we might lose a hundred boats out of two thousand; but nineteen hundred would pass over, and they would suffice for the ruin of England." "Yes," rejoined Admiral Decrès, "supposing the disaster of the hundred boats not to strike a panic into the crews of the other nineteen hundred; supposing the number of the nineteen hundred should not prove an inevitable cause of confusion, and supposing the officers to preserve their coolness, for hesitation or alarm would be inevitably followed by a general catastrophe."

Attention had also been bestowed upon the hypothesis of a summer's calm or a winter's fog, two equally propitious opportunities, for in a calm the English ships could not bear down upon our boats, in a fog they would be unable to see them, and in both cases their redoubtable encounter would be avoided. But these circumstances, though occurring twice or thrice in every season, would not afford sufficient security. Two tides, that is to say, the space of four and twenty hours, would be required to get out the whole flotilla, ten or twelve hours to cross over, and allowing for the always inevitable loss of time, about forty-eight hours in the whole. Was it not to be apprehended that in this interval of two days a sudden change in the atmosphere might surprise the flotilla in full operation?

The objections of the minister Decrès, then, were very serious. Napoleon drew his answers from his character, his confidence in fortune, and the remembrance of the St. Bernard and of Italy. He said that his most brilliant operations were accomplished in spite of obstacles as great; and that while it was necessary to leave to chance as little as possible, something must be left to it. However, while refuting the objections, he knew how to appreciate them, and this man who by dint of tempting fortune at length forfeited her protection, this man knew how to spare





himself a peril in order to add a chance of success to his plans. Rash in conception, he always evinced consummate prudence in execution. It was in order to meet these objections that he incessantly reflected upon the plan of bringing, by an unexpected manœuvre, a grand fleet into the Channel. If this fleet, only for three days superior to the English force in the Downs, should cover the passage of the flotilla, all obstacles would be at an end. Admiral Decrès confessed that, supposing that case, he had not another objection to raise, and that the vanquished ocean would deliver Great Britain up to our attacks. And if, as was almost certain, our fleet should have the superiority for more than two days (for intelligence could not be rapidly enough conveyed to the English fleet which blockaded Brest to enable it immediately to join that which observed Boulogne), there would be time enough for the flotilla to make the passage several times, to take over fresh troops left in the camps, where, too, ten or fifteen thousand horses and considerable additional baggage, ammunition, and artillery were waiting for the means of transport. The mass of force would then be so great that all resistance on the part of England would be impossible.

Prodigious results, therefore, depended upon the sudden arrival of a fleet in the Channel. For this an unexpected combination was requisite, such as the English could not baffle. Fortunately the old British admiralty, especially powerful by its traditions and its *esprit de corps*, could not compete in invention with a prodigious genius, constantly reflecting on the same subject, and free from the necessity of consulting with a collective administration.

Napoleon had at Brest a fleet of eighteen vessels, which was very soon to be increased to twenty-one; one of five at Rochefort, one of five at Ferrol, a ship lying for safety at Cadiz, and finally, eight vessels at Toulon, which were about to be increased to ten. Nelson with his squadron was cruising off the isles of Hyères to observe Toulon. Such was the state of the respective forces, such the field which presented itself to the combinations of Napoleon. His idea was to steal away one of his fleets and send it unexpectedly into the Channel, in order to be superior there for some days to the English. When he proposed to act in the winter, that is to say, in the preceding February, he had thought of sending the Brest fleet to the coast of Ireland, to land there the 15,000 or 20,000 men on board it, and to cause it then suddenly to appear in the Channel. This bold plan had no chance of success except in winter, as at that season the continual blockade of Brest being impracticable, advantage could be taken of bad weather to put to sea. But in summer the presence of the English was so constant that it was impossible to get out without a battle, and vessels

encumbered with troops looking upon the sea for the first time, opposed to vessels exercised by a long cruise, and but lightly laden, would run great risks unless immensely superior in point of numbers. At that time of year the facilities for getting out were greater on the side of Toulon. In June and July strong north-westerly breezes, frequently blowing, would oblige the English to seek shelter in Corsica or Sardinia. A squadron availing itself of such an occurrence could set sail at the close of day, make twenty leagues in a night, deceive Nelson by making false route, and by inspiring him with fears for the East probably draw him towards the mouths of the Nile, for since Napoleon had escaped him in 1798 Nelson was constantly engrossed with the possibility of the French throwing an army into Egypt, and he was unwilling to be taken off his guard a second time. Napoleon determined to entrust the Toulon fleet to the most daring of his admirals, Latouche-Tréville, to compose it of ten ships of the line and several frigates, and to form a camp in the neighbourhood in order to awaken the idea of a new expedition to Egypt; to embark, in reality, only a few troops, and to send this fleet out during a north-westerly breeze, assigning to it the following route. It was first to sail towards Sicily, then bearing to the westward to steer for the Straits of Gibraltar, pass them, pick up on the way the frigate *l'Aigle*, which had taken refuge at Cadiz, avoid Ferrol, whither Nelson would probably be tempted to hurry when he should learn that the French had passed the Straits, enter the Gulf of Gascony to rally the French division of Rochefort, and finally lying-to on the south of the Serlingueser to the north of Brest, profit by the first favourable breeze to pass into the Channel. This fleet, ten sail of the line strong at its departure, reinforced with six others during its cruise, and numbering sixteen on its arrival, ought to be sufficiently numerous to command the Strait of Calais for several days. To deceive Nelson was quite possible, for that great seaman, full of the genius of battle, had not always a perfectly correct judgment, and, moreover, his mind was continually disturbed with the remembrance of Egypt. To avoid Ferrol in order to reach Rochefort, to rally the squadron which lay there, was also very practicable. The most difficult was to penetrate into the Channel, and pass between the English squadron which guarded the coasts of Ireland and the fleet of Admiral Cornwallis which blockaded Brest. But the squadron of Ganteaume, always kept ready for sailing, with all its people embarked, could not fail strongly to attract the attention of Cornwallis, and to compel him to keep close up to the mouth of Brest. If the latter, abandoning the blockade of Brest, should hasten after Latouche-Tréville, Ganteaume would instantly sail out, and one of the two French fleets, perhaps both

of them, would be sure to arrive before Boulogne. It was almost impossible for the English admiralty to divine such a combination and guard against it. A point of departure so distant as that of Toulon ought less than any other to give alarm for the Channel. Moreover, in fitting out the flotilla in such a manner as that it could suffice for itself, all idea of external assistance was banished, and the vigilance of the enemy put to sleep. Thus, then, everything was combined for the success of this scientific manoeuvre, which could only occur to the mind of a man conceiving and acting alone, keeping his secret well, and perpetually thinking of the same thing.*

"If," said M. Decrès to the emperor, "you would entrust a grand design to a man, it is necessary that you should first see him, speak to him, and animate him with your genius. This is especially necessary with our marine officers, demoralised by our maritime reverses, always ready to die like heroes, but thinking less of conquering than of falling nobly." Napoleon, in consequence, sent for Latouche-Tréville, who had just previously returned from St. Domingo. That officer had neither the range of mind nor the organising spirit of Admiral Bruix, but in execution he displayed a boldness and a ready perception which would, probably, have made him, had he lived, the rival of Nelson. He was not discouraged like others, his companions-in-arms, but was ready to attempt any enterprise. Unfortunately he had contracted at St. Domingo the seeds of a disease of which many brave men had already died, and even more died subsequently. Napoleon unfolded to him his plan, made its feasibility palpable to him, disclosed to him the grandeur, the immense consequences of it, and succeeded in infusing into the admiral's soul the ardour which transported his own. Latouche-Tréville, full of enthusiasm, quitted Paris before he had recovered his health, and went to superintend the equipment of his squadron. All was calculated for the execution of the project in July, or at the latest in August.

Admiral Ganteaume, who preceded Latouche in the command at Toulon, was transferred to Brest. The emperor relied upon the devotion of Ganteaume, and was much attached to him. Nevertheless, he did not think him enterprising enough to be entrusted with his important manoeuvre. But though inferior to Admiral Bruix with respect to capacity, and to Admiral Latouche as to audacity, he preferred him to all others for courage and experience. He had, therefore, confided to him the Brest squadron, which was probably destined to throw troops into Ireland, and had charged him to complete its

* This was the first conception of Napoleon. We shall hereafter see that it was frequently modified according to the circumstances under which it was necessary to act.

equipment, that it might be in a state to co-operate with that of Toulon.

The fleet, however, was behindhand, owing to the unheard of efforts that had been made for the equipment of the flotilla. Since that had been ready, all the means of the marine had again been devoted to the equipment of the squadrons. They were working hard in the ports of Antwerp, Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon. Napoleon had said that he would have a hundred ships of the line in two years, and twenty-five out of that hundred at Antwerp; that it was in that port that he placed his hopes of effecting the restoration of the French navy, and that he should, besides, find in that system of vast naval constructions a means of employing the idle hands in the ports. But the consumption of materials, the encumbered state of the dockyards, and also the inadequate number of the workmen, retarded the execution of the emperor's grand designs. Scarcely any vessels were put upon the stocks at Antwerp, both the men and the materials having been employed at Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne to supply the unceasing necessities of the flotilla. At Brest only the eighteenth vessel was equipped; at Rochefort the fifth. At Ferrol the poverty of the Spanish resources delayed the refitting of the division sheltered in that port. At Toulon there were only eight ships fit for instant service, and yet the winter had been most actively employed. Napoleon urged his minister of marine, Decrès, and left him no repose.*

He had even given orders that they should work by torch-

* The following are two letters from the emperor to the admirals, which show the energy of will with which he busied himself with the restoration of the French navy:—

“To the Minister of Marine.

“SAINT CLOUD, 21st of April 1804 (1st Floréal, Year XII.).

“It appears to me to be very desirable that an imposing ceremony should mark the laying of the first stone of the arsenal of Antwerp; but it seems to me no less desirable not to destroy the building on the pretext of regularity. It is sufficient to build nothing contrary to the general plan of regularity. Insensibly the rest will be established. When we have to destroy, we destroy what is irregular; but I must repeat to you what I lately said, that I cannot feel satisfied with the works at Antwerp, seeing that there is but one ship on the stocks, and five hundred workmen. I should desire that before the 1st Messidor there should be at least three seventy-fours on the stocks, that before the 1st Vendémiaire, year XIII., there should be six, and before the 1st Nivôse, nine; and all this cannot be done with the small number of workmen you have there. There are many unemployed workmen in Provence, and there will be many more at Bayonne and Bordeaux; therefore collect three thousand workmen at Antwerp. Stores from the north, wood, iron, everything easily reaches there. If we were three years at war, we ought still to build twenty-five vessels there. Everywhere else this is impossible. We want a navy, and we cannot be considered to have one till we have a hundred ships. We must have them in five years. If, as I think, ships can be built at Havre, two must be put on the stocks there. Two new ones must

light, that the ten ships intended for Latouche should be equipped in good time. Sailors were no less wanted than materials and workmen. Admirals Ganteaume at Brest, Ville-neuve at Rochefort, Gourdon at Ferrol, and Latouche at Toulon, complained of being shorthanded. Napoleon, after many experiments, was confirmed in his idea of supplying the deficiencies of the crews by young soldiers picked from the regiments, who, being exercised at the guns and at upon-deck manœuvres, would advantageously complete the manning of the ships. Admiral Ganteaume had already tried that measure at Brest, and had found it answer well. He bestowed great praise upon these sailors borrowed from the land service, and especially for their services at the guns. Only he requested not to have formed

also be begun at Rochefort, and two more at Toulon ; the four last-mentioned should, I think, be three-deckers.

“I should also wish to keep an eye upon the port of Dunkirk. I beg that you will send me a note of the depth of the water there at low tide.

“The flotilla will soon be complete everywhere. It is necessary, therefore, to find employment for that host of workmen at Nantes, Bordeaux, Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, &c. We must consequently begin building frigates, brigs, and tenders. It is necessary as a matter of public spirit that the workmen on the coast be not allowed to die of hunger, and that the seaward departments, which have been the least friendly to the Revolution, be made to perceive that the time approaches when the sea will also be our domain. St. Domingo cost us two millions per month ; the English have taken it ; we must apply the two millions per month solely to shipbuilding. My intention is to have the same activity in that as for the flotilla, only, as we are not hurried, business will be carried on with stricter order. I am in no hurry for the completion, but I require the commencement of a great deal.

“I beg you to let me have, next week, a report from which I can ascertain the present condition of our marine, of what we are building, of what we require to build, and in what ports, and what will be the monthly cost, setting out from the principle that I should prefer your taking eighteen months to build each ship, so that I have by one-third the greater number.

“As to the ships, I would construct them on the same plan, the frigates on the model of the *Hortense* or the *Cornelie*, which seem good ; for the ships take the best ships, and build ships of eighty, and of three decks, everywhere except at Antwerp, *where it appears to me to be prudent to commence in the first instance with seventy-fours.*”

“To the Minister of Marine.

“SAINT CLOUD, 28th of April 1804 (8th Floréal, Year XII.).

“I this day sign a decree relative to the constructions. I will admit of no sort of excuse. Let me have an account twice a week of the orders that you give, and see to their execution ; if any extraordinary measures are required, let me know. I will not admit any excuse to be valid, for with a good administration I would build thirty vessels of the line in France in a year, if that were necessary. In a country like France we ought to be able to do whatever we will. It will not have escaped you that I intend to commence numerous constructions, except at Brest, where I do not intend to build any longer. My intention is to have afloat before Vendémiaire, year XIV., twenty-six ships of war : of course their being afloat at that time will depend upon whether we are previously at peace. But henceforth all seventy-fours should be built at Antwerp. Our principal building-yard should be at Antwerp. It is there only that in a few years the French navy can be restored.

“Before the year XV. we ought to have a hundred ships of war.”

soldiers sent to him, who unwillingly submitted to a second training, but young conscripts, who, having nothing to unlearn, were more apt in learning what it was desired to teach them, and showed themselves more docile. However, they were taken on trial, and only those retained who showed an inclination for the sea. By this means the total number of seamen was augmented by a fourth or a fifth.

France had then about forty-five thousand seamen fit for service; fifteen thousand in the flotilla, twelve thousand at Brest, from four to five thousand between Lorient and Rochefort, four thousand between Ferrol and Cadiz, and about eight thousand at Toulon, without reckoning some thousands in India. To this total force, twelve or perhaps fifteen thousand men could be added, which would carry the number of men embarked up to sixty thousand. The Brest fleet alone had received an addition of four thousand conscripts. They were much praised. If such squadrons could have sailed for some time under good officers, they would speedily have equalled the English squadrons. But blockaded in the ports, they had no sea practice; and, moreover, the admirals were without that confidence which is only acquired by victory. However, everything progressed under the influence of a powerful will, which exerted itself to restore confidence to those who had lost it. Admiral Latouche left nothing undone at Toulon to be ready in July or August. Admiral Ganteaume sailed out of Brest, and returned to train his crews a little, and to keep the English in continued doubt as to his actual intentions. By dint of threatening them with a sortie he would inspire them with an incredulity, of which he would some day take advantage.

Napoleon required a still further supplement to his naval force, and wished to appropriate to that purpose the marine of Genoa. He considered that, with a squadron of seven or eight ships of the line and some frigates in that port, he would divide the attention of the English between Toulon and Genoa, and oblige them to keep a double fleet of observation in that sea, or else to leave one of the two ports free while blockading the other. He ordered M. Salicetti, our minister at Genoa, to conclude with that Republic a treaty, by which she should give up to us her dockyards for the building of ten frigates and the same number of ships of the line. France, in return, engaged to receive into her navy a number of officers proportioned to that force, with pay equal to that of the French officers. Further, she undertook to enrol six thousand Genoese sailors, whom the Ligurian Republic, on her part, undertook to hold in constant readiness. On the conclusion of peace France was to grant her flag to the Genoese, which would secure her French protection, very serviceable against the States of Barbary.

All the arrangements of Napoleon were now concluded, and it was necessary for him to set out. But he chose previously to receive the ambassadors charged to present him with their new credentials, in which he was styled emperor. The Pope's nuncio, the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, and the ministers of Prussia, Holland, Denmark, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Wurtemberg, Hesse, and Switzerland, presented themselves to him on Sunday, the 8th of July (19th Messidor), with the forms adopted by all courts, delivered him their credentials, and treated him for the first time as a crowned sovereign. The ambassador from the court of Vienna, with which a negotiation was still in progress relative to the imperial title for the house of Austria; the ambassador of the court of Russia, with which France had quarrelled on account of the note addressed to Ratisbon; and finally, the ambassador of England, with which power we were at war, were alone absent from this assemblage. It may be said that, Great Britain excepted, Napoleon was recognised by all Europe, for Austria was about to execute a formal act of recognition; Russia regretted what she had done, and only required an explanation which should save her dignity to recognise the imperial title of the Bonaparte family.

Some days later the decorations of the Legion of Honour were distributed. Although this institution was decreed two years earlier, its organisation had required considerable time, and was now scarcely finished. Napoleon in person distributed those grand decorations to the first civil and military personages of the empire in the church of the Invalides, a monument for which he had an especial affection. He had not as yet exchanged the order of the Legion of Honour against foreign orders; but in the absence of those exchanges which he proposed to make, in order to place in every respect his new monarchy on an equal footing with others, he in the very middle of the ceremony called the Cardinal Caprara to his side, and detaching from his own breast the order of the Legion of Honour, he gave it to that old and respectable cardinal, who was profoundly affected by so marked a distinction. He also commenced with the Pope's representative the affiliation to an order which, all recent as it was, was speedily to be coveted by all Europe.

Endeavouring to render serious even the things apparently most vain, he sent the cross of grand-officer to Admiral Latouche-Tréville. "I have named you," he wrote to him, "grand-officer of the empire and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to such a degree of consideration and honour as shall leave you nothing

to wish for. Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world." * (2nd of July 1804.)

Wholly occupied with his grand projects, the emperor set out for Boulogne, after having delegated to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, in addition to the ordinary care of presiding over the Council of State and the Senate, the power to exercise the supreme authority should that be necessary. The arch-chan-

* The following is the entire letter :—

"By my courier, on his return, let me know on what day, wind and weather permitting, you will be able to sail; let me know what the enemy has done and where Nelson is.

"Meditate upon the grand enterprise with which you are entrusted, and before I sign your final orders let me know the manner in which you think that they will be most advantageously fulfilled.

"I have named you grand-officer and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to a degree of consideration and honour which shall leave you nothing to desire.

"The squadron of Rochefort, consisting of five vessels, one a three-decker, and four frigates, is ready to weigh anchor; she has but five of the enemy's vessels against her.

"The Brest squadron consists of twenty-one vessels. These vessels weigh anchor to harass Admiral Cornwallis, and oblige the English to have a greater number of vessels on that station. The enemy keep also six vessels in front of the Texel to blockade the Dutch squadron, consisting of fifty-one ships of the line, four frigates, and a convoy of eighty sail.

"General Marmont's army is embarked.

"Among Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, two new ports that I had constructed, we have 270 gunboats, 534 gun-brigs, 396 pinnaces, in all 1200 vessels, carrying 120,000 men and 10,000 horses. Let us be masters of the Strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world.

"The enemy have in the Downs, or before Boulogne, and before Ostend, two seventy-fours, three of sixty or sixty-four, and two or three of fifty. Hitherto, Cornwallis has only fifteen ships; but all the reserves of Plymouth and Portsmouth have come to reinforce him. The enemy have also at Cork, in Ireland, four or five ships of war. I do not speak of frigates and smaller craft, of which they have a great number.

"If you deceive Nelson, he will go to Sicily, or to Egypt, or to Ferrol. I do not think he will fail to present himself before Ferrol. Of five vessels which are in those parts, four are ready, as the fifth will be in Fructidor. But I think that Ferrol is too plainly pointed out; and it is so natural for the enemy to suppose if your Mediterranean force enter the ocean that it is intended to raise the blockade of Ferrol! It would appear better, then, to take a wide berth to make Rochefort, which will complete you a squadron of sixteen ships of the line and of eleven frigates, and then, without losing a moment, without letting go an anchor, whether in doubling Ireland, keeping well out to sea, or in executing the first plan, to arrive before Boulogne. Our Brest squadron of twenty-three sail will have an army on board, and will be daily ready to sail, so that Cornwallis will be obliged to hug the coast of Brittany to endeavour to oppose its sortie.

"For the rest, I await, ere I determine upon this operation, which has some hazards, but of which the success offers such immense results, the plan that you have promised me by the return of the courier.

"You should embark as much provisions as possible, in order that under any circumstances you may not be straitened for anything.

"At the end of the month a new ship will be launched at Rochefort and at Lorient. That of Rochefort we need say nothing about, but should that of Lorient be in the road and unable to join before your appearance at the Isle of Aix, I wish to know if you think that you should make your course to

cellor was the only personage in the empire in whom he had sufficient confidence to delegate to him such an extent of prerogatives. He arrived on the 20th of July at Pont de Briques, and immediately proceeded to the port of Boulogne to inspect the flotilla and the various works which he had ordered. The two armies, sea and land, welcomed him with transports of joy, and saluted his presence with unanimous acclamations. Nine hundred discharges of cannon from the forts and the line of broadsides, resounding from Calais to Dover, apprised the English of the presence of that man who for eighteen months past had so deeply disturbed the accustomed security of their isle.

Napoleon, embarking on the instant, in spite of a stormy sea, would visit the stone forts of la Crèche and of l'Heurt, as well as the wooden fort placed between the two first, all destined, as we have said, to cover the line of boats. He had some shots fired under his own eyes, in order to ascertain if the instructions he had given for obtaining the longest possible ranges had been duly followed. He then put out to sea, and within cannon-shot distance of the English squadron witnessed the manœuvring of several divisions of the flotilla, of which Admiral Bruix had constantly boasted the improvement. He returned highly pleased, after having lavished testimonies of satisfaction upon the chiefs, both naval and military, who under his supreme direction had contributed to this prodigious creation.

The following and the succeeding days he visited all the camps from Etaples to Calais; then returned to the interior to inspect the cavalry, which was encamped at some distance from the coasts; and, above all, the splendid division of grenadiers, organised by General Junot in the environs of Arras. That division consisted of companies of grenadiers picked from the regiments which were not destined to make part of the expedition. There was not a finer corps for the choice and beauty of the men. It far surpassed even the consular guard, now become the imperial guard. It comprised ten battalions of 800 men each. With these grenadiers the reform of the military head-dress had been commenced. They wore shakos instead of hats, and short hair, unpowdered, instead of the

pick her up; at all events, I think that going out with a good north-wester, it is above everything preferable to execute the operation before winter; for in bad weather it would be possible for you to have more chances of arriving, but no less so that there might be many days such as would render it impossible to profit by your arrival.

"Supposing that you can set sail before the 10th Thermidor (10th of July), it is improbable that you should not arrive before Boulogne in the course of September, a time when the nights are already reasonably long, and the weather not bad for any length of time."

former long and powdered hair, which was at once inconvenient and uncleanly. Inured to warfare by numerous campaigns, and manœuvring with unequalled precision, they were animated by that pride which gives its greatest strength to a *corps d'élite*, and presented a division of about 8000 men which no European corps of even twice or thrice their number would have ventured to oppose. It was these grenadiers whom Napoleon intended first to throw upon the shores of England, making them cross in the light pinnaces which we have elsewhere described. On beholding their bearing, their discipline, and their enthusiasm, Napoleon felt his confidence redoubled, and he doubted not that he should enter London, and there conquer the sceptre of the earth and the trident of the ocean.

Having returned to the coast, he resolved to inspect the flotilla, boat by boat, to see if his orders had been strictly attended to, and if it were possible at the first signal to embark with the requisite rapidity all that had been got together in the magazines of Boulogne. He found things exactly to his wishes. It required some days to embark the heavy matériel, but when that was once got on board, which should be done several weeks previous to the expedition, the horses, men, and field artillery could be embarked on the flotilla in three or four hours. All was not yet ready, however. Some divisions were behind from Havre to Boulogne. The guard-boats especially, under command of Captain Daugier, had not yet arrived. The Dutch flotilla, too, caused Napoleon more than one difficulty. He was to the highest degree satisfied with Admiral Verhuell, but the equipment of a part of that flotilla was not finished, whether from a lack of zeal on the part of the Dutch government, or, which is more probable, from the very nature of things. The two first divisions were assembled at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais; the third had not left the Scheldt. There remained another element of success which Napoleon exerted himself to secure; it was to assemble the entire Dutch fleet in the ports situated to the west of Cape Grisnez by uniting more compactly in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples. The two flotillas would thus sail at the same time, and with the same wind, at three or four leagues distance from each other. But there are two things which are expended in grand operations with a rapidity, and to an extent, which always go far beyond the notions of matter-of-fact persons, time and money. Arrived at the commencement of August, Napoleon saw that he could not be entirely prepared before the month of September, and caused an intimation to be given to Admiral Latouche that the expedition was deferred for a month. He consoled himself for that delay by considering that the month would be employed in getting better prepared

than he at that moment was; and that the season, moreover, being still sufficiently fine in the course of September, there would be the advantage of longer nights.*

In the meantime he determined to give the army a grand fête, calculated to raise the spirits of the troops, if it were possible. He had distributed the grand decorations of the Legion of Honour to the principal personages of the empire in the church of the Invalides, on the anniversary of the 14th of July. He now proposed, personally, to distribute to the army the crosses which were to be given in exchange for the suppressed arms of honour, and to celebrate that ceremony on his birthday, on the very brink of the ocean, and in the presence of the English squadrons. The result answered his wishes, and it was a magnificent spectacle, long remembered by all who witnessed it.

He selected a spot situated to the right of Boulogne, on the high land, not far from the column which has since been erected in that part. This spot, having the form of a semi-circular amphitheatre that had been designedly constructed on the brink of the ocean, seemed to have been prepared by Nature for some grand national spectacle. There was space enough to allow the whole army to be drawn up there. In the centre of that amphitheatre a throne was erected for the emperor, with its front to the land and its back to the sea. To the right and left of it benches were put up to accommodate the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and the marshals. In prolongation of these two wings, detachments of the imperial guard were to be drawn out. In front, on the slope of this natural amphitheatre, were to be ranged, as formerly the Roman people were in their vast arenas, the various corps of the army, formed in closed columns, and disposed in rays terminating at the throne as their common centre. At the head of each of these columns was to be the infantry, and at the rear the cavalry, overlooking the infantry from the whole height of their horses.

On the 16th of August, the morrow of Saint Napoleon, the

* The following is the text of the new order :—

“To the Minister of Marine.

“14th Thermidor, Year XII. (2nd August 1804).

“I wish you to despatch a courier-extraordinary to Toulon, to make known to General Latouche that different divisions of the flotilla having been unable to join, I have come to the conclusion that the delay of a month cannot but be advantageous, especially as we shall then have longer nights, but that it is my intention that he avail himself of this delay to add the ship *Berwick* to the squadron; that all possible means be used to bring about that result; that a ship more or less is no unimportant consideration, as it will bring the squadron up to eighteen ships.

“I also wish the orders to be renewed for fitting out the *Algésiras* with all speed at Lorient. She must be in the road on the 10th Fructidor.”

troops repaired to the scene of the fête, through the streams of an immense population that hurried from all the neighbouring provinces to be present at this spectacle. A hundred thousand men, almost all of whom were veterans of the Republic, with their eyes fixed upon Napoleon, awaited the recompense of their exploits. Those soldiers and officers who were to receive the crosses had left the ranks, and had advanced to the foot of the imperial throne. Napoleon, standing up, read to them the noble formula of the oath of the Legion of Honour, and then altogether, and accompanied by martial music and the reports of artillery, they responded, "WE SWEAR IT!" Then for several hours they in succession came forward to receive those crosses which were to replace nobility of birth. Gentlemen of the oldest lineage ascended the steps of the throne side by side with simple peasants, no less delighted than these were to obtain the distinctions awarded to courage, and all promising to shed their blood upon the shores of England to secure to their country and to the man who governed it the undisputed empire of the world.

This magnificent spectacle thrilled all hearts, and an unforeseen circumstance occurred to render it profoundly serious. A division of the flotilla which had recently left Havre entered Boulogne at this moment in heavy weather, and exchanging a smart cannonade with the English. From time to time Napoleon quitted the throne to direct his telescope upon the fight, and observe how his seamen and soldiers bore themselves in presence of the enemy.

Such scenes could not but be productive of great agitation in England. The British press, arrogant and insulting as the press ever is in free countries, jested very much upon Napoleon and his preparations, but jested like a jester who trembles at that which he affects to laugh at. The immense preparations which had been made for the defence of England agitated the country without completely reassuring men acquainted with the art of war. We have seen that, regretting that she had not a great army almost as much as France regretted that she had not a powerful navy, England had wished by means of a *corps de reserve* to augment her military force. A part of the men who were drawn by the ballot to serve in the reserve had passed into the line, which was thus increased to about 170,000 men. To this force were joined local militia corps, indefinite in number, who were only bound to serve in the provinces; and finally, 150,000 volunteers, who presented themselves in the three kingdoms, and who displayed great zeal in submitting themselves to military training. As many as 300,000 volunteers were spoken of, but there was not in reality above half that number in actual preparation for service. The most eminent

personages in England, in order to give an impulse to the public spirit, had assumed the uniform of the volunteers. Messrs. Pitt and Addington alike wore it. The levy, *en masse*, which had been decreed on paper, was not actually carried into effect.

Making the usual allowance for defalcations, England had to oppose to us 100,000 or 120,000 regular troops of excellent quality, militias without organisation, and 150,000 volunteers without experience, having inferior officers, and no general; the whole distributed in Ireland and England, and dispersed upon those points of the coast at which danger was apprehended. Of regular troops and volunteers, 70,000 men were reckoned to be in Ireland, leaving from 180,000 to 200,000 men of troops of the line and volunteers for Scotland and England. Even with the art of moving masses of men, which only Napoleon at that time possessed, it was as much as could have been done to get 80,000 or 90,000 men of these forces together at the place of danger. And what could even double their number have done against the 150,000 perfect soldiers that Napoleon could throw across the Strait? The ocean was England's true defence. The English had 100,000 sailors, 89 ships of the line distributed over every sea, a score of fifty gun ships, and 132 frigates, besides a proportionate number of vessels on the stocks or in the docks. Like Napoleon, perfecting their preparations with time, they had created sea *fencibles*, in imitation of the land *fencibles*. Under this title they had assembled all the fishermen and seamen not liable to the ordinary impressment, and these to the number of about 20,000 were distributed along the coast in boats, forming a continual guard independently of the advanced guard of frigates, brigs, and corvettes which extended from the Scheldt to the Somme. Night signals and carriages adapted for conveying troops by post completed that system of precaution which we have described elsewhere, and which had been still further perfected in the course of the fifteen months which had elapsed since its commencement. Further, entrenchments had been thrown up, and in the Thames there was a line of frigates connected together by iron chains, capable of opposing a continuous and solid obstacle to all vessels. From Dover to the Isle of Wight every approachable point of the shore was crowned with artillery.

The expense of these preparations, and the confusion which resulted from them, were immense. Men's minds, excited as they very naturally were in presence of a threatened invasion, deemed nothing good, nothing sufficiently reassuring, and with a weak ministry whose capacity every one felt entitled to dispute, there was no moral authority which could repress the rage for censuring and suggesting. Every measure that was proposed was pronounced to be trivial, bad, or not sufficiently

strong, and something else was suggested in its stead. Mr. Pitt, who had for some time been reserved, now ceased to be so, encouraged as he was by the general outcry. He bitterly blamed the measures of ministers, either because he considered the time to have arrived for overthrowing them, or because he really deemed their measures of precaution insufficient or badly calculated. It is at the least certain that his objections were better founded than those of other members of the opposition. He reproached the ministers for not having anticipated and prevented the concentration of the flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne, to the number, according to him, of above a thousand at the lowest. Although he sought rather to exaggerate than to conceal the actual danger, he was below the truth, for including the Dutch flotilla the number was 2300. He attributed this error to the ignorance of the Admiralty, which had not been able to foresee the use that might be made of gunboats, and which had employed ships and frigates in shallows where those large craft could not follow the small vessels of the French. He maintained that with some hundreds of gunboats, supported at a distance by frigates, the preparations of the French might be combated with equal weapons, and their immense armament destroyed ere it could be assembled in the Channel. The reproach was specious, at least, if it were not well founded.

The ministers replied, that during the last war an attempt had been made to employ gunboats, and that they could not hold to the wind. This proved that the English seamen had applied themselves less than the French seamen to handling this sort of craft, for our boats had sailed in all weather. Sometimes they had grounded in shallows, but with the exception of the accident which happened at Brest, not one had been lost owing to faulty construction.

Mr. Pitt, agreeing neither with the opinion of Mr. Wyndham, his former colleague, nor with that of Mr. Fox, his new ally, upon the insufficiency of the regular army, and perceiving the difficulty of instantly and at pleasure extending the proportions of an army, especially in a country which would not resort to the conscription, Mr. Pitt complained that greater use had not been made of the volunteers. He maintained that if these 150,000 English had been heartily made use of, and made to acquire that degree of training and discipline of which they were capable, they would have been rendered far less inferior than they actually were to the regular troops. This reproach, well or ill founded, was as specious as the former one.

Mr. Pitt maintained these opinions with great warmth. In proportion as he became more strongly engaged with the opposition he approached, if not in opinions and feelings, at least in conduct, to the old Whig opposition, that is to say, to Mr. Fox.

The two adversaries, who had combated each other for twenty-five years, now seemed to be reconciled, and there was a report in circulation that they were about to form a coalition ministry, the old majority being broken up. It has already been shown that a small part of that majority had followed Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville into opposition. A still larger part had joined them since Mr. Pitt had raised his standard. This Tory opposition consisted of all who thought that the existing ministry was incapable of making head against the circumstances, and that it was necessary to have recourse to the old leader of the war party. On the other hand, the old Whig opposition, headed by Mr. Fox, though it had sustained some losses, such as those of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan, who were said to have joined Mr. Addington, had been singularly increased by a court occurrence. The intellect of the king appeared to be affected again, and the approaching regency of the Prince of Wales was announced. Now that prince, who had formerly quarrelled with Mr. Pitt, and recently with Mr. Addington, was greatly attached to Mr. Fox, and it was supposed would make him prime minister. Thence a certain number of members of the House of Commons, acting under his influence, had swelled the party of Mr. Fox. The two oppositions, united and augmented, the one by the demonstrations of Mr. Pitt, the other by the anticipated success of Mr. Fox, almost counterbalanced the majority of the Addington ministry.

Several successive votes speedily proved the seriousness of this state of things for the cabinet. In the month of March Mr. Pitt had brought forward a motion for an account of the comparative state of the English navy in 1797, in 1801, and in 1803. Supported by the friends of Mr. Fox, he had succeeded in getting 130 votes for his motion against 201. The ministry, then, had only a majority of 70 votes, and on comparing that vote with previous votes one could not but be struck with the progress made by the opposition. Success encouraging the new allies, they pressed forward with new motions. In April Mr. Fox moved that all measures adopted for the defence of the nation since the renewal of the war should be referred to a committee. This was only another method of submitting to the judgment of Parliament the conduct and capacity of the Addington administration. This time the majority was still further diminished. The opposition mustered 204 votes and the ministers 256, which reduced to 52 the former majority of 70. This majority became daily weaker, and in the month of May a third motion was announced, which would place the ministry in an actual minority, when Lord Hawkesbury declared, in terms too clear to be misunderstood, that this motion was needless, as the cabinet was about to resign.

The old king, who liked Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury very much, and Mr. Pitt very little, nevertheless ended by summoning the last-named. That celebrated and all-powerful personage, so long our enemy, then resumed the reins of State, with the task of sustaining if possible the threatened fortune of England. On returning to the ministry he had left out his old friends, Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and his recent ally, Mr. Fox. He was reproached with his double breach of faith, of which very different explanations were given. The apparently true one was, that he was unwilling to have Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville as being too violent Tories, and that the king was unwilling to have Mr. Fox as being too decidedly a Whig. Mr. Pitt was accused of not having on this occasion made sufficient effort to overrule George III. It appeared to be the general wish, looking to the dangers with which the country was threatened, that the two ablest statesmen of England should unite their talents to give greater vigour and stability to the government.

Mr. Pitt, however, exercised so much influence on public opinion, he had so long enjoyed personal confidence, that he alone was sufficient to re-establish power. On entering the ministry he immediately demanded £2,400,000 of secret service money. It was maintained that he wanted this money to renew the connection of England with the continent; for he was rightly looked upon as the fittest of all ministers to re-establish those coalitions, by the great respect in which he was held by the courts inimical to France.

Such were the events that occurred in England while Napoleon assumed the imperial crown and repaired to Boulogne to make preparations for forcing the barrier of the ocean. It seemed as though Providence had brought these two men again upon the stage to strive once more against each other, and with more fierceness and violence than ever, Mr. Pitt in forming coalitions, which he well knew how to do, and Napoleon in destroying them at the edge of the sword, which he knew how to do still better. Napoleon was indifferent enough to what was passing on the other side of the Strait. He smiled at the military preparations of the English still more sincerely than the English journalists jeered at his flat-bottomed boats. He asked but one boon of Heaven, that but for eight and forty hours he might have a fleet in the Channel, in which case he undertook to have his own way full speedily with all the armies that could be assembled between Dover and London. The ministerial changes in England would only have affected him had they placed Mr. Fox in office. Believing in that statesman's sincerity, and in his friendly feelings towards France, he would in that case have been led to turn from ideas of an obstinate warfare to those of

peace and even of alliance. But the appointment of Mr. Pitt, on the contrary, strengthened him in the opinion that it was necessary to end with some bold and desperate stroke, in which the two nations would stake their very existence. At the same time a demand of 60 millions of secret service money, which was only explicable on the supposition of some secret proceedings on the continent, could not fail to excite his attention. He saw that Austria was very tardy in sending new credentials, and very far from being frank at Ratisbon in the affair of the Russian note. Finally, he had received from M. d'Oubril the reply of the cabinet of St. Petersburg to the despatch in which he had alluded to the death of Paul I. That reply of Russia appeared to him to indicate some ulterior project. With his usual sagacity, Napoleon already perceived the commencement of a coalition in Europe; he complained to M. de Talleyrand of his credulity, and of his complaisance to the two Messrs. de Cobentzel, and he added, that at the first doubt as to the dispositions of the continent he would throw himself, not upon England, but upon that power which should cause his anxiety; for he was not, he said, sufficiently infatuated to cross the Channel if he were not entirely secure on the side of the Rhine. It was thus that he wrote from Boulogne to M. de Talleyrand, pointing out to him the necessity of urging Austria and Russia to explain themselves, when a sudden and ever to be regretted incident occurred, inevitably to put an end to his uncertainties, and to compel him to defer till some months later his projects of descent.

The brave and unfortunate Latouche-Tréville, a prey to an incompletely cured malady, and to an ardour which he could not control, died in the port of Toulon on the 20th of August, and when on the very eve of sailing. Napoleon received this melancholy intelligence at Boulogne towards the end of August 1804, at the moment when, prepared to embark, he was struck with some presentiment of a European coalition, and tempted at times to direct his blows elsewhere than upon London. The Toulon fleet having lost its commander, it was unavoidably necessary to postpone the English expedition; for to select and appoint a new admiral, send him to his squadron, and give him time to become acquainted with it, all this would require more than a month. Now, it was the end of August; this, then, would lead to the month of October for the departure from Toulon, and to that of November for the arrival in the Channel. It would then be a winter campaign to make, and that would require new arrangements.

Napoleon immediately cast about for a man to be appointed in the room of Admiral Latouche. "There is not a moment to be lost," wrote he to the minister Decrès, "in sending an admiral

competent to command the Toulon squadron. It cannot be worse placed than it is now in the hands of Dumanoir, who is not capable of maintaining discipline in so large a squadron, or of manœuvring it. It appears to me that for the Toulon squadron there are but three competent men—Bruix, Villeneuve, or Rossily. You can sound Bruix. I have great confidence in Rossily, but he has done nothing during fifteen years. However, the matter is so urgent that something must be done.” (28th of August 1804.)

From this time he perceived that the naval and military establishment that he had formed at Boulogne would be less temporary than he had at first imagined, and he busied himself on the spot in simplifying its organisation, to render it less expensive, and at the same time to add to its perfection in manœuvring. “The flotilla,” he wrote to the minister Decrès, “has hitherto been looked upon as a mere expedition; henceforth it must be looked upon as a fixed establishment, and from this moment the greatest attention must be paid to that part of it which is to be permanent, in regulating it by other rules than the squadron.” (18th of September 1804, 23rd Fructidor, year XII.)

He simplified, in fact, the administrative machinery, suppressed many double employments arising out of the connection of the land and sea forces, revised all the appointments, in a word, employed himself in rendering the Boulogne flotilla a separate establishment, which, being maintained at the lowest possible cost, could be kept up as long as war lasted, and could still exist even should the army for a time have to quit the coasts of the Channel.

He also resolved upon the formation of escadrilles, to give a greater degree of order to the movements of these 2300 boats. The following was the division that was finally resolved on: nine boats or gunboats formed a section, and carried a battalion; two of these sections formed a division, and carried a regiment. The pinnaces, accommodating only half as many people, were to be double in number. The division of pinnaces was composed of four sections, or thirty-six pinnaces instead of eighteen, in order to take on board a regiment of two battalions. Several divisions of boats, gunboats, and pinnaces formed an escadrille, and were to carry several regiments, that is to say, a *corps d'armée*. To each escadrille were added a certain number of those fishing-boats or coasters which had been got ready for the embarkation of the cavalry horses and the heavy baggage. The whole flotilla was divided into eight escadrilles, two at Etaples for the corps of Marshal Ney, four at Boulogne for the corps of Marshal Soult, two at Vimereux for the advanced guard and reserve. The port of Ambleteuse, in the new plan which there had been

time to mature, was devoted to the Dutch flotilla, which was to carry the corps of Marshal Davoust. Each escadrille was commanded by a superior officer, and independently manœuvred at sea, though combined in the unity of operations. In this wise, the arrangements of the flotilla were completely adapted to those of the army.

In the meanwhile, Admiral Decrès sent for Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy to offer them the vacant commands. Deeming Bruix indispensable at Boulogne, and Rossily as too long unaccustomed to the sea, he looked upon Villeneuve as the fittest to command the Toulon squadron, and Missiessy that of Rochefort, which Villeneuve would leave vacant. Admiral Villeneuve, whose name is surrounded by an unfortunate celebrity, was a man of ability, courage, and practical acquaintance with his profession, but he had no firmness of character. Susceptible to the highest degree, he was apt to exaggerate beyond bounds the difficulties that presented themselves, and to sink into that state of depression which leaves no command of either head or heart. Admiral Missiessy, less able, but cooler, was but little given to elation, but as little to depression. Admiral Decrès sent for them both, and endeavoured to reason them out of that discouragement which had seized not upon the sailors and officers, who were all animated with a noble ardour, but upon the commanders-in-chief of our fleets, who had to risk in every battle that renown which they prized above life. Decrès caused Admiral Missiessy to accept the command of the Rochefort squadron, and Admiral Villeneuve to accept that of the Toulon squadron. Towards the latter he bore a friendship which dated from their early childhood. To him he entrusted the emperor's secret, and the immense operation to which the Toulon squadron was destined. He excited his imagination by pointing out the grand object that was to be achieved, and the great honours that were thereby to be obtained. Deplorable endeavours of an old friendship! This momentary excitement was to give place with Villeneuve to a fatal depression, and to inflict the most sanguinary reverses upon our navy.

The minister hastened to transmit an account to the emperor of the result of his conferences with Villeneuve, and of the effect produced upon that officer by the perspectives of danger and glory which he had laid open to him.*

Napoleon, who well understood men, did not expect much from the substitute of Admiral Latouche. Constantly reflecting

* We quote the letter of Admiral Decrès, for it is important to understand the appointment of the man who lost the battle of Trafalgar.

"Sire (wrote Decrès), Vice-Admiral Villeneuve and Rear-Admiral Missiessy are here.

"I have spoken to the first about the grand project. . . .

"He listened coldly, and was silent for some instants. Then with a calm

upon his project, he again modified and extended it in accordance with the circumstances which had occurred. The winter had restored freedom of movement to the Brest fleet by interrupting the continuance of the blockade. Although Ganteaume had failed in decision in 1801, he nevertheless had on more than one occasion displayed both courage and devotion, and Napoleon determined to entrust him with the most dashing and difficult part of his plan. He postponed the expedition until after the 18th Brumaire (9th of November), the epoch appointed for the coronation, and he resolved to send Ganteaume out at that rough season with fifteen or eighteen thousand men destined for Ireland; then, when that admiral should have landed those men on some accessible point of the island, to have him speedily back into the Channel, there to protect the crossing of the flotilla. In this modified plan Admirals Missiessy and Villeneuve were entrusted with quite a different part from that which was assigned to the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons when Latouche-Tréville had the command. Admiral Villeneuve, setting out from Toulon, was to sail for America, to reconquer the Dutch colonies of Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. A division, detached from Villeneuve's squadron, was to take the island of St. Helena *en passant*. Admiral Missiessy had orders to throw a reinforcement of from three to four thousand men into our Antilles, then to ravage the English Antilles, taking them by surprise, and almost undefended. The two admirals then joining company to return to Europe, had for their last instructions to raise the blockade of the squadron at Ferrol, and to return to Rochefort to the number

smile he said: 'I expected to hear something of the sort, *but to be approved, such projects must be achieved.*'

"I literally transcribe his reply in a private conversation, because it will depict to you more vividly than I can the effect which the offer produced upon him. He added: '*I will not lose four hours in rallying the first; with the five others and my own I shall be strong enough. It is necessary to be fortunate, and to ascertain how far I am so I must be enterprising.*'

"We spoke of the course. He agrees with your majesty as to that. He only dwelt upon the unfavourable sufficiently to show me that he was not going blindly to work. Nothing of the kind affected his courage.

"The appointments of grand-officer and vice-admiral have made a new man of him. The ideas of danger are effaced from his mind by the hope of glory, and he ended by saying, '*I embark in it with heart and soul,*' and this with a tone and gesture cool and decided.

"He will set out for Toulon as soon as your majesty shall have made me aware whether there are any further orders for him.

"Rear-Admiral Missiessy is more reserved with me; he asks to remain here for a week; he has an extreme coolness, but less defined. I have heard that he was offended that your majesty had not given him the Mediterranean squadron. He is so because he is not vice-admiral. His great argument among his intimates is this, that not having been employed during the war he has had no failures! I have given him orders to go and take the command of the squadron, and I reckon upon his being *en route* within a week. It will take him five or six days to reach his destination."

of twenty sail. They were ordered to sail before Ganteaume, in order that the English, being informed of their departure, might be induced to pursue them. Napoleon desired that Villeneuve might sail from Toulon on the 12th of October, Missiessy from Rochefort on the 1st of November, and Ganteaume from Brest on the 22nd of December 1804. He deemed it certain that the twenty sail of Villeneuve and Missiessy would draw fifty sail at least beyond the European seas; for the English, being suddenly attacked in all quarters, could not fail to send succour everywhere. It was then probable that Admiral Ganteaume would have sufficient freedom of movement to execute the operation entrusted to him, which consisted, after having touched at Ireland, of presenting himself before Boulogne, either by doubling Scotland or by sailing directly from Ireland into the Channel.

All his orders being given from Boulogne itself, where he was then located, Napoleon wished to avail himself of the time which still remained to him before winter to clear up the affairs of the continent. Directing the course of M. de Talleyrand by a daily correspondence, he prescribed to him the diplomatic measures which were calculated to lead to that end.

The reader will doubtless recollect the imprudent note of the cabinet of Russia on the subject of the violation of the Germanic soil, and the bitter reply of the French cabinet. The young Alexander had deeply felt that reply, and had perceived, but too late, that the manner in which he had come to his throne had deprived him of all right to give such lofty lessons of morality to other governments. He was humiliated and alarmed at this. The soul of Alexander was rather quick than firm. He willingly threw himself forward, and then as willingly drew back when he perceived danger. It was without consulting his ministers that he went into mourning for the Duc d'Enghien, and it was in opposition to a portion of them that he had sent to Ratisbon the note of which we have made mention. Nevertheless, they had the greatest difficulty in keeping him in his first resolutions. The prudent men of St. Petersburg, when the first excitement was gone by, perceived that too little judgment had been shown in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, and they blamed first the young men who governed the empire, and among those young men the Prince Czartoryski above all, because he was a Pole, and entrusted with the ministry of foreign affairs since the retirement to the country of the Chancellor Woronzoff. Nothing could be more unjust than this censure as regarded the Prince Czartoryski, for he had made all the resistance that he could to the vivacities of the court; but he was now desirous that the evil should be repaired without sacrifice of dignity. He consequently had directed M. d'Oubril, chargé d'affaires at Paris, to complain

in a note, at once firm and moderate, of the manner in which the French cabinet had thought fit to refer to certain reminiscences ; to show pacific inclinations, but to require a reply upon the three or four usual subjects of Russian remonstrance, such as the occupation of Naples, the still deferred indemnity of the King of Piedmont, and the invasion of Hanover. M. d'Oubril had orders, should he obtain even only a specious explanation on those points, to content himself with it, and to remain at Paris, but to take his passports should he be met by an obstinate and disdainful silence.

Prussia, which, to use the expression of Napoleon, *continually struggled between two giants*, being informed of the precise situation of the Russian cabinet, had communicated it to M. de Talleyrand through her minister, Lucchesini, and had said to him : "Defer the reply as long as possible ; then give a reply which will furnish the dignity of Russia with a seeming satisfaction, and this northern tempest, with which it is sought to alarm Europe, will be stilled."

These various communications having arrived at Paris while Napoleon was at Boulogne, M. de Talleyrand had had recourse to that procrastinating policy in which it has been seen that he was an adept. Napoleon had willingly acquiesced in it, neither seeking nor fearing war with the continent, and rather desiring to terminate all by a direct expedition against England. He therefore continued his preparations at Boulogne, leaving M. d'Oubril, in the meantime, in suspense at Paris. Nevertheless, M. de Talleyrand, not attaching sufficient importance to the Russian note, and taking too literally the intention of Prussia, had too readily trusted that all difficulty could be escaped from by delays. M. d'Oubril, after having waited through the whole month of August, had at length required a reply. Napoleon, wearied with M. d'Oubril's questions, and, moreover, inclined to come to a categorical explanation with the continental powers since the return of Mr. Pitt to power, desired that a reply should be made. He had himself sent the form of the note that was to be transmitted to M. d'Oubril, and M. de Talleyrand, according to his custom, had done his utmost to soften it, both as to form and substance. But, such as he transmitted it, the note was little calculated to spare the dignity of the Russian cabinet, which was unhappily involved.

This note opposed to the wrongs charged against France the wrongs which were chargeable against Russia. Russia, it argued, ought to have no troops at Corfu, yet she was daily augmenting the number of her forces there. She ought to have refused all favour to the enemies of France, and she had not confined herself to giving shelter to emigrants ; she had still further bestowed upon them public functions at foreign courts. That was a

positive violation of the last treaty. Moreover, the Russian agents everywhere showed themselves hostile. Such a state of things precluded all idea of intimacy, and rendered impossible that concert which had been agreed upon between the two cabinets in conducting the affairs of Italy and Germany. As for the occupation of Hanover and Naples, that had been an inevitable consequence of the war. If Russia had engaged to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English, the cause of the war being then removed, the countries occupied by France would have been instantly evacuated. But to endeavour to press upon France, without endeavouring equally to press upon England, was neither just nor becoming. If Russia pretended to constitute herself the arbitress between the two belligerent powers, to judge not only of the grounds of the quarrel but also of the means employed to decide it, the arbitration should be both impartial and firm. France was determined to accept no other. If war was wished for, she was quite ready for it, for, after all, the late campaigns of Russia in the west did not warrant her in assuming towards France so lofty a tone as that which she now appeared to take. It was necessary that they should distinctly understand that the Emperor of the French was not the Emperor of Turks or of Persians. If, on the contrary, there was a desire to come to a better understanding with him, he was quite disposed to that; and then he assuredly would not refuse to do what had been promised, especially as regarded the King of Sardinia; but in the present state of relations nothing could be obtained from him, for, as regarded him, threatening was the most inefficacious of all means.

This lofty note scarcely left M. d'Oubril any pretext for declaring himself satisfied. It was the consequence of the levities of his cabinet which, now wishing with reference to Naples and to Hanover to constitute itself judge of the means of war employed by the belligerent powers, and anon wishing to interfere as to some interior act like that of the death of the Duc d'Enghien, had laid itself open to having only unsatisfactory answers upon all the points upon which it touched. On consulting his instructions, M. d'Oubril deemed that it was his duty to demand his passports; but that he might act in precise conformity to his instructions, he added that his departure was a simple interruption of diplomatic connections between the two courts, but not a declaration of war; that when those connections were no longer either useful or agreeable, there was no reason for continuing them; that, for the rest, Russia had no intention of resorting to arms; and that it was the French cabinet that would decide, by its posterior course of action, whether war was to follow this interruption of diplomatic relations.

M. d'Oubril, after this cold and yet pacific declaration, left Paris. Orders were sent to M. de Rayneval, who continued at St. Petersburg as chargé d'affaires, to return to France. M. d'Oubril set out at the end of August, and stopped some days at Mayence to await the news of a free departure being permitted to M. de Rayneval.

It was evident that Russia, while endeavouring to evince its displeasure by the interruption of its relations with France, would nevertheless not resort to war unless a new European coalition should furnish her with an advantageous opportunity of doing so. All, consequently, in Napoleon's opinion, depended upon Austria. He put her, therefore, to close proof, that he might know what he had to expect previous to giving himself up altogether to his maritime projects. The recognition of the imperial title that he had assumed being still withheld, he peremptorily demanded it. His intention of visiting the banks of the Rhine would shortly take him to Aix-la-Chapelle, and he required that M. de Cobentzel should pay his respects and deliver his credentials in that very city in which the Germanic emperors were accustomed to take the crown of Charlemagne. He declared that if satisfaction were not given him in this respect, M. de Champagny, who had been named minister of the interior in the room of M. Chaptal, who had been called to the Senate, should have no successor appointed to him at Vienna, and that a withdrawal of ambassadors between powers so closely neighbouring as France and Austria would not pass over so pacifically as between France and Russia. Finally, he required that the Russian note, already avoided at Ratisbon by an adjournment, but the fate of which would shortly have to be decided on, should be finally rejected, or, he repeated, he would address to the Diet such a reply as must inevitably give rise to war.

All this being done, Napoleon quitted Boulogne, where he had passed six weeks, and proceeded towards the departments of the Rhine. Before setting out he had the opportunity of witnessing a battle between the flotilla and the English division. On the 26th of August (8th Fructidor, year XII.), at two o'clock in the afternoon, he was in the roadstead inspecting the line of the flotilla, consisting as usual of from 150 to 200 boats and pinnaces. The English squadron, moored at a distance from the shore, consisted of two ships of the line, two frigates, seven corvettes, six brigs, two luggers, and one cutter, in all twenty sail. A corvette, detaching herself from the main body of the enemy's division, placed herself at the end of our line of broadsides to reconnoitre it, and to discharge some broadsides at it. The admiral on this gave orders to the first division of gunboats, under the command of Captain Leray, to weigh anchor

and bear down altogether upon the corvette; the order was executed, and the corvette was obliged to retire immediately. Seeing this, the English formed a detachment, consisting of one frigate, several corvettes or brigs, and the cutter, to compel our gunboats to retire in their turn, and to prevent them from regaining their usual position. The emperor, who was in his barge with Admiral Bruix, the ministers of war and marine, and several marshals, went into the midst of the boats that were fighting, and to give them the example had his barge steered right for the frigate, which was advancing full sail. He knew that the sailors and soldiers, who admired his daring when ashore, sometimes asked each other whether he would be as daring on the sea. He wished to enlighten them on that head, and to accustom them carelessly to attack the great vessels of the enemy. He had his barge put well ahead of the French line, and as near as possible to the frigate. She, seeing the imperial barge, dressed out in colours, and perhaps suspecting the precious freight it bore, had reserved her fire. The minister of marine, fearing the consequences to the emperor of such an act of daring, was about to seize the rudder and alter the barge's course, but an imperative gesture of Napoleon stopped the movement of the minister, and the barge held on its course towards the frigate. Napoleon, with telescope in hand, was examining her, when suddenly she discharged her reserved broadside, and covered with her projectiles the barge that carried *Cæsar and his fortunes*. No one was wounded, and they got off with the mere splashing from the projectiles. All the French craft, witnesses of this scene, had advanced as rapidly as possible, in order to sustain the fire, and to cover the emperor's barge by passing before it. The English division, assailed in its turn by a shower of balls and grape-shot, began to fall astern by degrees. It was followed, but put about and bore down again towards the shore. In the meantime a second division of gunboats, under the command of Captain Pevrien, had weighed anchor and made towards the enemy. Very shortly the frigate, much damaged and scarcely answering her helm, was obliged to stand out to sea. The corvettes followed the same course, some of them much damaged, and the cutter so riddled that she was seen to sink.

Napoleon quitted Boulogne delighted with the battle he had witnessed, and the more so, that secret reports which reached him from the English coast gave him the most satisfactory details as to both the physical and moral effects which the battle had produced. We had had but one man killed and seven wounded, one of them mortally. The English, according to the reports addressed to Napoleon, had had from twelve to fifteen men killed, and sixty wounded. Their vessels had suffered

very much. The English officers had been struck with the bearing of our small vessels, and with the rapidity and precision of their fire. It was evident that if these boats had to fear the ships on account of their size, they could oppose to them a power very formidable from the multiplicity of their fire.*

Napoleon passed through Belgium, visited Mons and Valenciennes, and arrived at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 3rd of September. The empress, who had gone to Plombières to take the waters during Napoleon's stay on the coast, now joined him, to be present at the fêtes which were in preparation in the Rhenish provinces. M. de Talleyrand and several grand dignitaries and ministers were also there. M. de Cobentzel was punctual to the rendezvous given him. The Emperor Francis, feeling the inconvenience of further delays, had taken on the 10th of August, at an extraordinary conference of State, the imperial rank, and had assumed for himself and for his successors the title of *elected* Emperor of the Romans, always august, *hereditary* Emperor of Austria, King of Germany, Bohemia, and of Hungary, Arch-Duke of Austria, Duke of Styria, &c. He had then directed M. de Cobentzel to repair to Aix-la-Chapelle, there to present his credentials to the Emperor Napoleon. To this procedure, which the place at which it took place rendered still more significant, was joined a formal, and for the moment, sincere assurance of a desire to live in peace with France, and the promise, in compliance with Napoleon's desire, to take no heed of the Russian note to Ratisbon. That note, in fact, was done away with by an adjournment *sine die*.

The Emperor of the French gave M. de Cobentzel a gracious reception, and lavished upon him the most encouraging declarations in return for his own. With M. de Cobentzel there presented themselves M. de Souza, the bearer of the recognition of Portugal, the bailiff of Ferrato, with that of the Order of Malta, and a crowd of foreign ministers, who, knowing how agreeable their presence at Aix-la-Chapelle would be, had determined upon the compliment of soliciting leave to go thither. They were received there with great pleasure, and with the grace which gratified sovereigns can always command. This assemblage was singularly brilliant by the concourse of

* Napoleon wrote to Marshal Soult :—

“ AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 8th of September 1804.

“ The little battle at which I was present on the eve of my departure from Boulogne has produced an immense effect in England. It has created a real alarm there. On this subject you will see some very curious details translated for the newspapers. The howitzers which are on board the gunboats tell admirably. The private information that I have received makes the loss of the enemy sixty wounded, and from twelve to fifteen killed. The frigate was much damaged.”—*State Paper Office*.

both foreigners and French, by the splendour displayed, and by the military pomp. The reminiscences of Charlemagne were recalled there, with a scarcely disguised purpose. Napoleon descended into the vault in which the great man of the middle age had been interred, curiously examined his reliques, and gave the clergy striking proofs of his munificence. No sooner had he quitted these fêtes than he returned to his serious occupations, and traversed all the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, Juliers, Venloo, Cologne, and Coblentz, inspecting at once the roads and the fortifications, everywhere amending the designs of his engineers with that correctness of glance and profound experience which belonged only to himself, and ordered new works, which would render that part of the frontiers of the Rhine invincible.

At Mayence, where he arrived towards the end of September (the commencement of the year XIII.), new pomps awaited him. All the German princes whose States were in the neighbourhood, and who had an interest in paying court to their powerful neighbour, hastened to offer him their congratulations and homages, not through others, but in person. The prince arch-chancellor, owing to France the preservation of his title and of his opulence, came to render homage to Napoleon at Mayence, his former capital. With him there also presented themselves the princes of the house of Hesse, the Duke and the Duchess of Bavaria, and the venerable Elector of Baden, the oldest of the princes of Europe, who was accompanied by his son and grandson. These personages and others who succeeded them at Mayence were received with a magnificence far superior to that which they could have met with even at Vienna. They were all impressed with the promptitude with which the crowned soldier had taken the bearing of a sovereign. That was caused by his having early commanded men, not by virtue of a vain title, but by virtue of his genius, his character, and his sword; and, as regarded command, that was an apprenticeship far superior to that which can be served in courts.

The rejoicings which had taken place at Aix-la-Chapelle were renewed at Mayence in presence of the French and Germans who had hastened thither to be close spectators of the spectacle which at this moment excited the curiosity of all Europe. Napoleon invited to the fêtes of his coronation the greater number of the princes who visited him. In the midst of that tumult, withdrawing himself every morning from the vanities of the throne, he traversed the banks of the Rhine and examined in all its details the fortress of Mayence, which he regarded as the most important on the continent, not so much for its works as for its position on the bank of that great river, along which for ten centuries Europe has battled against

France. He ordered the works which would give it the strength of which it was susceptible. The sight of this place inspired him with the idea of a most useful precaution, of which no one else would have thought had he not gone to the very spot. The recent treaties had ordained the destruction of the forts of Cassel and of Kehl. The first forms the outlet of Mayence, and the second the outlet of Strasburg, on the right bank of the Rhine. These two fortresses would lose their value without those two *têtes de pont*, which served them at once as means of defence and as means of crossing to the other bank of the river. He gave orders for getting together great quantities of wood and every kind of materials necessary for sudden works, together with fifteen thousand spades and pick-axes, so that within four and twenty hours from eight to ten thousand labourers could be set to work upon the opposite side of the river to reconstruct the destroyed works. The want of tools alone, wrote he to the engineers, would cause you a loss of a week. He even laid down all the plans for the immediate commencement of the works at a telegraphic order.

Napoleon, after having stayed at Mayence and the new departments long enough to arrange all his plans, set out for Paris, visited Luxembourg in passing, and reached St. Cloud on the 12th of October 1804 (20th Vendemiaire, year XIII.).

He had for a time flattered himself with the hope of presenting to France and to Europe an extraordinary spectacle, by crossing the Strait of Calais with a hundred and fifty thousand men, and returning to Paris master of the world. Providence, which had reserved so much glory for him, had not permitted him to add so much splendour to his coronation. There remained to him another means of dazzling men's minds; that of causing the Pope to descend for an instant from the pontifical throne to go to Paris itself to bless his sceptre and his throne. That was a great moral triumph to gain over the enemies of France, and he did not doubt that he should succeed in gaining it. All was prepared for his coronation, to which he had invited the principal authorities of the empire, numerous deputations of the army and navy, and a crowd of foreign princes. Thousands of workmen had been employed upon the preparations for the ceremony in the church of Notre Dame. A rumour of the coming of the Pope had got abroad, and the public mind was struck with wonder and admiration, the devout population enraptured, the emigrant party deeply annoyed, and Europe at once astonished and jealous. The question had been discussed where all business was discussed, in the Council of State. In that body, in which the most complete freedom had been left to opinions, the objections engendered by the Concordat were reproduced in still greater strength by the idea of in some sort

submitting the coronation of the new monarch to the head of the Church. Those repugnances, so ancient in France, even among religious men, to ultramontane domination, were all re-awakened at once. It was said that this was to raise up again all the pretensions of the clergy, to proclaim a dominant religion, to make it appear that the recently elected emperor held his crown not from the will of the nation and the exploits of the army, but from the sovereign Pontiff, a dangerous supposition, for he who gave the crown could also take it away again.

Napoleon, out of patience with so many objections to a ceremony which would be a real triumph over European malevolence, took up the argument in person, pointed out all the advantages of the presence of the Pope at such a solemnity, the effect that it would produce upon the religious public and upon the whole world, the strength that it would bring to the new order of things, in the maintenance of which all the men of the Revolution were alike interested; he maintained that the pretensions of a Gregory VII. were incompatible with the spirit of the times, that the ceremony in question was simply an invocation of the protection of Heaven in favour of a new dynasty; an invocation made in the ordinary forms of the worship, which was oldest, most general, and most popular in France; that, moreover, without a religious pomp there would be no real pomp, especially in Catholic countries, and that if priests were to figure at the coronation, it was better to call the greatest and most highly qualified, and, if possible, the highest of them all, the Pope himself. Pushing his opponents as he pushed his enemies in war, that is to say, to extremities, he finished by this pointed question, which terminated the discussion at once: "Gentlemen," said he, "you are deliberating at Paris, at the Tuileries; suppose that you were deliberating at London, in the British cabinet—in a word, suppose that you were the ministers of the King of England, and that you were informed that the Pope at this moment crosses the Alps to crown the Emperor of the French; would you look upon that as a triumph for England or for France?" To this interrogation, at once so pointed and so home-thrust, no one made any reply, and the journey of the Pope to Paris encountered no further objection.

But to consent to that journey was not all; it still remained to get the consent of the court of Rome, and that was no ordinary difficulty. To succeed it was necessary to employ great skill, to combine much firmness with much gentleness; and the French ambassador, Cardinal Fesch, with the irascibility of his temper and the inflexibility of his pride, was far less qualified for the task than his predecessor, M. de Cacault. This is the opportunity to describe that personage, who figured both in the Church and in the empire. Cardinal Fesch was corpulent, of

middle height, and of mediocre abilities, vain, ambitious, hasty, but firm ; he was destined to prove a great obstacle to Napoleon. During the Reign of Terror, he, like so many other priests, had thrown aside the ensigns of the priesthood, and with the ensigns the obligations. Having become commissary of war in the army of Italy, no one, judging from his way of life, would have supposed him to be a former minister of religion. But when Napoleon, restoring all things to their proper places, had restored the priests to the altar, Cardinal Fesch thought of returning to his first profession, and of obtaining in it the rank which his powerful relationship warranted him in hoping for. Napoleon would only restore him on condition of an exemplary conduct ; and the Abbé Fesch, with a rare moral resolution, altered his manners, concealed his habits, and gave in a seminary the spectacle of an edifying penitence. Having received the archbishopric of Lyons, which had been kept vacant for him, and a cardinal's hat, he immediately showed himself, not the supporter of Napoleon, but rather his antagonist in the Church ; and it was already evident that he intended some day to compel a nephew, to whom he owed everything, to be dependent upon an uncle supported by the secret ill-will of the clergy.

Napoleon had complained bitterly to the prudent Portalis of this new instance of family ingratitude, and Portalis had advised him to rid himself of that uncle by sending him as ambassador to Rome.

"There," said M. Portalis, "he will have enough to do with the pride and prejudices of the Roman court, and he will employ the faults of his disposition to your service instead of to your injury." It was to this end, and not for the purpose of some day making him Pope, as was pretended by the retailers of false reports, that Napoleon had accredited Cardinal Fesch to the court of Rome. No pope could have been more disagreeable, more hostile, more dangerous to him.

Such was the personage who was to negotiate the journey of Pius VII. to Paris.

As soon as Pius VII. had learned from the extraordinary courier of Cardinal Caprara the desires conceived by Napoleon, he was seized with perplexity, and for some time remained agitated by the most opposite feelings. He fully comprehended that this was an opportunity to render new services to religion, to obtain concessions for it which hitherto had been constantly refused ; perhaps, even to obtain the restitution of the rich provinces which had been taken from the patrimony of St. Peter. But then, what risks were to be run ! What painful remarks to endure from Europe ! How many possible annoyances in the midst of that revolutionary capital, infected with the spirit of the philosophers, still swarming with their followers, and

inhabited by the most satirical people upon the face of the earth ! All these prospects presenting themselves at once to the mind of the Pope, sensitive and irritable as it was, agitated him to such a degree as obviously to affect his health. His minister and favourite counsellor, the Cardinal-Secretary Gonsalvi, immediately became the confidant of his agitations.* He communicated to him his own anxieties, and received the communication of those of the cardinal, and both found themselves almost in agreement. They dreaded what the world would say of this consecration of an illegitimate prince, of an usurper, as Napoleon was called by a certain party ; they feared the discontent of the courts of Europe, and especially that of the court of Vienna, which looked with a deadly dislike upon the rising of a new Emperor of the West ; they feared from the party of the *ancien régime*, a far greater and better grounded outcry than that which was raised at the epoch of the Concordat ; better grounded, because in this case the interests of religion were less evident than the interests of a man. They feared that when the Pope was once in France something unforeseen and inadmissible would be demanded from him with respect to religion, which he would have difficulty enough in refusing while at Rome, and which he could still less refuse at Paris, which would lead to troublesome, perhaps violent, disagreement. They did not go so far as to fear an actual violence, like the detention of Pius VI. at Valence ; but they confusedly pictured to themselves strange and alarming scenes. It is true that Cardinal Gonsalvi, who had been to Paris about the Concordat, and Cardinal Caprara, who had passed his life in that capital, had very different ideas of Napoleon, his courtesy, and the delicacy of his proceedings, from those which generally obtained in that court of old priests, who never thought of Paris but as an abyss governed by a fearful giant. Cardinal Caprara especially never ceased to repeat, that if the emperor was the most passionate and imperious of men, he was also the most generous and amiable when no offence was offered to him ; that the Pope would be delighted to see him, and would obtain from him whatever he wished for religion and for the Church ; that now was the time to set out, as the war tended towards some decisive crisis ; that there would once more be vanquished and victors, and new distributions of territory, and that the Pope would perhaps obtain the Legations ; that nothing had been promised, indeed, but that that, at bottom, was the intention of Napoleon, and that he only required an opportunity to realise it. These representations somewhat calmed the disturbed imagi-

* I do not suppose any invention here, I do not imagine any. What follows is faithfully extracted from the secret correspondence of Cardinal Gonsalvi with Cardinal Caprara, which correspondence remains in the possession of France.

nation of the luckless Pope ; but Paris, the capital of that frightful Revolution which had destroyed kings, queens, and thousands of priests, was an object of undefinable terror to him.

Then he was assailed by the opposite fears. No doubt Europe would speak ill should he go to Paris ; it was possible that in that capital he might be exposed to unknown and fatal dangers ; but should he not go, what would be the results to religion and the Holy See ? All the States of Italy were within the grasp of Napoleon. Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, and even Naples, despite the Russian protection, were swarming with French troops. Out of respect to the Holy See the Roman State had alone been spared. What would not Napoleon do, if irritated and affronted by a refusal which would infallibly be known to all Europe, and which would be taken for a denial of his rights, set forth by the Holy See ? All these contradictory ideas formed a most painful ebb and flow in the minds of the Pope and his Secretary of State Gonsalvi. The Cardinal Gonsalvi, who had already braved the danger, and who had found Paris anything but unpleasant, was less agitated. He was only anxious about Europe, its opinions, and the displeasure of all the old cabinets.

However, the Pope and the cardinal, expecting to receive from Paris such urgings as would put it out of their power to refuse, wished to have the sanction of the sacred college. They did not dare to consult it as a whole, for it contained cardinals connected with foreign courts, who probably would betray the secret. They selected ten of the most influential members from the congregation of cardinals, and submitted to them, under the seal of confession, the communications that had been made by Cardinal Caprara and Cardinal Fesch. Unfortunately these ten cardinals were divided in opinion, and it was to be feared that the same would be the case with the sacred college. The Pope and his minister then judged that it was necessary to refer to ten other cardinals, making twenty. That consultation, which remained secret, gave the following results :—Five cardinals were absolutely opposed to the demand of Napoleon, fifteen were favourable to it, but with some objections and upon some conditions. Of the five who were against, only two grounded their refusal upon the illegitimacy of the sovereign whose coronation was in question. All the five urged that it was to consecrate and ratify all that the new monarch had done or permitted to be done to the injury of religion : for if he was the author of the Concordat, he was no less so of the Organic Articles, and when he was general, had deprived the Holy See of the Legations ; that again, more recently, in concurring in the secularisations, he had assisted in despoiling the Germanic Church of its property ; that if he wished to be treated as a

Charlemagne, he must conduct himself like that emperor, and display the same munificence towards the Holy See.

The fifteen cardinals who were inclined to consent, with some restrictive conditions, had objected the opinions and the discontent of the European courts, the inconsistency with the papal dignity of the Pope going to Paris to crown the new emperor, while the emperors of the Holy Empire had all come to be crowned at Rome, at the foot of the altar of St. Peter; the unpleasantness of meeting the constitutional bishops whose retractation was incomplete, or who, subsequent to their reconciliation with the Church, had raised new controversies; the false position of the Holy Father in presence of some high functionaries, as, for example, M. de Talleyrand, who had broken the bands of the Church to enter those of matrimony; the danger of being exposed in a hostile capital to inadmissible demands, the refusal of which would probably lead to a violent rupture; and finally, the danger of such a journey for a health so delicate as that of Pius VII. Referring to the censure which had been incurred in the last century by Pope Pius VI. when he made the journey to Vienna to visit Joseph II., and returned without having obtained anything favourable to religion, the fifteen cardinals maintained that there could, in the eyes of the Christian world, be but one valid excuse for the act of condescension that was demanded of Pius VII., which was to demand and to obtain certain obvious advantages, such as the revocation of a portion of the Organic Articles, the abolition of the measures adopted by the Italian Republic respecting the clergy, the revocation of what the French commissioner had done at Parma and Plaisance relatively to the Church of that country, and finally, territorial indemnities for the losses which the Holy See had suffered, and, above all, the adoption of the ancient ceremonial observed at the coronation of Germanic emperors. Some of the fifteen cardinals now added as an express condition that the coronation should take place not in Paris, but in Italy, when Napoleon should visit his Transalpine States, and insisted upon this condition as indispensable to the dignity of the Holy See.

Somewhat reassured by these opinions, the Pope was inclined to consent to the wishes of Napoleon, insisting, however, in a peremptory manner upon the conditions demanded by the fifteen consenting cardinals, and he had communicated that resolution to Cardinal Fesch. But in the interval there had arrived at Rome the text of the *Senatus Consultum* of the 28th Floréal, and the formula of the emperor's oath, containing these words:—"I swear to respect, and to cause to be respected, THE LAWS OF THE CONCORDAT AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION." The laws of the Concordat appeared to include the Organic Articles; the

freedom of religion seemed to carry with it the consecration of heresies, and never had the court of Rome, on its part, admitted such a freedom. This oath suddenly became an argument for an absolute refusal. However, the twenty cardinals were again consulted, and this time there were only five who considered that the oath was not an insurmountable obstacle; while fifteen replied that it was impossible for the Pope to anoint the new monarch.

Although the secret had been well kept by the cardinal, the news from Paris, and some inevitable indiscretions of the agents of the Holy See, caused the negotiations to be divulged, and the public, consisting of prelates and diplomatists, who surround the Roman court, overflowed with censures and sarcasms. Pius VII. was styled *the chaplain of the Emperor of the French*, for that emperor, standing in need of the ministry of the Pope, had not come to Rome as the Charlemagnes, the Othos, the Barbarossas, and the Charles V. of the olden day had done; he had summoned the Pope to his palace.

This outcry, added to the difficulties of the oath, shook the determination of Pius VII. and the Cardinal Gonsalvi, and they both agreed to the resolution of sending an answer, apparently favourable, but in reality negative, for it consisted in an acquiescence loaded with conditions which the emperor could not admit.

The Cardinal Fesch had hastened to reply to the principal difficulty raised against the oath, and drawn from the engagement of the sovereign to respect liberty of religion, by saying that this engagement was not the canonical approbation of dissenting creeds, but the promise to permit the free exercise of all religions, and not to persecute any which was conformable to the spirit of the Church and to the principles adopted in the present age by all sovereigns. These very sensible explanations had, according to Cardinal Gonsalvi, only a private character, not a public character, and could not excuse the court of Rome in the eyes of the faithful, or in the eyes of God, if it were wanting to the Catholic faith.

Although of anything but an insinuating turn, Cardinal Fesch had contrived to penetrate, by means of fear and presents, into the secrets of more than one personage of the Roman court, and was pretty correctly acquainted with both the objections and their authors. He communicated all that he knew to Paris, that the emperor might perfectly understand how matters stood; and yet, being unaware to what extent the Pope desired to shelter himself from what was required of him, by proposing unacceptable conditions, he gave greater hope of success than he at the time had reason to entertain, adding, however, that in order to succeed it was necessary to give the Holy See entirely satisfactory promises and explanations.

These communications being transmitted to Paris, cruelly embarrassed Cardinal Caprara, for they were taken for a consent, dependent only upon some explanations to be given, and the Pope's journey to Paris was held to be certain. Cardinal Caprara, who was acquainted with the real dispositions of his court, and did not dare to disclose them, was trembling and confused. The Empress Josephine was even more anxious than Napoleon himself for the coronation, which seemed to her the pronouncing of Heaven's pardon for an act of usurpation. Accordingly, she received Cardinal Caprara at St. Cloud, and lavished the kindest attentions upon him. Napoleon, on his part, testified his lively satisfaction, and both told the cardinal that they deemed the matter arranged; that the Pope would be received at Paris with all the honours due to the head of the universal Church, and that religion would reap infinite benefits from his journey. Napoleon, without knowing all, yet surmised a part of the secret wishes of the court of Rome, and shunned the approach of Cardinal Caprara from fear of being asked either for something utterly impossible, as the revocation of the Organic Articles, or very difficult, under the circumstances, as the restitution of the Legations. The cardinal, therefore, was doubly embarrassed by the hopes, too easily conceived in Paris, and by the difficulty of getting access to Napoleon, to obtain from him such promises as would determine the court of Rome.

The Abbé Bernier, who had become Bishop of Orleans, the man whose at once prudent and profound intellect had been employed in overcoming all the difficulties of the Concordat, was again very serviceable on this occasion. He was entrusted with the replies to be made to the Roman court. He conferred for this purpose with Cardinal Caprara, and showed him that after the hopes that had been conceived by the imperial family, and the expectation to which the French public had been excited, it was impossible to draw back without insulting Napoleon, and risking the most serious consequences.

The Bishop of Orleans drew up a despatch which would have done honour to the most learned and practised diplomatist. He referred to the services rendered by Napoleon to the Church, and the claims that he had upon its gratitude, the benefit that religion might still expect from him, the effect, above all, that the presence of Pius VII. would produce upon the French people, and the impulse which it would give to religious ideas. He explained the proper construction to be put upon the oath, and the expressions relative to freedom of religion; moreover, he proposed an expedient, it was to have two ceremonies; the one civil, in which the emperor would take the oath, and assume the crown; the other religious, in which he would have that crown blessed by the Pontiff. Finally, he positively declared

that it was for the interests of religion and of the affairs cognate thereto that the presence of the Pope at Paris was requested. There were sufficient hopes hidden beneath this language personally to win over the Pope, and to furnish him with a pretext on which he could justify to Christendom his condescension towards Napoleon.

To this official despatch of the French government Cardinal Caprara added some private letters, in which he described what was passing in France, the good which was to be accomplished there, and the evil that was to be repaired, and positively affirmed that a refusal could not be given but with the greatest perils, and that the Pope would reap from his journey nothing but subjects of satisfaction.

A second time transported to Rome, the negotiation was destined to be successful. The Pope and the Cardinal Gonsalvi, enlightened by the letters of the legate and of the Bishop of Orleans, comprehended the impossibility of a refusal, and, urged by Cardinal Fesch, ended by agreeing. But they still felt the necessity of once more consulting the cardinals, and they were especially alarmed at that proposal of the Bishop of Orleans, in which he started the idea of a double ceremony. The Pope admitted but one of them, for he wished not only to sprinkle holy water over the new emperor, but also to crown him. The cardinals, therefore, were consulted anew upon the explanations that had been sent from Paris. Cardinal Fesch obtained access to them, and struck fear into their hearts, which he was better calculated to do than he was to persuade. The reply was favourable, but they demanded an official note explanatory of the oath, promising but a single ceremony, and containing an express mention of the terms on which the Pope was to proceed to Paris.

Pius VII., therefore, caused it to be declared, that he had consented to go to Paris on condition that the oath should be explained as not implying approbation of heretical dogmas, but the simple physical toleration of dissenting religions; that they should promise to listen to him when he should remonstrate against certain Organic Articles, or reclaim in behalf of the interests of the Church and the Holy See (the Legations were not named); that access to him should not be granted to the bishops who had disputed their submission to the Holy See until after a new and complete submission on their part; that he should not be exposed to the meeting with persons in a situation repugnant to the laws of the Church (the wife of the minister for foreign affairs was specifically pointed out); that the ceremonial observed should be that of the court of Rome crowning the emperors, or of the Archbishop of Rheims crowning the kings of France; that there should be but one ceremony,

by the ministry of the Pope exclusively; that a deputation of two French bishops should be the bearers to Pius VII. of a letter of invitation, in which the emperor should say that, detained by cogent considerations in the heart of his empire, and having much to consult upon with the Holy Father concerning the interests of religion, he begged him to visit him in France to bless his crown, and treat of the interests of the Church; that no sort of demand should be addressed to the Pope; and that his return to Italy should in nowise be obstructed. The pontifical cabinet finally expressed its desire that the coronation should be postponed to the 25th of December, the day on which Charlemagne had been proclaimed emperor, for the Pope, cruelly agitated, needed to pass some time at Castel-Gandolpho, to take some little repose, and, moreover, could not leave Rome without arranging many affairs of the Roman government.

There was nothing but what was very admissible in these conditions, for in promising to listen to the remonstrances of the Pope against certain of the Organic Articles, no pledge was given to act upon those remonstrances in the event of their being contrary to the principles of the French Church. Cardinal Fesch, indeed, had honestly declared that those of the Organic Articles which were most offensive to Rome would never be modified; those which required the consent of the civil authority to the introduction of papal bulls into France. Again, there could be no scruple as to promising a single ceremony; the observance of the Roman or the French ceremonial; a hope as to the territorial amelioration of the Holy See, for Napoleon had often contemplated this; the sending a deputation solemnly to invite the Pope to proceed to Paris; or the allegation of the interests of the Church as causing his journey; the repression of the four bishops who had relapsed from their reconciliation, and disturbed the Church in a mischievous manner. Finally, it was quite convenient to engage not to demand anything of Pius VII., and to leave him his liberty, for never had a contrary design entered the minds of Napoleon and his government. In fact, it was only in the minds of those trembling and enfeebled old men that the supposition could have birth, of the liberty of the Pope being at all endangered in France.

As soon as the consent was obtained, Cardinal Fesch declared that the emperor would defray all the expenses of the journey, which for an impoverished government was one great difficulty removed. He further made known the details of the magnificent reception that was in reserve for the Holy Father. Unfortunately, he worried him by accessory exactions, which were altogether misplaced. He desired that twelve cardinals, besides the Secretary of State Gonsalvi, should accompany the

Pope ; he wished, contrary to the established custom, by which the cardinals take precedence in the order of seniority, to have the first place in the pontifical carriage, in quality of ambassador, grand-almoner, and uncle of the emperor. All this was useless, and gave to timid and punctilious men as much pain as the most serious difficulties.

Pius VII. yielded upon some points, but was inflexible as to the number of cardinals, and as to being accompanied by the Secretary of State Gonsalvi. In their vague terrors Pius VII. and Gonsalvi had determined upon a singular precaution for providing against all the dangers of the Church. The Holy Father, who imagined his health worse than it really was, and mistook the nervous agitation into which he was thrown for a dangerous illness, thought it very likely that he might die on his journey. He also thought it possible that advantage might be taken of his presence in France. For this second case he had drawn up and signed his abdication, and placed it in the hands of Gonsalvi, in order that he might be able to declare the papacy vacant. Further, in the event of his death or abdication, it would be requisite to convoke the sacred college, in order to fill the chair of St. Peter. It was necessary, therefore, to have as many cardinals as possible at Rome, and among them the man whose ability rendered him the most capable of directing the Church in grave conjunctures, that is to say, Cardinal Gonsalvi himself. There was still another reason that decided the Pope upon acting thus. He had not been able to avoid an explanation with the court of Austria, to cause it to agree to his journey to Paris. Austria, appreciating his position, had admitted the necessity he was under of making the journey, but demanded a guarantee whereby he promised not to treat at Paris about the arrangements of the Germanic Church, which were to be the result of the recess of 1803. It was especially on this account that Austria dreaded the Pope's stay in France. Pius VII. had solemnly promised not to treat with Napoleon upon any question foreign to the French Church. But in order that faith should be placed in his promise, it was necessary that he should not take with him to Paris the Cardinal Gonsalvi, the man by whom all the important business of the Roman court was transacted. For these reasons Pius VII. refused to take more than six cardinals with him, and persisted in his resolution to leave the Secretary of State Gonsalvi at Rome. He consented to an arrangement as to the personal pretensions of Cardinal Fesch. He was to occupy the first place from their arrival in France.

These points being settled, the Pope proceeded to Castel-Gandolpho, where the pure air, the calm which follows a resolution taken, and the news, every day more satisfactory, of

the reception that was in preparation for him at Paris, re-established his much shaken health. Napoleon considered what he had obtained as a grand victory, which put the last seal on his rights, and which in point of legitimacy left him nothing more to desire. At the same time he would not lay aside his proper character amidst these external pomps; he would neither do nor promise anything opposed to his own dignity, or to the principles of his government. Cardinal Fesch having informed him that it would be sufficient to depute to the Pope some general enjoying a high reputation, he sent General Caffarelli as the bearer of his invitation, and he couched that invitation in respectful and even caressing terms, but without giving any intimation that he invited the Pope to France on any other business than that of the coronation. The letter, in which a perfect dignity was preserved, ran thus:—

“MOST HOLY FATHER,—The happy effect produced upon the morality and the character of my people by the re-establishment of religion, induces me to beg your holiness to give me a new proof of your interest in my destiny and in that of this great nation, in one of the most important conjunctures presented by the annals of the world. I beg you to come and give, to the highest degree, a religious character to the anointing and coronation of the first Emperor of the French. That ceremony will acquire a new lustre from being performed by your holiness in person. It will bring down upon ourself and our people the blessing of God, whose decrees rule the destiny alike of empires and of families.

“Your holiness is aware of the affectionate sentiments I have long borne towards you, and can thence judge of the pleasure that this occurrence will afford me of testifying them anew.

“And hereupon, we pray God that He may preserve you, most Holy Father, for many years, to rule and govern our mother, the Holy Church.—Your dutiful son,
NAPOLÉON.”

This letter was accompanied by urgent entreaties that the Pope would arrive towards the end of November instead of on the 25th of December. Napoleon did not disclose his real reason for wishing the ceremony to take place at the earlier epoch; that reason was no other than his project of a descent upon England, prepared for December. He alleged a reason, which was true, indeed, but less important; the inconvenience of too long detaining at Paris all the civil and military authorities, who were already convoked thither.

General Caffarelli having set out, and travelled with all speed, reached Rome in the night of the 28th to the 29th of September. Cardinal Fesch presented him to the Holy Father, who gave him a truly paternal reception. Pius VII. received the emperor's letter from the hands of General Caffarelli, and deferred reading it until after the audience. But when he had

read it, and found no allegation of religious affairs as the cause of his journey to Paris, he was deeply grieved, and was thrown into a state of nervous agitation, which excited the most lively anxiety. At bottom, what really affected that respectable Pontiff, as it does all high-souled princes, was his honour, the dignity of his crown. He considered these compromised if the interests of religion were not set forth as the cause of his journey. The nickname of *chaplain to Napoleon*, which had been given to him by his enemies, deeply wounded him. He summoned Cardinal Fesch, and said to him, "*It is poison* that you have brought me." He added that he would not reply to such a letter; and that he would not go to Paris, for faith had not been kept with him. Cardinal Fesch endeavoured to soothe the irritated Pope, and considered that a new consultation of cardinals would overcome this last difficulty. All began to feel the impossibility of drawing back, and by means of a last explanatory note, signed by the cardinal-ambassador, the difficulty was removed. It was settled that the Pope, on account of All Saints' Day, should set out on the 2nd of November, and reach Fontainebleau on the 27th.

While this was going on at Rome, the Emperor Napoleon had prepared everything at Paris to give a prodigious splendour to the ceremony. He had invited to it the princes of Baden, the prince arch-chancellor of the Germanic empire, and numerous deputations selected from the administration, the magistracy, and the army. He had committed to the Bishop Bernier and to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès the task of examining the ceremonial observed at the coronation of emperors and kings, and of suggesting the modifications that the manners and spirit of the times, and even the prejudices of France against the authority of Rome, rendered it necessary to effect in it. He had prescribed the utmost secrecy to them, in order that those questions should not become the subject of mischievous disputes, and reserved to himself the final decision on whatever was doubtful.

The two rituals, the Roman and the French, contained points of procedure which would have been equally difficult to render palatable to public taste. According to each ceremonial, the monarch arrived without the ensigns of supreme power, such as the sceptre, the sword, and the crown, and received them only from the hand of the Pope. Further, the crown was placed upon his head. By the French ritual, the peers, by the Roman ritual, the bishops, held the crown above the head of the kneeling monarch, and the Pope, laying his hands upon it, lowered it upon his brow. Messrs. Bernier and Cambacérès, after suppressing certain forms that were too much in contradiction to the feelings of the time, had decided for preserving the last

part of the ceremony, substituting for the peers of the French ritual, and for the bishops of the Roman ritual, the six grand dignitaries of the empire, but still leaving it to the Pope, according to the ancient custom, to place the crown on the sovereign's head. Napoleon, grounding his argument upon the spirit of the nation and of the army, maintained that he could not thus receive the crown from the Pontiff; that the nation and the army, from whom he held it, would be offended at the sight of a ceremony at variance with fact, and with the independence of the throne. On this point he was inflexible, saying that he, better than any one, knew the real sentiments of France, tending, no doubt, towards religious ideas, but on that very account always ready to censure those which went beyond certain limits. He was resolved, then, to present himself at the church with his imperial ensigns; that is to say, as an emperor, and only to give them to the Pope to be blessed. He consented to be blessed, consecrated, but not crowned. The arch-chancellor, admitting what was correct, in the opinion of Napoleon, pointed out the not inferior danger of offending the Pope, already much chagrined, and of depriving the ceremony of an important and valuable conformity with the antique forms in use from the days of Pepin and Charlemagne. Messrs. Cambacérès and Bernier, who were both intimately connected with the legate, were commissioned to procure his assent to the wishes of the emperor. Cardinal Caprara, knowing how important forms were to his court, considered that he ought not to determine the question without obtaining the opinion of the Pope, but, at the same time, that it was best not to make any communication to the Holy See, lest new difficulties should be created. Satisfied that when the Pope should have once arrived he would be at once reassured and delighted by the reception which was prepared for him, the cardinal believed that everything would be more easily arranged at Paris under the influence of an unexpected gratification, than at Rome, under the influence of the most vague alarms.

These difficulties being surmounted, there remained others, which originated in the bosom of the imperial family. The parts of the wife, the brothers, and the sisters of the emperor in this ceremony had to be decided upon. First, it was to be settled whether Josephine should be crowned and anointed like Napoleon himself. She ardently desired it, for it was a new tie to her husband—a new guarantee against a future divorce, which was the haunting anxiety of her life. Napoleon hesitated between his tenderness for her and the secret presentiments of his policy, when a domestic scene almost produced the ruin of the unfortunate Josephine. All were eager and busy around the new monarch; brothers, sisters, and relations. All were

anxious that in this ceremony, which seemed to consecrate them all, for a part consistent with their existing pretensions and future hopes. On witnessing this excitement, and the opportunities of which Napoleon was the object, especially on the part of one of his sisters, Josephine, agitated, and devoured by jealousy, manifested frightfully injurious suspicions of that sister, and of Napoleon himself, suspicions in accordance with the atrocious calumnies of the emigrant party. Napoleon was suddenly transported with a violent anger, and deriving from that anger the power of rising above his affection, he told Josephine that he would separate from her;* that, moreover, it would at a future time be necessary to do so, and that it would be better to do so at once, previous to having formed still closer ties. He called for his two adoptive children, and communicated his resolution, and plunged them into the deepest grief by the intelligence. Hortense and Eugène Beauharnais declared, with a resolution at once calm and sad, that they would follow their mother into the retreat to which she was to be condemned. Josephine, prudently counselled, displayed a submissive and resigned grief. The contrast between her grief and the satisfaction displayed by the rest of the family rent the heart of Napoleon, and he could not resolve to see exiled and unfortunate that wife, the companion of his youth, and exiled and unfortunate with her those children who had become the objects of his paternal tenderness. He caught Josephine in his arms, and told her, in a burst of tenderness, that he should never have the strength to part from her, even should his policy require him to do so; and then he promised her that she should be crowned with him, and should receive by his side, and from the hand of the Pope, the divine consecration.

Josephine, with her characteristic mobility, passed from alarm to the most lively satisfaction; and gave herself up with a childish joy to the preparations for the coronation.

Napoleon, secretly cherishing the design of some day re-establishing the Empire of the West, wished his throne to be surrounded by vassal kings. For the present he had made his brothers Joseph and Louis grand dignitaries of the empire; he intended soon to make them kings, and he had even now prepared a throne in Lombardy for Joseph. His design was, that on becoming kings they should still remain grand dignitaries of the empire. They were to bear the same relation to the French Empire of the West as the princes of Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Bavaria, Hanover, &c., bore to the Germanic empire. It was necessary that the ceremony of the coronation

* I here give the faithful account of a lady of unquestionable veracity, who was an eye-witness, and attached to the imperial family, and who has this reminiscence in her MS. memoirs.

should correspond to that design, and be an emblem of the reality that was in preparation. He had not allowed that the bishops or the peers should hold the crown suspended above his head, or even that the chief of bishops, the Bishop of Rome, should place it on his brow. For similar reasons it was his will that his brothers, destined to be vassal kings of the Grand Empire, should take beside him a position which should plainly indicate that future vassalage. He therefore required that when he, clad in the imperial robes, should proceed to the interior of the church, from the throne to the altar, from the altar to the throne, his brothers should bear the train of his robes. He required this not only for himself but also for the empress. It was the princesses, his sisters, who were to perform to Josephine the service that his brothers were to perform to him. An energetic expression of his will was required to obtain this. Although his kindness rendered domestic quarrels painful to him, he was very absolute when his resolutions concerned the views of his policy.

It was now November ; everything was in readiness at Notre Dame. The deputations had arrived ; the tribunals had adjourned ; sixty bishops or archbishops, attended by their clergy, had abandoned the duties of the altar. The generals, the admirals, the most distinguished officers of the land and sea service, Marshals Davoust, Ney, and Soult, and Admirals Bruix and Ganteaume, instead of being at Boulogne or at Brest, were at Paris. Napoleon was annoyed at this, for however much he liked pomps, they held a very secondary place in his liking to serious business. A multitude of the curious, flocking from all parts of Europe and France, crowded the capital, and impatiently awaited the spectacle which had attracted them. Napoleon, who was far from being displeased with the crowding of which he was the object, Napoleon nevertheless was in haste to put an end to a state of things which interfered with that regular order which he loved to see existing in his empire. He despatched officers after officers with letters to the Pope, filled with filial tenderness, but filled also with earnest importunities to him to hasten his progress. From delay to delay the ceremony was now fixed for the 2nd of December.

The Pope had at length determined on quitting Rome. After having confided all powers to Cardinal Gonsalvi, and having heaped caresses upon him, he on the morning of the 2nd of November proceeded to the altar of St. Peter, and knelt there for some time, surrounded by the cardinals, the grandees of Rome, and the populace. At this altar he offered up a fervent prayer, as though he had been about to brave some great peril, and then entered his carriage and took the road to Viterbo. The populace of Transteveris, so devoted to their pontiffs,

accompanied his carriage for a long time weeping. The time was gone by when that Roman court was the most enlightened in Europe! Now the members of the sacred college, scarcely understanding the age in which they lived, and even blaming, for lack of comprehending it, the prudent condescension of Pius VII., were prepared to believe the most absurd fables relating to it. There were some among them who considered as probable the report of a snare set in France to make the Holy Father prisoner, and wrest his States from him: as though Napoleon need resort to such means to become master of Rome! As if he at that moment desired anything but the pontifical benediction, which would render the character of his power respectable in the eyes of men!

Pius VII., on setting out, had desired, notwithstanding his poverty, to carry with him some presents worthy of the host with whom he was about to reside. With his usual delicacy of tact he had chosen, as presents for Napoleon, two antique cameos, as remarkable for their beauty as for their signification. The one represented Achilles, the other the continence of Scipio. For Josephine he destined some vases, also antique, and of admirable workmanship. By the advice of M. de Talleyrand he took for the ladies of the court a profusion of rosaries.

He set out, then, traversed the Roman State and Tuscany, amidst the population of Italy, kneeling on his path. At Florence he was received by the Queen of Etruria, now a widow, and regent for her son of the new kingdom created by Napoleon. That princess, pious as a Spanish princess, received the Pope with demonstrations of devotion and respect which delighted him. He already began to recover somewhat from his anxieties. He desired to avoid the Legations, in order that his presence might not consecrate the grant that had been made of them to another State than the State of Rome. He was conducted by Plaisance, Parma, and Turin. He was not yet in France, but French authorities and French troops already surrounded him. He saw the veteran Menou and the officers of the army of Italy respectfully bowing before him, and he was touched with the respectful expression of those masculine countenances. Cardinal Cambacérès and a chamberlain of the palace, M. de Salmatoris, who had been sent forward, presented themselves on the frontiers of Piedmont, which were also those of the empire, and presented him with a letter from Napoleon, filled with expressions of his gratitude and of his wishes for the speedy and prosperous journey of the Pontiff. Becoming more reassured every hour, Pius VII. at length ceased to feel much fear of the consequences of his resolution. He passed the Alps. Extraordinary precautions had been taken to render the journey there safe and easy to him and to the aged cardinals who accompanied him. Officers

of the imperial palace provided everything with infinite zeal and magnificence. At length he arrived at Lyons. There his alarms were changed into positive delight. Crowds of people had assembled from Provence, Dauphiny, Franche-Comté, and Burgundy to see the representative of God on earth. The people have all at heart a confused but deep sentiment of the Divinity. Little matters the form under which it is presented to their adoration, provided that that form have been very anciently admitted, and that those above them set the example of respect. If to the natural force of this sentiment we add the extraordinary power of reaction and the vivacity with which the multitude reverts to ancient practices that it has temporarily abandoned, we may conceive the eagerness with which the people, both in the towns and rural districts of France, pressed forward to see the Holy Father. On beholding upon their knees those people who had been described to him as continually in rebellion, alike against earthly and heavenly authority, Pius VII. was delighted and completely reassured; and he now perceived that his veteran councillor, Caprara, spoke quite truly when he told him that this journey would be a great benefit to religion, and would procure to himself infinite gratifications. Another letter from the emperor was presented to him at Lyons, conveying new thanks to him, and new wishes for his speedy arrival. That debilitated Pontiff, suffering from an unhealthy sensibility, no longer feeling his fatigue now that he saw himself welcomed in this manner, himself proposed to accelerate his journey by two days—an offer which was accepted. He left Lyons amidst the same homages, and passed through Moulins and Nevers, everywhere encountering on the road a multitude filled with emotion, and suing for the blessing of the head of the Church.

It was at Fontainebleau that Pius VII. was to stop. Napoleon had made this arrangement that he might have the opportunity of going to meet the Holy Father, and of providing him rest for two or three days in that lovely retreat. He had ordered for that day, the 25th of November, a hunting match, which was to approach the road by which the Holy Father was travelling. At the hour at which he knew that the pontifical cortège would arrive at the cross of St. Herem he turned his horse in that direction to meet the Pope, who almost immediately arrived there. He instantly presented himself to the Holy Father and embraced him. Pius VII., affected by this earnest eagerness, looked with mingled curiosity and emotion upon that new Charlemagne, whom for years past he had regarded as God's instrument here on earth. It was the middle of the day. The two sovereigns entered the carriage to proceed to Fontainebleau, Napoleon giving the right side to the head of the Church. At the entrance

to the palace the empress, the grandees of the empire, and the chiefs of the army were arranged in a circle to receive Pius VII., and offer him their homage. He, although accustomed to the pomps of Rome, had never before seen anything so magnificent. He was conducted, surrounded by this attendance, to the apartments intended for him. After some hours' repose, according to the rules of etiquette among sovereigns, he paid a visit to the emperor and empress, who immediately returned that visit. Each time more completely reassured and carried away by the seductive language of his host, who had promised himself not to intimidate but to enchant him, he conceived an affection for Napoleon which, at the close of his life, and after numerous and terrible vicissitudes, he still felt for the hero in exile. The grandees of the empire were successively presented to him. He received them with perfect cordiality, and that gracefulness of advanced age which has a very great and a very powerful charm. The at once mild and dignified countenance of Pius VII. touched all hearts, and he in turn was touched by the effect that he produced. He had not been spoken to about any of the difficulties which still remained to be removed. His sensitiveness and his fatigue had been considered. He was wholly filled with the emotion, the joy, of a welcome which to him seemed an actual triumph to religion.

The moment at length arrived to set out for Paris, to enter at length that dreaded city, in which for a century the human mind had so violently worked, in which for some years past the destinies of the world had been regulated. On the 28th of November, after three days of repose, the emperor and the Pope entered the same carriage to proceed to Paris, the Pope still having the right. The Pope was lodged in the Pavilion of Flora, which had been prepared for his reception. The whole day of the 29th was left to him entirely to recover from his fatigue, and on the 30th the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the Council of State were presented to him. The presidents of these four bodies addressed him in speeches in which his virtues, his wisdom, and his noble condescension towards France were celebrated in language at once brilliant and dignified. But among these harangues, fugitive as the sensation which inspired them, it is necessary to distinguish that of M. de Fontanes, grave and durable as the truths with which it was filled:—

“MOST HOLY FATHER,—When upon the field of battle the victor of Marengo conceived the design of re-establishing religious unity, and of restoring to the French people their ancient worship, he preserved the principles of civilisation from total ruin. This grand thought, occurring in the day of victory, gave birth to the Concordat; and the Legislative Body, on whose

behalf I have the honour to address your holiness, converted the Concordat into a law of the land.

“Memorable day, equally dear to the wisdom of the statesman and the faith of the Christian! It was then that France, abjuring but too serious errors, gave the most useful lessons to the human race. She seemed to confess in its presence that all irreligious ideas are impolitic ideas, and that every offence against Christianity is an offence against society. The return to the ancient worship speedily led the way to the return to a government more natural to great States, and more in accordance with the habits of France. The whole social system, shaken by the inconstant opinions of man, rested once more upon a doctrine immutable as God Himself. It was religion which in the bygone times polished savage societies, but it was now more difficult to repair their ruins than to lay their foundations.

“We owe this benefit to a double prodigy. France has witnessed the birth of one of those extraordinary men, who at rare intervals are sent to the succour of empires that are on the brink of ruin; while Rome, at the same time, has seen shining upon the throne of St. Peter all the apostolic virtues of the earliest ages. Their gentle authority is felt by all hearts. Universal homage must be paid to a pontiff as wise as he is pious, who knows alike what should be left to the course of human events, and what is demanded by the interests of religion.

“That august religion comes to consecrate with him the new destinies of the French empire, and observes the same solemnity as in the age of the Clovises and the Pepins.

“All things have changed around it; it alone has remained unchangeable.

“It sees the families of kings become extinct like those of subjects; but upon the ruins of fallen thrones, and upon the steps of thrones that are raised up, it ever admires the successive manifestations of the eternal designs, and obeys them with confidence.

“Never had the universe a more imposing spectacle; never had the people grander lessons.

“The time no longer exists in which the empire and the priesthood were rivals. Both unite to repel the fatal doctrines which have threatened Europe with utter subversion. May they for ever yield to the double influence of religion and policy united together. That wish will doubtless be realised; never in France had policy so great genius, and never did the pontifical throne present to the Christian world a more respectable and touching model.”

The Pope displayed a lively emotion as he listened to that noble language, the noblest that had been spoken since the age of Louis XIV. The populace of Paris crowded beneath his

windows, soliciting his appearance. The fame of his mildness and of his noble countenance had already spread throughout the capital. Pius VII. several times presented himself at the balcony of the Tuileries, always accompanied by Napoleon, was saluted with lively acclamations, and saw the people of Paris, that people who had been the actors of the 10th of August, and had worshipped the goddess Reason, kneeling before him, and awaiting the pontifical benediction. Singular inconstancy of men and of nations! which proves the necessity of holding to those grand truths on which human society reposes; for there is neither dignity nor repose in the caprices of a day, which are embraced and abandoned with a degrading precipitation.

The gloomy apprehensions which had so embittered the resolution of the Pope were now dissipated. Pius VII. found himself the guest of a prince full of respectfulness and attention, and adding courtesy to genius; and in the midst of a great nation, that had been led back to the old traditions of Christianity by the example of a glorious chieftain. He was delighted that he had arrived to add to this impulse by his presence. There were still some annoyances in store for him, both as touching the ceremony, and upon the subject of the constitutional bishops, who after their reconciliation to the Church had allowed themselves to cavil about the terms of that reconciliation. They were four in number—Messrs. Lecoq, Archbishop of Besançon; Lacombe, Bishop of Angoulême; Saurine, Bishop of Strasburg; and Remond, Bishop of Dijon. M. Portalis had sent for them, and by order of the emperor had enjoined them, if they desired to be presented to the Pope, to write a letter of reconciliation, drawn up in agreement with Bishop Bernier and the cardinals of the pontifical cortège. At the last moment they wished to change an expression of this letter, which the Pope perceived and remarked upon, leaving to the emperor the task of terminating these melancholy disputes. For the rest, he showed an equally mild and paternal countenance to all the members of the French clergy. There still remained the questions relating to the ceremonial. The Pope had admitted the principal modifications, founded upon the state of society; but he was singularly affected by the question of the crowning. He was desirous to preserve the right transmitted by his predecessors, of placing the crown upon the brow of the emperor. Napoleon gave orders for the point not to be insisted upon, and said that he would undertake to settle everything at the spot itself.

The eve of that grand solemnity now approached; that is to say, the 1st of December. Josephine, who had found favour with the Holy Father by a kind of devoutness much akin to that of the women of Italy, Josephine sought an interview with

him, to make an avowal which she hoped to turn to good account. She declared to him that she had only been civilly married to Napoleon, as at the time of her marriage religious ceremonies were abolished.

The very throne presented a strange specimen of the manners of the time. Napoleon had put an end to this state of things for his sister, the Princess Murat, by begging the Cardinal Caprara to give her the nuptial benediction; but he had not chosen to do the same for himself. The Pope, scandalised by a situation which, in the eyes of the Church, was a mere concubinage, instantly demanded an interview of Napoleon, and in that interview declared that he could very well consecrate him, for the state of the consciences of emperors had never been inquired into by the Church when they were to be crowned, but that he could not, by crowning Josephine, give the divine consecration to a state of concubinage. Napoleon, irritated against Josephine for this interested revelation, fearing to offend the Pope, whom he knew to be inflexible in matters of faith, and, moreover, unwilling to alter a programme which had already been published, consented to receive the nuptial benediction. Josephine, sharply reprimanded by her husband, but delighted with her success, received in the very night preceding the coronation the sacrament of marriage in the chapel of the Tuileries. It was Cardinal Fesch, having M. de Talleyrand and Marshal Berthier for witnesses, who, with the most profound secrecy, married the emperor and empress. The secret was faithfully kept until the epoch of the divorce. On the following morning the reddened eyes of Josephine still bore testimony to the tears which these inward agitations had cost her.

On Sunday, the 2nd of December, a cold but clear winter's day, that population of Paris which, forty years later, we have seen crowding in similar weather towards the mortal remains of Napoleon, hurried to see the passing of the imperial cortège. The Pope first set out at ten o'clock in the morning, and much earlier than the emperor, in order that the two cortèges should not obstruct each other. He was accompanied by a numerous body of clergy, attired with the most costly ornaments, and escorted by detachments of the imperial guard. A richly decorated portico had been erected all round the Place Notre Dame to receive, at their descent from their carriages, the sovereigns and princes who were to proceed to the ancient basilick. The Archbishopric, adorned with a luxury worthy of the guests that it was to shelter, was arranged so that the Pope and the emperor could rest there for an instant. After a brief stay, the Pope entered the church, where for several previous hours there had already been assembled the deputies of the towns, the representatives of the magistracy and of the army, the sixty bishops with their

clergy, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Council of State, the princes of Nassau, Hesse, and Baden, the Arch-Chancellor of the Germanic empire, and lastly, the ministers of the different powers. The great door of Notre Dame had been closed because the back of the imperial throne was placed against it. The church, therefore, was entered by the side doors, situated at the two extremities of the transversal nave. When the Pope, preceded by the cross, and by the ensigns of the successor of St. Peter, appeared within that ancient basilick of St. Louis, all present rose from their seats, and 500 musicians pealed forth in solemn strain the consecrated chant, TU ES PETRUS. The effect of this was instant and sublime. The Pope proceeded at a slow pace direct to the altar, before which he knelt, and then took his place on a throne that had been prepared for him to the right of the altar. The sixty prelates of the French Church presented themselves in succession to salute him. To each of them, constitutional or not, his countenance was equally benevolent. The arrival of the imperial family was now awaited.

The church of Notre Dame was decorated with an unequalled magnificence. Hangings of velvet sprinkled with golden bees descended from the roof to the pavement. At the foot of the altar stood two plain arm-chairs, which the emperor and empress were to occupy before their crowning. At the west end of the church, and opposite to the altar, raised upon twenty-four steps, and placed between columns which supported a pediment, stood an immense throne, a sort of monument within a monument, intended for the emperor, when crowned, and his wife. It was the custom in both the Roman and the French ritual. The monarch did not seat himself upon the throne until after he had been crowned by the Pontiff.

They now waited for the emperor, and waited for a considerable time. This was the only disagreeable circumstance in this grand solemnity. The position of the Pope during this long delay was painful. The fear of the director of the ceremonies lest the two cortèges should meet was the cause of the delay. The emperor set out from the Tuileries in a carriage completely surrounded with glass, surmounted by gilt genii, bearing a crown, a popular carriage in France, and always recognised by the Parisians when it has since appeared in subsequent ceremonies. He was attired in a costume designed by the greatest painter of the day, and very similar to the costumes of the sixteenth century. He wore a plumed hat and a short mantle. He was not to assume the imperial costume until he reached the Archbishopric, and at the moment of entering the church. Escorted by his marshals on horseback, he proceeded slowly along the Rue St. Honoré, the Quay of the Seine, and the Place

Notre Dame, amidst the acclamations of immense crowds, delighted to see their favourite general become emperor, as though he had not himself achieved this with his excitable passions and his warlike heroism, and as if some touch of a magic wand had done it for him. Napoleon, on arriving before the portico which we have already described, alighted from his carriage, proceeded to the Archbishopric, took the crown, the sceptre, and the imperial robe, and directed his course to the cathedral. Beside him was borne the grand crown, in the form of a tiara, and modelled after that of Charlemagne. At this first stage of the ceremony he wore only the crown of the Cæsars, namely, a simple golden laurel. All admired that noble head, noble beneath that golden laurel as some antique medallion. Having entered the church to the sound of pealing music, he knelt, and then passed on to the arm-chair which he was to occupy previous to taking possession of the throne.

The ceremony then commenced. The sceptre, the sword, and the imperial robe had been placed on the altar. The Pope anointed the emperor on the forehead, the arms, and the hands, then blessed the sword with which he girded him, and the sceptre which he placed in his hand, and approached to take up the crown. Napoleon, who had watched his movements, now, as he had promised, settled that difficulty on the spot, by firmly, though not violently, seizing the crown, and placing it upon his own head. This action, which was perfectly appreciated by all present, produced an indescribable effect. Napoleon, then, taking the crown of the empress, and approaching Josephine, as she knelt before him, placed it, with a visible tenderness, upon the head of the partner of his fortunes, who at that moment burst into tears. This done, he proceeded towards the grand throne. He ascended it, followed by his brothers, bearing the train of his robes. Then the Pope, according to custom, advanced to the foot of the throne to bless the new sovereign, and to chant those words which greeted Charlemagne in the basilick of St. Peter, when the Roman clergy suddenly proclaimed him Emperor of the West:—*VIVAT IN ÆTERNUM SEMPER AUGUSTUS*. At this chant shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur*" resounded through the arches of Notre Dame; the cannon added their thunder, and announced to all Paris the solemn moment of Napoleon's consecration, with all the forms received among mankind.

The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès then presented him with the form of the oath, a bishop handed him the New Testament, and upon the book of Christians he took that oath which embodied the great principles of the Revolution. A pontifical high mass was then chanted, and the day was far advanced when the two

cortèges regained the Tuileries, through an immense concourse of people.

Such was the august ceremony which consummated the return of France to monarchical principles. It was not one of the smallest triumphs of our Revolution to see that soldier, sprung from her own womb, anointed by the Pope, who for that express purpose had quitted the capital of the Christian world. It is on this account especially that such pomps are worthy of the attention of the historian.

If moderation of desires, ascending that throne as the companion of genius, had provided sufficient liberty for France, and put a timely limit to heroic enterprises, that ceremony would have consecrated the new dynasty for ever—that is to say, for several centuries. But we were destined to pass by other tracks to a more free political condition, and to a grandeur unhappily too confined.

It was fifteen years since the Revolution had commenced. A monarchy during three years, a Republic during twelve, it had now become a military monarchy, still based upon civil equality, upon the nation's participation in the framing of the laws, and upon the free admission of all the citizens to those re-established social distinctions. It was thus that French society had progressed in fifteen years, successively decomposed and recomposed with the characteristic promptitude of popular passions.

BOOK XXI.

THIRD COALITION..

THREE days after the ceremony of the coronation, Napoleon determined to distribute to the army and the national guards the eagles which were to surmount the colours of the empire. This ceremony, as nobly regulated as the preceding one, had the Champ de Mars for its scene. The representatives of all the corps came to receive the eagles intended for them at the foot of a magnificent throne, raised in front of the palace of the military school, and previous to receiving them they took the oath, which they have since fulfilled, of keeping them even unto death. On the same day there was a banquet at the Tuileries, where the Pope and the emperor sat side by side at the same table, clad in their pontifical and imperial ornaments, and served by the grand officers of the crown.

The multitude, ever greedy for display, was delighted with these pomps. Many, without acknowledging their import, yet admitted them to be a natural consequence of the re-establishment of monarchy. The wise and prudent put up their prayers that the new monarch might not allow himself to be intoxicated by these fumes of omnipotence. However, no sinister prognostic as yet disturbed the public satisfaction. The new order of things was believed to be permanent. With much magnificence, perhaps with too much, there yet was seen a faithful adherence to the social principles proclaimed by the French Revolution, a constantly increasing prosperity notwithstanding the war, and a continuation of grandeur which was calculated to flatter the national pride.

The Holy Father had not wished to remain long in France, but he now hoped that by remaining there he should find a favourable opportunity to express to Napoleon the secret wishes of the Roman court, and he had resigned himself to a two or three months' stay in Paris. Moreover, the season did not admit of his immediately repassing the Alps. Napoleon, who desired to have the Pontiff by his side to show him France, to enable him to comprehend her spirit, and the conditions upon which the re-establishment of religion was practicable, and finally, to win his confidence by frank and daily communication,

Napoleon employed consummate courtesy and kindness in order to detain him, and at length succeeded in completely gaining the affection of that Holy Pontiff. Pius VII. was lodged in the Tuileries, at liberty to follow his simple and religious tastes, but surrounded when he went abroad with all the attributes of supreme power, escorted by the imperial guard, in a word, covered with honours. His interesting countenance and his virtues, almost visible in his person, had deeply touched the Parisians, who followed him everywhere with a mingled curiosity, sympathy, and respect. He visited in their turns all the parishes of Paris, where he officiated amidst extraordinary crowds. His presence added to the religious impulse that Napoleon desired to give to the public mind. The Holy Pontiff was rejoiced at it. He visited the public monuments and the museums which Napoleon had enriched, and seemed to interest himself in the grandeurs of the new reign. In a visit that he made to one of our public establishments he displayed a tact and discretion which obtained him general approbation. Surrounded by a kneeling crowd who solicited his benediction, he perceived a man whose stern and disapproving countenance still bore the imprint of our extinguished passions, and who had turned away to withdraw himself from the pontifical benediction. The Holy Father approaching this person said to him in the gentlest tone —“Do not go away, sir, an old man’s blessing never injured any one.” This noble and touching speech was repeated and applauded by all Paris.

The fêtes and the hospitable attentions that he had lavished upon his venerable guest had not withdrawn the attention of Napoleon from his grand affairs. The fleets that were destined to aid in the descent continued to occupy his full attention. That of Brest was at length ready to sail; but that of Toulon, retarded in its fitting out by the determination to increase it from eight ships to eleven, had occupied the entire month of December. Since it had been complete, foul winds had detained it in port during January. Admiral Missiessy, with five ships fitted out at Rochefort, waited for a tempest to put to sea unperceived by the enemy. Napoleon devoted this time to the interior administration of his new empire.

Although determined upon a war of extinction against England, he thought it necessary to commence his reign by a procedure which was quite useless at that time, and which, besides its uselessness, had the inconvenience of being a mere repetition of another admirably well-timed proceeding which he had taken on attaining the consulate. He wrote a letter to the King of England proposing peace, and he forwarded that letter by a brig belonging to the English squadron before Boulogne. It was immediately communicated to the British cabinet, who

sent word that an answer would be given at a future time. Peace was not only possible but even necessary to the two powers in 1800. The proceeding of the First Consul at that time, therefore, was very proper, and the rejection of his conditions of peace, followed by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, covered Mr. Pitt with confusion, and was even a principal cause of the fall of that minister. But in 1805 the two nations were at the commencement of a new war; their pretensions had risen to such a height that they could only be settled by force, and a proposal for peace seemed too obviously resorted to for the purpose of affecting moderation, or of creating an opportunity to address the King of England as monarch addressing monarch.

What was of more importance than these vain proceedings was the definitive organisation of the Italian Republic. That Republic, daughter of the French Republic, was in everything to share the lot of her mother. In 1802, at the epoch of the Consultum of Lyons, she had framed for herself a constitution in imitation of France, and adopted a government republican in form, but absolute in fact. Now it was natural that she should take the last step in the track of France, and that from a republic she should become a monarchy.

In the preceding book we have recounted the overtures that M. Cambacérès and the minister of the Italian Republic at Paris, M. de Marescalchi, had been charged to make to the Vice-President Melzi, and to the members of the Consultum of the State. Those overtures had been pretty well received, although the Vice-President Melzi, rendered ill-tempered by the state of his health, and by a task too onerous for his powers, had mingled some tolerably bitter reflections with his reply. The Italians had without hesitation accepted the transformation of their Republic into a monarchy, because they hoped to profit by this opportunity to obtain, in part at the least, the fulfilment of their wishes. They were quite willing to accept a king, and to have a brother of Napoleon for that king, but on condition that the choice should fall upon Joseph or Louis Bonaparte, and not upon Lucien, whom they formally excepted; that their king should belong to them alone; that he should constantly reside at Milan; that the two crowns of France and Italy should be immediately separated; that they should pay no further subsidy for the support of the French army; and finally, that Napoleon should undertake to procure Austria's approval of this new change.

"On these conditions," said the Vice-President Melzi, "the Italians would be satisfied, for as yet they had felt their enfranchisement only by the imposition of new burdens."

The idea of their money being carried beyond the Alps is in

general an engrained one with the Italians, subjected, as they so long have been, to powers placed on the other side of the Alps. At the same time they had a more cogent and a nobler motive for wishing for their enfranchisement—the desire of living under a national government. The paltrier reasons disgusted Napoleon, but did not surprise him; for if he had but a sorry opinion of mankind, he never laboured to debase them. In fact no one seeks to debase them who requires great things at their hands. He consequently was indignant at the reasoning of the Vice-President Melzi.

“What!” exclaimed he, “the Italians can only consider the money which their independence costs them! That supposes them very base and very dastardly: for my part, I am far from thinking so poorly of them. Can they free themselves and protect themselves without French troops? If they cannot do so, is it not just that they should contribute to the support of the soldiers who shed their blood for them? Who, then, has consolidated into one State, to make it the body of a nation, five or six provinces formerly governed by five or six different princes? Who, I ask, but the French army, and I who command it? Had I so chosen, Upper Italy would now be cut up, distributed in separate bits, one part given to the Pope, another to the Austrians, a third to the Spaniards. At this price I should have disarmed the powers, and obtained continental peace for France. Do not the Italians perceive that the foundation of their nationality is laid in a State that already includes one-third of all Italy? Is not their government composed of Italians, and founded upon the principles of justice, equality, and a prudential liberty—in a word, upon the principles of the French Revolution? What better can they desire? Can I accomplish everything in a day?”

Napoleon on this occasion was perfectly in the right as to Italy. But for it the fragments of Lombardy would have gratified the Pope, the Emperor of Germany, Spain, and the house of Sardinia, and have served as an equivalent for the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was true that it was in the interests of French policy that Napoleon had laboured to constitute the Italian nationality. But was it not a great benefit to the Italians thus to be bound up with the French policy? Was it not incumbent on them to lend that policy their strenuous support? And, in truth, 22 million francs per annum for the support of above 30,000 men—a fictitious number, too, for there were generally 60,000 at least required there—was that such a very heavy burden for a country which included the richest provinces in Europe? However, Napoleon gave himself but very little uneasiness about these doleful complaints of the Vice-President Melzi. He knew that all this was not to be

taken to the letter. The Italian moderate party, with whose support he governed, abandoned by the nobility and by the priests, who in general inclined towards the Austrians, and by the liberals, who were imbued with exaggerated ideas—the liberal party, in its isolation, felt a certain depression, and willingly painted its situation in the darkest colours. Napoleon attached no weight to this, and, constantly anxious to withdraw Italy from the influence of Austria, he sought the means of accommodating its institutions to the new institutions of France.

The coronation had afforded an opportunity of assembling at Paris the Vice-President Melzi and some delegates of the various Italian authorities. Messrs. Cambacérès, de Marescalchi, and de Talleyrand entered into conferences with them, and came to an understanding upon all points excepting one—that of the subsidy to be paid to France; for although the Italians invoked the French occupation as their salvation, they were nevertheless unwilling to bear the expense of it.

The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was then charged to treat with Joseph Bonaparte on the question of his elevation to the Italian throne. To the great astonishment of Napoleon, Joseph refused that throne upon two pleas, one of them very natural, the other singularly presumptuous. Joseph declared that, on account of the principle of the separation of the two crowns, the condition of the throne of Italy being the renunciation of the throne of France, he preferred to remain a French prince, with all his rights of succession to the empire. Napoleon having no children, Joseph preferred the distant possibility of some day reigning in France to the certainty of immediately reigning in Italy. Such a pretension was only natural and patriotic. The second reason given by Joseph for his refusal was, that the kingdom offered to him was too near a neighbour to France, and consequently too dependent; that he could only reign under the authority of the head of the French empire; and that it did not suit him to reign on those terms. Thus already broke forth those sentiments which animated the brothers of the emperor, upon all the thrones which he bestowed upon them. It was a proof of a silly vanity to be unwilling to have for counsellor such a man as Napoleon. It was a very impolitic ingratitude to wish to be freed from his power; for, placed at the head of a newly-created Italian State, to tend towards isolation was to tend alike towards the ruin of Italy and the weakening of France.

All persuasions employed with Joseph were in vain; and although his future royalty had been announced to all the courts with which France had amicable relations, to Austria, to Prussia, and to the Holy See, it was necessary to revert to other ideas,

and to determine upon a new arrangement. Napoleon, warned by this new experience that he must not create in Lombardy a jealous royalty disposed to obstruct his grand designs, resolved to take himself the iron crown, and assume the title of EMPEROR OF FRANCE AND KING OF ITALY. There was but one objection to this project; it was to recall too forcibly to attention the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was to run the risk of deeply offending Austria, and to recall her from her pacific ideas to the warlike ideas of Mr. Pitt, who since his return to office had endeavoured to avail himself of the breaking off of diplomatic relations between France and Russia to form a new coalition. In order to ward off this inconvenience, Napoleon resolved upon making a formal declaration that he would only wear the crown of Italy until the return of Peace; that at that epoch he would proceed to the separation of the two crowns, by choosing a successor from the French princes. For the moment he adopted Eugène de Beauharnais, the son of Josephine, whom he loved as his own son, and entrusted to him the Viceroyalty of Italy.

This determination once taken, he gave himself but little trouble to make it palatable to M. de Melzi, whose somewhat unreasonable complaints began to weary him, for he perceived in him far more of hankering after popularity than of intention to labour in common for the future establishment of Italy. Messrs. Cambacérès and de Talleyrand were charged to signify these resolutions to the Italians who were present in Paris, and to concert with them the means of execution. These latter appeared apprehensive lest the three grand permanent colleges of *possidenti*, *dotti*, and *commercianti*, to which was entrusted the task of electing the authorities and modifying the constitution when there was need, might resist the project of any other than a Lombard monarchy, completely distinct from the French monarchy, and might cloak their opposition under Italian nonchalance by voting neither for nor against. Napoleon, then, renounced the employment of constitutional forms; he acted as a creator who had made Italy what she then was, and who had the right still to make her whatever he believed it useful that she should become. M. de Talleyrand addressed a report to him, in which he demonstrated that those provinces, some of which were dependent on the ancient Republic of Venice, some of them on the house of Austria, these on the Duke of Modena, those on the Holy See, depended, as conquered provinces, upon the will of the emperor; that what was due to them was an equitable government, adapted to their interests, and founded upon the principles of the French Revolution; but that for the rest he could give to that government whatever form might best accord with his vast designs. A decree

followed constituting the new kingdom, a decree which was to be adopted by the State Consultum and the Italian deputies who were then at Paris, and then communicated to the French Senate as one of the grand constitutional acts of the empire, and promulgated in an imperial sitting. However, it was necessary that Italy should seem to be more or less a party to these new arrangements. It was determined to prepare for her also the pageant of a coronation. It was resolved to take out of the treasury of Monza the famous iron crown of the Lombard kings, that Napoleon might place it upon his head after its being blessed by the Archbishop of Milan, according to the ancient custom of the Germanic emperors, who received the crown of the West at Rome, but that of Italy at Milan. The ceremony would impress the Italians, revive their hopes, regain the nobles and priests, who especially missed in the domination of the Austrians the monarchical forms, and gratify the populace, always captivated by the state of their rulers; for that very state while it charms their sight also feeds their industry. As for the enlightened liberals, they could not fail ultimately to perceive that the future security of Italy could only be provided for by the association of her destinies with those of France.

It was agreed that after the adoption of the new decree, the Italian deputies, the minister Marescalchi, and the grand master of the ceremonies, M. de Segur, should precede Napoleon to Milan, there to arrange an Italian court, and prepare the programme of the coronation.

At this moment a thousand rumours were circulated among the European diplomatists. Now it was affirmed that Napoleon was about to give the crown of Holland to his brother Louis, now that he was about to confer that of Naples upon Joseph, and anon that he was about to annex Genoa and Switzerland to the French territory. There were even some who maintained that Napoleon wished to promote Cardinal Fesch to the papacy, and who already spoke of the crown of Spain as being reserved for a prince of the house of Bonaparte. The hatred of his enemies anticipated his projects on some points, exaggerated them on others, attributed to him some designs which he had not as yet formed, and undoubtedly facilitated them by preparing the mind of Europe for them. The sitting of the Senate for the promulgation of the decree constituting the kingdom of Italy was to reply to all these suppositions, whether true or false, and for the time at least pushed too far.

The Italian deputies were previously assembled at Paris; the decree was submitted to them, and they unanimously agreed to it; and then the imperial session was ordered for the 17th of March 1805 (26th Ventôse, year XIII.). The emperor pro-

ceeded to the Senate at two o'clock, surrounded by all the state of the constitutional sovereigns of England and France when they hold a royal sitting. A grand deputation received him at the door of the palace of the Luxembourg, and he proceeded to seat himself upon the throne, around which were ranged the princes, the six grand dignitaries, the marshals, and the grand officers of the crown. M. de Talleyrand read his report, and after the report the imperial decree. A copy of the same decree, in the Italian language, and bearing the adhesion of the Lombard deputies, was then read by the Vice-President Melzi. Then the minister Marescalchi presented those deputies to Napoleon, to whom in his quality of King of Italy they took the oath of fidelity. That ceremony being terminated, Napoleon, seated, and wearing his hat, delivered a firm and concise speech, such as he well knew how to make, and of which the intention will easily be perceived.

“SENATORS,—We have willed on this occasion to come among you, fully and freely to acquaint you with our views upon one of the most important subjects of State policy.

“We have conquered Holland, three-fourths of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Amidst the greatest prosperity we have been moderate. Out of so many provinces we have kept only those which were necessary to maintain France in the rank of consideration and power to which she has been accustomed. The partition of Poland, the abstraction of provinces from Turkey, the conquest of India and of almost all the colonies had to our injury disturbed the general balance of power.

“All that we have deemed not absolutely necessary for the re-establishment of this balance we have restored.

“Germany has been evacuated; their possessions have been restored to the descendants of many illustrious houses, who would have been irredeemably ruined had we not granted them a generous protection.

“Austria herself, after two unsuccessful wars, has obtained the State of Venice. At any time she would gladly have exchanged for Venice the provinces which she has lost.

“Scarcely was Holland conquered ere she was declared independent. Her annexation to our empire would have been the completion of your commercial system, as the greatest rivers of one-half of our territory have their mouths in Holland. Nevertheless, Holland is independent, and her customs, her commerce, and her administration are regulated at the will of her own government.

“Switzerland was occupied by our armies; we defended it against the combined forces of Europe. Its annexation would have completed our military frontier. Nevertheless, Switzerland,

by the act of mediation, governs itself according to the pleasure of the nineteen free and independent cantons.

“The annexation of the territory of the Italian Republic to the French empire would have aided the development of our agriculture; nevertheless, after its second conquest, we confirmed at Lyons its independence. We this day do still more, we proclaim the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, appointing for that separation the epoch when it shall be practicable and safe to our Italian subjects.

“We have accepted, and we will place upon our head the iron crown of the ancient Lombards, that we may temper anew and strengthen it. But we do not hesitate to declare that we will transmit this crown to one of our lawful children, whether of our own issue or adoptive, as early as we shall be without fears for the independence which we have guaranteed to the other States of the Mediterranean.

“The Genius of Evil will in vain seek for pretexts for rekindling war upon the continent; that which has been annexed to our empire by the constitutional laws will remain annexed to it. No new province will be incorporated with it; but the laws of the Dutch Republic, the act of mediation of the nineteen Swiss cantons, and this first statute of the kingdom of Italy will be constantly under the protection of our crown, and we will never permit them to be attacked.”

At the conclusion of this lofty and peremptory address Napoleon received the oath of some senators whom he had named, and then returned, surrounded by the same attendance, to the palace of the Tuileries. Messrs. de Melzi, de Marescalchi, and the other Italians were directed to proceed to Milan to prepare the public mind for the new solemnity which had been determined upon. Cardinal Caprara, the Pope's legate to Napoleon, was Archbishop of Milan. He had accepted that dignity only in obedience, being very old and oppressed by infirmities, and after a long life passed in courts he was far more inclined to leave the world than to prolong his part. At the request of Napoleon, and with the consent of the Pope, he set out for Italy to crown the new king according to the ancient custom of the Lombard Church. M. de Segur instantly set out, with orders to hurry on the preparations. Napoleon fixed his own departure for the month of April, and his coronation for the month of May.

This excursion into Italy agreed perfectly well with his military projects, and, indeed, even considerably forwarded them. Napoleon had been all the winter waiting till his squadrons should be ready to run out of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. In January 1805 it was about twenty months since the naval war with England had been proclaimed, for the rupture with

England took place in May 1803, and yet the fleet of men-of-war had been unable to set sail. The administration had not been without the strong impulse of Napoleon; but in naval matters nothing can be hurried, as all nations well know who endeavour to create a naval power. At the same time we must admit that the Brest and Toulon fleets would have been sooner ready if it had not been determined to increase their original strength. That of Brest had been increased from eighteen sail to twenty-one, and was calculated to embark seventeen thousand men and five hundred horses, with a great matériel, without any aid from transports borrowed from the merchant service. In the project of sailing in winter, and during bad weather, it had been necessary to give up the idea of being accompanied by vessels of small tonnage, which were equally incapable of following vessels of the line, and of being towed by them. Old men-of-war were in consequence taken up, cleared of their guns, and laden with men and munitions. By this means the squadron could run out altogether, and in all weathers, touch at Ireland, land its seventeen thousand men and its munitions, and then return into the Channel. For the rest, it had been ready, as desired, in November. That of Rochefort, consisting of five ships of the line and four frigates, carrying three thousand men, four thousand muskets, and 100 cwt. of powder, was ready at the same period. Only that of Toulon, increased from eight to eleven sail, had required the whole month of December. General Lauriston, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, had been appointed to form a corps of six thousand picked men, with fifty cannon and a battering train, and to embark the whole in the Toulon fleet. That fleet, as we have mentioned, was to detach a division to St. Helena, to take possession of that island, then proceed to Surinam to retake the Dutch colonies, and then join the squadron of Missiessy, which on its part would have relieved our own West India islands, and ravaged the colonies of the English. Both, then, after having thus decoyed the English towards America, and liberated Ganteaume, were to return to Europe. Ganteaume, whose preparations were completed, had during the whole winter awaited the moment when Missiessy and Villeneuve, running out of Toulon, should draw off the English. Missiessy, who wanted energy, but did not want courage, ran out of Rochefort on the 11th of January, during a frightful storm, and steering through the narrow passes, gained the open sea without being overtaken or even seen by the English. He made sail for the West Indies with five ships of the line and four frigates.

His vessels received some damage, which was repaired at sea. As for Villeneuve, to whom the minister Decrès had communicated a factitious and merely temporary excitement, he was

instantly cooled on obtaining a close sight of the Toulon squadron. To make eleven crews out of eight, it had been necessary to divide, and of course to weaken them. They had been completed with conscripts drafted from the land service. The materials used in the port of Toulon were not of good quality, and it was found that the iron work, cordage, masts, and spars easily broke. Villeneuve was in great, perhaps too great, anxiety about the risks to be run in facing with such craft and such crews the ships of the enemy, trained by a cruise of twenty months. His soul was shaken even before he put to sea. However, urged by Napoleon and by the minister Decrès, he got ready to weigh anchor towards the end of December. A head wind detained him in Toulon roads from the end of December to the 18th of January. On the 18th, the wind having shifted, he set sail, and by shifting his course succeeded in evading the enemy. But in the course of the night a heavy tempest arose, and the inexperience of the crews and the bad quality of the materials exposed all our vessels to serious accidents. The squadron was dispersed. In the morning Villeneuve found himself separated, with four ships of the line and one frigate. Some had carried away their top-masts, others had sprung leaks or had received damage not easily repaired at sea. Besides these misadventures, two English frigates were watching us, and the admiral was afraid of the enemy coming up with him at the moment when he had but five sail to oppose to him. He therefore determined to put back to Toulon, although he was already seventy leagues distant from it; and notwithstanding the entreaties of General Lauriston, who, reckoning four thousand and some hundreds of men on board the vessels which still remained together, demanded to be taken to his destination, Villeneuve returned to Toulon on the 27th, and succeeded in assembling his whole squadron there.

The time was not thrown away. The damages that had been sustained were repaired, the masts and rigging were repaired, and everything put in order for sailing again. But Admiral Villeneuve was much affected; on the very day of his return to Toulon he wrote the minister: "I declare to you that vessels thus equipped, short-handed, encumbered with troops, with superannuated or bad materials, vessels which lose their masts or sails at every puff of wind, and which in fine weather are constantly engaged in repairing the damages caused by the wind or the inexperience of their sailors, are not fit to undertake anything. I had a presentiment of this before I sailed; I have now only too painfully experienced it." *

* Despatch of the 1st Pluviôse, year XIII. (21st of January 1805), dated on board the ship *Bucentaur* in Toulon road.

Napoleon was sensibly displeased on hearing of this useless sortie. "What," said he, "is to be done with admirals who allow their spirits to sink and determine to hasten home at the first damage that they receive? It would be requisite to give up sailing, and to remain wholly inactive even in the finest weather, if an expedition is to be prevented by the separation of a few vessels. The whole of the captains," he added, "ought to have had sealed orders to meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired *en route*. If any vessel leaked dangerously she should have been left at Cadiz, her crew and the troops being transferred to the *Eagle*, which was in that port and ready for sailing. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale of wind, were everyday occurrences. Two days of fine weather ought to have cheered up the crews and put everything to rights. *But the great evil of our navy is that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command.*" *

Unfortunately the right moment for the expedition to Surinam had gone by, and it was necessary that Napoleon, with his usual fertility of invention, should devise a new plan. The first, which had consisted in Admiral Latouche proceeding from Toulon into the Channel, had fallen to the ground, owing to the death of that valuable officer. The second, which had consisted in decoying the English into the American seas, by sending Villeneuve's squadron to Surinam, and Missiessy's to the Antilles, and in taking advantage of this diversion to bring Ganteaume's squadron into the Channel, had equally failed from delays in organisation, foul winds, and an unsuccessful sortie. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to another plan. A new loss, that of Admiral Bruix, different from Admiral Latouche, but at least his equal in merit, added to the difficulty of naval operations. The unfortunate Bruix, so remarkable for his firmness, experience, and strength of mind, had died through his zeal and devotion to the organisation of the flotilla. Had he lived, Napoleon would certainly have placed him at the head of the squadron charged with the grand manœuvre that he meditated. One would have said that Fate, conjured up in hostility to the French navy, had purposely deprived it in the course of ten months of its two most eminent admirals, either of them undoubtedly capable of opposing the English admirals. It was in consequence necessary to be content with Admirals Ganteaume, Villeneuve, and Missiessy until the events of war should develop new officers of merit.

A grave event had recently taken place as to the sea, where it greatly altered the situation of the belligerent powers. England, in an unlooked for and very unjust manner, had declared war

* Letter to Lauriston, of the 1st of February 1805.

against Spain. For some time she had perceived that the neutrality of Spain, without being friendly in intention towards France, was nevertheless useful to her in more than one respect. Our squadron, lying at Ferrol, had refitted there while waiting for the blockade to be removed. The *Eagle* did the same at Cadiz. Our privateers entered the ports of the Peninsula for the purpose of selling their prizes. As matter of reciprocity, England had a right to the same advantages; but she preferred to forego them rather than suffer France to enjoy them. Accordingly she announced to the court of Madrid that she considered as a breach of neutrality what was taking place in the ports of the Peninsula, and threatened war if our vessels continued to repair or fit out there, and if our privateers continued to find an asylum and a market there. She had still further required Charles IV. to guarantee Portugal against all attempts on the part of Napoleon. This last was an exorbitant exaction, going beyond the limit of the neutrality that was required from Spain. At the same time, France had permitted the court of Madrid to show itself accommodating towards England, and even to grant a part of her demands in order to prolong a state of things which answered our purpose. In fact, the military co-operation of Spain was not worth so much to us as a subsidy of 48 million francs per annum, and that subsidy could only be paid by means of the neutrality which alone permitted the arrival of specie from the New World. We were consequently ready to consent to everything; but England, becoming more exacting in proportion as her demands were complied with, had required that all repairs and outfitting should cease in the ports of Spain; by which she meant that our ships were immediately to be sent out of Ferrol, in other words, to be given up. Openly violating the laws of nations, she, without any previous notice, ordered the capture of all Spanish vessels that might be met with at sea. Considering that such an order had no other object than the capture of vessels coming from America laden with gold, we may justly term it a measure of downright piracy. At this time four Spanish frigates, laden with 12 million dollars (£2,400,000), on their passage from Mexico to Spain, were captured by an English squadron. The Spanish commander having refused to give up his vessels, was barbarously attacked by an immensely superior force, and made prisoner after a gallant defence. One of the frigates was blown up, the other three were taken to ports of Great Britain.

This odious measure excited the indignation of Spain and the reprobation of all Europe. Charles IV. unhesitatingly declared war against England. He at the same time ordered the arrest of the English who were found on the territory of the Peninsula,

and the sequestration of all their property, to answer for the property and persons of Spanish merchants.

Thus in spite of her inaction, and in spite of the skilful forbearance of France, Spain was dragged into war by the maritime violences of England. Napoleon, having no longer any ground for requiring the subsidy of 48 million francs, hastened to settle the manner in which Spain should co-operate in the war, and especially endeavoured to inspire her with resolutions worthy of herself and of her ancient greatness.

The Spanish cabinet, with the desire of gratifying Napoleon, and from a sense of justice towards merit, had chosen Admiral Gravina as its ambassador to France. He was at the head of the Spanish navy, and beneath a simple exterior concealed a rare intelligence and great courage. Napoleon was much attached to Admiral Gravina, who was equally attached to Napoleon. For the same reasons that had caused him to be named ambassador, he had the principal command of the Spanish navy given to him, and previous to quitting Paris he was instructed to concert with the French government on the plan of naval operations. To this end the admiral, on the 4th of January 1805, signed a convention which detailed the part which each of the two powers should take in the war. France engaged constantly to keep at sea forty-seven ships of the line, twenty-nine frigates, fourteen corvettes, and twenty-five brigs; and to hasten as much as possible the finishing of the sixteen ships and fourteen frigates which were on the stocks; to concentrate all the troops which were encamped near the ports of embarkation, in the proportion of five hundred men to each ship and two hundred to each frigate; to keep the French flotilla constantly ready to transport ninety thousand men, exclusive of the thirty thousand intended to be embarked in the Dutch flotilla. Reckoning the flotilla as equal to so many ships and frigates, and adding our ships of war, we may be said to have had an effective total of sixty ships and forty frigates at that time at sea.

Spain, on her part, promised instantly to fit out thirty-two ships of the line, furnished with provisions for six months, and with water for four months. The division of them was thus fixed: fifteen to Cadiz, eight to Carthagena, and nine to Ferrol. Spanish troops were to be assembled at the points of embarkation, at the rate of four hundred and fifty men to each ship and two hundred men to each frigate. Further, she was to be prepared with vessels *en flute* (i.e., converted into transports by having their guns taken out), in the proportion of four thousand tons at Cadiz, two thousand at Carthagena, and two thousand at Ferrol. It was agreed that Admiral Gravina should have the chief command of the Spanish fleet, and should correspond

directly with the French minister Decrès. In other words, he was to receive instructions from Napoleon himself, and Spanish honour needed not to blush for accepting such a direction. Some political conditions accompanied these military stipulations. The subsidy naturally ceased on the day on which England commenced hostilities against Spain. Further, the two nations agreed not to make peace separately. France promised to cause the colony of Trinidad to be restored to Spain, and Gibraltar also, should the war be attended with some signal success.

The engagement entered into by the court of Madrid was far above its means. Instead of thirty-two ships, it was much if she fitted out twenty-four, and but of middling quality, though with gallant crews. If, then, the whole forces of France, Spain, and Holland be summed up, we may consider the three nations to have possessed ninety-two ships of the line; of which sixty belonged to France, twenty-four to Spain, and eight to Holland. But the flotilla must be reckoned for fifteen, which reduced the actual naval force of the three nations to seventy-seven sail of the line. The English had eighty-nine, perfectly armed, well found, manned with experienced crews, and in every respect superior to those of the two allies, and this number was about to be increased to a hundred. The advantage, therefore, was on their side; they could only be beaten by superior combinations, which are far from being as efficacious by sea as they are by land.

Unfortunately, Spain, formerly so powerful in her navy, and still so much interested in being so on account of her vast colonies—Spain, as we have already often remarked, was in a state of absolute destitution. Her arsenals were abandoned, and contained no wood, hemp, copper, or iron. The magnificent establishments of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena were empty and deserted. They had neither stores nor workmen. The seamen, few in number in Spain, since her commerce was almost reduced to the conveyance of specie, were just now still further diminished in number by the yellow fever, which had ravaged all the seaboard, and had driven them abroad or into the interior. When to this we add a great scarcity of grain, and extreme financial distress, increased by the loss of the galleons that had recently been captured, we shall still have but an inadequate idea of all the miseries which afflicted that power, once so great, but at that period so sadly reduced.

Napoleon, who had so often and so vainly counselled Spain during the late peace to devote at least a portion of her resources to the reorganisation of a navy—Napoleon, although with but little hope of being attended to, resolved to make another effort with that court. This time, instead of employing threats, as in 1803, he employed encouragements and

caresses. He had recalled Marshal Lannes from Portugal to place him at the head of the grenadiers, who were to be the first of our troops to land in England. He had appointed General Junot to replace Lannes in Portugal. He was partial to Junot, who had natural talent and a boundless devotion, though somewhat too ardent a temperament. He ordered him to stop at Madrid, to see the Prince of Peace, the queen, and the king. Junot was to pique the honour of the Prince of Peace, to make him feel that the fate of the Spanish monarchy was in his hands, and that he had to choose between the part of a contemptible and detested favourite, and that of a minister making use of the favour of his sovereigns to restore power to his country. Junot was authorised to promise him the full friendship of Napoleon, and even a principality in Portugal, if he would zealously serve the common cause, and endeavour to infuse an adequate activity into the Spanish administration. Napoleon's envoy was then to see the queen, to declare to her that her influence over the government—that is to say, over the king and the Prince of Peace—was well known in Europe; that her personal honour, as well as the honour of the kingdom, was interested in great and successful exertions being made; that if the power of Spain was not put forth on this occasion, she, the all-powerful queen, would in the eyes of the world and of her children be responsible for the disorders which would have weakened and ruined the monarchy. Junot was to try all possible means to inspire this princess with better principles. As regarded the king, no such efforts were necessary, for his sentiments were excellent; but the weak king had neither attention nor energy. He was brutalised by the chase, and by mechanical labours.

Junot had orders to make some stay at Madrid previously to proceeding to Portugal, and to play the part of ambassador-extraordinary, in order to reanimate in some degree that degenerate court.

The great matter now was to make the best possible use of the naval resources of the three nations, France, Holland, and Spain. The project of suddenly bringing a more or less considerable portion of his navy into the Channel, a project which had twice been modified, had incessantly occupied the attention of Napoleon. But a grand and sudden idea now for a moment turned him aside from it.

Napoleon had frequently received reports from General Decaen, commandant of our factories in India, who had retired to the Isle of France since the renewal of war, and in conjunction with Admiral Linois had done great damage to the English commerce. General Decaen, an ardent spirit, well qualified to command at a distance, and in an independent and perilous

position, had formed connections with the Mahrattas, who were still insubordinate. He had procured some curious information as to the dispositions of the recently vanquished princes, and had arrived at the conviction that six thousand French, disembarked with a sufficient war matériel, and speedily joined by a multitude of insurgents eager to throw off the yoke, could shake the British empire in India. It will be remembered that it was Napoleon who in 1803 had suggested this to General Decaen, who had ardently seized the idea. But it was no mere mad enterprise that Napoleon contemplated; if anything was to be attempted it was a grand expedition, worthy to rival that of Egypt, and adequate to wresting from the English that important conquest which forms at once their glory and their grandeur in the present century. The distance alone would render that expedition far more difficult than that of Egypt. To transport, in a time of war, thirty thousand men from Toulon to Alexandria was a difficult operation; but to convey them from Toulon to the shores of India, doubling the Cape of Good Hope, was a gigantic enterprise. Napoleon was of opinion, founded on his own experience, that the immensity of the ocean rendering meetings there very unfrequent, only invention was required to venture upon and succeed in the boldest movements without falling in with an enemy, though very superior in number. It was thus that in 1798 he had passed through the English fleets with some hundreds of vessels and an entire army, taken Malta, and reached Alexandria, without being met by Nelson. It was thus that he hoped to get a fleet into the Channel. The success of such enterprises required profound secrecy and great art to deceive the British admiralty. He had elaborately prepared everything for perplexing the English nation. Having troops assembled and ready for embarkation wherever he had squadrons, at Toulon, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, and at the Texel, he at all times had it in his power to send out an army without the English being aware of either its strength or its destination. The project of the descent had this use, that the attention of the enemy being constantly directed towards that object, they would anticipate an expedition against Ireland or the coasts of England. The moment, then, was favourable for attempting one of those extraordinary expeditions, which Napoleon was so prompt in planning and deciding upon. He considered, for instance, that to wrest India from the English was a result sufficiently grand to warrant him in deferring all his other projects, even including that of the descent, and upon that expedition he was inclined to employ all his naval resources. The following were his calculations upon this subject:—In the outfitting ports he had, besides the squadrons ready to sail, a reserve of old vessels

not very fit for active service. He had also among his crews, besides able and experienced seamen, very young novices, and conscripts newly put on board ship. It was upon this double consideration that he based his plan.

He determined to combine with a certain number of new vessels all those which were past service, but which were still fit to make a voyage; he resolved to arm them *en flute*, that is, to remove their guns, to put on board instead of them a great mass of troops, complete the crews with all sorts of men from our ports, and thus to send out from Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, fleets which, without being accompanied by a single transport ship, could land a considerable army in India. He proposed to send thirteen ships from Toulon and twenty-one from Brest, in all thirty-four, one-half of them at least old vessels, and to add to them a score of frigates, one-half of them almost past service. These two fleets, running out to sea almost at the same time, and being appointed to join company at the Isle of France, would be capable of carrying soldiers and sailors to the number of 40,000. On reaching India the vessels in bad condition were to be broken up, and only those preserved which were fit for sailing, which would be fifteen ships out of thirty-four, and ten frigates out of twenty. There were also two divisions to be made in the crews. All the good sailors were intended to man the vessels that were to be preserved, while the inferior sailors, capable, however, of being converted into soldiers, were to complete the army of disembarkation. Napoleon judged that it would require about 14,000 or 15,000 seamen efficiently to man the fifteen ships and ten frigates which were to return to Europe. We should then have in India from 25,000 to 26,000 troops out of the 40,000 seamen and soldiers sent from Europe, and we should have back a fleet of fifteen sail, excellent alike for the quality of the vessels, the choice of the men, and the experience acquired in a long voyage. In reference to the navy, the only loss would be worthless hulks and the fag ends of crews, and we should leave in India an army sufficient to conquer the English, especially if it were commanded by so enterprising a man as General Decaen. Napoleon still further prepared to send out 3000 French in the Dutch fleet of the Texel, 2000 in a new fleet organised at Rochefort, and 4000 Spaniards in the Spanish fleet of Cadiz, which would form a new reinforcement of 9000 men, and raise the army of General Decaen to 35,000 or 36,000 men. It is extremely probable that, India being scarcely subjected, such a force would have overthrown the British power there. As regarded the voyage, nothing was less likely than meeting the English. It would have been difficult to escape from them if the war squadron had to be accompanied by some hundreds

of transport ships. But the old ships and old frigates, armed *en flute*, rendered that unnecessary. The principle, then, on which the project rested was to sacrifice the inferior or bad portion of the navy, alike as to men and vessels, and resolve to bring back only the portion which was excellent. At this cost the miracle would be performed of transporting to India an army of 36,000 men. Indeed, the sacrifice was not as great as it appeared to be, for every sailor knows that at sea, as on land, and even more at sea than on land, the quality of forces is everything, and that more can be done with ten good vessels than with twenty inferior ones.

This project implied the momentary postponing of the descent; but it was possible that it would favour it in an extraordinary manner, for after some time, when the English should learn the departure of our fleets, they would follow them, and thus leave the seas of Europe open, while the squadron, returning from India with fifteen ships and ten frigates, could pass into the Straits of Dover, where Napoleon, in constant readiness, would be prepared to avail himself of even the shortest gleam of good fortune. It is true that this latter part of the plan supposed a double success; success in going to India and success in returning; and Fortune rarely heaps her favours to this extent upon any man, however great. During four weeks Napoleon remained in suspense between the idea of sending this expedition to India and the idea of crossing the Straits of Dover. The overthrow of the English power in India appeared to him to be so important a result as to dispense with the necessity for risking himself and his army in so perilous an attempt as the descent. For a whole month, then, he hesitated between these two plans, and his letters bear testimony to the fluctuations of his mind between those two extraordinary enterprises.

However, the Boulogne expedition gained the preference. Napoleon considered that stroke the prompter of the two, the more decisive, and even the more infallible if a French fleet should suddenly appear in the Channel. He set his mind to work again, and he hit upon a new arrangement, grander, more profound, and more promising than the two former ones, for assembling without the knowledge of the English all his naval forces between Dover and Boulogne.

His plan was resolved upon early in March, and the orders accordingly given. In this plan, as in that of Surinam, the English were to be decoyed towards India and the West Indies, whither the squadron of Admiral Missiessy, which had sailed on the 11th of January, already called their attention, and the French were then suddenly to return to the seas of Europe, with an assemblage of force superior to any squadron the English

could muster. It was in some degree the same project as that of the previous December, but increased and completed by the junction of the forces of Spain. Admiral Villeneuve was to sail with the first favourable wind, pass the Strait, call at Cadiz for Admiral Gravina, with six or seven Spanish ships, besides the *Eagle*, then proceed to Martinique, and if Missiessy were still there, join him, and wait for a further junction more considerable than all the others. This junction was that of Ganteaume. He, profiting by the first equinoctial gale which should disperse the English, was to sail from Brest with twenty-one ships, the best of this arsenal, steer for Ferrol, be joined by the French division in port there, and the Spanish division which would be ready to sail, and then steer for Martinique, where Villeneuve would be awaiting him. After this general assemblage, which presented but few real difficulties, there would be at Martinique twelve sail under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, and twenty-one under Ganteaume, besides the Franco-Spanish squadron of Ferrol, that is to say, about fifty to sixty vessels—an enormous force, the concentration of which had never been witnessed at any time or on any sea. The plan was now so complete, so well calculated, that it necessarily produced in the mind of Napoleon a rapture of hope. Even the minister Decrès confessed that it presented the greatest chances of success. It was always possible to run out of Toulon with the (*Mistral*) north-west wind, as the late sortie of Villeneuve showed. The junction with Gravina at Cadiz, should Nelson be outwitted, was easy, for the English had not yet thought it necessary to blockade that port. The Toulon squadron, thus increased to seventeen or eighteen sail, was almost certain to reach Martinique. Missiessy had touched there without meeting anything during his voyage except some merchantmen, which he captured. The most difficult point was to get out of Brest road. But in March there was every reason to expect some equinoctial gale. Ganteaume, on arriving before Ferrol, which was only blockaded by five or six English vessels, would, on presenting himself with twenty-one, put all idea of fighting out of their minds, and without striking a blow, succeed in adding to his force the French division commanded by Admiral Gourdon, and those Spanish vessels which were ready, and then proceed to Martinique. It could not be suspected by the English that there was any design of assembling, at a single point like Martinique, from fifty to sixty vessels at once. It was probable that their ideas would turn towards India. At all events, Ganteaume, Gourdon, Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy, having once effected a junction, no English squadron that they might meet, and numbering at most only from twelve to fifteen sail, would venture to oppose fifty, and the return

into the Channel was consequently secured. All our forces, then, were to be assembled together between the shores of England and France, at the moment when the fleets of England would be sailing towards the East or the West Indies. Events speedily proved that this grand plan was practicable even with an inferior execution.

Every precaution was taken to preserve the most profound secrecy. The plan was not confided to the Spaniards, who had engaged to follow with docility the directions of Napoleon. Villeneuve and Ganteaume alone of the admirals were to be entrusted with the secret, and they were not to have it on sailing, but when fairly at sea, and without opportunity of communicating with land. Then their sealed orders, which they were only to open on reaching a certain latitude, would instruct them what course to steer. None of the captains of these vessels were let into the secret of the expedition, but they had certain fixed points at which to rejoin each other in case of separation. None of the ministers were acquainted with the plan excepting Admiral Decrès. He was expressly instructed to correspond directly with Napoleon, and to write his despatches with his own hand. The report of an expedition to India was circulated in all the ports. It was pretended that great numbers of troops were embarked; in reality, the Toulon squadron was charged to take scarcely three thousand men, and the Brest squadron six or seven thousand. The admirals were instructed to land half that force in the West Indies to reinforce the garrisons there, and to bring back four or five thousand of the best soldiers to add to the force of Boulogne.

By arranging matters thus, the fleets would not be greatly encumbered, but free and comfortable. They were all victualled for six months, so that they might remain at sea a long time without putting into port. Couriers were despatched to Ferrol and Cadiz, bearing orders to have everything prepared for weighing, because at any moment the blockade might be raised by an allied fleet, without saying which or how.

To all these precautions for outwitting the English one more was added, which was not less calculated to deceive them—the journey of Napoleon into Italy. He computed that his fleets, sailing towards the end of March, and employing the month of April to go to Martinique, the month of May to assemble together, and the month of June to return, would get into the Channel in the beginning of July. He was to remain all that time in Italy reviewing troops and giving fêtes, hiding his profound designs beneath the appearances of a vain and sumptuous life; then at the appointed moment to set off secretly by post, travel in five days from Milan to Boulogne, and while he was supposed to be still in Italy, strike his long-meditated blow

upon England; that blow which she had so much expected for two years, that she now began to disbelieve it. Europe now considered it a mere feint, intended to convulse the British nation, and oblige it to exhaust itself in useless efforts. While this idea was adopted, Napoleon, on the contrary, had incessantly been increasing his army of invasion by drafting from the depôts the number of men necessary to increase the effective force of the war battalions, and by filling up from the conscription of the year the void thus caused in the depôts. The army of Boulogne was thus augmented by nearly thirty thousand men, without any one knowing it. He had always kept this army in such a state of activity and readiness, that it was scarcely possible to judge of its greater or less effective force. The opinion of a mere demonstration intended to harass England daily became the prevalent opinion.

Everything being thus arranged, with the firmest resolution to attempt the enterprise, and with a deep conviction of success, Napoleon prepared to set out for Italy. The Pope had remained during the whole winter at Paris. He at first intended to set out in the middle of February on his return to his own States. Heavy snowstorms in the Alps delayed his departure. Napoleon so winningly urged his further stay that the Holy Father yielded, and consented to defer his departure to the middle of March. Napoleon was not ill-pleased that Europe should note this long visit, that his intimacy with the Pope should become greater every day, and that his holiness should remain on this side of the Alps while preparations were making at Milan for a second coronation. The courts of Naples, Rome, and even Etruria, did not without regret perceive the creation of a vast French kingdom in Italy, and if the Pope had been at the Vatican, besieged by all sorts of suggestions, perhaps he would have been induced to show himself unfavourable to it.

Pius VII., after having learned to put full confidence in Napoleon, had ended by entrusting him with his secret desires. He was delighted with the honours paid to his person—honours which benefited religion—with the good which his presence appeared to do, and also with what the new emperor had done in France to aid the restoration of public worship. But though a saint-like man, Pius VII. still was a man and a prince; and the triumph of spiritual interests, while it filled him with satisfaction, did not cause him to forget the temporal interests of the Holy See, damaged since the loss of the Legations. Six cardinals had accompanied him, one of whom, Cardinal Borgia, had died at Lyons. The others, especially Antonelli and di Pietro, were of the ultramontane party, and strongly opposed to Cardinal Caprara, who was too prudent and enlightened to suit them. They consequently had induced the Pope to conceal

his proceedings from that cardinal, who in his quality of legate ought to have been informed of all negotiations attempted in Paris. He certainly would not have taught them the way to succeed in their projects, for what could be done for the Church Napoleon did spontaneously, and without being urged. But that personage, full of prudence and experience, would have dissuaded them from useless efforts, which are always to be regretted, as they most frequently become the cause of quarrel.

They began to dogmatise with Napoleon upon the four propositions of Bousset, which Louis XIV., towards the close of his reign, was said to have promised to annul. Napoleon, gentle in manner, but inflexible as to the essential, made it manifest that nothing was to be expected from him as to the revocation of the famous Organic Articles. There remained the manner of executing them. He appeared inclined to attend to the observations which they might offer to him upon this subject. At first they spoke to him of the jurisdiction of bishops over the ecclesiastics, of which much had been said to him, and which Pius VII. did not deem to be sufficiently complete. To this Napoleon, concerting his replies with M. Portalis, replied that every spiritual offence was, and would continue to be, left to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that every civil offence against the civil law would continue to be referred to the ordinary tribunals, for the priests were citizens, and therefore must be held accountable to the common laws. It was pretended that 38 million francs per annum (£1,520,000) were required for the support of religion, while there were but 13 million francs (£520,000) devoted to it in the budget of the State, which left a deficiency of 25 million francs (£1,000,000 sterling). Napoleon replied by enumerating what he had done in that respect, and that which he still intended to do, in proportion to the gradual increase of the revenues of the State. Mention was made to him of various other objects foreign to the Organic Articles and their execution, especially of divorce, which was permitted by our new laws. Napoleon, still consulting M. Portalis, replied, that divorce had appeared to the legislator to be indispensable as a remedy to certain disorders of morals, but that the priests remained free to refuse the religious benediction to divorced persons who wished to contract a new marriage; that the conscience of the priests, therefore, was not outraged; and that, moreover, that was not a matter opposed to the dogma, inasmuch as divorce had existed in the ancient Church. From this subject they turned to that of Sundays and holidays, which, notwithstanding the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar, were not generally enough observed by the people. Napoleon replied that already, towards the close of the last century, manners, more potent than laws,

had brought about a relaxation ; and that before the Revolution workmen in the towns used to work on Sundays ; that penalties applied in this case would be less serviceable than example ; that the government would always set good ones ; and that workmen paid by the State should never work on holidays ; that the Sunday was faithfully observed by the country people, and only neglected by the population of the towns ; and that in the towns, to compel the people in the towns to be idle, would, besides the inconvenience of having recourse to the penal law, be giving to drunkenness and vice the time taken away from labour ; and finally, that everything had been tried that was permitted by a religious, but also a prudent policy.

Another subject was touched upon—that of education ; and they demanded for the clergy the power of superintending the schools. Napoleon replied, that in the Lyceums there would be almoners chosen from among priests conforming in doctrine with the Church ; that they would virtually be ecclesiastical inspectors of houses of education, and could point out to their bishops those in which the religious teaching was defective, but that there would be over the educational establishments no other authority than that of the State. Some mention was also made of the bishops dissentient with the Holy See, and it was agreed to reduce them to that peace, voluntary or forced, in which Napoleon was resolved that the whole clergy should live. This series of questions of spiritual interests was terminated by the discussion of a plan which had unceasingly occupied the court of Rome—that of obtaining that the Catholic religion should be the established religion of the State. On this subject Napoleon was inflexible. He maintained that that religion was dominant, in fact, since it was the religion of the majority of the French people, and since the important actions of the government, such, for instance, as the taking of the crown, had been surrounded by Catholic ceremonies. But a declaration of that kind was calculated to alarm all the dissenting faiths ; now his intention was to ensure perfect repose to them all, and he would not allow that the re-establishment of the Catholic faith, a re-establishment which he had willed, and frankly willed, should be any diminution of the security of any other religion.

On all these points Napoleon was extremely mild in form, unalterably firm as to substance. At length they passed to the essential point, that which touched Rome more nearly than all the points of ecclesiastical discipline—the business of the Legations. A memorial was drawn up, which Pius VII. himself delivered to Napoleon, and which related to the losses which the Holy See had sustained during a century past, alike in revenues and in territories. In this memorial various revenues

were enumerated, which the Holy See formerly collected in all Catholic States, and which, under the influence of the public spirit in France, had been diminished or wholly suppressed in France, in Austria, and even in Spain.

The memorial recalled the manner in which the Holy See had been kept out of its reversion of the duchy of Parma, on the extinction of the Farnese house, the still older privation of the county Venaissin, which had been ceded to France; and the gravest of all the losses, that of the Legations, incorporated in the Italian Republic. Thus reduced, the Holy See could no longer, it was urged, make head against the inevitable expenses of the Catholic worship in all parts of the world. It could neither put the cardinals in a position to support their dignity, nor support foreign missions, nor provide for the defence of its weak States. They reckoned upon the modern Charlemagne vieing in munificence with the ancient one. Here Napoleon did not fail to feel some embarrassment at so direct a demand. He had made no promise to attract the Pope to Paris; but all along he had, in a general way, left room to hope that he would ameliorate the worldly circumstances of the Holy See. To restore the Legations to the pontifical court was a thing impossible, without odiously betraying that Italian Republic of which he was the founder, and was about to become the monarch. That would have been to destroy all the hopes of the Italian patriots, who looked upon that new State as the commencement of the independent existence of their country. But he had at his disposal the duchy of Parma, which he would not grant either to the house of Sardinia as an indemnity for Piedmont, nor to Spain as an aggrandisement of the kingdom of Etruria, and which at this time he reserved as a family endowment. It would no doubt have been prudent to employ it as an indemnity to the house of Sardinia, or even to add it to Etruria, while obliging the latter to indemnify the house of Sardinia with the Siennese. At the same stroke, peace would have been purchased with Russia, and great pleasure given to Spain. But if it were not thought worth while to keep on good terms with Russia, who had withdrawn her *chargé d'affaires*, or to gratify Spain, whose inertness was scarcely to be roused into energy by friendly actions, it would have been a destination worthy of the lofty designs of Napoleon, to give the duchy of Parma to the Pope. In ceding it to the Holy See, Napoleon would have put an end to many rumours as to his designs in Italy; he would have destroyed the chief argument used to induce Austria to join in a new coalition, and what was no less important, he would for ever have bound the Pope to him, and prevented that painful rupture with the Holy See, which, at a later period, did him so much moral injury, and which in reality had no other origin

than the ill-disguised discontent of the court of Rome on this occasion. All this would have been better than reserving Parma, as Napoleon then resolved to reserve it, as a family endowment. His having, in 1804, allowed the alliance of Prussia to escape him, and sent home the Pope in 1805, covered with honours, but wounded in his interests, formed, in our opinion, the first essential errors of that powerful policy, whose mistake it was to account only with itself, and never with others.

Napoleon took advantage of these applications being confined solely to the Legations, to make the simple and easy reply which sprang out of the very state of the case. He could not betray a State which had chosen him for its head, a legitimate and decisive reason as to the Legations; and he announced his intention of, at a future time, ameliorating the situation of the Holy See. He charged Cardinal Fesch to enter into an explanation with the Pope. He would at that time render him pecuniary aid, and he held out the prospect of new distributions of territory at no distant day, by means of which the Pope could be indemnified. For the rest he was sincere, for he descried these distributions in a not distant future. He saw, in fact, an early rekindling of war upon the continent, Italy wholly conquered, Venice wrested from Austria, and Naples from the Bourbons, and he deemed that in all this he could easily find wherewithal to satisfy the Pope.

But the deferring of these good intentions allowed a present displeasure to arise, which speedily became the source of mischievous consequences.

Napoleon and the Pope separated without being so much displeased with each other as the demands made and refused might have given reason to fear. The Pope, in lieu of the dangers which blunderers had predicted on his leaving Rome, had experienced a magnificent reception at Paris, had augmented the religious impulse by his presence; in short, had occupied in France a position worthy of the palmiest days of the Church. On the whole, if his interested councillors were discontented, he departed satisfied. He left Paris on the 4th of April 1805, in the midst of a greater crowd of people than had welcomed his arrival. He was to stay some days at Lyons to celebrate Easter.

Napoleon had prepared everything for his journey at the same period. After having given his final orders to the fleet and the army, and reiterated his urgent directions to the court of Spain, to have everything ready at Ferrol and at Cadiz, and after giving the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, not the ostensible, but the actual direction of the empire, he, on the 1st of April, proceeded to Fontainebleau, where he was to remain for two or three days. He departed, delighted with his projects, and full of confidence

in their success. He had a first pledge of that success in the fortunate departure of Admiral Villeneuve. He had at length set sail on the 30th of March, with a favourable wind, and he had been lost sight of from the heights of Toulon, without any fear existing of his having met the English. One thwarting circumstance alone prevented the satisfaction from being complete. On the 1st of April the equinox was not yet felt at Brest, and the existing calm and clear weather was not that which was needed for dispersing the English, or concealing from them the movements of a squadron, so that the departure of Ganteaume had been rendered impossible. Had he once been clear of Brest, the success of the assemblages would have been almost made certain; and it was to suppose a phenomenon in the seasons, to entertain a doubt that the equinox would not bring on a gale in the course of April. Napoleon departed from Fontainebleau on the 3rd of April, proceeding by Troyes, Châlons, and Lyons, and preceding the Pope by the rapidity with which he travelled, so that the two trains should not interfere. While he journeyed towards Italy, busied with his grand ideas, and occasionally allowing his attention to be diverted by the homages of the people, Europe, variously excited, was in travail with a third coalition. England alarmed for her existence, Russia wounded in her pride, Austria deeply annoyed at what was in progress in Italy, and Prussia constantly hesitating between opposing fears, formed, or suffered to be formed, a new European league, which, far from being more successful than the former ones, was to procure Napoleon a colossal empire, which, unhappily, was too disproportioned to be permanent.

The Russian cabinet, regretting the errors which the ardour of the young sovereign had caused him to commit, would have been glad to have discovered in the replies of France a pretext for retracing its inconsiderate course. The pride of Napoleon, which withheld even a specious explanation of the occupation of Naples, of the refusal to indemnify the house of Savoy, or of the invasion of Hanover, considering them as matters which might be explained to a friendly court, but not to a hostile court—this pride had disconcerted the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and compelled it, in spite of itself, to recall M. d'Oubril. The Emperor Alexander, who had not firmness enough to bear the consequences of a first movement, was disconcerted, and almost intimidated. Messrs. de Strogonoff, de Nowosiltzoff, and Czartoryski, more firm, but perhaps less penetrating, had surrounded him, and made him feel the necessity of upholding the dignity of his crown in the eyes of Europe. The Russian cabinet had reverted to the not very practicable, but seductive ideas of a supreme arbitration, exercised in the name of justice and right. Two powers, France and England, disturbed Europe, and

oppressed it, for the interests of their rivalry. It was necessary to head the ill-treated nations, and propose to them a common plan of pacification, in which their rights should be guaranteed, and the points of dispute between France and England set at rest. It was necessary to rally Europe to this plan, propose it in the name of Europe to England and France, then side with that one of the two powers which adopted it against the one which refused it, and to overwhelm this latter with the force and just right of the whole world. Men not quite so young, nor so crammed with theory, would have seen in all this just simply a coalition with England and part of Europe against France. This plan, in fact, which was conceived in a spirit entirely favourable to England, which managed Russia, and unfavourable to France, which did not, was sure to be tolerably acceptable to Mr. Pitt, and unacceptable to Napoleon, and productive, sooner or later, of a war against the latter. It brought about a third coalition. The proposals presented to the Emperor Alexander were mingled with so many specious and brilliant ideas, and with some so generous and so just, that the young Czar, alarmed at first at what was proposed to him, was at length struck and seduced to the extent of immediately putting his hand to the work.

Previous to giving an account of the negotiations which followed, we must describe this plan of European arbitration, and point out its author. It will be seen, from the gravity of the consequences, that they merit to be known.

One of those adventurers, sometimes endowed with rare and eminent abilities, who carry into the north the intellect and learning of the south, had proceeded to Poland to find a field for his talents. He was an abbé, named Piatoli, and had in the first instance been attached to the court of the last king of Poland. After the various partitions he had passed into Courland, and from Courland into Russia. He was one of those active spirits, who, unable to rise to the government of States, placed too far above them, conceive plans, which, though commonly chimerical, are not always contemptible. The man of whom we speak had meditated much upon the affairs of Europe, and chance having brought him into connection with the young friends of Alexander, he seized the opportunity of exercising a great though secret influence, and of causing a part of his conceptions to prevail in the resolutions of the powers. Those subaltern thinkers rarely have such an honour. The Abbé Piatoli had the melancholy advantage of furnishing, in 1805, some of the principal ideas, which ended by being admitted into the treaties of 1815. On this account he is worthy of notice, and the ideas which we attribute to him are not mere suppositions, for they are contained in secret memorials sent at that

time to the Emperor Alexander.* This foreigner discovering in Prince Czartoryski a more earnest and thoughtful spirit than animated the other young men who governed Russia, associated himself more closely with him, and their ideas became identical to such an extent, that the plan proposed to the emperor belonged almost as much to one as to the other. The following was this plan.

The ambition of the northern powers, and the conquests of the French Revolution, had for thirty years disturbed the balance of Europe, and oppressed all the second-rate nations. It was necessary to remedy this by a new organisation, and by the establishment of a new law of nations, placed under the protection of a grand European confederation. To this end, it was necessary that there should be one perfectly disinterested power, which would cause that disinterestedness to be shared by all the others—and which would labour for the accomplishment of the proposed object.

One power alone bore all the marks of that noble mission, and that power was Russia. Her true ambition, if she rightly understood her part, would be to acquire, not territory, as England, Austria, or Prussia would, but moral influence. For a great State influence is everything. After a long influence come territorial acquisitions. This Italian was right. By appearing to protect, against what is called the Revolution, the European princes, great or small, to whom it was a bugbear, Russia has gained Poland. It is not impossible that she may yet gain Constantinople. The first thing needful is influence—conquest follows.

Russia, then, was to propose to the other courts, not a war against France, which would not have been either politic or just, but a *mediatory alliance for the pacification of Europe*. There would certainly be no difficulty in procuring the adhesion of Austria and England to this alliance, but everything was in peril without the concurrence of Prussia. It was necessary, therefore, to drag that astute court from its interested hesitations, or even to trample her down with European armies, should she refuse to concur in the common project. No consideration was to be shown to Prussia, or to any other power that should resist the proposed plan, *because* (by such resistance) *they would have deserted* the cause of humanity.

The co-operation of all the European States, with the exception of France, being once secured, three grand masses of troops were to be formed; one to the south, consisting of Russians and English transported into Italy by sea, and intended to ascend, with the Neapolitans, the Italian peninsula, to join a column of one hundred thousand Austrians operating in Lombardy; a mass to the east, consisting of two grand Austrian and Russian armies, marching

* There is a copy of these memorials extant in France.

by the valley of the Danube towards Suabia and Switzerland; finally, a mass to the north, consisting of Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Danes, proceeding straight from north to south upon the Rhine. These three grand masses of troops were to act independently of each other, in order to avoid the inconveniences of coalitions, which strive in vain to produce an impracticable concert. Each of the three was to act as an army having to think only of its own safety and its own action. It was by endeavouring to combine their movements that the Archduke Charles and Suwarrow produced the disaster of Zurich.

The three masses of troops being thus composed, proceedings would be taken in the name of a general congress, representing the Mediatory Alliance. To France conditions would be offered compatible with her existing grandeur; conditions to which the consent of England would be preliminarily obtained, and war would not be resorted to except in the case of a refusal. The bases treated upon would be these: the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, but those treaties as expounded by Europe. Assuredly a high idea may be formed of our power at that period, merely by looking at the plans elaborated by our jealous enemies.

France would be allowed to keep the Alps and the Rhine, that is to say, Savoy, Geneva, the Rhenish provinces, Mayence, Cologne, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Piedmont would be restored. The new State created in Italy would not be destroyed in order to give the fragments to Austria, but would be employed to construct an independent Italy. With that view, Austria would be required even to give up Venice. Switzerland, preserving the organisation bestowed upon it by Napoleon, would be closed against the French troops, and declared perpetually neutral. It would be the same with Holland. In a word, France, maintained in her grand limits of the Alps and the Rhine, would be obliged to evacuate all Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, not to mention Hanover, which, the war over, could not longer be occupied.

In return for these concessions demanded from France, England would be compelled to give up Malta, to restore the colonies which she had seized upon, and even to aid the French in another enterprise against St. Domingo, for Europe was interested in seeing that magnificent country wrested from the barbarism of the revolted negroes. England would also be obliged to agree with all the nations upon an equitable maritime code. As the last condition, all the courts were to acknowledge Napoleon Emperor of the French.

Undoubtedly, if Russia had been strong enough to make Austria consent to the independence of Italy, and England to the freedom of the seas, Napoleon would have been very blamable for refusing the proposed conditions! But, far from aban-

doning Venice to those benevolent organisers of a new Europe, Austria was eager to regain possession of Milan, and to extend her frontier into Suabia; and England was determined to keep possession of Malta, and not to recognise the rights of the neutrals. If, then, Napoleon was bent, as doubtless he was, upon keeping Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland, in order to turn to his own advantage those countries which his enemies desired to combine against him, we certainly may excuse his ambition in the face of that of all the other governments of Europe.

This plan, conceived, in the first instance, sincerely and with generous intentions, had been wholly equitable if wholly accepted by all parties. But it was to be a pretext in the hands of a hypocritical coalition for urging France to a refusal which would rouse the whole power of Europe once more against her. The facts will speedily prove this.

Supposing France to refuse, which was probable, military measures were to be employed against her. In that case it would be requisite rather to conceal than to publish the intention of changing her government, to spare her pride, reassure the holders of national property, promise to the military the preservation of their ranks (all of which was done in 1814), and if the weariness of a warlike and agitated government should turn the public mind of France towards the old dynasty, then, but then only, to think of restoring it, because that dynasty, owing its restoration to Europe, would be more easily reconciled than the Bonaparte family with the remnant of a kingdom left to it.

The war might have various results. If it were only half successful, Italy and Belgium would be taken from France; if it were completely successful, France would also be deprived of the Rhenish provinces, that is to say, of the territory lying between the Meuse and the Rhine. Still, it was necessary to bear in mind the error committed against Louis XIV., and beware of imitating the lofty proceedings of the Pensionary Heinsius, for if France were too sternly treated she would never remain at rest. It was necessary, then, to leave her some of her existing conquests, by drawing a line from Luxembourg to Mayence, and conceding to her, besides the fortress of Mayence, what is called Rhenish Bavaria. It is evident that the plans of this policy not having yet been modified by Mr. Pitt, did not bear the imprint of passionate hate which marked those which prevailed ten years later.

On the double hypothesis of a war more or less fortunate, Europe was to be distributed in the following manner:—

It was before all things necessary to guard against that French nation that was endowed with *such dangerous talents*, and was of so enterprising a turn. For this purpose it was

necessary to surround her with powerful States capable of protecting themselves. It was, in the first place, requisite to strengthen Holland, and for this purpose to give her Belgium, to make of the two countries what was called *the kingdom of the two Belgiums*, which should be given to the house of Orange, which had suffered so severely from the consequences of the French Revolution. Prussia would be maintained as she was on the Rhine; perhaps she would have restored to her the small provinces that she had ceded to the French Republic, such as the duchies of Cleves and Gueldres, and, as far as possible, she would be established in Westphalia, around Holland, to separate her from all contact with France. Nevertheless, in accordance with the principle of disinterestedness that was imposed upon the great courts, a principle without which Europe could not be established upon a durable footing, but little would be given to Prussia, in order that there might be means of giving a fitting organisation to Germany and Italy. After creating the kingdom of the two Belgiums on the north of France, they would create to the south and east the kingdom of Piedmont, under the name of the Subalpine Kingdom. This crown would be adjudged to the then dethroned house of Savoy, which had suffered even more than the house of Orange for the common cause of kings. Savoy would not be restored to it, but it would be put in possession of all Piedmont, all Lombardy, and even the Venetian State, taken with this object from Austria, which was to receive compensation as specified hereafter. Finally, to this vast territory Genoa was to be added. This Subalpine Kingdom, thus forming the most considerable State in Italy, would be capable of holding the balance between France and Austria, and of serving at a future time as the foundation of Italian independence.

Italy, that splendid and interesting country, was to be separately constituted, and to enjoy that independent existence so much and so vainly desired by her. To consolidate her into one single nation was for the time impracticable. She was to be composed of several States united by a federal bond, a sufficiently strong bond to render common action at once prompt and easy. Besides the Subalpine Kingdom, comprising all Upper Italy, from the Maritime Alps to the Julian Alps, and having two ports, such as Venice and Genoa, there would be the kingdom of the two Sicilies preserved within its existing limits, which would be placed at the other extremity of the Peninsula; at the centre would be the Pope, with the Legations restored to him, enjoying a perpetual neutrality, and, like the Elector of Mayence in the Germanic body, performing the duties of Chancellor of the Confederation; also at the centre would be the kingdom of Etruria, left to Spain; and then

either between these or at the extremities, the Republic of Lucca, the Order of Malta, the Republic of Ragusa, and the Ionian Islands. This Italian body, in its federative organisation, would have a head like the Germanic body, but not like him elective. The King of Piedmont and the King of the two Sicilies were alternately to enjoy that dignity.

Here, undoubtedly, was a grand and a skilful combination, for which France ought to have imposed some sacrifices upon herself, if the young heads that governed Russia had been capable of seriously and resolutely carrying out any scheme truly great.

Savoy, taken from the crown of Sardinia, was not to be given up to France, but, together with the Valteline and the Grisons, converted into a Swiss canton. Switzerland, divided into cantons, was to be joined to Germany, as one of the Confederated States.

The Germanic empire was to be absolutely modelled anew. It had been alternately oppressed by Austria and Prussia, who had striven with each other for preponderance. Those two powers would be excluded from the Confederation, in which they played only the part of ambitious party leaders. The Germanic body thus left to itself, diminished by these two great members, but increased by the kingdom of the two Belgioms and by Switzerland, freed from all mischievous influence, and having only the interests of Germany in view, would no longer be dragged in its own despite into wars, unjust in themselves, or hostile to its real interests. The crown was to cease to be elective in Germany. The principal States of the Confederation would in succession have the supreme power, as it was proposed for Italy. By means of new territorial delimitations, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria were to be strengthened. The mischievous quarrel between Bavaria and Austria would be terminated by giving the frontier of the Inn to the latter.

The three great States of the continent, France, Prussia, and Austria, would thus be separated from each other by three great independent confederations—the Germanic confederation, the Swiss confederation, and the Italian confederation, extending themselves from the Zuyder Zee to the Adriatic.

Even supposing these combinations correct and practicable, we cannot refrain from pointing out, that to cut off Prussia and Austria from the Germanic body was not to enfranchise Germany, for those two powers, remaining excluded, would have acted towards Germany as absolute States adjoining a free State; as Frederick and Catherine had acted towards Poland; they would have convulsed and divided it; instead of seeking to influence it, they would have tried to conquer it. The true independence of Germany consisted, then, in a strong

organisation of the Diet, and in an equitable division of votes between Austria and Prussia in such wise that the Confederation could hold the balance between them. Add to this such European arrangements as should not render Prussia the natural enemy of France (as was done in 1815, by giving the former the Provinces of the Rhine), and the two German powers remaining rivals, but kept in equilibrium by the Diet, Germany would have been free; that is to say, capable of making her interests and resolutions coincide.

The suppression of the election to the imperial crown would not, as it seems to us, have been a whit more useful. Although for two centuries that crown had not gone out of the house of Austria, the election, nevertheless, was a dependent tie, which put that house under obligations to the States of Germany. Now it is sometimes useful to render the great dependent upon the little, when anarchy is not the consequence. Germany, constituted as she had been in 1803 by Napoleon, with some votes given to the Catholics, to re-establish the balance that had been too much disturbed at the expense of Austria, would, in our opinion, have presented a better and more natural arrangement than that which was conceived by the authors of the new European organisation.

Although disinterestedness was the fundamental principle of the proposed plan, that disinterestedness could readily go so far as not to acquire aught, and to content itself with a better arrangement of Europe as the sole indemnity for the costs of war, but it could not go so far as actual loss. It was necessary, therefore, to indemnify Austria for the required cession of the State of Venice. In consequence, it was proposed to give her Moldavia and Wallachia, to extend her thus to the Black Sea, and secure her against the danger of seeing herself at a future time hemmed in by Russia.

The Ottoman empire was to be maintained, such as it was, with the exception of some restrictions, which will be hereafter mentioned.

There still remained the north to be arranged. In that quarter a great deal was to be done, according to the singular organiser of Europe, who carved out so freely the map of the world. Prussia and Russia were separated by an ill-chosen frontier. Poland was divided between these two powers. In the judgment of the Abbé Piatoli, in that of the young men whom he inspired with his policy, and especially in that of Prince Czartoryski, and finally, in the judgment even of Alexander, the partition of Poland was a great crime. Alexander, in fact, in unoccupied and oppressed youth, during the life of Paul, had often, in the outpourings of his confidence, declared that the partition of Poland was a crime of his pre-

decessors which he should be happy to repair. But how reconstruct that Poland? How replace her, erect and isolated, between the rival States which had destroyed her? There existed one means: it was to reconstruct her entirely, to restore her all the parts of which she was formerly composed, and then to give her to the Emperor of Russia, who would bestow independent institutions upon her, in such wise that Poland, intended in the ancient ideas of Europe to serve as a barrier to Germany against Russia, would now serve as a barrier, or rather an advanced post, of Russia against Germany.

Such was the dream of these young politicians, such was the ambition with which they imbued Alexander! That grand indignation against the crime of the preceding century, that noble disinterestedness imposed upon all the courts, for the purpose of restraining the ambition of France, was to end in reconstructing Poland for the purpose of giving her to Russia! It is not the first time that beneath displays of virtue, ostentatiously claiming the esteem of the world, towering ambition and consummate vanity have been concealed. This court of Russia which at that time pushed to the utmost extent its affectation of justice and disinterestedness, and which pretended to lecture England and France, was in secret dreaming of the possession of Poland! However, amidst these projects, there was a sentiment to which we must pay due honour. It was that of the Prince Czartoryski, who, seeing no immediate possibility of re-establishing Poland solely by Polish hands, was willing, for want of others, to use Russian hands. He, at least, had a legitimate object. He was open to reproach only upon one point, which was often perceived by the Russians, and more than once denounced to the Emperor Alexander; namely, that the Prince Czartoryski was less zealous for the interests of Russia than for those of his native country, and was thus led to urge his master into an imprudent war. The Abbé Piatoli, long attached to Poland, partook of all those ideas. It was difficult, however, to propose to this Mediatory Alliance, founded upon the principle of disinterestedness—it was difficult to propose to it the abandonment of Poland to Russia; still there were means of attaining the end. Prussia, strongly attached to the peace and the profits of neutrality, would probably not give her adhesion. Then, to punish her for her refusal, she would be attacked, deprived of Warsaw and the Vistula, and with those vast portions of ancient Poland, added to those which Russia already possessed, that new Poland would be founded, of which Alexander would be the king and the legislator.

To these ideas were added some others, accessory to the plan, some of them whimsical, and others just and generous.

England was to be compelled to restore Malta to the Order.

Russia would give up Corfu, which would thenceforth be reckoned among the Ionian Islands. England had conquered India, which there was no choice but to leave to her; but Egypt could be made immensely serviceable to the civilisation of the world, to general commerce, and to the balance of naval power. It would be taken from the Porte and given to France, that the latter might undertake the task of civilising it. It would be formed into an eastern kingdom, subject to France. The Bourbons would reign there, if, on the return of peace, Napoleon were to be kept on the throne of France; and Napoleon, if the Bourbons were restored. The Barbary States were to be restored to the Porte, and that power would even be assisted in reconquering them, that their piracy, which was a barbarism disgraceful to Europe, might be suppressed. Finally, there were certain possessions contrary to the nature of things, although consecrated by time and conquest, which it would be both wise and humane to put an end to. For instance, Gibraltar enabled the English to keep up a system of smuggling in Spain, at once shameful and demoralising to that country; the islands of Jersey and Guernsey assisted the English in stirring up civil war in France; Memel, in the possession of Prussia, was to the Russian territory a sort of Gibraltar for the purposes of smuggling. If possible, it was requisite to induce, by means of compensations, the possessors to renounce posts of which so reprehensible a use was made.

Spain and Portugal were to be reconciled and united by a federal tie, which should protect them from the French influence on the one hand, and from the English influence on the other. It was requisite that England should be obliged to redress the wrongs she had inflicted on Spain, and constrained to restore the captured galleons; by this course Spain, which demanded nothing better, would be wrested from the tyranny of France.

To complete this grand work of European reorganisation, the Emperor of Russia was to address himself to all the learned men of Europe, to demand from them a code of the laws of nations, including a new maritime law. It was urged that it was inhuman and barbarous, that a nation should declare war without having previously submitted the cause of dispute to a neighbouring and disinterested State; and it was especially so, that one nation should commence hostilities against another, without a previous declaration of war, as England had lately done towards Spain, and that innocent merchants should thus find themselves ruined, or deprived of their property, by a sort of ambush. It was also intolerable that neutral nations should be made victims of the fury of powerful rivals, and could not cross the seas without being exposed to the consequences of a quarrel in which they had no part. The honour of the grand

reforming court demanded that all these evils should be provided against by international laws.

It was by this mixture of heterogeneous ideas, some lofty, others merely ambitious, these wise, those chimerical, that ardour was communicated to the heart and the head of this young, mercurial, and sprightly emperor, who was as vain of his honest, but fugitive intentions, as one should be of long-practised virtues. He believed himself really called upon to regenerate Europe; and if he sometimes awakened from his splendid dreams, it was when he thought of the great man who ruled the West, and who was not of a temper to tolerate any regeneration without his aid or against his policy. Those who had the opportunity of closely observing Alexander plainly perceived that his heart failed him when he perceived war with Napoleon to be the probable final consequence of all his plans.

This strange conception would not have merited the honour of being introduced at such length, any more than the thousand and one projects with which schemers often pester those courts which have the weakness to listen to them, if it had not captivated the goodwill of Alexander and his friends, and if, which is still more important, it had not become the text of all the succeeding negotiations, and served at last as the basis of the treaties of 1815.

One thing is worthy of remark. This epoch of the French Revolution is reproached with having promised, and not given, liberty, independence, and happiness to the nations, and having thus been guilty of breach of promise to humanity. Now, observe absolute power at work. Young men of ability, some of them honest and sincere, others merely ambitious, all reared in the school of the philosophers, united by their birth and the uniformity of their tastes, and surrounding the inheritor of the mightiest despotic empire upon the face of the earth, were possessed with the idea of rivalling the French Revolution, as respected generous and popular intentions. That Revolution which, according to them, had not even procured liberty for France, as it had given her a master, and which had given nothing to other nations but a humiliating dependence upon the French empire, that Revolution they resolved to confound, by opposing to it a European regeneration, founded upon an equitable distribution of territories, and upon a new law of nations. There was to be an independent Italy, a free Germany, and a reconstructed Poland. Each great power was to be restrained by efficient counterpoises. France herself was to be not humiliated, but merely brought back to respect the rights of others. The abuses of war would disappear alike from sea and land; piracy would be abolished; the ancient road of commerce would be re-established by Egypt; and finally, science would be

called upon to remodel the public law of nations. All this was not merely laid down by some vulgar scribbler of memorials, but seriously proposed to all the courts of Europe, and discussed with the least chimerical of men, with Mr. Pitt! We know now, we who are forty years older, what has been the upshot of all those philanthropic views of absolute power. The inventors of these plans, beaten and baffled during ten years by him whom they wished to destroy, but at length conquerors in 1815, have made neither a code of the laws of nations nor a code of maritime laws; they have freed neither Italy, nor Germany, nor Poland. The English have not been deprived of Malta nor of Gibraltar; and the territorial boundaries of Europe, traced according to temporary interests, and without any view to the future, are the least prudent that can be imagined.

However, let us not anticipate the sequel of this history. To describe how all those ideas became common to Alexander and his young friends would be useless. What is certain is that both he and they were fully possessed with those ideas, and with the desire to make them the basis of the Russian policy. Prince Czartoryski, seeing in this system a chance of reconstruction for Poland, was most ardently desirous of having it carried into execution. The prince, since the retirement of M. de Woronzoff, had become, from a mere assistant in the Foreign Office, the directing minister of that department. Messrs. de Nowosiltzoff and de Strogonoff, subalterns, one in the Department of Justice, and the other in the Home Department, devoted their energies to far other matters than those of their ostensible employments; they, with their young colleague and the emperor, employed themselves in poisoning the world upon new bases. It was agreed that the most dexterous among them, M. de Nowosiltzoff, should be sent to London to confer with Mr. Pitt, and procure his assent to the projects of the court of Russia. It was necessary to bring round the ambitious British cabinet, and render acceptable the disinterested views of the project in order to found the Mediatory Alliance, and, in the name of that alliance, to speak to France in such a manner as to secure attention. A cousin of M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid with the double view of reconciling England and Spain, and of binding Spain and Portugal together by indissoluble bonds. It was decided that M. de Strogonoff should proceed to London before going to Madrid, in order to commence in that capital his conciliatory mission. In the judgment of all Europe, the procedure of the British government against the Spanish shipping had been unjust and odious. That government was to be told that if it did not exhibit more moderation it would be left alone to contend with France, and that Russia, with all

the continental powers, would observe a neutrality which would be fatal to Great Britain.

The two young Russians who were charged to present the policy of their cabinet for acceptance abroad set out for London at the close of 1804. M. de Nowosiltzoff was presented at the court of St. James's by the ambassador Woronzoff, brother of the retired chancellor, and was received with distinction and attention, well calculated to affect a young statesman admitted for the first time to the honour of treating upon the affairs of Europe. Roughness and haughtiness, rather than astuteness, usually characterise English diplomatists. Nevertheless, Lord Harrowby, and especially Mr. Pitt, with whom the Russian envoy entered into direct conference, could soon discover with what sort of minds they had to do, and conducted themselves accordingly. The veteran Pitt, a veteran still more by the part he played than by age, rendered flexible by danger, lofty as he was, was too happy to regain the alliance of the continent to show himself unaccommodating. He was complaisant, as it was necessary to be towards inexperienced young men nurtured in chimeras. He listened to the singular proposals of the Russian cabinet, and appeared to receive them with great consideration, but modified them to suit his own policy, abstaining from refusal, and confining himself to postponing till the general peace those points which were incompatible with the interests of English policy. He had the proposals of the Russian envoy delivered to him, and added his own observations.* At first Mr. Pitt tolerated even the reproaches of the young Russian envoy; he allowed himself to be reproached with the ambition of England, with the harshness of her proceedings, and with her encroaching system, which served as a pretext for the encroaching system of France. He allowed himself to be told that in order to form a new alliance it was necessary to found it upon a grand disinterestedness on the part of all the contracting powers. The head of the British cabinet became animated on this subject, much approved of the ideas of Alexander's ambassador, and declared that, in fact, it was necessary to display the most perfect freedom from all personal views if the mask was to be torn away that covered the ambition of France; that it was indispensably necessary that the allies should not appear to think of themselves, but only of the enfranchisement of Europe, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical power. The gravity of men and the gravity of the interests which they treat does not prevent them from frequently presenting a very puerile spectacle! Was there not something, in fact, truly puerile in the sight of these diploma-

* I have myself perused the minutes of these conferences, of which a copy is extant in France.

tists, representatives of ambitious nations which for centuries have agitated the world, reproaching France with her insatiable greediness? As if the English minister wanted in this instance aught less than Malta, the Indies, and the empire of the seas! As if the Russian minister really aimed at aught less than Poland, and a dominant influence on the continent! How pitiable to hear the heads of States addressing such reproaches to each other! No doubt Napoleon was far too ambitious for his own interest, and still more so for ours; but Napoleon, considered, if we may so speak, in his moral position—Napoleon, was he aught else than the reaction of the French power against the encroachments of the European courts in the last century, against the partition of Poland and the conquest of India? Ambition is the vice or the virtue of all nations—vice, when it agitates the world without benefiting it; virtue, when it civilises while agitating it. Thus considered, the ambition of which the nations have still the least reason to complain is that of France, for there is not a country which has been traversed by her armies which France has not left ameliorated and enlightened.

It was agreed, then, between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff, that the new alliance should lay great and public stress upon its disinterestedness, in order to make more than ever evident the insatiable cupidity of the Emperor of the French. While admitting that it would be very important to disembarass Europe of that redoubtable personage, it was nevertheless agreed that it would be imprudent to announce the intention of imposing a new government upon France. It was necessary to wait till the nation should declare itself, to second it to the utmost should it show a disposition to shake off the yoke of the imperial government, and especially to take great pains to assure the heads of the army of the preservation of their rank, and the holders of national property, of that property being preserved to them. All the proclamations addressed to the French nation were to abound in the most tranquillising assurances on these points. So important did Mr. Pitt consider this precaution, that he even stated himself to be ready to make, from the funds of England, *a provision* (his own words) to indemnify the emigrants who surrounded the Bourbons, and thus deprive them of any motive for alarming the holders of the national property. Mr. Pitt, then, thought of the famous indemnity to the emigrants, twenty years before it was voted by the Parliament of France. In wishing to render such pretensions disinterested, he assuredly knew not what he undertook; but in showing himself disposed to try it at the expense of the British treasury he proved the immense importance which England attached to the downfall of Napoleon, who had become so menacing towards her.

The idea of assembling an imposing mass of forces, in whose name the Mediatory Alliance could treat, previous to fighting, was naturally admitted by Mr. Pitt with extreme readiness. He consented to the mockery of a preliminary negotiation, well knowing that it would lead to no result, and that the pride of Napoleon would never be reconciled to the conditions proposed. The latter could on no account suffer that, without him, or against him, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland should be organised, under the specious pretext of their independence. Mr. Pitt, therefore, allowed the young rulers of Russia to fancy that they were labouring for a grand mediation, because he was well convinced that they were simply and merely progressing towards a third coalition. As regarded the distribution of the forces, he opposed certain parts of the project. He agreed readily enough to three grand masses; one to the south, composed of Russians, Neapolitans, and English; another to the east, composed of Russians and Austrians; and one to the north, composed of Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Hanoverians, and English. But he declared that he could not, on the instant, supply a single Englishman. He maintained, that in keeping them upon the coasts of England, constantly ready to embark, a very important result would be produced, that of threatening the seaboard of France on all points at once; which signified that, living in constant terror of the expedition prepared at Boulogne, the British government was unwilling to send troops from its own territory; which, after all, was natural enough. Mr. Pitt promised subsidies, but not nearly to the amount asked; he offered six millions sterling. He insisted upon one point, to which it seemed to him that the authors of the Russian project had by no means attached sufficient importance; the concurrence of Prussia. Without her, all seemed to him to be difficult, even impossible. To him it seemed requisite to have the concurrence of all Europe, in order to destroy Napoleon. He approved of attacking Prussia if she could not be persuaded to give her adhesion, for Russia would thus permanently ally herself to English policy; he offered even, in that case, to send to St. Petersburg the portion of the subsidy intended for Prussia; but he considered this a matter of grave importance, and that the most advantageous proposals should be made to the cabinet of Berlin in order to seduce it. "Do not imagine," said he to M. de Nowosiltzoff, "that I am at all favourable to that hypocritical, astute, and greedy cabinet, which now asks from Napoleon, and even from Europe, the price of its perfidies. No. But upon that cabinet depends the fate of the present, and even of the future. Prussia, jealous of Austria, and fearing Russia, will always have a leaning to France. We must detach her from that country, or she will never cease to be the accomplice

of our irreconcilable enemy. With reference to her alone, you must depart from your ideas of disinterestedness; we must give her more than Napoleon can offer; something, especially, which will irrevocably embroil her with France." Mr. Pitt, then, aided by hate, which sometimes enlightens, if it sometimes blindfolds—Mr. Pitt proposed a modification of the Russian plan, as fatal for Germany as for France. He confessed that it was a luminous and profound idea, that of surrounding our soil with kingdoms able to resist us, a kingdom of the two Belgiums, and a Sub-alpine kingdom; the one for the house of Orange, protected by England; the other for the house of Savoy, protected by Russia. But he thought that the precaution was insufficient. He desired that, instead of separating Prussia and France by the Rhine, they, on the contrary, should be placed in immediate contact; and he proposed that if Prussia pronounced for the coalition, she should receive all the country enclosed between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, which we now call the Rhenish Provinces. This appeared to him to be indispensable if it were desired for the future to withdraw Prussia from her interested neutrality and her leaning to Napoleon, in whom she had incessantly sought and found a support against Russia. This project was extended in 1815, when, besides Prussia, Bavaria was placed upon the Rhine, in order to deprive us of all our ancient allies in Germany. When Germany shall some day need support against the dangers which will threaten her from the north, she will appreciate the services rendered to her by those who have studied to create causes of dispute between her and France.

From these conferences there sprang a new idea, destined to complete the creation of a kingdom of the two Belgiums: it was to construct a chain of fortresses like those which Vauban formerly planned to cover France, in that country without frontiers, and to construct those fortresses at the expense of the alliance.

As regarded Germany and Italy, the English minister showed how impossible it was to execute these vast projects immediately; how they would offend the two powers who were most needed, Prussia and Austria. Neither one nor the other would consent to quit the German confederation; Prussia, in particular, would not agree to the crown of Germany being made hereditary; Austria would oppose a constitution for Italy that would exclude her from that country. Of the project as to Italy, Mr. Pitt only admitted the constitution of the kingdom of Piedmont. He wished Savoy to be added to all which the Russian project already bestowed upon Piedmont.

Finally, scarcely any mention was made of Poland; all that portion of the project rested on the supposition of war with Prussia, and that Mr. Pitt was especially 'anxious to avoid

The Russian diplomatist who was imbued with such generous ideas when he quitted St. Petersburg, dared not even make mention of Egypt, Gibraltar, Memel—in a word, of that which was loftiest in the original project. Upon two very important subjects Mr. Pitt was by no means favourable, that is to say, he was almost negative—we mean Malta and the maritime law. As regarded Malta Mr. Pitt peremptorily declined the discussion, and postponed all explanations on that point till it should be known what sacrifices France was inclined to make. As regarded the new law of nations, he said that it would be necessary to refer that work, a moral but somewhat impracticable one, to a congress which would assemble after the war to conclude a peace, in which all the interests of the nations would be equitably weighed. The idea of a new law of nations seemed to him to be a very admirable one, but difficult of realisation, for various populations do not easily adopt uniform dispositions, and observe them still less readily when they have adopted them. However, he had no objection to allowing these matters to be treated in the congress, which at a future time would settle the conditions of a general peace.

These conferences ended with a singular explanation. The object of it was the East and Constantinople. Very recently, by her policy in Georgia, and by her connections with the insurgents of the Danube, Russia had given some umbrage to England, and provoked a note from her, in which the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire were already professed as principles of the European policy. “That is not the way to proceed in order to produce confidence between allies,” said M. de Nowosiltzoff to Mr. Pitt. “My master is the noblest and most generous of men ; it is sufficient to trust to his honour. But to endeavour to stop him by menaces, or only by insinuations, is uselessly to affront him. He will be rather excited than restrained by such means.” In reply Mr. Pitt made many apologies for having shown suspicions so ill-founded, which, however, were natural previous to the establishment of that full mutual confidence, though, of course, in the intimate connection which was about to be established they for the future would be quite impossible. “Moreover,” added M. de Nowosiltzoff, “what inconvenience would there be in Constantinople belonging to a civilising people like the Russians, instead of belonging to a barbarous people like the Turks? Would not your commerce in the Black Sea be greatly improved by it? No doubt, were the East subjected to this ever-encroaching France, there would be a real danger, but to Russia there would be no danger.” Mr. Pitt * replied, “That assuredly these considerations had great

* These details are contained in a very curious letter of M. de Nowosiltzoff to his cabinet.

importance in his view; that, as far as he was concerned, he had no prejudice upon this subject, and could not see the great danger if Constantinople should fall to Russia; but that it was a prejudice of his nation, which he must avoid offending, and that it was essentially necessary to avoid touching upon such a subject at that period."

Relatively to Spain M. de Strogonoff obtained nothing, or next to nothing. She gave up all her resources to France, argued the British cabinet, and to serve or gratify her would be merely to be her dupe. However, if she would declare against France, her galleons would be restored to her.

M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid, and M. de Nowosiltzoff for St. Petersburg. It was agreed that Lord Gower, since Lord Granville, ambassador from England to St. Petersburg, should be furnished with detailed powers to conclude a treaty upon the bases agreed upon by the two courts.

The Russian plan had only undergone a few days' elaboration at London, and it returned divested of everything generous, and also of whatever was impracticable, that it had contained. It was reduced to a destructive project against France. No more mention of independent Italy, independent Germany, or independent Poland! The kingdom of Piedmont, the kingdom of the two Belgiums, with a profoundly inimical idea, Prussia upon the Rhine; the restitution of Malta evaded, the new law of nations postponed for a future congress; finally, previous to the commencement of hostilities, a pretence of negotiation, a very vain pretence, for general and immediate war was at the very heart of the proceeding—such was all that remained of the boastful project of European reconstitution, the production of a sort of fermentation of mind in the young heads which governed Russia. The negotiation was, however, opened at St. Petersburg by Lord Gower, upon the points agreed upon at London between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff.

While this sort of league was being formed with England, it was necessary to undertake a similar labour with Austria and Prussia to draw them into the new coalition. Prussia, who had engaged with Russia to declare war if the French should go beyond Hanover, but who at the same time had promised France to remain unalterably neutral if the number of French in Germany were not augmented—Prussia would not quit that perilous equilibrium. She affected not to understand Russia, and entrenched herself in her old system, become proverbial, *of the neutrality of the north of Germany*. This manner of evading the question was the more facile to her, because from fear of seeing the secrets of the new coalition divulged to Napoleon the Russian diplomatists dared not openly explain. The cabinet of Berlin, from its hesitations, had got such a

reputation for duplicity, that it was thought impossible to entrust it with a secret which it would not immediately communicate to France. Nothing, therefore, was said to that cabinet about the project sent to London, and the subsequent and consequent negotiation, but Prussia was daily reminded of new encroachments by Napoleon, especially the conversion of the Italian Republic into a kingdom, which, it was argued, amounted to an annexation of Lombardy to France, equal to the annexation of Piedmont. The most gigantic plans were announced. It was reported that Napoleon was about to convert Parma, Piacenza, Naples, and finally, Spain herself, into kingdoms for his family; that Holland would very soon share the same fate; that Switzerland would be incorporated, under the pretext of rectifying the French frontiers; that Cardinal Fesch would soon be raised to the papacy; that it was necessary to save Europe, which was threatened with a universal domination; that the courts which should persist in want of forethought would be the cause of the general ruin, and would at length be themselves involved in it. Well knowing that the rivalry of Austria and Prussia was the principal cause of the latter inclining to France, an endeavour was made to reconcile the rivals. Prussia was asked to fix her pretensions, and to make them known; she was told that an endeavour would be made to draw from Austria an avowal of her pretensions, and to reconcile the pretensions of both parties by a definitive arbitration. It was announced that, in consideration of some addition to the Catholic votes in the College of Princes, an unimportant concession, Austria would be permanently contented with the recess of 1803, and would consecrate, by her irrevocable adhesion, the new arrangements by which Prussia had so largely profited. It was even insinuated that if, unfortunately, a struggle should become inevitable, Prussia would be largely indemnified for the risks of the war. However, it was not avowed that a coalition was on the point of being formed, still less that its basis was agreed upon; only the wish seemed to be expressed that Prussia would unite herself to the rest of Europe to guarantee the equilibrium of the nations, which was seriously threatened.

In order to get into closer communication with the court of Prussia a Russian general was sent to it, an officer of the staff, well acquainted with what was in agitation, M. de Vinzingerode, who was to explain matters by degrees to the king, but to the king alone, and who, being acquainted with the military plan, could, if he succeeded in obtaining his majesty's attention, propose the means of execution, and regulate the whole future warfare and its details. M. de Vinzingerode arrived at the close of the winter of 1804, at the time when Napoleon was preparing

to set out for Italy; the general observed a great reserve towards the Prussian cabinet, but was somewhat more communicative with the king, and invoking the friendship which had commenced between the two sovereigns at Memel, endeavoured to win this prince in the name of that friendship, and of the common cause of kings. The young Frederick William, finding himself closely pressed, and comprehending at length what was in question, dwelt upon his personal affection for Alexander, and his warm sympathies in the cause of Europe, but objected that he was the first who would be exposed to the attacks of Napoleon; that he did not believe himself able to resist so powerful an adversary; that the aid for which he was led to hope had so far to come that it must needs be tardy, and that he should probably be vanquished before aid arrived. He also pointed out the danger of acting on the suggestions of England, and even proposed, in order to prevent a general war, of which he was greatly in dread, to mediate between Russia and France.

In this delicate state of things the king had called for the advice of M. d'Haugwitz, who had for some time retired to his estates in Silesia, and found in his opinions a new encouragement to his ambiguous and pacific policy. If it had been necessary, however, to take a positive resolution, M. d'Haugwitz would rather have inclined to France. M. de Hardenberg, who had succeeded him, would rather have inclined to Russia, but this latter was ready, he said, to determine in favour of France as soon as to determine in favour of Russia, provided only that some positive course were determined upon. With less talent, tact, and prudence than M. d'Haugwitz, he was fond of censuring that statesman's tergiversations, and in order to distinguish himself from his predecessor, professed a liking for decided measures. It was requisite, in his view of affairs, to side with France if it were thought useful to do so, and to embrace her cause, but in that case to secure the advantages and reap the reward of a decided support. In this he was less agreeable to the king than M. d'Haugwitz, who allowed that prince to enjoy the pleasure of indecision; and already there arose between M. d'Haugwitz and M. de Hardenberg that discrepancy of language by which quarrels between rival ministers are preceded, whether in despotic courts or in free States.

The king, in acknowledgment of the mission of M. de Vinzingerode, determined to send a confidential agent to St. Petersburg, and despatched M. de Zastrow, with the mission of explaining to the Emperor Alexander the position of the king, to reconcile him to his reserved conduct, and, if possible, to become better acquainted with the still hidden secret of the new coalition. While he despatched M. de Zastrow to hold this language at St. Petersburg, Frederick William claimed

credit of Napoleon for the resistance he had made to the suggestions of Russia; he spoke of the neutrality of the north of Germany, not as of a real neutrality, as it really was, but as of a positive alliance, which to the north covered France against all the enemies whom she could have to combat; further, this prince offered Napoleon, as he had already offered Russia, to play the part of a conciliator.

M. de Vinzingerode, after having prolonged his stay at Berlin until he had rendered himself unwelcome to the court, which feared to be compromised by the prolonged presence of a Russian agent, repaired to Vienna, where the same efforts were made as at Berlin. With Austria there was not so much dissimulation required as with Prussia. None at all, indeed, was needed with the former. Austria was full of hatred towards Napoleon, and ardently desired the expulsion of the French from Italy. With her it was not necessary, as with the King of Prussia, to conceal the truth under specious professions of disinterestedness. Here the plain truth and the real object might be avowed, for Austria desired what was desired at St. Petersburg; true, she indulged in none of the illusions of youth, and disdained false sentimentality, which fell short of her veteran experience. Moreover, Austria could keep a secret. If in appearance she was infinitely anxious to show her complaisance towards France, and if towards Napoleon personally her language was constantly flattering, she in her heart nourished all the resentment of a balked ambition, constantly ill-treated for ten years. From the first, then, she had entered secretly into the passions of the Russian government, but remembering her defeats, she had only with extreme prudence consented to enter the alliance, and had taken only conditional engagements of pure precaution. She had signed with Russia a secret convention, which was, as to the south of Europe, what the convention signed by Prussia was as to the north. She promised in this convention to abandon her inactive policy if France, committing new usurpations in Italy, should extend further the occupation of the kingdom of Naples, then extending to the Gulf of Taranto, make new incorporations, like that of Piedmont, or threaten Egypt or any part of the Turkish empire. Three hundred and fifty thousand Austrians were, in that case, to be her war contingent. She had the assurance, should fortune favour the arms of the coalitionists, of obtaining Italy to the Adda and the Po, the Milanese being thus reserved. She was also promised the restoration of the two archdukes to their ancient States of Tuscany and Modena; while she should have the then vacant territories of Salzburg and the Brisgau. The house of Savoy was to receive large possessions in Italy, consisting of the Milanese, Piedmont, and Genoa. Here, then,

was the upshot of the Russian scheme: at Vienna, as at London, there remained no portion of it but what was hostile to France and advantageous to the coalitionists. Austria desired and obtained that this convention * should be buried in the

* This convention is dated 6th of November 1804. We give the hitherto unpublished text of it, as we have given that of the convention with Prussia.

*Declaration signed the 25th of October, N. S., 1804.
6th of November, O. S.,*

The preponderating influence exercised by the French government upon the circumjacent States, and the number of countries occupied by its troops, having inspired just anxieties for the maintenance of the general tranquillity and safety of Europe, his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias shares with his majesty the emperor-king the conviction that this state of things calls for their mutual and most serious solicitude, and renders it necessary that they should unite to that end by a close concert, adapted to the state of crisis and of danger to which Europe is exposed.

The undersigned having been furnished in consequence with instructions and powers for negotiating and treating with the plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor-king, for the attainment of this salutary object, and having mutually communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed with the said plenipotentiary upon the stipulations contained in the following articles:—

Article I.—His majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises and engages himself to establish, in consideration of the crisis and danger above-mentioned, the closest concert with his majesty the emperor-king, and the two monarchs will be careful to give mutual notice and explanations of all negotiations and agreements into which they shall think fit to enter with other powers, for the same object as that upon which they have agreed, and their measures in that respect will be so taken as in nowise to compromise the present engagement determined upon between them, until they shall mutually have agreed to its being made public.

Art. II.—His majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and his majesty the emperor-king will not neglect any opportunity or precaution to be in a condition efficiently to co-operate in the active measures judged necessary for preventing the dangers which may suddenly threaten the general safety.

Art. III.—If in revenge for the opposition which the two imperial courts, in virtue of their mutual agreement, will offer to the ambitious views of France, one of them should be immediately attacked (the Russian troops presently stationed in the seven Ionian Isles are included in the present stipulation), each of the two high contracting parties obliges himself, in the most formal manner, to put in motion, for the common defence, as speedily as possible, the forces enumerated hereafter in Article VIII.

Art. IV.—If it should happen that the French government, abusing the advantages procured to it by the position of its troops, which now occupy the territory of the empire of Germany, should invade the adjacent countries, of which the integrity and independence are essentially connected with the interests of Russia, and that, consequently, being unable to look upon such an encroachment with an indifferent eye, his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias should find himself obliged to march his troops thither, his majesty the emperor-king will consider such proceedings on the part of France as an aggression which will impose upon him the obligation of placing himself as speedily as possible in a condition to furnish prompt succour, according to the stipulations of the present agreement.

Art. V.—His imperial majesty of all the Russias fully participates in the lively interest that his imperial and royal apostolic majesty takes in the maintenance of the Ottoman Porte, the vicinity of which is agreeable to both; and as an attack upon European Turkey by any other power cannot but compromise the safety of Russia and Austria, and as the Porte, in its present disturbed state, would not be able to repel with its own force an enterprise directed against it,

most profound secrecy, that she, Austria, might not be prematurely compromised with Napoleon. Thus much justice must be done to Austria that at least she did not, like Prussia, make a display of pretended virtues. She pursued her interests steadily, sternly, and without pretence. She can be censured for nothing on the present occasion but the falseness of her language at Paris.

At the same time, in signing this convention, she flattered

on that supposition, and if war on that account should ensue directly between one of the two imperial courts and the French government, the other will immediately prepare to assist, as speedily as possible, the power at war, and to aid in concert towards the preservation of the Ottoman Porte in its present integrity.

Art. VI.—As the fate of the kingdom of Naples must necessarily influence that of Italy, in the independence of which their imperial majesties take an especial interest, it is agreed that the stipulations of the present convention will have effect in the event of the French determining to carry their occupation of the kingdom of Naples beyond their present lines; to seize upon the capital, or the fortresses of that country, or to penetrate into Calabria; in a word, if they shall force his majesty the King of Naples to peril his whole State in resisting such encroachments upon it, and forcibly to oppose this new violation of his neutrality; and that if his imperial majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, through the succour which, in such case, he will be bound to furnish to the King of the two Sicilies, shall be engaged in a war against France, his imperial and royal majesty obliges himself to commence, on his part, the operations against the common enemy, in accordance with the stipulations herein contained, and with especial reference to Articles IV., V., VIII., and IX. of the present agreement.

Art. VII.—In consideration of the uncertainty in which the two high contracting powers up to the present moment remain as to the future designs of the French government, they reserve it to themselves, beyond what is stipulated above, to agree, according to the urgency of the circumstances, upon the different cases which may also require the employment of their combined forces.

Art. VIII.—In all cases in which the two imperial courts resort to active measures, in virtue of the present agreement, or of those which hereafter may be made between them, they promise and engage to co-operate simultaneously, and according to a plan which will immediately be agreed upon between them, with sufficient forces to combat the enemy with the probability of success, and of driving him back into his own territories, which forces will not be fewer than 350,000 men under arms for the two imperial courts; his imperial and royal majesty, on his part, will furnish 235,000 men, and the rest will be supplied by his imperial majesty the Emperor of Russia. These troops will be embodied and constantly provided on both sides with every requisite, and there will further be a corps of observation left to secure the non-activity of the court of Berlin. The respective armies will be so distributed as shall prevent the forces of the two imperial courts, acting in concert, from being inferior in number to those of the enemy they will have to combat.

Art. IX.—In conformity with the desire manifested by the imperial royal court, his imperial majesty of all the Russias undertakes to use his good offices to obtain from the court of London, for his imperial and royal apostolic majesty, in the cases of war with France, set forth in the present declaration, or which may result from the future agreements, which by Article VII. the two imperial courts reserve the power of making, subsidies alike for the opening of the campaign and annually for the whole duration of the war, which shall as far as possible meet the expectations and wants of the court of Vienna.

Art. X.—In the execution of the plans determined upon, a just consideration will be paid to the obstacles arising, as well from the present state of the frontiers and forces of the Austrian monarchy as from the imminent dangers to which she would, in that state, be exposed, by demonstrations and arma-

herself that it would be but an act of simple precaution, for she had not ceased to dread war. Accordingly, after having signed it, she resisted all the solicitations of the Emperor of Russia to proceed immediately to military preparations; she even angered him by her inertness. But on receiving tidings of the arrangements made by Napoleon in Italy, she was suddenly drawn from her inaction. The title of king, taken by Napoleon, and, above all, so general a title as that of "King of Italy," which

ments, which would provoke immediately a premature invasion on the part of France. Consequently, in determining the active measures to be mutually agreed upon, and so far as the safety of the two empires and the essential interests of the common cause will permit, the greatest care will be taken to combine with the employment of them the time and means of putting the forces and frontiers of his majesty the emperor-king into a condition for opening the campaign with the energy necessary to attaining the object of the war. When once, however, the encroachments of the French shall have established the cases in which his said imperial and royal apostolic majesty will be engaged to take part in the war, by virtue of the present agreement, and of those which may hereafter be mutually formed, he engages not to lose an instant in making his preparations in the shortest possible space of time, and which shall not exceed three months after demand made for efficient co-operation on the part of his imperial majesty of all the Russias, and for vigorously proceeding to the execution of the plan which will be settled.

Art. XI.—As the principles of the two sovereigns forbid their seeking, under any circumstances, to constrain the free will of the French nation, the object of the war will be not to operate any counter-revolution, but solely to provide against the common dangers of Europe.

Art. XII.—His majesty the Emperor of all the Russias admitting that it is just that, in the event of a new breaking out of war, the house of Austria should be indemnified for the immense losses that it has suffered in its recent wars with France, engages to co-operate in procuring it such indemnification in such event as far as may consist with the success of their arms. Nevertheless, in the case of even brilliant success, his majesty the emperor-king will not extend his frontiers beyond the Adda on the west, and the Po on the south; it being distinctly understood that of the different mouths of the latter river it is the most southerly which is in this case referred to. The two imperial courts are desirous that, in the supposed case of success, his royal highness the Elector of Salzburg may be replaced in Italy, and that to this end he either be put into possession of the grand-duchy of Tuscany, or that he obtain some other suitable possessions in the north of Italy, supposing events to render such arrangements practicable.

Art. XIII.—Their imperial majesties, on the same supposition, will strive to procure the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, even with a great ulterior accession of territory. Should the issue be less favourable, every endeavour will still be used to secure him suitable possessions in Italy.

Art. XIV.—In the same case of great successes, the two imperial courts will agree upon the destination of the Legations, and will concur in causing the duchies of Modena, of Massa, and of Carrara to be restored to the legitimate heirs of the last duke; but in the case of events compelling a limitation of these projects, the said Legations or the Modenese shall form the dominion of the King of Sardinia; the Archduke Ferdinand will remain in Germany; and his majesty will content himself, if need be, with a frontier nearer than that of the Adda to that now existing.

Art. XV.—If the circumstances shall permit the replacement of the Elector of Salzburg in Italy, the territories of Salzburg, Berchtolsgrad, and Passau will be annexed to the Austrian monarchy. This is the only contingency in which his majesty is to obtain also an extension of his frontier in Germany. As to the part of the territory of Aichstaedt, at present possessed by the Elector of Salzburg, it is then to be disposed of in such manner as the two

seemed necessarily to apply to the whole Peninsula, had alarmed Austria to the highest degree. On the instant she commenced those armaments which at first she had desired to defer, and called to the war department the celebrated Mack, who, although destitute of the qualities of a general-in-chief, was not without talent in the organisation of armies. Henceforward she paid quite a new attention to the urgent proposals of Russia, and without engaging herself, as yet, in writing, to an immediate war; she left to Russia the task of pushing forward the common negotiations with England, and of treating with that power upon the difficult question of subsidies. In the meanwhile, she discussed with M. de Vinzingerode a plan of campaign adapted to all imaginable hypotheses.

It was at St. Petersburg, then, that was finally to be formed the new coalition; that is to say, the third, reckoning from the commencement of the French Revolution. That of 1792 ended in 1797 at Campo Formio, under the blows of General Bonaparte; that of 1798 ended in 1801, under the blows of the First Consul; the third, that of 1804, was destined to have a no more prosperous issue under the blows of the Emperor Napoleon.

Lord Gower, as we have said, had powers from his court to treat with the Russian cabinet. After long discussions, the following conditions were agreed upon:—A coalition was to be formed among the powers of Europe, comprising England and Russia at the outset, and subsequently those which they could influence. The object was to procure the evacuation of Hanover and of the north of Germany, the effective independence of Holland and Switzerland, the evacuation of the whole of Italy, including the Isle of Elba, the reconstitution and enlargement

courts shall mutually agree upon, and especially in favour of the Elector of Bavaria, if by his part taken in the common cause he has acquired a claim to be benefited. In like manner, in the case supposed in the preceding Article, of the re-establishment of the heirs of the late Duke of Modena in his ancient possessions, the possessions of Brisgau and Ortenau would become a means of encouragement in the good cause to one of the principal princes of Germany, particularly to the Elector of Baden, in whose favour it then would be renounced by the house of Austria.

Art. XVI.—The two high contracting powers engage not to lay down their arms, and not to treat of an accommodation with the common enemy, except by mutual consent, and after preliminary agreement between them.

Art. XVII.—In limiting for the present to the above objects and points this present preliminary agreement, upon which the two monarchs mutually promise the most inviolable secrecy, they reserve to themselves, without delay and directly, to fix by ulterior arrangements, as well upon a plan of operations, in the event of war becoming inevitable, as upon all which relates to the support of the respective troops, as well in the Austrian States as upon foreign territory.

Art. XVIII.—The present declaration, mutually recognised as being equally obligatory with the most solemn treaty, will be ratified within the period of six weeks, or earlier if practicable, and the acts of ratification likewise exchanged at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

of the kingdom of Piedmont, the consolidation of the kingdom of Naples, and finally, the establishment in Europe of an order of things which would guarantee the safety of all the States against the usurpations of France. The object was not more precisely defined, in order that a certain latitude might remain for treating with France; at the least, deceptively. All the powers were to be invited to give their adhesion.

The coalition had determined to assemble, at fewest, 500,000 men, and to take the field as soon as it had 400,000 men. England furnished an annual subsidy of £1,250,000 sterling per 100,000 men. She further advanced a sum down, amounting to three months' subsidy, to defray the expenses of opening the campaign. Austria engaged to supply 250,000 men out of 500,000; the remainder was to be furnished by Russia, Sweden, Hanover, England, and Naples. The very grave question of the adhesion of Prussia was settled in a very summary and hardy manner. England and Russia promised to make common cause against any power which, by hostile measures, or by its too close connections with France, should oppose the designs of the coalition. It was determined, in fact, that Russia, dividing her forces into two masses, should march, one by Galicia, to the aid of Austria; the other, by Poland, to the frontiers of the Prussian territory; and if definitively Prussia should refuse to enter into the coalition, overrun her territory before she could put herself in a state of defence; and as it was desirable not to forewarn her by the assemblage of such an army upon her frontiers, it was agreed that the pretext should be taken of a desire to hasten to her aid in the event of Napoleon suspecting her, and throwing himself upon her States. The name, then, of auxiliaries and friends were to be given to the eighty thousand Russians destined to trample Prussia under foot.

This projected violence against Prussia, although it appeared to England to be somewhat rash, was very acceptable to her, as she could do nothing better towards saving herself from invasion than to kindle a vast flame upon the continent, and excite a frightful war there, no matter who the combatants or who the vanquished or the victors. On the part of Russia, on the contrary, this resolution was a great imprudence; for to risk throwing Prussia into the arms of Napoleon was to ensure herself a certain defeat, even were the invasion of the Prussian territory as prompt as it was proposed to be. But Prince Czartoryski, the most obstinate of those young men in pursuing an object, saw in all this only a means of wresting Warsaw from Prussia, in order to reconstitute Poland by giving it to Alexander.

The military plan that was indicated by the situation was still to attack in three masses; in the south, with the Russians

of Corfu, the Neapolitans, and the English ascending the Italian Peninsula, and joining a hundred thousand Austrians in Lombardy; in the east, with the grand Austrian and Russian army acting upon the Danube; lastly, in the north, with the Swedes, the Hanoverians, and the Russians descending upon the Rhine.

As to the diplomatic plan, it consisted in an intervention in the name of a Mediatory Alliance, and an offer of a preliminary negotiation previous to fighting. Russia was much attached to this portion of her original project, which preserved to her that altitude of arbiter which flattered her pride, and which, it must be added, was also agreeable to the weakness of her sovereign. He still entertained a vague hope that Prussia would be prevailed upon, provided that she were not too much alarmed by being made aware of the fixed design of a coalition, and that Napoleon would thus have only to choose between an alarming league of all Europe and reasonable concessions.

From England, consequently, was obtained the most singular dissimulation, the least dignified, but also the best adapted to her views. England consented to be left out, to be unmentioned in the negotiations, especially with Prussia. In the efforts upon the last-mentioned power Russia was to represent herself as being unconnected with Great Britain by any project of common war, but as wishing to impose a mediation, in order to put an end to a state of things that was burdensome to all Europe. In a solemn proceeding with respect to France, Russia, without ostensibly acting in the name of a coalition, was to offer her mediation, affirming that she would cause every one to accept equitable conditions, provided that Napoleon would accept similar ones. Here was a double means intended to avoid alike alarming Prussia and irritating the pride of Napoleon. England lent herself to everything, provided only that Russia, compromised by this mediation, were definitively drawn into the war. As to Austria, the greatest pains were taken to leave her in the shade, and not even to name her; for should she appear to be in the plot, Napoleon would throw himself upon her before preparations were completed for aiding her. She actively prepared herself without taking any part in the negotiations. It was necessary to pursue the same course as to the court of Naples, which was the first exposed to the blows of Napoleon, as General St. Cyr was at Taranto with a division of from fifteen to eighteen thousand French. Queen Caroline had been advised to take all the engagements of neutrality, and even of alliance, which Napoleon might impose upon her. In the meantime, Russian troops were by degrees transported in vessels through the Dardanelles and disembarked at Corfu. Here a strong division was preparing, which at the

last moment was to be joined at Naples by a reinforcement of English, Albanians, and others. It would then be time to throw aside the mask, and to attack the French by the extremity of the Peninsula.

In order to attempt a preliminary negotiation with Napoleon, it was necessary to be able to offer him some at least specious conditions. There were none such apart from offering to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English. The Russian cabinet had thrown aside all the brilliant portion of its plan, such as the reorganisation of Italy and of Germany, the reconstitution of Poland, and the framing of a new maritime code. If, in addition, it conceded Malta to the English, instead of playing the part of arbiter between France and England, it only became the agent of the latter, or at the very most her docile and dependent ally. The Russian cabinet consequently held to the evacuation of Malta with an obstinacy not common to it, and when the moment arrived for signing the treaty was inflexible. Hitherto Lord Gower had given way on every point in order to compromise Russia, by means of a treaty of some kind, with England; but now he was asked to abandon a maritime position of the greatest importance, a position which, if not the only, was at least the principal cause of the war, and he would not yield. Lord Gower deemed it incompatible with his instructions to go any further, and he refused to sign the abandonment of Malta. The project was in danger of falling to the ground. However, on the 11th of April the Emperor Alexander consented to sign the convention, at the same time declaring that he would not ratify it unless the English cabinet would give up the island of Malta. A courier, therefore, was despatched to London, bearer both of the convention and of the condition which was annexed to it, and upon which depended the ratification by Russia.

It was settled that, without loss of time, lest the season for military operations should be lost, the step agreed upon should be taken as to the Emperor of the French. For this mission the personage was selected who, at London, had fastened the first link of the coalition, M. de Nowosiltzoff. As assistant to him the Abbé Piatoli was selected, the actual author of that plan of a new Europe, which had since been so disfigured.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was extremely proud of being about to proceed to Paris to present himself to that great man who for years past had attracted the gaze of the whole world. If, as the decisive moment drew nearer and nearer, the Emperor Alexander more and more warmly desired to see this preliminary mediation successful, M. de Nowosiltzoff desired it no less. He was young and ambitious; he considered it a great distinction in the first place to treat with Napoleon, and in the second place to be the negotiator who, at the moment when Europe

seemed about to return to war, would suddenly pacify it by his able intervention. It could thence be relied upon that he would not himself add to the difficulties of the negotiation. After long deliberations, the conditions were agreed upon which he was to offer to Napoleon, and it was also agreed that they should be kept a profound secret. He was charged to offer a first, a second, and a third project, each more advantageous to France than the preceding one, but was recommended not to pass from one to the other until after a great struggle.

The basis of all these projects was the evacuation of Hanover and of Naples, the practical independence of Switzerland and Holland, and in return the evacuation of Malta by the English, and the promise of subsequently compiling a new code of maritime law. Thus far Napoleon would oppose no serious difficulties. In fact, in the event of a solid peace, he had no objection to evacuate Hanover, Naples, Holland, and even Switzerland, on condition of the act of mediation being maintained in the last-named country. The real difficulty was Italy. Russia, already obliged to forego her plans of European reconstitution, had promised, in the event of war becoming inevitable, one part of Italy to Austria, and another part to the future kingdom of Piedmont. Now, on the supposition of a mediation, it would be indispensable, on pain of seeing the negotiator sent away from Paris on the day after his arrival there, to concede to France a part of this same Italy. It was necessary, in order that the mediation should appear serious, above all, that it should appear serious to Prussia, that she might be persuaded and compromised by the appearance of a negotiation attempted in good faith. It was resolved, in the first place, to demand the separation of Piedmont, but saving its reconstitution as a separate State for a branch of the Bonaparte family, and further, the abandonment of the existing kingdom of Italy, intended, together with Genoa, for the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza remained to furnish another endowment for a prince of the Bonaparte family. This was only the first proposition; the second was then to be brought forward. Piedmont would remain incorporated with France; the kingdom of Italy, with the addition of Genoa, would, as in the first proposition, be given to the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza would remain the only endowment of the collateral branches of the house of Bonaparte. From this second proposition the envoy was finally to pass to the third, which would be as follows: Piedmont continuing to be a French province, and the existing kingdom of Italy being given to the Bonaparte family, the indemnity of the house of Savoy would be reduced to Parma, Piacenza, and Genoa. The kingdom of Etruria, assigned for four years past to a Spanish branch, would remain as it was.

It must be allowed that if to these last conditions the evacuation of Malta by the English had been added, Napoleon would have had no legitimate reason for refusing peace, for they were the conditions of Luneville and Amiens, with the addition of Piedmont for France. The sacrifice demanded of Napoleon being in reality confined to that of Parma and Piacenza, which had become French possessions by the death of the last duke, and of Genoa, hitherto independent, Napoleon might consent to such an arrangement provided always care was taken to give no offence to his dignity in the form of the propositions.

All the five projects, then, of the friends of Alexander led to a very slender result. After having dreamed of a reconstitution of Europe by the means of a powerful mediation, after having seen that reconstitution of Europe converted at London into a destructive project against France, Russia, alarmed at having advanced so far, reduced her grand mediation to the obtaining Parma and Piacenza as an indemnity for the house of Savoy; for the evacuation of Hanover and Naples, and the independence of Holland and Switzerland, which she further demanded, had never been contested by Napoleon, peace being once re-established. And should so small a matter not be obtained, she would have a terrible war upon her hands. The rash and inconsiderate conduct of Russia had hemmed her up in a very narrow pass.

It was further agreed upon, that passports should be solicited for M. de Nowosiltzoff through the medium of a friendly court. There was only the choice between Prussia and Austria. To apply to Austria would be to draw upon her the penetrating glance of Napoleon, and, as we have already said, it was desired to have her as much as possible kept in the background, in order that she might have time to make her preparations. Prussia, on the contrary, had offered herself as mediatrix, which furnished a natural reason to make use of her mediation to procure passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. He at the same time was to proceed to Berlin, see the King of Prussia, make another effort with that prince, communicate to him alone, and not to his cabinet, the moderate conditions proposed to France, and make him perceive that if she refused to accede to such arrangements it must be from her having views alarming for Europe, views irreconcilable with the independence of all States, in which case it was the duty of all to unite and march against the common enemy.

M. de Nowosiltzoff, then, set out for Berlin, where he speedily arrived, eager as he felt to commence the negotiation. He was accompanied by the Abbé Piatoli. His demeanour was mild, conciliating, but extremely reserved. Unfortunately the King of Prussia was absent, engaged in visiting his provinces of

Franconia. This was a vexatious circumstance. There was a double danger: of a refusal on the part of England relative to Malta, which would render all negotiation impossible, or of some new enterprise of Napoleon upon Italy, where he then was, an enterprise which would ruin beforehand the various projects of reconciliation on their way to Paris. The prompt arrival of M. de Nowosiltzoff in Paris was, consequently, of immense importance for the peace. Moreover, the young Russians who governed the empire were so impressionable, that their first contact with Napoleon might attract them to him, and seduce them, as the contact with Mr. Pitt had drawn them far indeed away from their first plan of European regeneration. There was, consequently, reason greatly to regret the time which was about to be lost.

The King of Prussia having learnt that he was solicited to demand passports for the Russian envoy, greatly congratulated himself upon that circumstance, and upon the probabilities of peace, which he deemed he could discern in it. He did not suspect that, masked behind this endeavour at reconciliation, there was a project of war more mature than had been entrusted to him, more mature than it was deemed to be by those who had so inconsiderately engaged in it. The pacific Frederick William gave the order to his cabinet immediately to apply to Napoleon for passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. The latter was not to assume at Paris any official character, in order to avoid the difficulty of recognising the imperial title borne by Napoleon; but in addressing him, he was to employ only the title of sire and of majesty, and he was, moreover, provided with full and positive powers, which he was to show as soon as they should be agreed, which authorised him on the instant to concede the recognition of the imperial title.

While the powers of Europe were thus exerting themselves against Napoleon, he, surrounded by all the pomps of Italian royalty, was brimful of ideas the very opposite to those of his adversaries, even to the most moderate of them. The sight of that Italy, the scene of his first victories, the object of all his predilections, filled him with new designs for the grandeur of his empire and for the establishment of his family. Far from purposing to share Italy with any one, he proposed, on the contrary, wholly to occupy it, and to create there some of those vassal kingdoms which were to strengthen the new Empire of the West. The members of the Italian Consultum, who were present at the formality of the institution of the kingdom of Italy, accompanied by the Vice-President Melzi and the minister Marescalchi, had preceded him to prepare his reception at Milan. Although the Italians were proud to have him for their king, though his government reassured them more than any other,

yet the hope lost, or at the very least deferred, of a purely Italian royalty, the fear of war with Austria in consequence of this change, and even the generality of that title of King of Italy, calculated to please them, but also to alarm Europe, all this had much perplexed them. Messrs. Melzi and Marescalchi found them more disturbed and also less zealous than previous to their departure. The ultra-liberal party receded more every day, and the aristocracy did not draw closer. Napoleon alone could mend this state of things. Cardinal Caprara had arrived, and endeavoured to inspire the clergy with his own devotion to Napoleon. M. de Segur, accompanying M. Marescalchi, had selected the ladies and officers of the palace from the first Italian families. Some at first declined. The exertion of M. de Marescalchi, of some members of the Consultum, and the general attraction of the fêtes which were in preparation, had brought over the froward, and finally the arrival of Napoleon had determined every one. His presence as general had always deeply moved the Italians; his presence as emperor and king could not but strike them still more forcibly; for that prodigy of fortune, whom they had delighted to gaze on, had become a prodigy still more vast and marvellous. Magnificent troops assembled upon the battlefields of Marengo and Castiglione, prepared to execute grand manœuvres, and to represent immortal combats. All the foreign ministers were convoked to Milan. The crowds of gazers who had flocked to Paris to see the coronation there, now repaired to Milan. The impulse was given, and the Italian imaginations were again seized with love and admiration of the man who for nine years had so much excited them. The youth of the great families formed, in imitation of the towns of France, guards of honour to receive him.

On his arrival at Turin he had there met Pius VII., and exchanged tender and filial adieux with him. Then he had with an infinite gracefulness and affability received his new subjects, and had busied himself about their interests, which were still distinct from those of the rest of the French empire, with that intelligent solicitude which marked all his journeys. He had repaired the blunders or the acts of injustice of the administrations, decided upon a whole host of demands, and displayed to seduce the people all the attractions of the supreme power. He had then employed several days in visiting the stronghold, which was his grand creation, and the foundation of the defensive system of Italy, that of Alessandria. Thousands of workmen were employed on it at this instant. Finally, on the 5th of May, in the middle of the plain of Marengo, from the summit of a throne raised in that plain where, five years previously, he had gained the sovereign authority, he had witnessed some splendid manœuvres representing the battle.

Lannes, Murat, and Bessières executed those manœuvres. There wanted only Desaix ! Napoleon had laid the first stone of an intended monument to the memory of the brave who fell upon that field of battle. From Alessandria he had proceeded to Pavia, whither the magistrates had repaired to offer him the homages of his new capital, and he had entered Milan itself on the 8th of May amidst the pealing of bells, the thunder of cannon, and the acclamations of a population excited to enthusiasm by his presence. Surrounded by the Italian authorities and the clergy, he had bent the knee in that old Lombard cathedral, which was admired by all Europe, and which was destined to receive from him its final completion. The Italians, sensitive to the highest degree, sometimes agitate themselves for sovereigns whom they do not love, seduced thereto, like all other people, by the power of grand spectacles ; what, then, must they not have felt at sight of that man whose grandeur commenced under their eyes, that star that they could boast of having been the first to perceive upon the European horizon ?

It was amidst these intoxicating displays of grandeur that the proposal to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris reached Napoleon. He felt every inclination to welcome the Russian minister, to hear him, to treat with him, no matter under what form, official or not, provided the negotiation was serious ; and that in endeavouring to influence him no partiality or condescension was shown to England. As for the conditions, he was far enough from reckoning as the Russians did. But he was unaware of their offers ; he saw only the advance, which was made in becoming terms, and he cautiously avoided the error of repulsing it. He replied that he would receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris towards the month of July ; his maritime projects, to which he never ceased to be attentive, notwithstanding his apparent abstraction from them, would not recall him to France until that period. He proposed, then, to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff, to judge if it was worth while to attend to him ; and he would at the same time hold himself in constant readiness to interrupt this diplomatic communication, and set out for London, there to cut the Gordian knot of all the coalitions.

Although he was not precisely aware of the one which had been organised, and was far from believing it to be so far perfected as it really was, he well understood the character of the Emperor Alexander, and the unreflecting impulses which had rapidly drawn him towards the English policy ; and on sending to Prussia the passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, he caused the following observations to be communicated to that court :—

“The emperor,” wrote the minister for foreign affairs to M. de Laforest—“the emperor having read your despatch,

finds that it fully justifies the fears that he had manifested in his letter to the King of Prussia, and all that his majesty hears of the language that has been held by the British ministers tends to keep him in that state of suspicion. The Emperor Alexander is led away in spite of himself; he has not perceived that the design of the English cabinet in offering him the part of a mediator was closely to connect the interests of England and those of Russia, and eventually to lead the latter to take up arms to sustain a cause which would have become her own.

"From the instant that, by experience in public affairs, the Emperor Napoleon had acquired precise ideas of the character of the Emperor Alexander, he felt that, at one time or another, that prince would be seduced into the interest of England, who had so many means of gaining over so corrupt a court as that of St. Petersburg.

"Probable as that future appeared to the Emperor Napoleon, he contemplated it coolly, and he had taken steps to meet it, as far as that rested with him. Independently of the conscription of the year, he had made a call upon the reserve of the year XI. and of the year XII., and had augmented by fifteen thousand men the call made upon the conscription of the year XIII.

"At the slightest word of menace that may be uttered by M. de Nowosiltzoff, of threatening, of affront, or of hypothetical treaties with England, he will no longer be listened to. If Russia or any other continental power wishes to interfere in the affairs of the day, and to press equally upon France and upon England, the emperor will have no objection to that, and will readily make some sacrifices. England, on her part, should make equivalent concessions; but if, on the contrary, sacrifices are required from France alone, then, whatever be the union of the powers, the emperor will avail himself, to their utmost extent, of his good right, of his genius, and of his armies." (Milan, 15th Prairial, year XIII., 4th of June 1805.)

On the 26th of May Napoleon was crowned in the cathedral of Milan, with as much pomp as that with which he had six months previously been crowned at Paris, in presence of the ministers of Europe and of the deputies of all Italy. The Crown of Iron, reputed to be the ancient crown of the Lombard kings, had been conveyed from Monza, where it is carefully kept. After Cardinal Caprara, Archbishop of Milan, had blessed it with the forms anciently used in the case of the German emperors, when crowned kings of Italy, Napoleon placed it upon his own head, as he had placed that of Emperor of the French, pronouncing in Italian these decisive words, "*God has given it to me, let him beware who shall touch it!*" (*Dio me l' ha data, guai a chi la toccherà!*) He sent a thrill through all present by the significant accents in which he spoke those

words. This pageant, prepared by Italian artists, and especially by the painter Appiani, surpassed in splendour and magnificence all that had ever been witnessed in Italy.

After this ceremony, Napoleon promulgated the Organic Statute, by which he created in Italy a monarchy in imitation of that of France, and named Eugène de Beauharnais viceroy. He then presented that young prince to the Italian nation in a royal sitting of the Legislative Body. He employed the whole of the month of June in presiding over the Council of State, and in giving to the administration of Italy the impulse that he had given to the administration of France, by daily occupying himself with its affairs.

The Italians, for whose satisfaction there needed only a government present in the midst of them, had one now beneath their eyes, which to its real value added a prodigious magic of externals, and thus, withdrawn from their discontents, and from their repugnance to foreigners, they had already rallied, great and small, around the new king. The presence of Napoleon, supported by those formidable armies which he had formed and organised for every event, had dissipated the fear of war. The Italians began to believe that they should see it no more upon their soil, even should it again break out, and that its shoutings and its thunders would come to them from the banks of the Danube, and from the very gates of Vienna. Every Sunday Napoleon held grand reviews of troops at Milan; after which he returned to his palace, and gave public audience to the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe, to foreigners of distinction, and, above all, to the representatives of the great Italian families and the clergy. It was at one of these audiences that he exchanged the insignia of the Legion of Honour with the insignia of the most ancient and illustrious orders of Europe. The Prussian minister first presented himself, to deliver to him the Black Eagle and the Red Eagle. Then came the ambassador of Spain, who delivered to him the Golden Fleece; and then the ministers of Bavaria and Portugal, who delivered to him the orders of St. Hubert and of Christ. Napoleon gave them in exchange the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and bestowed a number of decorations equal to that which he received. He then distributed those foreign decorations among the principal personages of the empire. In a few months his court was on the same footing as all the other courts of Europe; the same insignia were worn in it, with rich costumes, chiefly of a military character. In the midst of all this splendour, remaining simple in his personal appearance, having for his sole decoration a star of the Legion of Honour upon his breast, wearing a coat of the chasseurs of the guard, without gold embroidery, a black hat, with no

ornament but a tricoloured cockade, Napoleon proved to all that the luxury by which he was surrounded was not for himself. His noble and handsome countenance, around which the imagination of men ranged so many glorious trophies, was all that he chose to display to the eager gaze of the people. Yet his person was the only one that they sought, that they desired to behold amidst that train glittering with gold and bedizened with the ribands of all Europe.

The various towns of Italy sent deputations to him to obtain the favour of seeing him within their walls. It was not only an honour but an advantage that they solicited, for everywhere his penetrating eye discerned some good to be done, and his powerful hand found the means of accomplishing it. Having resolved to devote the spring and half the summer to Italy, the better to divert the attention of the English from Boulogne, he promised to visit Mantua, Bergamo, Verona, Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, and Piacenza. These tidings completed the joy of the Italians, and gave them all hopes of participating in the benefits of the new reign.

His abode in this splendid country soon engendered within him those formidable impulses which were so much to be dreaded for the maintenance of general peace. He began to feel an extreme irritation against the court of Naples, which, wholly devoted to the English and to the Russians, and publicly protected by the latter in all negotiations, incessantly displayed the most hostile feelings towards France. The imprudent queen, who had allowed the government of her husband to be compromised by odious cruelties, had now taken a most unfortunately imagined step. She had sent to Milan the most clumsy of negotiators, a certain Prince de Cardito, to protest against the title of King of Italy, taken by Napoleon, a title which many people translated by those words that were inscribed upon the Iron Crown: "*Rex totius Italiae*—King OF ALL Italy." The Marquis de Gallo, ambassador from Naples, a man of sense, and much esteemed at the imperial court, had vainly endeavoured to prevent this perilous proceeding. Napoleon had consented to receive the Prince de Cardito, but upon a day of diplomatic audience. On that day he first gave the most gracious reception to the Marquis de Gallo, and then, in Italian, addressed the most crushing harangue to the Prince de Cardito, declaring to him in terms equally harsh and contemptuous to the queen, that he would drive her out of Italy, and scarcely leave her Sicily for shelter. The Prince de Cardito was led away nearly fainting. This outbreak produced a great sensation, and speedily filled the despatches of all the European ministers. Napoleon from this moment conceived the idea of making the kingdom of Naples a family kingdom, and one of the fiefs of

his grand empire. By degrees the idea had entered his mind of expelling the Bourbons from all the thrones of Europe. However, the accidental zeal that those of Spain had displayed in the war against the English banished this formidable idea as concerned them. But Napoleon, under the strong presentiment that he should speedily have to reconstruct Europe, whether he should become all-powerful by crossing the Straits of Dover, or whether, withdrawn from the maritime war by continental war, he should succeed in expelling the Austrians from Italy, Napoleon promised himself that he would unite the Venetian States to his kingdom of Lombardy, and that he would then effect the conquest of Naples for one of his brothers. But all this portion of his designs was for the moment postponed. Exclusively occupied with the descent, he would not actually provoke a continental war. Nevertheless, there was one measure which seemed to him to be opportune and without danger: it was to put a period to the sad situation of the Republic of Genoa. That Republic, placed between the Mediterranean, which was commanded by England, and Piedmont, which France had annexed to her territory, was, as it were, imprisoned between two great powers, and was thus deprived of her ancient prosperity, for she had all the inconveniences of being annexed to France without any of its advantages. In fact, the English had refused to recognise her, considering her as an annexation of the French empire, and had attacked her flag. Even the Barbary States pillaged and insulted her vessels without mercy. France, treating her as a foreign country, had separated her from Piedmont and from the territory of Nice by lines of custom-houses and by exclusive tariffs. The trade of Genoa was consequently stifled between the sea and the land, which were alike closed against her. France received no more benefit from Genoa than she bestowed upon her. The Apennine, separating Genoa from Piedmont, formed a frontier that was infested by brigands: it required the bravest gendarmerie in great numbers to render the roads safe there. With reference to the navy, the treaty that had recently been made only very partially secured the services which Genoa was capable of rendering us. That borrowing of a foreign port for the purpose of founding a naval establishment there was an essay leading to other things. By uniting the port of Genoa and the population of both shores of the Gulf of Genoa to the French empire, Napoleon would acquire from the Texel to the extremity of the principal gulf of the Mediterranean an extent of coasts and a number of seamen which, with time and persevering attention, might render him if not England's equal upon the seas, at least her respectable rival.

Napoleon could not resist all these temptations. He con-

sidered that England alone could take any real interest in this question. He would not have ventured to deal with the duchy of Parma and Piacenza; whether on account of the Pope, for whom that duchy was a motive to hope; on account of Spain, who coveted it to extend the kingdom of Etruria; or, finally, on account of Russia herself, who did not despair of an indemnity for the late sovereign of Piedmont, so long as it remained an unappropriated territory in Italy. But Genoa, appearing to him to possess but little interest for Austria, which was too far removed from it, and of no consideration to the Pope and Russia, was of importance, in his opinion, only to England; and having no occasion to avoid offending her, and not supposing her to be as strongly bound up as she was with Russia, he resolved to annex the Ligurian Republic to the French empire.

This was an error, for in the then temper of Austria, to pronounce a new annexation was to throw her into the arms of the coalition; it was to furnish to all our enemies, who filled Europe with perfidious rumours, new and not unfounded pretext for declaiming against the ambition of France, and especially against her violation of promises, since Napoleon himself, on instituting the kingdom of Italy, had promised to the Senate that he would not add a single province more to his empire. But Napoleon, sufficiently apprised of the inimical designs of the continent to deem himself warranted in dispensing with considerations towards it, yet not sufficiently apprised to perceive all the danger of a new provocation; flattering himself, moreover, that he should speedily solve all European difficulties at London; did not hesitate, but determined to add Genoa to the naval establishments of France.

His minister to that Republic was his fellow-Corsican Salicetti, whom he instructed to sound and prepare the public mind. The task was not a difficult one, for the public mind of Liguria was well disposed. The aristocratic and Anglo-Austrian party could not become more hostile than it was. The existing protectorate, under which Genoa was placed, seemed to that party to be as hateful as annexation to France. As for the popular party, it saw in that annexation the freedom of its commerce with the interior of the empire, the certainty of a great future prosperity, a guarantee against ever again falling beneath the yoke of oligarchy, and finally, the advantage of belonging to the greatest power in Europe. The minority of the nobility, favourable to the Revolution, alone contemplated with some pain the destruction of the Genoese nationality, but the grand employments of the imperial court were a sufficient attraction to console the principal personages of that class.

The proposition, prepared in concert with some senators, and presented by them to the Genoese Senate, was there adopted

by twenty members out of twenty-two, who deliberated upon it. It was then confirmed by a species of Plebiscitum, given in the form employed in France during the consulate. Registers were opened, upon which every one could inscribe his vote. The people of Genoa hastened, as those of France had formerly done, to record their suffrages, almost all of which were favourable. The Senate and the Doge proceeded to Milan, to present their request to Napoleon. They were introduced to him amidst a pomp and ceremony which recalled the times when vanquished nations were wont to repair to Rome to solicit the honour of forming part of the Roman empire. Napoleon, on the 4th of June, received them on his throne, told them that he acceded to their wish, and that he would visit Genoa ere he quitted Italy. To this incorporation was added another, which was of small importance in itself, but which was like the drop of water which overflows the vessel. The Republic of Lucca was without a government, and incessantly tossed about between Etruria become Spanish, and Piedmont become French, like a rudderless vessel—a very small vessel indeed, upon a very small sea. The same prompting that had been resorted to at Genoa caused Lucca to offer herself to France, and her magistrates, like those of Genoa, repaired to Milan to solicit a government and a constitution. Napoleon acceded to their request also, but considering them too distant to be annexed to the empire, he made their territory the dowry of his elder sister, the Princess Eliza, a woman of capacity and judgment, indulging in some pretensions as a wit, but endowed with the qualities of a queen regnant, and possessed of the talent to make her authority popular in that little State which she governed; which procured her the title, smartly enough coined by M. de Talleyrand, of the *Semiramis of Lucca*. Napoleon had already conferred the duchy of Piombino upon her; he now gave to her and her husband, the Prince Bacciochi, the territory of Lucca, in the form of an hereditary principality, dependent on the French empire, and reverting to the crown in the case of failure of the male line; consequently, with all the conditions of the ancient fiefs of the German empire. This princess was for the future to bear the title of Princess of Piombino and Lucca.

M. de Talleyrand was directed to write to Russia and to Austria to explain these proceedings, which Napoleon considered of no consequence to those powers, or at least insufficient to rouse the court of Vienna from its inertness. Nevertheless, secret as were the military preparations of Austria, they had partially been perceived, and had not failed to strike the experienced glance of Napoleon. Troops were in motion towards the Tyrol and towards the ancient Venetian provinces. The march of those troops could not be denied, and Austria did not attempt

to deny it, but hastened to declare that the grand assemblages of troops at Marengo and at Castiglione appearing to her to be too vast for mere reviews, she had made some musters as a mere measure of precaution, musters which, moreover, were sufficiently justified by the yellow fever, which was raging in Spain and Tuscany, especially at Leghorn. To a certain extent this excuse was plausible; but the point to be ascertained was, whether this was a mere shifting of the quarters of some troops, or whether the army was in reality being put upon a war footing by the filling up of regiments and the remounting of cavalry; and more than one secret intimation, sent by Poles attached to France, began to render these things probable. Napoleon instantly sent some disguised officers into the Tyrol, the Friuli, and Carinthia, to ascertain upon the spot the nature of the preparations which were being made there, and he at the same time demanded decisive explanations from Austria.

He determined upon another method of fathoming the intentions of that court. He had exchanged the Legion of Honour against the orders of friendly courts; he had not as yet effected that change against the orders of Austria, and he desired to place himself on the same footing with this court as with others. He conceived the idea, then, of making an immediate communication to Austria upon this subject, and thus to ascertain her real sentiments. He thought that if she had really determined upon an early war, she would not venture, in the face of Europe and of her allies, to give a testimony of cordiality, which, in the usages of courts, was the most significant that could be given, especially to a power so recent as that of the French empire. M. de la Rochefoucauld was minister at Vienna in the room of M. de Champagny, who had become minister of the interior. The former was directed to demand explanations from Austria of her military preparations, and to propose to her an exchange of her orders against the order of the Legion of Honour.

Napoleon, continuing from the heart of Italy to keep the English under the delusion that the descent so often announced and so often put off was but a mere feint, busied himself incessantly in providing for its execution in the summer. Never did an operation cause the sending of so many couriers and despatches as that which he at this period meditated. Consular agents and naval officers, stationed in the Spanish and French ports, at Carthage, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Bayonne, at the mouth of the Gironde, at Rochefort, at the mouth of the Loire, at Lorient, at Brest, and at Cherbourg, having couriers at their orders, transmitted to Italy all naval intelligence, even the slightest. Numerous secret agents, kept in pay in the ports of England, forwarded their reports, which were immediately

sent to Napoleon. Finally, M. de Marbois, who was well acquainted with English affairs, had the especial duty of reading all the journals published in England, and of translating the slightest news relating to naval movements; and it is a circumstance worthy of remark, that it was especially from these journals that Napoleon, who could with perfect correctness anticipate all the plans of the English Admiralty, received the best information. Although their statements were for the most part false, they yet furnished to his prodigious sagacity the means of guessing at the real facts. There was something more singular still. By dint of attributing to Napoleon the most extraordinary, and, frequently, the most absurd plans, several of them, without knowing that they did so, hit upon his real project, and said that he had sent his fleets on distant voyages, only to reassemble them on a sudden in the Channel. The Admiralty did not fasten upon this supposition, which, however, was the true one. Their measures, at all events, would lead us to suppose that they did not take it to be the true one.

With the exception of one circumstance which annoyed him greatly, and which had led to a last modification of his vast plan, Napoleon had every reason to be satisfied with the progress of his operations. Admiral Missiessy, as we have seen, had sailed in January for the West Indies. The details of his expedition were not yet known, but it was certain that the English were greatly alarmed for their colonies; that one of them, the island of Dominica, had been taken, and that they had sent strong reinforcements into the seas of America, a diversion all in our favour in the seas of Europe. Admiral Villeneuve, who sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, had touched at Cadiz, after a voyage of which the particulars were not known, rallied Admiral Gravina with a Spanish division of six ships of the line and several frigates, besides the French frigate *l'Aigle*, and had steered for Martinique. No subsequent tidings of him had arrived, but it was known that Nelson, who guarded the Mediterranean, had not been able to intercept him, either on his running out of Toulon or on his getting clear of the Strait. The Spanish seamen did their best in the state of destitution in which they were left by an ignorant, corrupt, and indolent government. Admiral Salcedo had assembled a fleet of seven sail at Carthagena; Admiral Gravina, as we have just seen, one of six at Cadiz; Admiral Grandellana a third of eight at Ferrol, which was to operate with the French fleet in harbour there. But sailors were scarce, owing to the epidemic and to the depressed condition of Spanish commerce, and fishermen and the working men of the towns were taken to form crews. Finally, a scarcity of grain, added to scarcity of money and the epidemic, had so exhausted the resources of Spain, that the

six months' biscuit which was necessary for each squadron could not be procured. Admiral Gravina had scarcely enough for three months when he had joined the squadron of Villeneuve, and at Ferrol Admiral Grandellana had scarcely enough for a fortnight. Fortunately M. Ouvrard, whom we have seen undertaking to transact business for and with France and Spain, had arrived at Madrid, had delighted that debt-laden court with the most charming projects, obtained its confidence, concluded a treaty with it, a treaty which we shall describe by-and-by, and by various combinations put an end to the horrors of the dearth. He at the same time provided the Spanish navy with a considerable quantity of biscuit. Matters, therefore, in the ports of Spain went on as well as the impoverished and wretched state of the Spanish administration would allow.

But while Admiral Missiessy spread dismay in the English colonies, and Admirals Villeneuve and Gravina, with their combined squadrons, sailed without accident towards Martinique, Ganteaume, who was to have joined company with them, owing to a sort of phenomenon in the season, had not had a single day such as would admit of his running out of the port of Brest. Within the memory of man the equinox had never before been unattended by a gale. The months of March, April, and May (1805), however, had gone by without the English fleet having once been compelled to abandon the Brest station. Admiral Ganteaume, well knowing how immense an operation he was called upon to take part in, was so impatient for the moment of departure as actually to be rendered ill by his vexation.*

The weather was almost always calm and clear. Occasion-

* I cite the two following letters, which will prove both the state of mind of the admiral and the serious intention of the naval expedition, which some persons, bent upon seeing feints where no feints, in fact, exist, have supposed to be a mere demonstration. These are not the only letters of the same sort, but I select these for quotation :—

GANTEAUME to the EMPEROR.

"ON BOARD "L'IMPERIAL," 11th *Floréal*, Year XIII. (1st of May 1805).

"SIRE,—The extraordinary weather which we have had since we were ready for sea is quite distracting; I cannot possibly describe to you the painful feelings which I have endured on finding myself kept in port while the other squadrons are in full sail for their destinations, and may be cruelly compromised by our difficulties; this last and most afflicting idea allows me no rest, and if I have thus long resisted the impatience and the sufferings by which I am racked, I have done so because I have seen not one chance in our favour should I run out, and all chances in favour of the enemy; a disadvantageous battle was and is inevitable as long as the enemy shall keep his present position, and then our expedition would be irreparably ruined, and our forces for a long time paralysed.

"Nevertheless, at the moment when I received your majesty's despatch of the 3rd *Floréal*, I had determined to run out at all hazards; all the vessels had weighed anchor; a westerly wind, which had become fresher and fresher

ally a gust from the west, accompanied by stormy clouds, gave hopes of a tempest, but suddenly all became clear again. There was no resource but to fight a disadvantageous battle with a squadron which was now very nearly equal in number to the French squadron, and very superior to it in quality. The English, without precisely suspecting what threatened them, yet struck by the presence of a fleet at Brest and another at Ferrol, and put still more on the alert by the sorties from Toulon and Cadiz, had augmented the force of their blockade. They had twenty sail before Brest, commanded by Admiral Cornwallis, and seven or eight before Ferrol, commanded by Admiral Calder. Admiral Ganteaume, in this position, passed out of the road and returned into it, anchored at Bertheaume, or returned to the inner moorings, having for two months all his hands kept strictly

during twelve hours, had led me to hope that the enemy might be driven out to sea, when his look-out vessels were perceived from our moorings, and his squadron signalled off Ushant, and the shifting and lightness of the wind prevented me from carrying out my intention. Feeling sure that I should be obliged to bring up in Bertheaume road, and there attract the notice of the enemy, I abandoned all thought of stirring, and I wish to make it appear that we never had any real intention of running out.

"Here I would fain repeat to your majesty the assurance I have already given you, as to the order and preparation in which I keep all the vessels; the crews are all mustered on board, no communications take place with the shore except for indispensable objects of duty, and at all hours every vessel is ready to obey the signals which may be made to it; these arrangements, which alone can enable us to profit by the first favourable opportunity, will be kept up with the utmost exactitude."

GANTEAUME TO DECÈS.

"7th Floréal, Year XIII. (27th of April 1805)."

"I doubt not, my friend, that you share all that I am suffering. Every day that passes is a day of torment to me, and I tremble lest I should after all be forced upon some precious blunder! The wind, which for two days was in the west, but light, although with rain and a dirty sky, has shifted into the north-north-east, and freshened, and I have been tempted to run all risks, although the enemy was still signalled as being in the Yroise, and though his advanced ships were in the road, and the weather was very clear. The certainty, however, which his position and his force gave me of having to fight to disadvantage, and the variableness of the wind, restrained me, and I am now glad of it; but I am none the less in a state of horrible anxiety.

"The length of the days and the fineness of the weather make me now almost despair of getting out, and then how shall I support the idea of keeping our friends waiting in vain at the place of rendezvous and of compromising them by exposing them to delays and to an extremely dangerous return? These ideas leave me not an instant of peace, and I daresay that they harass you also. However, my friend, you may rest perfectly assured that I have done the best I could, unless I had run the risks of an encounter which, independent of the chances that the enemy would have derived from his superior force, would equally have spoiled the expedition. As I have already reported, the weather has constantly been such as to render it impossible for us to elude the observation of the enemy.

"Although in your last you recommended me to write frequently to the emperor, I dare not write to him, having nothing favourable to say; I remain silent, awaiting events, being unwilling to trouble him about mere trifles, and I confine myself to saying that I trust that he will do us justice."

on board, land forces as well as seamen. In his vexation he asked if he should give battle in order to get out to open sea, but this he was expressly forbidden to do.

Napoleon, calculating that after the middle of May it would be dangerous to leave Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy waiting any longer at Martinique, and that the English squadrons sent in their pursuit would end by overtaking them, once more altered this part of his plan. He determined that if by the 20th of May Ganteaume had not been able to sail, he should not do so at all, but remain at Brest until relieved from blockade. Villeneuve, therefore, had orders to return with Gravina to Europe to do what was in the first instance entrusted to Ganteaume; that is to say, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, where he would find five sail of French and seven of Spanish, then, if he could, to touch at Rochefort and be reinforced by Missiessy, who would probably have returned from the West Indies, and finally, to present himself before Brest to open the sea to Ganteaume, which would increase his whole force to fifty-six sail. He was to steer for the Channel with this squadron, the largest ever assembled upon the ocean.

This plan was perfectly practicable, and even had great chances of success, as the result will presently prove. Nevertheless, it was less secure than the preceding one. In fact, if Ganteaume could have got out to sea in April, raised the blockade of Ferrol, which was possible without fighting, for only five or six English vessels then blockaded that port, and afterwards proceeded to Martinique, his junction with Villeneuve and Gravina would have taken place without any probability of battle: they would have returned to Europe to the number of fifty sail, and needed to touch nowhere previous to entering the Channel. There were no other risks to run than those of rencontres at sea, risks so rare that they might be wholly left out of question. The new plan, on the contrary, had the inconvenience of exposing Villeneuve to a battle before Ferrol, and to another before Brest; and though he would have a great superiority of force, there was no certainty that the two squadrons whom he had freed from blockade would have time to come to his aid and take part in the battle. In fact, the egress both from Ferrol and Brest is by narrow channels; there, as elsewhere, the wind that suits vessels going in is not that which suits them on coming out, and it was very possible for a battle to take place at the entrance of those ports and be brought to a termination before the fleets within could arrive to take a share in it. Even a battle of doubtful result would suffice to discourage the officers, whose confidence at sea was not very firm, however great their personal courage. Admiral Villeneuve especially, though a gallant sailor, had not a firmness equal to these risks, and it was to be regretted that

the serenity of the weather had prevented the execution of the first plan.

There was another which Napoleon had in contemplation for a moment, which would have consolidated fewer forces, indeed, but which would have taken Villeneuve with certainty into the Channel: it was, not to send Villeneuve before either Ferrol or Brest, but to cause him to double Scotland, and then steer down the North Sea, and so reach Boulogne. It is true that he would have arrived with only twenty sail instead of fifty; but this would have sufficed for three days; and the flotilla, sufficiently protected, would certainly have crossed. This idea presented itself for an instant to the mind of Napoleon; he put it on paper, and then, wishing for still greater security, he preferred a greater consolidation of forces to a greater certainty of making the Channel, and he reverted to the plan of raising the blockade of Ferrol and Brest by Villeneuve.

This was the last change of his plan that was produced by circumstances. It was in the midst of a fête, as he himself relates in a postscript to one of his letters, that he had ruminated on all these combinations, and decided upon his course. He immediately gave the necessary instructions. Two ships of the line had been prepared at Rochefort; Rear-Admiral Magon commanded them. He immediately sailed for Martinique, to announce the change that had taken place in Napoleon's determination. Frigates fitted out at Lorient, at Nantes, and at Rochefort were ready to leave these ports as soon as it was decided that Ganteaume was to make no further attempt at getting out, and they were commissioned to take orders to Villeneuve, to return immediately to Europe, there to execute the new plan. Each frigate was to be accompanied by a brig, furnished with a duplicate of these orders. The despatches were enclosed in leaden boxes, and entrusted to confidential officers, who were to throw them into the sea in case of danger. These precautions, and those which follow, are worthy of being mentioned for the instruction of governments.

In order that the fleets of Brest and Ferrol might be able to second those which were to raise the blockades for them, great precautions had been taken. Ganteaume was to anchor outside the road of Brest, in the creek of Bertheaume, an open place of doubtful safety. To correct this defect, a general of artillery was sent from Paris, and a hundred and fifty guns were placed in battery, in order to cover the squadron. Gourdon, commanding at Ferrol, in the room of Admiral Boudet, who was ill, had orders to pass from Ferrol to Corunna, where the anchorage is open, and to conduct the French division thither. Admiral Grandellana was directed to do the same with the Spanish vessels. The court of Spain was solicited to take precautions

similar to those taken at Bertheaume, to secure the anchorage by means of batteries. Finally, anticipating the case of the vessels that were to raise the blockade having consumed their provisions, there were prepared at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne, barrels of biscuit containing many millions of rations, which could be embarked without loss of time. An order was awaiting Admiral Missiessy at Rochefort should he return thither. That order enjoined him to set sail again on the instant, to go and alarm Ireland by his presence for a few days, and then to cruise at a distance from Ferrol in a given latitude, where Admiral Villeneuve, instructed by a frigate, was to join company with him.

While these measures of foresight were taken for the marine force, continual and secret pains were bestowed upon the land force to increase the effective strength of the war battalions on the coasts of the ocean. The troops of the expedition now amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, exclusive of the Brest corps, which had been broken up since the new destination was assigned to the fleet of Ganteaume. Admiral Verhuell had orders to repair to Ambleteuse with the Dutch fleet, in order that the whole expedition might be able to set out together from the four ports adjoining Boulogne. Those ports, artificially created, had become choked up with sand in the four years that had elapsed since their construction. New labours had cleared them. Further, repairs had been done to the vessels of the flotilla, which had suffered a little from their continual sorties and an exposed anchorage ground.

At the same time that he sent forth this multitude of orders, Napoleon had continued his journey in Italy. He had visited Bergamo, Verona, and Mantua, and had been present at a representation of the battle of Castiglione, given by a corps of twenty-five thousand men upon the actual field of that battle; he had stayed several days at Bologna, and enchanted the learned men of its celebrated university; then he had traversed Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and finally, "Genoa the superb," acquired by a dash of the pen. Here he remained from the 30th of June to the 7th of July, amidst fêtes worthy of the city of marble palaces, and even surpassing the most splendid of those with which he had been welcomed by the Italians. At Genoa he met with an illustrious personage, weary of an exile which had lasted for twelve years, and with an opposition which his religious principles no longer justified: that personage was the Cardinal Maury. The Pope had given him an example which he had at length determined upon following, and he had come to the resolution of espousing the cause of the restorer of religion. It was at Genoa that an opportunity had been provided for him to return to favour. Like those partisans of Pompey,

who, one after the other, endeavoured to meet with Cæsar in some one of the cities of the Roman empire, voluntarily to deliver themselves to his allurements, Cardinal Maury, in the city of Genoa, bent before the new Cæsar. He was received by him with the courtesy of a man of genius, who desires to ingratiate himself with a man of talent, and could see that his return into France would be recompensed with the highest dignities of the Church.

After having received the oath of the Genoese, planned with the engineer Forfait the future naval establishment that he wished to create on that coast, and entrusted to the Arch-Chancellor Lebrun the task of organising this new portion of the empire, Napoleon set out for Turin, where he pretended to occupy himself with reviews; then, on the evening of the 8th of July, leaving the empress in Italy, he started with two very humble post-carriages, caused himself to be represented on the road as the minister of the interior, and in eighty hours reached Fontainebleau. He arrived there on the morning of the 11th. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and the ministers were already in waiting there to receive his final orders. He was about to depart on an expedition which was to render him absolute master of the world, or plunge him, like another Pharaoh, into the abyss of the deep. Never had he been more calm, cheerful, or confident. But no matter what even the mightiest geniuses may will, their will, however powerful it may be, is still but the will of man; it is a mere caprice without strength when the will of Providence is opposed to it. Here is a memorable example of it. While Napoleon had everything prepared for the meeting with armed Europe between Boulogne and Dover, Providence had prepared that meeting for him in very different places!

The Emperor Alexander had adjourned the ratification of the treaty which constituted the new coalition to the moment when England should consent to evacuate Malta. Not doubting of a favourable reply, he had demanded passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, in order to put himself as early as possible in communication with Napoleon. The Emperor Alexander, less martially disposed as he approached the denouement, hoped by this promptitude to increase the chances of peace. But he had misjudged the cabinet of London. That cabinet, resolved to preserve a capital position, which the course of events and an act of bad faith had thrown into its hands, had positively refused to abandon the island of Malta. That intelligence, which arrived at St. Petersburg while M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, had thrown the Russian cabinet into indescribable embarrassment. What was to be done? To give way to whatever England chose, to submit to all the exactions of her

intractable ambition, would be to accept, in the eyes of Europe, a very inferior part, and to relinquish the negotiation of M. de Nowosiltzoff, for he would be dismissed from Paris on the very day of his arrival there, and probably in a humiliating manner, should he not take with him England's consent to the evacuation of Malta. It was, therefore, immediate war for the profit of England, at her beck, at her wages, and Europe would know that it was so. On the other hand, to break with her on account of this refusal was publicly to confess having engaged in a course of policy without understanding it, to decide, before the whole world, in favour of Napoleon, and to place Russia in a ridiculous isolation, involved in a quarrel with England through the exactions of that power, and with France through her own levities. To avoid being at the mercy of England was to become at the mercy of Napoleon, who would be master of the conditions of reconciliation with France.* If Napoleon had not come to the aid of the Russian cabinet by his error in annexing Genoa to France, he would now have seen his enemies plunged into the greatest confusion. In fact, the Russian cabinet was busily deliberating upon this grave situation, when it was informed of the annexation of Genoa. It was a real subject of rejoicing, for that unforeseen event released from their embarrassment statesmen who had most imprudently committed themselves. It was resolved to noise the tidings abroad to the utmost, and to declare very plainly that it was impossible to treat with a government which daily committed new usurpations. A very natural pretext was hereby furnished for recalling M. de Nowosiltzoff from Berlin, and an order was instantly despatched to him to return to St. Petersburg, leaving behind him a note to the King of Prussia explanatory of this change of determination. The Russian cabinet now held itself released from the necessity of urging England to the evacuation of Malta, and ratified the treaty which constituted the third coalition, alleging as its reason for so doing the recent usurpations of the Emperor of the French.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, whither the King of Prussia had at length arrived. The order for his return surprised and deeply annoyed him, for it was an opportunity lost of undertaking the finest of negotiations. He did not disguise his disappointment from the king himself, made him aware of his own personal inclination to do everything to win over the Emperor of the French had he gone on to Paris, and disclosed to him even the concessions to which he would have subscribed in the name of his court. It was an additional reason for the King of Prussia to deplore the new impulse to which Napoleon had

* It is from authentic documents that I describe this embarrassment of the Russian cabinet.

yielded, and to indulge in his usual complaints, complaints very mild, as was his custom, but also extremely doleful, for every additional risk added to the already very numerous risks of war affected him deeply.

At Vienna the effect was still more decisive. It was not from an embarrassment arising out of inconsiderate conduct that the cabinet of Vienna was drawn, but from long prudential hesitations. That cabinet had long perceived that Napoleon desired to possess himself of the whole of Italy, and could not resign itself to abandon it to him without making one last resistance with all the courage of despair. But the Austrian finances were in a deplorable condition, and a frightful dearth of grain afflicted Upper and Lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. Bread was so dear at Vienna that the usually mild and submissive population of that capital grew so enraged as even to plunder the shops of some bakers. Thus situated, Austria would still have hesitated for a long time ere she would have plunged herself into the expense of opposing so formidable an enemy as Napoleon; but on learning the annexation of Genoa, and the creation of the duchy of Lucca, all doubts ceased on the instant. The resolution to fight was immediately taken. Despatches were sent to St. Petersburg announcing the resolution, and were received with joy by the Russian cabinet, which, seeing itself drawn into a war, looked upon the concurrence of Austria as the most fortunate of events.

The adhesion of that court to the coalition was signed forthwith. Russia undertook to negotiate with England, to provide Austria with the largest possible amount of subsidy. They asked and obtained for the first expenses of opening the campaign one million sterling, besides the immediate advance of the moiety of the annual subsidy, that is to say, two millions sterling more. The plan of the campaign discussed between M. de Vinzingerode and the Prince of Schwartzenberg was settled on the 16th of July. It was agreed that ten thousand Russians and some thousands of Albanians should be opportunely thrown into Naples, to prepare a movement upon Lower Italy, while one hundred thousand Austrians should march upon Lombardy; that the grand Austrian army, supported by a Russian army of sixty thousand men at least, entering by Galicia, should operate in Bavaria; that an army of eighty thousand Russians should advance towards Prussia; that another army of Russians, English, Hanoverians, and Swedes, assembled in Swedish Pomerania, should march upon Hanover; and that, finally, the Russians should have considerable reserves to bring up wherever needed. The English were to effect disembarkations upon the points of the French empire which were deemed the most accessible, as soon as the diversion with which

Napoleon was threatened should have led to the dissolution of the army of the coasts of the ocean. It was settled that the troops destined to aid Austria should be ready to march before the autumn of the current year, to prevent Napoleon from taking advantage of the winter to destroy the Austrian army.

It was further agreed that the court of Vienna, continuing its system of deep dissimulation, should persist in denying its military preparations, while making them more actively than ever; and when dissimulation was no longer possible, should speak of negotiating and of resuming on her own part, and that of Russia, the negotiations abandoned by M. de Nowosiltzoff. This time, also, all connection with England was to be disavowed, and the continent alone to seem to be treated for. The usual duplicity of weakness characterised all this conduct. Prussia was in a state of cruel anxiety. Without completely penetrating it, she had had a presentiment of this determination to go to war, and she had kept herself aloof from all engagement by alleging to Russia that she was too much exposed to the attacks of Napoleon, and to Napoleon, who had renewed his offers of alliance to her, that she was too much exposed to the attack of Russia.

M. de Zastrow had returned from St. Petersburg after a disagreeable and bootless mission. An unforeseen circumstance nearly led to the sudden discovery of the coalition and the obligation of Prussia to pronounce. Since a treaty of subsidies concluded between England and Sweden had secured that, at least thus far, insane royalty to the coalition, Stralsund swarmed with troops. It is known that that important place was the last foothold that Sweden possessed in the north of Germany. Napoleon had perceived from certain reports of his diplomatic agents that something was brewing in that quarter, and had given notice of it to the King of Prussia, telling him to take care of that neutrality of the north of Germany, that great object of his anxiety, and that he, for his part, would send thirty thousand more men into Hanover at the first danger. These few words had sufficed to alarm the King of Prussia, who immediately desired the King of Sweden to discontinue his military preparations in Swedish Pomerania. The King of Sweden feeling secure of support, replied to the King of Prussia that he was master in his own territory; that he was making preparations which he deemed to be necessary to his own safety; and that if the King of Prussia wished to restrict his liberty, he reckoned upon the King of England and the Emperor of Russia, his allies, to aid him in compelling respect to the independence of his States. His gasconading did not end there; he returned to King Frederick William the orders of Prussia, saying that he would not wear them from the moment

that they had been conferred on the most cruel enemy of Europe.

This affront deeply irritated Frederick William. Extremely prudent as he was, he would have taken vengeance for it, had not Russia, immediately interfering, declared to Prussia that Swedish Pomerania was under the protection of Russia, and should remain inviolable. This sort of prohibition of action signified to Prussia gave her much cause for reflection, and humiliated her no less. She determined to make no reply, confining herself to dismissing the Swedish minister, and declaring to Napoleon that she could not answer for what would take place in Hanover; but, nevertheless, she would guarantee that the Prussian territory should not serve as the road of an invading army.

The horizon then grew dark on all sides, and in a manner very visible to the dullest sight. From all parts assemblages of troops were announced, in the Friuli, in the Tyrol, and in Upper Austria. It was not simple concentrations of men that were spoken of, but the organisation of special services, which was more significant. Cavalry were remounted, artillery provided with horses, and conducted in numerous trains to the banks of the Adige; considerable magazines were everywhere formed, bridges thrown over the Piave and the Tagliamento, and field-works thrown up in the lagunes of Venice; all this could scarcely leave any doubt. Austria denied her preparations with a hardihood of which there are but few examples in history, and confessed only some precautions in the Venetian States, caused by the French assemblages formed in Italy. As for the exchange of grand decorations which had been demanded of her, she had declined it under various pretexts.

It was upon this concatenation of circumstances that Napoleon had to come to a resolution during the few days that he was to pass at Fontainebleau and St. Cloud, previous to his departure for Boulogne. It was necessary to decide for the descent or for an overwhelming march upon the continental powers. On the 11th of July, the very day of his arrival at Fontainebleau, the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès had repaired thither, and commenced consulting with him on the grand affairs of the moment. That grave personage was alarmed at the state of the continent and at the threatening symptoms of an approaching war, and rightly looked upon the annexations in Italy as being the inevitable cause of a rupture. In such a state of things he could not well comprehend that Napoleon should leave Italy and France exposed to the attacks of the coalition to throw himself upon England. Napoleon, full of confidence and enthusiasm for the vast maritime plan, of which he had not entrusted the whole secret even to the arch-chancellor, was not embarrassed by any

of these objections. In his opinion the acquisition of Genoa and Lucca did not concern Russia, for Italy was not calculated to be subject to her influence. That court ought to think it fortunate that he asked no account of the Russian proceedings in Georgia, in Persia, and even in Turkey. Russia had allowed herself to be engaged in the English policy; she was visibly in a state of coalition with her; M. de Nowosiltzoff was a mere English commissioner, whom they had wished to send, but whom he would have received accordingly. It was very evident that Russia and England were closely engaged together, but those two powers could do nothing without Austria, without the armies and the territories of that power, and Austria, still impressed with a great dread of France, would still hesitate for some time ere she would be entirely gained over. At all events, she would not be ready soon enough to prevent the English expedition. A few days would suffice for the execution of that expedition, and the Channel being once crossed, all the coalitions would be destroyed at a single blow, and the arm of Austria, now raised against France, would be stricken down on the instant. "Leave it to me," said Napoleon to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès—"rely on my activity; I will surprise the world by the grandeur and the rapidity of my strokes!"

He then gave some orders concerning Italy and the Rhine. He enjoined Eugène, who remained at Milan, and Marshal Jourdan, the young prince's military mentor, to set about provisioning fortresses, getting together field artillery, purchasing draught horses, and forming parks of artillery and stores of ammunition and provisions. He ordered the troops who had been reviewed at Marengo and Castiglione to be moved towards the Adige. He had some time previously posted a reserve division in the neighbourhood of Pescara, to support General St. Cyr should he need it. He directed that general to obtain all possible information, and should he discover the slightest attempt of the Russians or the English upon any part whatever of the Calabrias, to pass from Taranto to Naples itself, drive the court from the kingdom, and retain possession of it.

He sent forward upon the Rhine the heavy cavalry which was not intended to embark for England, and directed upon the same point the regiments which were not to be included in the expedition. He gave especial orders to commence the formation of field batteries at Metz, Strasburg, and Mayence.

He then gave his last instructions to M. de Talleyrand with reference to diplomatic business. As often as any new information was received of the preparations of Austria, that court was immediately to be made aware of it, convicted of its bad faith, and made to tremble for the consequences of its conduct. This time it would perish, and have no mercy shown to it

should it interrupt the expedition to England. As to Prussia, communications had long since been opened with her upon the subject of Hanover. It was necessary to seize upon the present opportunity to sound her about this valuable acquisition, to stimulate her known ambition, and, should she nibble at that bait, to offer it to her immediately on condition of an alliance with France, concluded on the instant, and publicly proclaimed. With such an alliance, Napoleon was certain to freeze Austria with terror, and render her motionless for many a year. In any case he was convinced that between Boulogne and Dover he was about to arrange matters better than they could be arranged by the most skilful and successful negotiations.

Time pressed, everything was prepared on the coasts of the ocean, and at any moment Admiral Villeneuve might arrive before Ferrol, before Brest, and in the Channel. Admiral Missiessy had returned to Rochefort after having traversed the West Indies, taken Dominica from the English, thrown troops, arms, and munitions into Guadaloupe and Martinique, taken numerous prizes, and displayed the French colours upon the ocean, without suffering a repulse. Nevertheless, he had returned too soon; and as he displayed some unwillingness to put to sea again, Napoleon had replaced him by Captain Lallemand, an excellent officer, whom he sent off before the ships were repaired to join company with Villeneuve in the latitudes of Ferrol. All this being finished, Napoleon repaired to Boulogne, leaving Messrs. Cambacérès and de Talleyrand at Paris, taking Marshal Berthier with him, and giving orders to Admiral Decrès to join him without delay. He arrived at Boulogne on the 3rd of August, amidst the enthusiastic joy of the army, which began to be weary of daily repeating the same exercises, during two years and a half, and which firmly believed that this time Napoleon arrived to place himself at its head, and finally cross into England.

On the very morrow of his arrival he had all the infantry mustered on the shore at low-water mark. It occupied above three leagues, and presented the enormous mass of 100,000 infantry, drawn up in a single line. In his whole warrior life he had seen nothing finer. Accordingly, on returning to his headquarters in the evening, he wrote these significant words to Admiral Decrès: "*The English know not what awaits them. If we have the power of crossing for but twelve hours, England is no more!*" *

He had now assembled in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, that is to say, to the west of Cape Grisnez, and to the northward of Boulogne, all the

* Letter to M. Decrès of the 16th Thermidor, year XIII. (4th of August 1805).—*Archives of the State Paper Office.*

corps which were to embark on the flotilla. The wish formed two years before was now realised, thanks to the pains taken in consolidating, and thanks to a splendid battle fought by the Dutch flotilla, under Admiral Verhuell, in doubling Cape Grisnez in presence of the English. That battle, fought on the 18th of July (29th Messidor), a few days previous to the arrival of Napoleon, was the most important check that the flotilla had offered to the English. Several divisions of Dutch gunboats had fallen in at Cape Grisnez with forty-five sail of the English, consisting of ships of the line as well as frigates and corvettes, and had fought them with a rare coolness and complete success. The meeting at the Cape was dangerous, because the water being deep there, the English vessels could press our slightly constructed vessels close, without fear of grounding. Notwithstanding this advantage of the enemy, the Dutch gunboats held their own in presence of their powerful adversaries. The artillery that guarded the shore hastened to sustain them, the Boulogne flotilla ran out to their support, and amidst a shower of projectiles Admiral Verhuell, with Marshal Davoust by his side, passed at half cannon-shot from the English squadron without losing a single vessel. This battle established the reputation of Admiral Verhuell, who already enjoyed great esteem in the expedition, and infused confidence into the hundred and sixty thousand men, soldiers and sailors, ready to cross the Channel upon the French and Dutch flotillas.

Napoleon had now his whole army under his hand. In two hours both men and horses could be embarked, and in two tides, that is to say, in twenty-four hours, they could be conveyed to Dover. As for the matériel, it was embarked.

The army assembled on this point, successively increased, now amounted to nearly one hundred and thirty-two thousand fighting men and fifteen thousand horses, independently of the corps of General Marmont stationed at the Texel, amounting to twenty-four thousand men, and of the four thousand men at Brest destined to sail with the squadron of Ganteaume.

The one hundred and thirty-two thousand who were to go on board the flotilla and sail from the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples were divided into six corps. The advanced guard, commanded by Lannes, fourteen thousand strong, consisting of the Gazan division and of the famous united grenadiers, encamped at Arras, was to embark at Vimereux. Those ten battalions of grenadiers, forming by themselves a corps of eight thousand men, of the finest infantry in the world, embarked on a light division of pinnaces, were called to the honour of being the first to throw themselves upon the shore of England, under the inspiring impulse of Lannes and Oudinot. Then came the main body, divided into right wing,

centre, and left wing. The right wing, under the command of Davoust, numbering twenty-six thousand men, consisting of the valiant divisions of Morand,* Friant, and Gudin, which have since distinguished themselves at Awerstaedt and in a hundred fights, was destined to embark at Ambleteuse upon the Dutch flotilla. The centre, under Marshal Soult, numbering forty-six thousand men, distributed into four divisions, at the head of which were Generals Vandamme, Suchet, le Grand, and St. Hilaire, were to embark upon the four divisions of the flotilla that were assembled at Boulogne. Finally, the left, or camp of Montreuil, was under the command of the intrepid Ney. It consisted of twenty-two thousand men; it comprised three divisions, and especially the Dupont division, which soon after covered itself with glory at Albek, at the bridge of Halle, and at Friedland. This corps was to depart from Etaples upon two divisions of the flotilla. A division of the élite of the guard, three thousand strong, and already on its march, was about to arrive at Boulogne, there to strengthen the centre.

Finally, the sixth subdivision of that grand army was what was called the reserve. It was under the command of Prince Louis; it comprised the dragoons and the foot chasseurs, commanded by Generals Klein and Margaron, the heavy cavalry commanded by Nansouty, and an Italian division, perfectly disciplined, and not yielding in steadiness of bearing to the finest French divisions. Napoleon had said that he would show the English what they had never seen since Cæsar—Italians in their island; and that he would teach those Italians to know their own prowess and to fight as well as the French. This reserve, amounting to twenty-seven thousand men, and posted in the rear of all the other camps, was to march to the shore when the five first corps of the army had sailed; and as it was presumed that a squadron would cover the passage, and that we should for some days be masters of the Strait, the transport flotilla, parting company for a few hours with the war flotilla, was to return and embark this reserve, as well as the second half of the horses. In fact, out of fifteen thousand horses, the flotilla could only embark eight thousand at a time. The other seven thousand were to be taken at a second trip.

Thus besides the twenty-four thousand men under Marmont, embarked in the fleet of the Texel, and the four thousand men embarked at Brest, Napoleon could at once put in motion a total mass of one hundred and thirty-two thousand men, being one hundred thousand infantry, seven thousand mounted and twelve thousand dismounted cavalry, and thirteen thousand artillery.†

* At that time the Bisson division.

† I have taken all these numbers from the memorandum book of the emperor; the very book which he carried with him. This memorandum book is

It was in this formidable array that Napoleon awaited the squadron of Villeneuve.

That admiral, as we have seen, had sailed on the 30th of March from Toulon with eleven vessels, of which two were eighty-gun ships and six frigates. Nelson was cruising near Barcelona. Endeavouring to make it believed that his intention was to remain in that neighbourhood, he had suddenly steered to the south of Sardinia, in the hope that the French, misled by the reports that he had circulated, would endeavour to avoid the coast of Spain, and so meet him by their own act. The French fleet having run out with a fair wind, and being informed of the truth by a Ragusan vessel, steered between Majorca and Minorca on the one hand, and Carthagená on the other, touched at the last-named place on the 7th of April, and lay there one day owing to a dead calm. Villeneuve offered the Spanish admiral, Salcedo, permission to join his squadron, an offer which, for want of orders, the latter could not accept; and Villeneuve, resuming his course with a favourable wind, arrived on the 9th of April at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar. On the same day at noon he entered the Straits in two columns, his frigates in advance, all his vessels cleared for action, and everything prepared for fighting. The French fleet was perceived by the look-out at Gibraltar, the alarm-bells were rung, and the alarm-guns fired, for there was only a very weak division in the port. On the same evening Villeneuve hove in sight of Cadiz.

Advertised by his signals, the captain of *l'Aigle* hastened to run out of port, and the brave Gravina, who had neglected nothing to be in readiness, hastened to weigh anchor to join the French admiral. But many things were still left undone at Cadiz. The two thousand five hundred Spaniards who were to be conveyed to the colonies were not even embarked. All the provisions were not yet on board. It would have required at least eight and forty hours more for Admiral Gravina to have been fully ready; but Villeneuve was in a hurry to be gone, and said that he would not wait if they could not join him at once. Although somewhat recovered from the anxiety of his first sortie, he was still haunted by the image of Nelson, whom he constantly fancied he saw in pursuit of him.

Gravina, deeply devoted to the projects of Napoleon, embarked *pêle-mêle*, determining to complete stowage and other arrangements at sea, and sailed out of Cadiz during the night. Such, indeed, were the hurry and confusion of this sortie, that one vessel actually took the ground.

deposited at the Louvre, and it alone gives the true statistics of the army of the ocean, which are not to be found in the archives of either the war or the navy department. Consequently all military works have given incorrect numbers relatively to the composition of the army.

About two o'clock in the morning, Villeneuve, who had been riding at a single anchor, took advantage of the wind, and resumed his course to the west. On the 11th he was well out at sea, having escaped the dreaded observation of the English. During the 11th and 12th he awaited the Spanish ships, but only two of them hove in sight, and being unwilling to lose any more time, he made sail, reckoning that they would rejoin him either en route or at Martinique, for every commander had received information of that general rendezvous. Moreover, no one but Villeneuve knew the main destination of the squadron.

Villeneuve should now have felt reassured, and have taken some confidence in himself, for he had overcome the most serious difficulties of his undertaking, in quitting Toulon, passing the Straits, and rallying the Spaniards, without accident. But the sight of his crews filled him with vexation. He saw that they were far inferior to those of the English, and to those of France in the time of the American war. It was very natural that they should be so, seeing that they had just left port for the first time. He complained not merely of the quality of his seamen, but also of the vessels themselves and of their equipment. Three of his ships were inferior or bad sailers: these were *le Formidable*, *l'Intrepide*, and especially *l'Atlas*. A new vessel, *le Pluton*, had bad iron work, which frequently gave way. Admiral Villeneuve was annoyed by all this, to an extent which affected his self-confidence. The emperor's aide-de-camp, Lauriston, had made every effort to cheer him, but to little purpose. For the rest, he had excellent captains, who, as far as possible, made amends for the inexperience of the crews and the defects of the fleet. Villeneuve was not consoled until he saw the condition of the Spanish ships, which were inferior to his own. However, the voyage, though retarded by their slow sailers, which is not uncommon when sailing in a squadron, appeared a fortunate one, and continued without accident.

Nelson, outwitted, had in the first instance gone in pursuit of the French squadron to the south, and to the east of the Mediterranean. He had learned on the 16th of April that the French squadron had steered for the Straits, had been detained by westerly winds till the 30th, had anchored on the 10th of May in the Bay of Lagos, and after detaching one of his ships to escort a convoy he had not made the ocean till the 11th of May, to sail for the West Indies, whither he supposed our squadron to have steered.

At this period Villeneuve had very nearly reached his destination, for on the 14th of May he made Martinique, having been six weeks on the passage. On touching there he had the

gratification of being rejoined by the four Spanish sail which had parted company with the squadron, and which arrived nearly at the same time that he did. It was a great advantage, and he ought now to have felt a little more confidence in his fortune, which hitherto had been uniformly favourable.

This voyage had been of great service. It had given experience to the crews. As the weather had been moderate, the rigging too had been put into ship-shape. "*We are,*" wrote General Lauriston to the emperor, "*stronger by one-third than we were when we sailed.*" *

A fleet already disciplined and practised gains nothing by a voyage of twelve or fifteen hundred leagues the more, but a fleet which has never before been out of sight of port will in such a voyage acquire the main of the instruction it required, and such was the case with ours.

Admiral Villeneuve, alarmed at his responsibility, and not setting due value upon any of the advantages which he at the same time enjoyed, considered that we were destitute of so many requisites, that some improvements made on the passage would not suffice to supply our deficiencies. He had the folly, like a man whose moral courage is shaken, to exaggerate the merit of the enemy, and to underrate that of his own men. He said that with twenty French or Spanish ships he would not venture to offer battle to fourteen sail of English, and this language he held in the presence of his own officers. Fortunately, the soldiers and sailors, full of zeal, were not so much impressed as their commander with the insufficiency of our means, but full of confidence in their own courage, ardently desired to engage the enemy. General Lauriston, whom the emperor had attached to Villeneuve that he might sustain and excite him, fulfilled his duty with untiring zeal, but rather contributed to vex and irritate him by contradiction. Gravina, simple, sensible, and full of energy, agreed with Villeneuve as to the quality of his squadron, but with Lauriston as to the necessity of unwavering devotion, and was resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice his own existence in carrying out the designs of Napoleon.

Now that they had escaped all the perils of the voyage, it was necessary to wait forty days at Martinique for the arrival of Ganteaume, unaware of his detention at Brest by that rare occur-

* "All our vessels are in good order, and in better order, in my opinion, than when we first sailed from Toulon. The moderate weather has afforded the opportunity of setting up the rigging by degrees; notwithstanding this, the chains, and generally speaking, all the iron work of the *Pluton* and of the *Hermione*, are of such bad quality, as well as the masts and spars, that many of them have been sprung.

"At present everything is refitted; the sailors have learned a great deal; there is a sensible difference in the working of the ships; *we are stronger by one-third than at the moment of our first sailing.*"—*Letter of General Lauriston to the emperor.*

rence, an equinox without a single gale. Villeneuve, then, having arrived at Martinique on the 11th of May, had to remain in those latitudes until the 23rd of June, and he reflected, with vexation, that that was a space of time even more than sufficient to allow of his being overtaken by Nelson, and blockaded in Martinique, or beaten if he ventured out.

His orders were to wait for Ganteaume, which implied a sort of inaction; and, like all men who are ill at ease, he wished to be in motion. He complained of being unable to go and ravage the islands of the English, which, but for his orders, he easily could have done with twenty sail. To pass away the time they took the Diamond Fort, which is in front of Martinique, and which Admiral Missiessy, to the great regret of Napoleon, had neglected to capture. It was cannonaded by several ships, and then some hundreds of men landed from the boats and carried it by assault. They now would fain have completed the occupation of Dominica by the capture of the Bluff of Cabry, of which also Admiral Missiessy had neglected to make himself master; but this position, strongly defended by nature and art, required a regular siege, and that they could not venture to undertake. Villeneuve sent his frigates, which were excellent, and fast sailers, to cruise in the Archipelago, to make prizes and procure him tidings of the enemy.

They had brought troops; Missiessy had also brought some; there were about 12,000 men in the French islands. Such a force would have sufficed for the execution of important operations, but they could not be ventured upon from the fear of missing Ganteaume. For the rest, the French islands were in the best condition, garrisoned, provided with munitions, and, thanks to the privateers, with abundance of provisions, and, moreover, animated by the best spirit. However, to prevent the crews from further contracting the sickness which had begun to prevail among them from their stay in this climate, and also with the view of preventing desertion, to which the Spaniards showed a strong inclination, it was determined to attempt a *coup de main* upon Barbadoes, where the English had important military establishments. It was in that island, in fact, that they kept all the depôts of their colonial troops. General Lauriston had brought with him an excellent division of five thousand men, organised and equipped with the greatest care. It was intended for this service. General Lauriston determined to go by Guadeloupe to embark another battalion there, for it was expected he would find some ten thousand men at Barbadoes, half militia and half troops of the line. It was determined, then, to set out on the 4th of June; but on the very day appointed, Rear-Admiral Magon arrived with the two vessels from Rochefort, which Napoleon had despatched to convey the first tidings

of the change which had taken place in his projects. Magon brought word that as Ganteaume had not been able to get out of Brest, it was necessary to go and release from blockade not only him, but also the Ferrol squadron, and after rallying the fleets which were in those ports, to steer in a body for the Channel. However, he at the same time brought orders for remaining at Martinique till the 21st of June, as up to the 21st of May it was possible that Ganteaume might get out of Brest, in which case, allowing a month for the passage to Martinique, it could not be definitively known until the 21st of June whether that admiral had sailed or not. There was sufficient time, therefore, for executing the project against Barbadoes. Magon had brought troops and munitions in his ships. He joined the squadron, now twenty-seven sail strong, fourteen being French sail of the line, six Spanish sail of the line, and seven frigates. On the 6th of June they reached Guadaloupe, here they embarked a battalion; on the 7th they had got as far as Antigua, on the 8th they had got clear of that island, which had incessantly fired upon them, when they came in sight of a convoy of fifteen sail which had left Antigua. They were merchantmen laden with colonial produce, and convoyed only by a corvette.

The admiral instantly gave the signal to give chase, *according to sailing*, as the sailors have it; that is to say, that each vessel should do its best, and take the rank that it could get by its speed. Before evening the convoy was taken. It was of the value of from nine to ten millions of francs. Some American and Italian passengers gave intelligence of Nelson. They stated that he had arrived at Barbadoes, as they left that island. They varied as to the strength of his squadron. But he had been joined by Admiral Cochrane, who guarded those seas. This intelligence produced an extraordinary effect upon the mind of Admiral Villeneuve. He fancied he saw Nelson with fourteen, sixteen, perhaps even eighteen sail; that is to say, with a force nearly equal to his own, ready to come up with him, and give him battle. On the instant he formed the determination of returning to Europe. Lauriston, on the contrary, resting upon the assertion of the prisoners, which gave only two sail to Cochrane, leading to the supposition that Nelson had at most only fourteen, maintained that with twenty we were able to fight him to advantage, and that after having rid ourselves of his pursuit by a battle, our expedition would be far more secure of success. Villeneuve was not of this opinion, but would absolutely make sail for Europe. So much in haste was he, that he would not even return to the French islands to re-land the troops he had embarked thence. To do this it would have been necessary to beat up against the wind that blows from east to west along the Antilles, and they were now at

Antigua, far to the west of Martinique. Ten days, perhaps, would have been lost, and they would have run the risk of meeting with the English. He therefore determined to select his four best frigates, to put as many troops on board them as he could, and to despatch them for Martinique. He gave them orders to rejoin the squadron at the Western Islands. But there still remained some four or five thousand troops on board, and these were a very embarrassing freight. By keeping them, he would deprive the colonies of a very valuable force, which it was very difficult to send to them from the mother country, besides having so many more mouths to feed, which was very vexatious, seeing that he was somewhat short of provisions, and had barely water enough for the passage. Further, there was the risk of missing Ganteaume, as it was as yet uncertain whether he had left Brest for Martinique. In point of fact they were right in supposing that Ganteaume had not set out, but they did not certainly know it, and the course proposed was, therefore, a serious blunder. To these objections Villeneuve replied, that if Ganteaume had set out, it was so much the better; that in that case they would not have to raise the blockade of Brest, but could pass that port without difficulty, and enter the Channel at once.

Villeneuve at once formed his determination, put all the troops that he could on board the frigates, and sent them to Martinique. Unwilling either to hamper himself with the convoy or to lose it, he gave it in charge to another frigate, to escort it to one of the French islands. On the 10th of June he was on his passage to Europe. His resolution, though censurable in principle, was not bad in effect, provided he returned to Martinique to land his troops, to revictual and to take in water, and to receive tidings from Europe.

Nelson, whom he so much dreaded, had arrived at Barbadoes early in June, after a prodigiously rapid voyage, sailing fearlessly with only nine ships. Imagining that the French intended to retake Trinidad from the Spaniards, he had embarked two thousand men at Barbadoes, rallied the two vessels of Admiral Cochrane, and, without staying to revictual or refit, on the 7th he was in the Gulf of Paria, before Trinidad. There he discovered his error, set sail again, and on the 10th made Grenada. He prepared to return to Barbadoes; to land there the troops he had needlessly brought thence, and to return to Europe with eleven sail. What activity! what energy! It is a new proof that in war—and in war by sea still more than in war by land—the quality of the forces is always of more consequence than their number. Nelson, with but eleven sail, was full of confidence, on those seas on which Villeneuve trembled with twenty sail, and those manned by heroic sailors!

Villeneuve steered for Europe, bearing to the north-west with pretty favourable weather. On making the Western Islands on the 30th of June, he there found his frigates, which had occupied but four days in landing their troops, and which had not fallen in with the English, showing that Villeneuve might safely have done the same. The four detached frigates had fallen in with the fifth, which was escorting the captured convoy, and could not conduct it. They had therefore determined to burn it, which involved a loss of ten millions of francs. All had then assembled at the Western Isles, and Villeneuve now resumed his voyage with the twenty ships and seven frigates, shaping his course towards the coast of Spain. They were repaid for the loss of the burned convoy by the capture of a rich galleon from Lima, laden with dollars to the amount of from seven to eight millions (£280,000 to £320,000 sterling). It was a resource which soon became very valuable. Suddenly, at the commencement of July, when they were sixty leagues from Cape Finisterre, the wind shifted to the north-east, and became entirely against them. They began to tack, in order to gain time without being driven back. But the wind continued in the same quarter, and became so violent that several vessels were damaged; some even losing their topmasts. The two ships that had come from Rochefort under Magon had brought the fever with them from Charente. They were crowded with sick. The troops who had been carried from Europe to America, and from America to Europe, almost without touching land, were attacked by sickness of all sorts. Misery reigned throughout the squadron. Eighteen hours of a contrary wind completed that misery, and helped still further to depress the courage of Admiral Villeneuve. He wanted to go to Cadiz, that is to say, directly away from the point at which Napoleon expected him, and to which his instructions directed him. Lauriston resisted as strongly as possible, and at length prevailed over him. The wind, too, having shifted about the 20th of July, they again made for Ferrol.

The bad weather had caused two misfortunes; the first, the depression of the moral courage of both the squadron and its commander; and the second, giving intelligence of its course to the British Admiralty. Nelson had despatched in advance of him the brig *le Curieux*, to convey to England the bulletin of his passage. This brig had seen the French squadron, and making all sail, had arrived at Portsmouth on the 7th of July. On the 8th the despatch had been delivered at the Admiralty. Though still unaware of the precise object of the French squadron, yet thinking it likely that it was to raise the blockade of Ferrol, the Admiralty had ordered Admiral Sterling, who was

detached from the blockade of Brest to watch Rochefort, to take five sail, and join Calder, who was cruising off Cape Finisterre. The length of time which had elapsed since Napoleon thought of his grand naval plan, the various sorties that had been recently attempted, the departure of Villeneuve, his passage to Cadiz, his junction with Gravina, his return to Europe, where two fleets, for a long time ready to sail, seemed to be waiting for him to raise their blockade; all these circumstances had at length by degrees led the English, at the least vaguely, to surmise a part of the projects of Napoleon. They did not exactly contemplate a junction of the French squadrons in the Channel, but they resolved to prevent the raising of the blockade of Ferrol or of Brest, which appeared to them to be the probable design. Accordingly they had increased the blockading squadron of Cornwallis before Brest to twenty-four sail, of which five were detached to watch Rochefort, and that of Ferrol to ten. The latter was about to have fourteen or fifteen sail by the junction of the division of Rochefort. Every delay is a misfortune for a project which requires secrecy. It gives the enemy time to reflect, sometimes to guess by dint of reflecting, and frequently thus to receive such indications as end by putting him on the right scent.

On the 22nd of July, Villeneuve, sailing in three columns, was making for Ferrol, that is to say, to the north-east, with a tolerable north-west wind on his quarter. Towards the middle of the day he saw twenty-four sail, of which fifteen were ships of the line; it was Admiral Calder's English squadron coming up in the opposite direction to meet him, and cut him off from Ferrol. They were forty leagues from that port.

There was not much room to doubt that a battle must take place. Villeneuve no longer thought of avoiding it; for it was responsibility, and by no means danger, of which he was afraid; but still worn out with anxieties, he lost some precious time in ranging himself for battle. General Lauriston, urging him incessantly, pressed him to give at eleven o'clock in the morning the orders which he did not give until one. The best part of the day was thus wasted, which there was soon good reason to regret. The vessels of the two combined squadrons consumed two hours in forming in order of battle, and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that the twenty French and Spanish ships were brought into a regular line, the Spaniards forming the head of the column, and Magon, with the Rochefort division and several frigates, its rear. The English admiral, Calder, with fifteen ships of the line, several of them carrying a hundred guns, while the strongest of ours were only of eighty, in his turn ranged up for battle, and formed a long line parallel to ours, but advancing in the opposite direction. The English

bearing to the south-west, and we to the north-west, and the wind blowing from the north-west, both squadrons had it on their quarter. Each bearing down, and in opposite directions, they would speedily have ended by avoiding each other, when Calder directed the head of his column against the rear of our line in order to break it. Villeneuve, to whom danger restored the resolution of a man of courage, perceiving that the English admiral, according to a manœuvre often repeated in our days, wished to break our line, so as to place it between two fires, imitated the manœuvre of his enemy, and coming, as seamen say, *luff by luff by the stern way*, brought off the rear of this column, and presented its head to the head of that of the enemy. In this double movement the two squadrons meeting, the first Spanish vessel, the *Argonaut*, with Admiral Gravina on board, found itself engaged with the first English vessel, the *Hero*. English and French, following up this movement, were speedily engaged from one end of the line to the other. But the English squadron being less numerous than ours, the fire did not reach on one side further than to the thirteenth or fourteenth vessel. Our rearguard, without an enemy before it, and merely receiving some stray shots, now was the time for some decisive manœuvre. Unfortunately a heavy fog, which at this moment prevailed over several hundred leagues, for it was visible at Brest, obscured the two fleets to such a degree that the English admiral was for some time unaware whether he had an enemy on the starboard or on the larboard side. Each ship could perceive only the one that was opposite to it, and fought only that. A smart and well-sustained, but not quick cannonading ensued. The French and Spaniards, notwithstanding their inexperience, fought coolly, and in good order. Our crews had not attained to that precision of fire which now distinguishes them; nevertheless, in this kind of duel, of ship to ship, the English suffered as much as we did; and if our rear, which had no enemy to engage it, could have discovered what was passing, and had doubled upon the English line, so as to place part of it between two fires, the victory would have been secured to us. Villeneuve, making nothing out through the fog, had difficulty in giving his orders. Magon, it is true, had made his inaction known to Villeneuve; but this information, owing to the state of the atmosphere, having been transmitted, not by signals, but by frigates, arrived too late, and induced no determination on the part of the French admiral, who after a momentary decision at the commencement of the battle had relapsed into his customary indecision, fearing to act in the dark lest he should make false movements. All that he ventured upon was to fight his flagship gallantly.

After a long cannonade the English ship, the *Windsor*, had suffered so severely, that a frigate was obliged to tow her out

of the line of battle to prevent her from falling into our hands. Other English vessels had also been much damaged. The French vessels, on the contrary, though they stood up gallantly, had been fortunate enough to escape serious damage. Our Spanish allies, who formed the first third of the line of battle, had suffered much more, without being at all in fault. Their three ships nearest to us, *l'España*, the *San Firmo*, and the *San Rafaël*, were in a sad condition. The *San Firmo* especially had lost two masts. As the wind blew from us to the English, these vessels, being unable to manœuvre, were drifting towards the enemy. Seeing this, the brave captain of the *Pluton*, M. de Cosmao, lying nearest to the Spaniards, quitted the line, and advanced to cover with his ship the disabled Spanish vessels. The *San Rafaël*, a slow sailer, and the first of the three Spaniards thus drifting, endeavoured to let herself run between the two lines towards the rearguard, in the hope of escaping by this movement. The *San Firmo*, which had suffered more, was in vain protected by M. de Cosmao, who could not prevent her from going to leeward, and thus falling into the hands of the English. M. de Cosmao succeeded in saving *l'España*, which, thanks to him, was kept in our line. About six o'clock a gleam of clear weather disclosed this spectacle to Admiral Villeneuve. The *San Rafaël* was seen escaping to the rearguard, and the *San Firmo*, already surrounded by enemies, driving gradually towards the English squadron. As they fought at long shot, there was sufficient space between the two to allow of a forward movement, by which movement our disabled vessels would again have made part of our line. General Lauriston kept by the side of Villeneuve, and he heard the officers of the squadron proposing that movement. He therefore advised him to make the signal for bearing up all together, that is to say, for sailing before the wind, which, blowing towards the English, would have enabled us to come up with our endangered vessels. We should have been nearer to the enemy, and he, damaged and inferior in number, would probably have given way before this offensive movement. Villeneuve, in consequence of the fog, seeing but imperfectly what was passing, and fearing to derange his line of battle, and to run new risks, preferred the loss of two ships to the chance of recommencing the action. He consequently refused to give the order, which was solicited on all hands. By this time night was coming on, and the firing had almost ceased. The English drew off, towing with them two of their ships which were much shattered by the fire, and the two Spaniards that were abandoned to them by our blunder.

As for us, we had suffered but little; there was not one of our crews that was not ready to recommence the fight, and who did not believe himself a conqueror on seeing the enemy

withdraw. The loss of the two Spanish vessels was unknown in the fleet.

All night the English were visible far away to leeward, with lights astern, busied in repairing damages.

The same was done on our side. At daybreak the situation of the two squadrons was clearly discernible. The English were retreating, but carrying off the two Spanish vessels with them. Grief and exasperation became general on board our vessels. The crews asked to renew the action, and fight a decisive battle. The wind was in our favour, as on the previous evening, blowing from us towards the English. If at this instant Villeneuve had given the signal to bear down upon the enemy, without any other order of battle than the order of speed in sailing, fourteen of the eighteen vessels we still possessed, being of an equal rate of speed, would have fallen upon the English at once; the other four would have arrived soon afterwards, and the battle would certainly have been in our favour. Roused by the cry which arose among all the officers, Villeneuve at length gave orders for that movement, and went with Lauriston on board the frigate *l'Hortense* to give his orders verbally to each chief of division. The *Argonaut*, the Spanish admiral's ship, having sprung her mizen-top-yard, required time to fish it. Villeneuve would wait for her, which took till near noon. Then he commenced the chase; but the wind had slackened, and he saw the English steal away from him without his being able to gain much upon them even under a press of canvas. Imagining that he should not overtake them until night, he waited till morning, in order to fight by daylight. But on the morrow the wind had shifted to the north-east, that is to say, in the very contrary direction. The English now had the weather gage; to come up with them was difficult. Villeneuve had now good reason to halt. In pursuing the contrary course he would have been getting further and further from Ferrol, and have run the risk of finding the English reinforced, and thus for two damaged and captured vessels have sacrificed his main object, the raising the Ferrol blockade and pursuing his mission.

Thus ended the battle, which might have been taken for a victory on our side but for the loss of the two Spanish ships. The crews, notwithstanding their inexperience, had fought bravely and well; but, on the other hand, the fog, which had increased the natural indecision of Admiral Villeneuve, his exaggerated want of confidence in himself and in his seamen, had paralysed the resources that he had at his command, and prevented this battle from ending in a brilliant victory. There, as in so many naval battles, one wing of our fleet did not aid the other; but on this occasion it was not the fault of the wing

that remained inactive, for Rear-Admiral Magon was not the officer who would willingly keep out of fire. In the first moments after the battle Villeneuve was almost happy that had met the English without experiencing a disaster; but he having left the scene of action, and having had time for reflection, his discouragement and habitual melancholy deepened into a profound grief. In his imagination he saw himself exposed to the censure of Napoleon and of public opinion for having lost two ships while fighting with twenty against fifteen. He believed himself disgraced, and was a prey to a kind of depression that bordered upon despair. The severe judgment of his people, who openly complained of his want of resolution, and were loud in their praise of the bravery and decision of Admiral Gravina, cut him to the heart's core. To complete his misfortune, the wind, which for two days had been favourable, had now become contrary again. To the sick, whose numbers had increased, the wounded had now to be added. There were not the necessary refreshments for them, and there was only water for five or six days. Thus situated, he again wanted to proceed to Cadiz. Lauriston again opposed this course: they split the difference, and ran into Vigo.

This port was far from being secure, and, moreover, had no great resources to offer. However, succour was found there for the sick and wounded. Three vessels, one French, *l'Atlas*, and two Spanish, *l'America* and *l'España*, were such heavy sailers, that they could not keep up with the squadron. The *Atlas* was turned into an hospital, into which the sick and wounded were conveyed. General Lauriston had brought with him, for the use of his division, the necessaries for a field hospital; and he employed it for the succour of the sailors who were left at Vigo. The treasure of the Spanish galleon was now in part employed in supplying the various wants of the squadron. Fresh provisions and water for a month were laid in, wages were paid to the whole squadron; and having somewhat re-animated the men's spirits, no difficult matter with sailors of a lively temperament, they set sail again after a stay of five days, which had been serviceable. The wind not being foul, the squadron stood up from Vigo to Ferrol, and on the 2nd of August entered the open roadstead which separates Ferrol from Corunna.

The moment the French squadron hove in sight, the consular agents, who were stationed on the shore by the orders of Napoleon, communicated to Admiral Villeneuve the orders which awaited him. These orders enjoined him not to enter Ferrol, which was difficult of egress; barely to allow himself time to rally the two divisions which awaited the junction, and then to proceed to Brest. Villeneuve transmitted this order to Gravina;

but the latter was already in the pass, and could not retrograde, and a part of the squadron entered with him. The rest, obeying Villeneuve, brought up opposite, that is to say, at Corunna.

This separation placed the two squadrons at three or four leagues distance from each other. The greatest evil that could result from it was the loss of three or four days in getting out again. This loss would have been greatly to be regretted with an admiral who was not in the habit of losing days at a stretch, but with Villeneuve it was of minor importance.

That admiral found at Corunna the pressing orders of Napoleon, his encouraging words, and his magnificent promises, as well as the private communications of the minister Decrès, the friend of his boyhood. The emperor and the minister both urged him not to remain for an instant, to hasten to Brest, and give battle to Cornwallis, at the risk even of annihilation, provided that Ganteaume succeeded in getting out safe and sound, and to rally what might remain entire of the squadron after he had raised the blockade of Brest. All these things for a moment revived the spirits and courage of Villeneuve. The little consequence that Napoleon attached to the sacrifice of ships, provided only that a fleet should arrive in the Channel, greatly tended to reassure him. Had he rightly comprehended the task entrusted to him, he would have been gratified, rather than depressed. After all, if the enemy had captured two vessels from him in the late battle, he had regained Ferrol safe and sound, escaped the enemy's squadrons, and eluded the precautions of the English Admiralty. Of the two admirals, the English and the French, Calder, not Villeneuve, was the most ill-treated by fortune; for Villeneuve had achieved his object, and Calder had failed in his. Deducting the two vessels which had been taken, and the three which had been left at Vigo, he had now twenty-nine French and Spanish vessels assembled at Ferrol, which might at any moment be increased to thirty-four by the division of Lallemand, and would then be strong enough to attempt to raise the blockade of Brest. Moreover, the English Admiralty itself, and Napoleon, were of the same opinion; the Admiralty sent Admiral Calder before a court-martial, and Napoleon publicly addressed great praises to Villeneuve, for having fulfilled his mission, said he, although two ships remained in the hands of the enemy.

What fear, then, could an officer conceive for his reputation, to whom an all-powerful master, disposing of the reputation and the fortunes of his lieutenants, constantly said: "Give battle, risk all, lose all, provided only that your efforts open the port of Brest." But it seems that there was a sort of fatality attached to this unfortunate seaman, to disturb his spirit, and to lead him from pang to pang to the result which he fain would

have shunned, that is to say, to losing a great battle, and losing it without obtaining the only result that Napoleon demanded of him, that of being four and twenty hours in the Channel.

Nevertheless, he felt some consolation on seeing the division of Rear-Admiral Gourdon, which division had sailed some time previously to being shut up in Ferrol, had been carefully repaired and completed, and merited every confidence. He saw with no less satisfaction nine Spanish ships equipped by Admiral de Grandellana, and far superior to those of Admiral Gravina, because that time had been bestowed upon equipping them which could not be spared for those which had sailed from Cadiz. "Would to Heaven," wrote Villeneuve, when he had compared the division of Ferrol and that of Cadiz, "that the Spanish squadron (*l'Argonaut* and the line-of-battle ship *l'Atlas* alone excepted) had never made part of my squadron. Those vessels are absolutely fit for nothing but to peril their consorts. They alone have brought us to the lowest depths of misfortune." This language shows how deeply Villeneuve's feelings were shocked, since he characterises as "the lowest depths of misfortune" a cruise which thus far had fulfilled the object prescribed by Napoleon, and which had even won him the approbation of a master who was not easily pleased.

Villeneuve was now concerned only about what awaited him on quitting Ferrol. He imagined that Calder would be at him again, reinforced by Nelson or Cornwallis, and that a new battle awaited him, in which he might reasonably look for destruction. Letters from Cadiz informed him, in fact, that Nelson had returned to Europe, that he had been seen at Gibraltar, but that he had steered for the ocean, in order to form a junction with Calder before Ferrol, or with Cornwallis before Brest. The truth is, that Nelson, sailing with prodigious speed, had touched at Gibraltar towards the end of July, at the very epoch when Villeneuve gave battle to Calder; that he had repassed the Straits, and strove against contrary winds to get into the Channel; that he had only eleven sail; that he had rallied neither Calder nor Cornwallis, and that his intention, after two years' constant sailing, was to go into harbour for a short time to revictual his exhausted division. Villeneuve was unaware of these facts; but he knew his orders, which for a man of courage were easy of execution, since he was not ordered to conquer, but to fight as long as he had a ship to swim, in order to raise the blockade of Brest. If, before Brest, he should be seconded by Ganteaume, it was not likely that the battle, fought with fifty-five sail against twenty or twenty-five, would be a lost battle. If, on the contrary, the weather or other circumstances should prevent Ganteaume from taking part in the action, Villeneuve, in fighting desperately,

even to the utter destruction of his fleet, would render it impossible for Cornwallis to remain at sea and continue the blockade, and Ganteaume, rallying to his fleet the remains of a fleet gloriously vanquished, could still command the Channel for some days. That was all that Napoleon demanded of his admirals.

Unfortunately, Villeneuve had made port. All the captains of the vessels that had been in the action were anxious to refit. They would have sailed for another month or two had they been kept out at sea; but being within reach of a grand arsenal, they all found some damage to repair. Masts were replaced, rigging refitted, leaks were to be stopped; the surplus stores of some ships were to be removed to others. The whole squadron was thus detained for forty-five days. Owing to the Spanish dearth it had not been possible to execute at Ferrol the orders of Napoleon, to have biscuit to the number of two or three millions of rations in each port. But they would find biscuit at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne. Moreover, forty-five days sufficed. At length on the 10th of August they prepared to weigh anchor. Villeneuve stationed himself off Corunna, in the Bay of Ares, waiting for Gravina and the second Spanish division to run out of Ferrol, which was no easy matter on account of the wind. He waited three days, which he employed in worrying himself. He wrote thus to the minister Decrès: "I am made the arbiter of vast interests; my despair redoubles with the confidence shown me, because I see no prospect of success, take what course I may. It is quite evident to me that the navies of France and Spain can do nothing in great squadrons. Divisions of three, four, or five vessels are at the utmost all that we are capable of commanding. Let Ganteaume put to sea, and he will judge for himself. *As regards the public, the question will be decided.*

"I am about to sail; but I know not what I shall do. Eight vessels remain in sight of the coast, at eight leagues off. They will follow us; I cannot wait for them; and they will go and join the squadrons before Brest or Cadiz, according as I steer for the one or for the other of those two ports. No doubt it is thought that, sailing hence with twenty-nine sail, I am considered able to fight vessels of anything like the same number; I am not afraid to confess to you that I should be very sorry to meet with twenty. Our naval tactics are out of date; we only know how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. I have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with the commanders of the vessels of the two nations. . . . I foresaw all this before I left Toulon; but all my delusions did not vanish until the day on which I saw the Spanish ships which are joined to mine . . . then I was obliged to despair of everything."

At the moment of sailing the fever broke out again in the vessels from Rochefort, *l'Algeiras* and *l'Achille*; some Spanish vessels ran foul of each other on leaving Ferrol, breaking their bowsprits and tearing their sails. These accidents, of no consequence in themselves, yet being added to all the mishaps that Villeneuve had already experienced, completed his despair. Ready at length to set sail, he gave his orders to Captain Lallemand. The latter, with an excellent division of five ships of the line and several frigates, was to touch at Vigo on the 15th or 16th of August. It would have been sufficient for Villeneuve to have taken his whole squadron thither, to rally that division, and thus procure a considerable augmentation of his strength; but not venturing to move, still haunted by the fear of Nelson, he sent an officer to Captain Lallemand, and directed him to repair to Brest, without being sure that he would go thither himself; thus exposing this division to destruction should it arrive there alone. He wrote to Admiral Decrès a despatch, in which, exposing all the distress of his soul, he manifested an inclination to steer for Cadiz rather than for Brest. To Lauriston, whose troublesome presence reminded him of the emperor, he said that they would proceed to Brest. Lauriston, grieved to see him in such a state of mind, delighted with his professed determination, wrote to the emperor by a courier, whom he despatched from Ferrol, that at length they were going to Brest, and from Brest into the Channel.

In the midst of these deplorable anxieties Villeneuve departed from Corunna, and lost sight of land during the day of the 14th. To crown his misfortunes, a pretty strong north-easterly wind came on, and prevented his making much progress towards his destination. Melancholy consequence of a want of confidence, which often makes us neglect the most splendid favours of fortune! At that very moment Calder and Nelson were not united near Ferrol as Villeneuve feared. Nelson, after having vainly sought after the French at Cadiz, had returned northward, had long to beat up against the same north-easterly wind that then prevailed, and had at length rejoined Cornwallis before Brest, on the very day, the 14th of August, when the French squadron put out from Ferrol. He left with Cornwallis the few vessels which could still keep the sea, and went with the others to refit at Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 18th of August. Calder, on his part, after the battle of Ferrol, had rejoined Cornwallis with his damaged fleet. A part of his vessels were despatched to the Channel ports to refit. Cornwallis had immediately composed for him another division of seventeen or eighteen sail, and had sent him back to Ferrol, keeping at the most only eighteen sail to blockade Brest. Calder then returned to find Ferrol evacuated. If Villeneuve, regaining a little confi-

dence, had rallied Lallemand at Vigo, and proceeded by open sea to the Channel, he would have crossed without encountering Calder, who would have gone to blockade the empty Ferrol; he would have surprised Cornwallis, separated from Nelson and Calder, and with, at the most, seventeen or eighteen sail, and have attacked him with thirty-five, without reckoning the twenty-one of Ganteaume. What an opportunity was lost to him by his want of energy! For the rest, General Lauriston overwhelmed him with the most urgent persuasions; a momentary shifting of the wind, a momentary revival of the depressed spirits of Villeneuve, and the grand idea of Napoleon might yet have been realised!

It would not be easy to imagine the impatience with which Napoleon was racked upon that coast of Boulogne, where he every instant expected the appearance of his fleets, and the so much coveted opportunity of invading England. All his forces were embarked, from the Texel to Etaples. At the Texel, the horses of the artillery and of the cavalry had been many weeks on board. The troops, without an exception, were on board the boats. The line squadron, charged with convoying the forces, only awaited the signal to weigh anchor. In the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, the one hundred and thirty thousand men intended to pass in the flat-bottomed boats had several times been put under arms. They had been marched to the quays, and all made to take their respective places on the boats. The time necessary for this operation was thus ascertained. At Ambleteuse the men of Davoust's corps had been embarked in a quarter of an hour, and the horses in an hour and a half. It had been the same at Etaples and Boulogne, allowing for the different number of men and horses.

All, then, was ready, when Napoleon at length received tidings of the battle of Ferrol, of the putting in at Vigo, and of the entering of Corunna. Whatever displeasure he felt at the moral condition of Villeneuve, however sternly he judged his conduct, he nevertheless was gratified by the whole result, and by his orders all the gazettes contained an account of the sea-fight, with the most flattering praises of Villeneuve and of the two combined squadrons. The loss of the two vessels appeared to him to be a mere accident, attributable to the fog; to be regretted, doubtless, but of very minor importance compared to the result obtained, that of the entrance of Vigo and the junction of the two fleets.*

* The following letters were written upon the subject by Napoleon to Admiral Villeneuve and the emperor's aide-de-camp, General Lauriston:—

“To Admiral VILLENEUVE.

“BOULOGNE, 25th Thermidor, Year XIII. (13th of August 1805).

“Vice-Admiral VILLENEUVE,—I perceive with pleasure, by the battle of

Now he no longer doubted that Villeneuve would make his appearance at Brest. Ganteaume was at Bertheaume, that is to say, outside the inner roadstead, in face of the open sea, and supported by a hundred and fifty cannon, ranged in battery upon the coast. Nothing short of a concatenation of misfortunes could prevent Ganteaume from taking part in the attack of the blockade; and the French, having a force of fifty sail,

the 3rd Thermidor, that several of my ships have borne themselves with the bravery that I anticipated from them. I am much pleased with the admirable manœuvre which you executed at the beginning of the action, and which baffled the designs of the enemy. I could have desired that you had employed your numerous frigates in aiding the Spanish ships, which, being the first engaged, must necessarily have been most in need of support. I could equally have desired that on the day after the action you had not given the enemy time to place his ships—the *Windsor Castle* and *Malta*—in safety, as well as the two Spanish ships which, having lost their rigging, must have been heavy and embarrassing sailers. This would have given to my arms the éclat of a grand victory. The tardiness of this manœuvre left the English time to send them into their ports. But I am justified in concluding that the victory remained on my side, since you have entered Corunna. I hope that this despatch will not find you there; that you will have repulsed the enemy's squadron, so that you may effect your junction with Captain Lallemand, sweep away everything that you find before you, and come into the Channel, where we await you with great impatience. If you have not done so, do it. Bear down boldly upon the enemy. The preferable order of battle appears to me to intermix the French and Spanish vessels, and to station behind each Spanish vessel frigates to aid them in the battle, and thus turn your numerous frigates to useful purpose. You can still further increase their number by means of *la Guerrière* and *la Revanche*, and that without retarding your operations. You at this time have under your command eighteen of our ships, and twelve, or, at the least, ten of those of the King of Spain. It is my desire that wherever the enemy presents himself before you with fewer than twenty-four vessels you give him battle.

"By the return of the frigate *le Président*, and of several others that I had despatched to you at Martinique, I have learned that, instead of your having landed troops in those islands, they are weaker than they were before. Nevertheless, Nelson had but nine sail. The English are not so numerous as you seem to imagine. They are everywhere in a state of uncertainty and alarm. Should you make your appearance here for three days, nay, even for twenty-four hours, your mission would be fulfilled. Make the moment of your departure known to Admiral Ganteaume by an extraordinary courier. Never for a grander object did a squadron run such risks, and never have our soldiers and seamen poured out their blood for a grander and nobler result. For this great object of forwarding the descent upon that power which for six centuries has oppressed France, we may all die without regretting the sacrifice of life. Such are the sentiments which should animate you, and which should animate all my soldiers. England has in the Downs only four ships of the line, which we daily harass with our praams and our flotillas.

"And with this, &c."

On the 14th of August he is still bent, and even more than ever bent, upon the expedition, although Decrès thought otherwise.

"To General LAURISTON.

"BOULOGNE, 25th Thermidor, Year XIII. (14th of August 1805).

"I have received, General Lauriston, your two letters of the 9th and 11th Thermidor. I hope that this letter will find you no longer at Ferrol, but that the squadron will have set sail and proceeded to its destination. I do not understand why you have not left the 67th and the 16th regiments at Marti-

twenty-nine under Villeneuve and twenty-one under Ganteaume, from scattering the enemy from their path, and entering the Channel with thirty or forty sail, even should they lose ten or twenty.

"You clearly perceive," said Napoleon to Decrès, who was with him at Boulogne, "that notwithstanding a host of blunders and unfavourable accidents, the plan, as a whole, is essentially so good, that all the advantages are still on our side, and that we are on the eve of success." Decrès, who was in the secret of the misgivings of Villeneuve, and who shared his doubts of fortune, was not so tranquil. "All this is possible," he replied, "for all this has been perfectly calculated; but if this fall out to our hopes, I shall see the finger of God in our success! However, it has so often been visible in the operations of your majesty, that I should not be surprised to behold it in them once more." *


It was from the 18th to the 20th of August that Napoleon was in the most lively expectation. Signals prepared on the most elevated points of the coast were to inform him if the French fleet became visible upon the horizon. Attentive to every courier who arrived from Paris or from the ports, he every moment gave new orders for guarding against accidents that might have thwarted his designs. M. de Talleyrand having informed him that the preparations of Austria were daily becoming more significant and more threatening, and that a continental war was to be feared, but that, at the same time, Prussia, seduced by the brilliant temptation held out to her, that of Hanover, was ready to agree to an alliance with France, Napoleon, without taking an hour to deliberate, had summoned Duroc, and delivered him a letter for the king, and all the powers necessary for signing a treaty. "Set out directly," said he to him; "proceed to Berlin without passing by Paris,

nique and at Guadaloupe. It was very distinctly expressed in your instructions. The consequence is, that after so extended an expedition I have not even the pleasure of seeing my islands secure from all attack. There are only 3000 men there now, and after Vendémiaire there will only be 2500. I hope that Villeneuve will not allow himself to be blockaded by a squadron inferior to his own. Aid and urge the admiral as much as you possibly can. Arrange with him about the troops that you have on board, and send me an exact account of their condition; you can leave them on board. If the admiral deem fit you can land them and form them into a division.

"Take measures for forming a dépôt of the men whom you have landed at Vigo, whither an officer was sent in the supposition that Villeneuve had not made his appearance on the 20th Thermidor. *We are ready everywhere. Your presence in the Channel for twenty-four hours will suffice.*

"With this, &c."

* I have confined myself to a correct analysis of the numerous notes which Napoleon and Admiral Decrès daily exchanged, although they were within half a league of each other. One was at Pont de Briques, the other on the coast.



and determine the King of Prussia to sign a treaty of alliance with me. I give him Hanover, but on condition that it be decided immediately. The present that I make him is an ample equivalent. In a fortnight I will not make him the same offer. At present I require to be covered on the side of Austria while I embark. To obtain this service from the King of Prussia I grant him a vast territory, which will add forty thousand men to his army. But if by-and-by I should be obliged to quit the seashore to return inland, my camps being broken up and my projects against England being abandoned, I should have no need of any one to bring Austria to her senses, and I would not pay so dear for a service which would be useless to me."

Accordingly, Napoleon required that Prussia should immediately put troops in motion against Bohemia, and would not allow, moreover, that the treaty should be laden with conditions relating to Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. He ceded Hanover, and expected that Prussia would join him without any other condition.*

One can judge from a step of such gravity, and so promptly resolved upon, what paramount importance Napoleon at this moment attached to the free accomplishment of his projects. On the very day on which he gave instructions to Duroc, that is to say, on the 22nd of August, the courier who had been despatched from Ferrol as Villeneuve sailed thence arrived at Boulogne. Napoleon immediately received at the little château of Pont de Briques the despatch of Lauriston; while that of Villeneuve, addressed to Decrès, was delivered to Decrès at the coast, in the hut in which he had taken up his quarters.

Napoleon, delighted with those words of Lauriston, *we are going to Brest*, had immediately dictated two letters for Villeneuve and Ganteaume. They are too worthy to be preserved in history to allow of our omitting their insertion here.

To Ganteaume he said:

"I have already made known to you by telegraph that it is my desire that you do not allow Villeneuve to lose an hour, in order that, profiting by the superiority given to me by fifty ships of the line, you instantly put to sea and proceed to your destination, by making sail for the Channel with all your forces. I reckon upon your firmness, your talents, and your character, under circumstances so important. Set out and come hither. We will take vengeance for six centuries of insults and disgrace. Never have my soldiers and sailors exposed their lives for a grander object." (From the imperial camp of Boulogne, 22nd of August 1805.)

* This is the substance of the instructions given to the Grand Marshal Duroc.

To Villeneuve he wrote :

"I hope, Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, that you are arrived at Brest. Set out, lose not a moment, bring my united squadrons into the Channel, and ENGLAND IS OURS! We are all ready, everything is embarked. Be here but for twenty-four hours, and all is ended." (Imperial camp of Boulogne, 22nd of August.)

But while Napoleon, misled by the despatch of Lauriston, addressed these burning words to the two admirals, Decrès by the same courier had received a widely different despatch, which left but little hope of Villeneuve steering for Brest. He hastened to wait upon the emperor, and to make known to him the melancholy moral condition in which Villeneuve had quitted Ferrol.

On hearing this contradictory intelligence, Napoleon was thrown into a fury. The first bursts of his anger fell upon Admiral Decrès, who had given him such a man to command his fleet. He inveighed all the more violently against that minister because he attributed to him, besides his choice of Villeneuve, opinions analogous to those which had deprived that unfortunate admiral of all courage. He reproached him alike with the weakness of his friend and with decrying the French navy, which had carried despair into the hearts of all the fleet. He complained of not being seconded in his grand designs, and of being able to find only men who, in order to spare their persons or their reputations, did not even know how to lose a battle, when nothing more after all was required of them but the courage to fight it and lose it. "Your Villeneuve," said he to Decrès, "is not even fit to command a frigate. What can be said of a man who, on account of a few sailors falling sick on board a couple of vessels of his squadron, for a broken bowsprit or a split sail, or for a report of a junction between Nelson and Calder, loses his self-possession and renounces his plans? They would have been at the very entry of Ferrol, ready to pounce upon the French, and not upon the open sea! All this is so simple that it must strike the eyes of every one who is not blinded by fear!" *

Napoleon even went so far as to call Villeneuve a coward and even a traitor, and directed orders to be instantly drawn up for bringing him by force from Cadiz into the Channel, if he were gone to Cadiz; and in case of his having made sail for Brest, for giving the command of the two united squadrons to Ganteaume. The minister of marine, who had not yet

* These scenes, of which there are now no living witnesses, would have been lost to history, but for the private and autograph letters of Admiral Decrès and the emperor. They are evidence of the stormy emotions of those memorable days. There are a great number of them for the same day, though the emperor and Decrès were within half a league of each other.

ventured to give his entire opinion upon the assemblage of the fleets in the midst of the Channel, and who under existing circumstances considered that assemblage to be horribly dangerous, since the English, on their guard, were concentrated between Ferrol, Brest, and Portsmouth, supplicated the emperor not to issue so fatal an order; urged that the season was too far advanced; that the English were too much upon their guard; and that, should he persist, some horrible catastrophe would take place before Brest. To all such objections Napoleon had but one reply, that fifty sail would be assembled at Brest should Villeneuve present himself there, that the English would never have that number, that, at all events, one of the two fleets being lost would be of no consequence to him, provided that the other, being liberated, could enter the Channel and keep the command of it for twenty-four hours.

Decrès, overwhelmed by the sternness of the emperor, determined to write to him what he could not venture to say verbally.

"4th Fructidor, Year XIII. (22nd of August)."

"On my knees I supplicated your majesty not to associate the Spanish vessels in the operations of your squadron. Far from conceding this point, your majesty required that this combined fleet should be increased by the vessels of Cadiz and those of Carthagená.

"With such an addition, you willed that a thing should be undertaken, difficult in itself, and rendered still more so by the elements composing the force, by the inexperience of the leaders, their want of the habit of commanding, and other circumstances with which your majesty is as well acquainted as I am, and which, therefore, it is superfluous to recapitulate.

"In such a state of things, when your majesty allows my reasoning and my experience to go for nothing, I know of no situation more painful than mine. I beg that your majesty will take it into your consideration that I have no interest but that of your flag and the honour of your arms; and if the squadron is at Cadiz, I supplicate you to consider that as a decree of Providence, which reserves it for other operations. I entreat you not to compel it to come from Cadiz into the Channel, for the attempt at this moment cannot be unproductive of misfortunes. Above all, I entreat that this passage may not be ordered to be attempted with two months' provisions, for M. d'Estaing, I believe, has been seventy or eighty days, or perhaps more, in coming from Cadiz to Brest.

"If these entreaties which I address to your majesty seem to you to be of no weight, you should judge of what passes in my heart. . . .

"It is especially at this moment, when I can still arrest the issuing of these fatal orders, that, in my opinion, it is my duty to your majesty most strongly to urge this. May I be more fortunate on this occasion than I have formerly been!

"But it is unfortunate for me to be acquainted with the naval profession, since that acquaintance obtains me no confidence, and

produces no results upon the plans of your majesty. In truth, sire, my situation becomes too painful. I reproach myself with being unable to prevail with your majesty. I doubt if any one man can do so. Condescend, as regards naval affairs, to form yourself an admiralty council, or whatever your majesty may deem best; but for myself I feel that instead of growing stronger I grow weaker every day. And to speak the whole truth, a minister of marine, subjugated by your majesty in naval affairs, serves you badly, and becomes useless to your arms, if not actually injurious to them.

"It is in the bitterness of my soul, which in no wise diminishes either my devotion or my fidelity to your person, that I beg your majesty to accept my profound respects.

(Signed) "DECRÈS."

The emperor, angry and yet touched, replied to him on the instant from Pont de Briques.

"I beg you will send me in the course of the day a memorial upon this question:—As matters stand, if Villeneuve remain at Cadiz, what is he to do? Raise yourself to the height of the circumstances, and of the situation in which France and England are placed; do not write me another letter such as that which you have written, all that says nothing. For my part I have but one want—to succeed." (22nd of August, Dépôt of the Louvre.)

On the following day, the 23rd, Decrès submitted his plan to the emperor. It was, in the first place, to adjourn the expedition till the winter, for it was too late to bring the fleet from Cadiz into the Channel. They would be obliged to execute the enterprise in the midst of the equinoctial gales. Moreover, the English were warned. Every one had at length perceived the project of a junction between Boulogne and Brest. According to Decrès' opinion, it would be necessary to divide the squadrons, which were too large, into seven or eight squadrons, of five or six sail each. What Lallemand was at this very time doing, was the proof of what might be expected from these detached squadrons. They should be composed of the best officers and of the best ships, and sent out upon the ocean. They would drive the English to despair, by ruining their commerce, and form excellent sailors and naval commanders. Thence could be drawn the elements of a fleet for a grand ulterior project.

"That," said Admiral Decrès, "*is the system of war which I would fain pursue.*"

"If, finally, in the winter," added he, "you wish for a fleet in the Channel, there are means of bringing one. You will have at Cadiz forty sail. Assemble there an army of embarkation, and give to this project the appearance of an expedition against India or Jamaica. Then divide the squadron into two parts. Select among the vessels the swiftest sailers; among

the officers, those who for a year have proved themselves the boldest and most skilful; go out secretly with only twenty sail, taking care to leave the others to attract the attention of the English; then let these twenty sail round Ireland and Scotland and thence into the Channel. Summon Villeneuve and Gravina to Paris, reanimate their courage, and to a certainty they will execute this manœuvre."

On reading this plan, Napoleon entirely gave up the idea of recalling the fleet immediately from Cadiz, if, indeed, it was there. With his own hand he thus endorsed this despatch: "*To form seven squadrons, with the following destinations:—Africa, Surinam, St. Helena, the Cape, the Windward Islands, the United States, the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the mouth of the Thames.*"* Then he read and re-read the despatches of Villeneuve, of Lauriston, and of the consular agent, who for a long time had watched through a glass the progress of the French squadron, until all sight of it was lost from the heights of Ferrol. In those despatches he sought, as in the book of destiny, a reply to this question: "Is Villeneuve steering for Cadiz or for Brest?" The uncertainty in which these despatches left him irritated him still more than would the certainty of the squadron having gone to Cadiz. In that state of agitation, and especially as Europe was situated, it would have been the greatest of all services to inform him how the case really stood, for the news from the frontier of Austria became more alarming every instant. The Austrians now scarcely aimed at concealment; the troops were assembling in considerable force upon the Adige, and threatened the Inn and Bavaria.

Now, if he did not strike a crushing blow upon London, which would make all Europe tremble and draw back, it was necessary that he should make forced marches upon the Rhine, to prevent the outrage preparing for him, that of being on his frontiers before him. In this urgent necessity of knowing the truth he wrote several letters to Admiral Decrès from Pont de Briques to the camp, to learn his personal opinion as to the probable determination of Villeneuve. Decrès, fearing to irritate the emperor too much, and at the same time conscientiously averse from deceiving him, replied each time in an almost directly contradictory manner, now saying yes, and then no, and partaking of the anxiety of his master, but evidently inclining towards the opinion that Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz. In fact, he had himself no doubt of it. It was then that Napoleon, that he might not be taken wholly unprepared, was divided between two plans, and passed several days in one of those ambiguous situations which are so insupportable to characters of his stamp; ready at once to cross the sea or to throw him-

* I transcribe these details from the document itself.

self upon the continent; to make a descent upon England, or a military march towards Austria. It was an especial trait in his character, when action became necessary, instantly to control himself, suddenly to subdue those gusts of passion to which for an instant he had abandoned his better judgment, as if to be the more entirely master of it at the moment when he needed it. After numerous perplexities, on the day of the 23rd he gave the necessary orders for a double hypothesis. "My resolution is fixed," he wrote to M. de Talleyrand. "My fleets were lost sight of from the heights of Cape Ortegal on the 14th of August. If they come into the Channel, there is time yet; I embark, and I attempt the descent; I go to London, and there cut the knot of all coalitions. If, on the contrary, my admirals fail in conduct or in firmness, I raise my ocean camps, I enter Germany with two hundred thousand men, and I do not stop until I have *scored the game at Vienna*, taken Venice and all that she still possesses of Italy from Austria, and driven the Bourbons from Italy. I will not allow the Austrians and the Russians to assemble; I will strike them down before they can form their junction. The continent being pacified, I will return to the ocean, and work anew for a maritime peace." Then, with his profound and incomparable experience of war, with that unparalleled discernment of that which was of the most or the least consequence to hasten forward in the arrangements, he gave his first orders for the continental war, without as yet deranging anything of his maritime expedition, which was still in constant readiness, as all still remained on board or alongside the vessels. He commenced with Naples and Hanover, the two parts furthest removed from his will. He ordered that there should be added to the division which was being organised at Pescara, under General Reynièr, several regiments of light cavalry and some batteries of horse artillery, in order to form movable columns in that country of guerillas. He sent orders to General St. Cyr at the first sign of hostility to call in this division of Reynièr, join it to the division he had brought from Taranto, and to throw himself upon Naples with twenty thousand men, so as to prevent the descent into Italy of the Russians from Corfu, and of the English from Malta.

He then commanded Prince Eugène, who, though Viceroy of Italy, was under the military direction of Marshal Jourdan, to assemble on the instant all the French troops distributed between Genoa, Bologna, and Verona, to direct them upon the Adige, to purchase artillery horses all over Italy, and to get a hundred guns horsed immediately. As the French troops were formed in divisions, and kept upon a war footing, these arrangements were easy to make, and prompt of execution. He ordered the recruits from the dépôts to be sent to them. He at the same

time gave orders for baking large quantities of biscuit, for victualling the fortresses of Italy. Alessandria not being yet completed, he ordered that the citadel of Turin should serve as the magazine for Piedmont.

He made similar arrangements for Germany. On the same day, the 23rd, he despatched a courier for Bernadotte, who had succeeded General Mortier in the command of Hanover. He ordered him, under the pledge of the utmost secrecy, and without giving any outward sign of his new destination, to assemble at Göttingen, that is to say, at the extremity of that electorate, the greater part of his *corps d'armée*; to commence by despatching to that quarter the artillery and heavy baggage; to execute those movements so that they could not be clearly discerned for ten or twelve days, and in order to procrastinate the doubt to show himself in person at the opposite point, and finally, to await further orders for putting himself in actual march. His idea was, if he should agree with Prussia, as he doubted not that he should, relatively to Hanover, to evacuate that kingdom, and to traverse without permission all the small States of Central Germany, to carry into Bavaria the *corps d'armée* withdrawn from Hanover.

By the same courier he ordered General Marmont at the Texel immediately to prepare his trains and matériel, so as to be able in three days to march with his *corps d'armée*, recommending him carefully to keep the secret, and to make no change in the embarkation of his troops until further orders. Finally, he made at Boulogne a first and only displacement of the troops under his own hand, that of the heavy cavalry and the dragoons. He had assembled far more cavalry than he really wanted, and especially far more than he could embark. He sent the cuirassiers of Nansouty a march to the rear, and assembled at St. Omer the foot and horse dragoons, under the command of Baraguay d'Hilliers. To these he added a certain number of pieces of horse artillery, and instantly sent them on to Strasburg. He at the same time ordered the assemblage at Alsace of all the heavy cavalry remaining in France, despatched the general-in-chief of artillery, Songis, to prepare a park of field-guns between Metz and Strasburg, and provided with funds for purchasing in Lorraine, in Switzerland, and in Alsace all the draught horses that could be procured. The same order was given for the infantry stationed near the eastern frontier. Five hundred thousand rations of biscuit were ordered at Strasburg. His numerous cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, and supported by a species of infantry, that of the dragoons, might furnish a first support to the threatened Bavarians, who loudly demanded aid. Some regiments of infantry would speedily be ready to assist them. In fact, Bernadotte could reach Wurzburg in ten or twelve marches. Thus in a few days, without with-

drawing anything from his embarked forces, merely some divisions of heavy cavalry and dragoons, he was ready to support the Bavarians, upon whom Austria wished her first attack to fall.

These arrangements being made with the promptitude of a great character, he resumed a little tranquillity of mind, and resolved to await what the winds might bring him.

He was gloomy, absent, and harsh towards Admiral Decrès, upon whose countenance he seemed to see imprinted all the opinions which had shaken Villeneuve, and he was incessantly upon the seashore looking for some sudden arrival upon the horizon. Naval officers, stationed with their glasses upon the various points of the coast, were employed to observe all that was visible upon the sea, and to report to him. Thus he passed three days in that uncertainty which is the most intolerable to strong and ardent minds, which love decision and action. At length Admiral Decrès, whom he continually questioned, declared to him that, in his opinion, seeing how long a time had passed, and the winds that had prevailed upon the coast, from the Gulf of Gascony to the Straits of Dover, and looking also at the moral condition of Villeneuve, he was persuaded that the fleets had sailed for Cadiz.

It was with deep grief, mingled with violent bursts of anger, that Napoleon at length gave up all hope of seeing his fleet arrive in the Straits. Such was his irritation, that a man for whom he entertained no ordinary friendship, the learned Monge, who almost every morning made a very military breakfast with him in the imperial hut on the seashore, Monge on seeing him in that disposition discreetly retired, judging that his presence would be troublesome. He went to M. Daru, then principal secretary at war, and told him what he had seen. At the same instant M. Daru himself was called, and had to repair to the emperor. He found him agitated, talking to himself, and not seeming to perceive the persons around him. Scarcely had M. Daru arrived, and still stood silent and waiting for orders, when Napoleon went up to him, and addressing him as if he had been acquainted with everything, said, "Do you know where Villeneuve is? He is at Cadiz!" Then he launched out into long and fierce invectives against the weakness and incapacity of all who surrounded him, said that he was betrayed by the cowardice of mankind, deplored the ruin of the most splendid, the most secure of all the plans he had ever conceived in his life, and displayed in all its bitterness the grief of genius abandoned by fortune. Suddenly mastering his agitation, he all at once calmed himself, and with a surprising facility recalling his mind from those closed ways of the ocean to the open roads of the continent, he dictated for several hours in succession, with an extraordinary precision and presence of mind, the plan which

will be given in the following book. It was the plan of the immortal campaign of 1805. There was no longer the slightest trace of irritation either in his voice or in his countenance.*

The grand conceptions of genius had dissipated the griefs of his soul. Instead of attacking England directly, he was about to combat her by the long and sinuous route of the continent, and he was about to find upon that route an incomparable grandeur previous to finding his ruin there.

Would he more surely have attained his end by the direct road, in other words, by the descent? That is a question which will often be asked both in our days and by future generations, and which it is not easy to solve. However, supposing Napoleon to have once effected a landing at Dover, we do not affront the English nation in believing that it would have been vanquished by the army and by the captain who, in eighteen months, conquered and subjected Austria, Germany, Prussia, and Russia. Not a man was added to that ocean army which at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland beat the eight hundred thousand soldiers of the continent. It must be added, too, that the territorial inviolability so long enjoyed by England has not familiarised her with the danger of invasion, nor tested her means and courage to repel it; a circumstance which by no means diminishes the glory of her fleets and regular armies. It is therefore very improbable that she would have successfully withstood the soldiers of Napoleon, not yet exhausted by fatigue, and not yet decimated by war. An heroic resolution of her government, taking refuge, for instance, in Scotland, and leaving England to be ravaged until Nelson, with the English squadrons, could come and cut off all retreat from Napoleon, such a resolution, exposing Napoleon, the conqueror, to be made a prisoner in his own proper conquest, would doubtless have brought about some singular conjunctures; but it is beyond all probability to suppose that it would have been adopted. We are firmly persuaded that had Napoleon reached London, England would have treated.

All the difficulty lay in the crossing of the Straits. Although the flotilla could pass in a summer calm, or in the fogs of winter, the passage was full of danger. Accordingly, Napoleon had planned the co-operation of a fleet to cover the expedition. But then it may be urged, the difficulty was, after all, coincident with the original one, that of being superior to the English on the sea. By no means. The point in question was, not to be superior, or even equal to them. All that he proposed was, by an able plan to bring a fleet into the Channel, by taking advantage of the chances of the sea, its immensity rendering

* I extract this account from a fragment of memoirs written by M. Daru, a copy of which is now in my possession, thanks to the kindness of his son.

encounters on it so uncertain. The plan of Napoleon, so often modified and reproduced with so much fecundity, had every chance of success in the hands of a firmer man than Villeneuve. Doubtless, Napoleon experienced here, under another form, the disadvantages of his naval inferiority. Villeneuve, keenly alive to that inferiority, became discouraged; but he was too much discouraged, and in a manner to affect his honour in the eyes of posterity. After all, his fleet fought well at Ferrol; and if we suppose that he had fought before Brest the disastrous battle which he shortly afterwards lost at Trafalgar, Ganteaume would have run out; and as for losing that battle, would it not have been well lost in order to secure the passage of the Channel? Nay, under such circumstances could it be said to be lost? Villeneuve, then, acted wrongly, although he has been too much decried, as is usually the case with those who are unfortunate. A practical seaman, and unmindful that by dint of energy and resolute courage one can often supply what is deficient in matériel, he knew not how to elevate himself to the height of his mission, and attempt that which, in his situation, Latouche Tréville would assuredly have accomplished.

The enterprise of Napoleon, then, was no chimera; it was perfectly possible, as he had prepared it; and, perhaps, in the eyes of discerning judges, this unfinished enterprise will do him more honour than those which have been crowned with the most brilliant success. Neither was it a mere feint, as it has been supposed to be by some people, who discover depths where there are none: some thousands of letters of the ministers and the emperor put an end to all doubt on that point. It was a serious enterprise, followed up and matured for several years, with aerial passion. It has also often been asserted that if Napoleon had not rejected Fulton's offer of steam navigation he would have crossed the Straits. It is not possible even now to predict what part steam navigation will play in future warfare. That it will add to the strength of France against England is very probable. Whether it will or not render the Straits more easy to be crossed will solely depend upon the efforts which France shall see fit to make for securing a superiority in the employment of this wholly new power; that will depend upon her patriotism and her foresight. But with respect to the refusal of Napoleon, it may be affirmed that Fulton proposed to him an art in its infancy, and which at that moment would have rendered him no aid. Napoleon, then, did all that he could do. On this occasion there was not the shadow of a fault to reproach him with. It was doubtless the will of Providence that he should not succeed. Yet why? He who was not always in the right against his enemies had in this instance the right upon his side.

BOOK XXII.

ULM AND TRAFALGAR.

IT was an egregious fault to unite Genoa with France on the very eve of the expedition against England, and thus to furnish Austria with the last reason that must decide her to war. It was provoking and drawing upon one's self a formidable coalition at a moment when one had need of absolute peace upon the continent in order to have the utmost freedom of action against England. Napoleon, it is true, had not foreseen the consequences of the union of Genoa; his error consisted in despising Austria too much, and in believing her to be incapable of acting, whatever liberty he might take with her. Though he has been justly censured for this union, effected under such circumstances, still it was in reality a fortunate event. No doubt, had Admiral Villeneuve been able to sail up the Channel and to appear off Boulogne, there would be reason to regret for ever the derangement of the execution of the most gigantic plan; but as that admiral did not arrive, Napoleon, reduced once more to inaction, unless he had been rash enough to cross the Strait without the protection of a fleet, Napoleon would have found himself in extreme embarrassment. This expedition, so frequently announced, and which had miscarried thrice successively, would at last have exposed him to a sort of ridicule, and would have exhibited him to the eyes of Europe as in a real state of impotence in opposition to England. The continental coalition, furnishing him with a field of battle which he needed, repaired the fault that he had committed by coming itself to commit one, and drew him most seasonably from an indecisive and unpleasant situation. The chain which links together the affairs of this world is sometimes a very strange one. Frequently the judicious combination fails, and that which is faulty succeeds. This, however, is not an absolute motive for declaring all prudence vain, and for preferring to it the impulsions of caprice in the government of empires. No, we ought always to prefer calculation to impulse in the conduct of affairs; but we cannot help acknowledging that the designs of man are overruled by the designs of Providence, more sure, more profound than his. It is a reason for modesty, not for abdication, to human wisdom,

One must have had a close view of the difficulties of government, one must have felt how difficult it is to form great determinations, to prepare them, to accomplish them, to move men and things, in order to appreciate the resolution which Napoleon took on this occasion. The mortification of witnessing the miscarriage of the Boulogne expedition having once passed off, he turned his whole attention to his new plan of continental war. Never had he greater resources at his disposal; never had a wider field of operations opened to his view. When he commanded the army of Italy, he found his movements bounded by the plain of Lombardy and the circle of the Alps; and if he thought of extending his views beyond that circle, the alarmed prudence of Carnot, the director, stepped forward to check him in his combinations. When as First Consul he conceived the plan of the campaign of 1800, he was obliged to humour lieutenants who were still his equals; and if, for example, he devised for Moreau a plan which would probably have been attended with the most fortunate consequences, he was stopped by the timid spirit of that general; he was forced to allow him to act in his own sure but limited manner, and to confine himself within the sequestered field of Piedmont. It is true that he signalised his presence there by an operation which will for ever remain a prodigy of the art of war, but still his genius in striving to expand itself had met with obstacles. For the first time he was free, free as Cæsar and Alexander had been. Such of his companions-in-arms whose jealousy or whose reputation rendered them troublesome had excluded themselves from the lists by their imprudent and guilty conduct. He had left him none but lieutenants submissive to his will, and combining in the highest degree all the qualities necessary for the execution of his designs. His army, weary of long inaction, eager for glory and battle, trained by ten years of war and three of encampment, was prepared for the most difficult enterprises, for the most daring marches. All Europe was open to his combinations. He was in the West, on the shores of the North Sea and the Channel; and Austria, assisted by Russian, Swedish, Italian, and English forces, was in the East, pushing upon France masses which a sort of European conspiracy had placed at her disposal. The situation, the means, everything were grand. But if France had never been better able to cope with sudden and serious dangers, so never had the difficulty been equally great. That army, so prepared that we may affirm such another never existed, that army was on the shores of the ocean, far from the Rhine, the Danube, the Alps, which explains why the continental powers had suffered it to assemble without remonstrating, and it was necessary to transport it all at once to the centre of the continent. There was the problem to be resolved.

We shall see how Napoleon managed to traverse the space that separated him from his enemies, and to throw himself among them at the most suitable point for dissolving their formidable coalition.

Although he had persisted in believing that the war was not so near at hand as it really was, he had completely settled the preparations and the plan. Sweden was making armaments at Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania; Russia at Revel, in the Gulf of Finland. Two strong Russian armies were alleged to be concentrating themselves, one in Poland, in order to hurry away Prussia, the other in Galicia, to assist Austria. It was not merely suspected but known with certainty that two Austrian armies were forming, one of 80,000 men in Bavaria, the other of 100,000 men in Italy, both connected by a corps of 25,000 or 30,000 in Tyrol. Lastly, Russians assembled at Corfu, English at Malta, and symptoms of agitation in the court of Naples, left no room to doubt that some attempt would be made towards the south of Italy.

Four attacks then were preparing: the first, in the North, from Pomerania, on Hanover and Holland, was to be executed by Swedes, Russians, and English; the second, in the East, by the valley of the Danube, assigned to Austrians and Russians united; the third, in Lombardy, reserved for Austrians alone; the fourth, on the south of Italy, was to be undertaken rather later by a force composed of Russians, English, and Neapolitans.

Napoleon had as complete a comprehension of this plan as if he had been present at the military conferences of M. de Vinzingerode at Vienna, to which we have already adverted. There was but one more circumstance yet unknown to him, likewise to his enemies—should they gain Prussia? Napoleon did not think so. The coalesced powers hoped to effect this by intimidating King Frederick William. In this case, the attack in the North, instead of being an accessory attempt, greatly cramped by the neutrality of Prussia, would become a threatening enterprise against the empire from Cologne to the mouths of the Rhine. This, however, was not at all probable, and Napoleon considered only the two grand attacks from Bavaria and Lombardy as serious, and regarded those preparing in Pomerania and towards the kingdom of Naples as at most deserving of some precautions.

He resolved to direct the bulk of his forces into the valley of the Danube, and to frustrate all the secondary attacks by the manner in which he should repulse the principal. His profound conception was based on a very simple fact, the distance of the Russians, which would be likely to make them arrive late to the assistance of the Austrians. He thought that the Austrians, impatient to fall upon Bavaria, and to occupy, according to their custom, the favourite position of Ulm, would

by acting in that manner add to the distance which naturally separated them from the Russians; that the latter would consequently appear late in line, ascending the Danube with their principal army united to the Austrian reserves. Crushing the Austrians before the arrival of the Russians, Napoleon then purposed to fall upon the latter, deprived of the aid of the principal Austrian army, and intended to employ the expedient, extremely easy in theory, extremely difficult in practice, to beat his enemies one after the other.

In order to its success this plan required a particular mode of moving his army to the theatre of operations, that is to say, to the valley of the Danube. If, after the example of Moreau, Napoleon should ascend the Rhine, for the purpose of crossing it at Strasburg and Schaffhausen, and were then to debouch by the defiles of the Black Forest between the Suabian Alps and the Lake of Constance, and thus attack in front the Austrians posted behind the Iller, from Ulm to Memmingen, he should not completely fulfil his object. Even in beating the Austrians, as he was more certain than ever of doing with the army trained in the camp of Boulogne, he should drive them before him upon the Russians, and should cause them, weakened merely, to form a junction with their northern allies. It behoved him, therefore, as at Marengo, and still more than at Marengo, to turn the Austrians, and not to be satisfied with beating them, but to surround them, so as to send them all prisoners into France. Then Napoleon could throw himself upon the Russians, who would have no other support but the Austrian reserves.

To this end, a perfectly simple march occurred to his mind. One of his *corps d'armée*, that of Marshal Bernadotte, was in Hanover; a second, General Marmont's, in Holland; the others at Boulogne. He conceived the idea of making the first descend through Hesse into Franconia, upon Wurzburg and the Danube; of making the second advance along the Rhine, taking advantage of the facilities afforded by that river, and of uniting it at Mayence and Wurzburg with the corps coming from Hanover. While these two great detachments were to descend from north to south, Napoleon resolved to transport by a movement from west to east, from Boulogne to Strasburg, the corps encamped on the shores of the Channel, to feign with these latter a direct attack by the Black Forest, but in reality to leave that Forest on the right, to pass to the left through Wurtemberg, in order to join in Franconia the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, to cross the Danube below Ulm, in the environs of Donauwerth, to get thus into the rear of the Austrians, to surround them, to take them, and, after getting rid of them, march upon Vienna to meet the Russians.

The position of Marshal Bernadotte coming from Hanover, of General Marmont coming from Holland, was an advantage, for it took one of them but seventeen days, the other only fourteen or fifteen, to reach Wurzburg, on the flank of the hostile army encamped at Ulm. The movement of the troops starting from Boulogne for Strasburg required about twenty-four days, and this was to fix the attention of the Austrians on the ordinary debouché of the Black Forest. In the space of twenty-four days, that is to say, about the 25th of September, Napoleon might therefore have arrived at the decisive point. By adopting an immediate resolution, by concealing his movements as long as possible, by his further stay at Boulogne, by circulating false reports, by disguising his intentions with that art for deceiving an enemy which he possessed in a supreme degree, he could have passed the Danube in the rear of the Austrians before they had any suspicion of his presence. If he succeeded, he should rid himself in the month of October of the first hostile army; he would employ that of November in marching upon Vienna, and in the environs of that capital he should meet with the Russians whom he had never seen, whom he knew to be steady foot soldiers, but not invincible, for Moreau and Massena had already beaten them, and he promised himself to beat them still more severely. Having reached Vienna, he should have got far beyond the Austrian army of Italy, which would become an urgent motive for that army to retreat.

The plan of Napoleon was to give Massena, the most energetic of his lieutenants, and the one who was best acquainted with Italy, the command of the French army on the Adige. It was to consist of no more than 50,000 men, but choice troops, for they had made all the campaigns beyond the Alps from Montenotte to Marengo. Provided that Massena could detain the Archduke Charles on the Adige for a month, which seemed beyond doubt with soldiers accustomed to conquer the Austrians, whatever might be their number, and under a general who never fell back, Napoleon, having arrived at Vienna, would relieve Lombardy as he had relieved Bavaria. He would draw the archduke upon himself, but at the same time he would draw Massena; and then, uniting the 50,000 men from the banks of the Adige with the 150,000 with whom he had marched along the Danube, he should find himself at Vienna at the head of 200,000 victorious French. Disposing directly of such a mass of forces, having thwarted the two principal attacks, those of Bavaria and Lombardy, what need he care about the two others prepared in the north and south, towards Hanover and towards Naples? Were all Europe in arms, he would have nothing to fear from the whole of its forces.

Still he omitted not to take certain precautions in regard to

Lower Italy. General St. Cyr occupied Calabria with 20,000 men. Napoleon gave him instructions to march upon Naples and make himself master of that capital on the first symptom of hostility. It would, no doubt, have been more consistent with his principles not to cut the army of Italy in two, not to place 50,000 men under Massena on the banks of the Adige, and 20,000 under General St. Cyr in Calabria, to unite the whole, on the contrary, into one mass of 70,000 men, which, certain to conquer in the north of Italy, would have little to fear from the south. But he conceived that Massena, with 50,000 men and his character, would be sufficient to detain the Archduke Charles for a month, and he deemed it dangerous to permit the Russians and the English to gain a footing at Naples, and to foment in Calabria a war of insurrection, which it would be difficult to extinguish. For this reason he left General St. Cyr and 20,000 men in the Gulf of Taranto, with orders to march on the first signal to Naples, and to throw the Russians and the English into the sea before they had time to establish themselves on the continent of Italy. As for the attack prepared in the north of Europe, at such a distance from the frontiers of the empire, Napoleon was content to provide against it by merely continuing the negotiation begun at Berlin relative to the kingdom of Hanover. He had offered that kingdom to Prussia as the price of her alliance; but having scarcely any hope of a formal alliance on the part of so timid a court, he proposed to place Hanover in its hands in pledge, if it would not receive it as a definitive gift. In either case, it would be obliged to keep the belligerent troops out of the country, and its neutrality would consequently suffice to cover the north of Europe.

Such was the plan conceived by Napoleon. Moving his *corps d'armée* by rapid and unexpected marches from Hanover, Holland, and Flanders into the heart of Germany, passing the Danube below Ulm, separating the Austrians from the Russians, enveloping the former, overthrowing the latter, then pushing on through the valley of the Danube to Vienna, and by this movement relieving Massena in Italy, he should soon have repulsed the two principal attacks directed against his empire. His victorious armies being thus united under the walls of Vienna, he should no longer need to give himself any concern about an attempt in the south of Italy, which, besides, General St. Cyr would frustrate, and another in the north of Germany, which would be cramped on all sides by the Prussian neutrality.

Never had captain either in ancient or modern times conceived and executed plans on such a scale. Never, indeed, had a more mighty mind, possessing greater freedom of will, commanding means more prodigious, had to operate on such an

extent of country. What is it, in fact, that we see on most occasions? Irresolute governments, deliberating when they ought to act, improvident governments, which think of organising their forces when they ought to be on the field of battle, and under them subordinate generals, scarcely capable of stirring on the circumscribed theatre assigned to their operations. Here, on the contrary, genius, decision, foresight, absolute freedom of action, all concurred in the same man and to the same end. It is rarely that such circumstances are combined, but when they do meet together the world has a master.

In the last days of the month of August the Austrians were already on the banks of the Adige and the Inn, the Russians on the frontiers of Galicia. It seemed as if they should surprise Napoleon; but that was not the case. He gave all his orders at Boulogne on the 26th of August, but with the recommendation not to issue them till ten at night on the 27th. His object in this was to reserve for himself the whole of the 27th before he definitively renounced his grand maritime expedition. The courier despatched on the 27th would not reach Hanover before the 1st of September. Marshal Bernadotte, already forewarned, was to commence his movement on the 2nd of September, to have collected his corps on the 6th at Göttingen, and to reach Wurzburg by the 20th. He had orders to collect in the fortress of Hameln the artillery taken from the Hanoverians, the military stores of all kinds, the sick, the dépôts of his *corps d'armée*, and a garrison of 6000 men, commanded by an energetic officer, who could be relied upon. This garrison was to be provisioned for a year. If an arrangement were concluded with Prussia for Hanover, the troops left at Hameln were immediately to rejoin Bernadotte's corps; if not, they were to remain in that fortress, and to defend it to the death in case the English should send an expedition to the Weser, which the Prussian neutrality could not prevent. "I shall be," wrote Napoleon, "as prompt as Frederick, when he went from Prague to Dresden and Berlin. I will run fast enough to the relief of the French defending my eagles in Hanover, and fling into the Weser the enemies who shall have come from that quarter." Bernadotte had orders to traverse the two Hesses, to tell the governments of those two principalities that he was returning to France by Mayence, to force a passage if it were refused, but to march with money in his hand, to pay for everything, and to observe rigid discipline.

On the same evening of the 27th of August a courier set off with orders for General Marmont to march with 20,000 men and 40 pieces of cannon, well horsed, to follow the banks of the Rhine to Mayence, and to proceed by Mayence and Frankfort to Wurzburg. This order was to reach Utrecht on the 30th of August. General Marmont, having received a previous intima-

tion, was to set himself in motion on the 1st of September, to arrive at Mayence on the 15th or 16th, and at Wurzburg on the 18th or 19th. Thus these two corps from Hanover and Holland were to be amidst the Franconian principalities of the Elector of Bavaria from the 18th to the 20th of September, and to form there a force of 40,000 men. As the elector had been recommended to retire to Wurzburg if the Austrians should attempt to do him violence, he was sure of finding there a succour ready prepared for his person and for his army.

Lastly, on the evening of the 27th were issued the orders for the camps of Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Montreuil. These orders were to begin to be executed on the morning of the 29th. On the first day the first divisions of each corps were to march by three different routes, on the second day the second divisions, on the third day the last; consequently they followed each other at twenty-four hours' distance. The three routes specified were—for the camp of Ambleteuse, Cassel, Lille, Namur, Luxemburg, Deux-Ponts, Mannheim; for the camp of Boulogne, St. Omer, Douai, Cambrai, Mezieres, Verdun, Metz, Spire; for the camp of Montreuil, Arras, La Fère, Rheims, Nancy, Saverne, Strasburg. As it would require twenty-four marches, the whole army might be upon the Rhine between the 21st and the 24th of September. That would be timely enough to be of use there; for the Austrians, unwilling to make any stir in order to be the more sure of surprising the French, had continued in the camp of Wels near Linz, and consequently could not be in line before Napoleon. Besides, the further they advanced upon the Upper Danube, the nearer they approached to the frontier of France between the Lake of Constance and Schaffhausen, the more chances Napoleon had of enveloping them. Officers, despatched with funds to all the roads which the troops were to travel, were directed to get provisions prepared for them at every station. Formal and several times repeated orders, like all those given by Napoleon, enjoined that each soldier should be furnished with a greatcoat and two pair of shoes.

Napoleon, closely keeping his secret, which was entrusted to none but Berthier and M. Daru, said to those about him that he was sending 30,000 men to the Rhine. He wrote to the same effect to most of his ministers. He communicated nothing more to M. de Marbois, and merely directed him to collect as much money as possible in the chests at Strasburg, which the avowed mission of 30,000 men to Alsace was sufficient to account for. He ordered M. Daru to set out immediately for Paris, to go to M. Dejean, minister of the matériel of war, to write with his own hand all the accessory orders required by the displacing of the army, and not to let a single clerk into the secret. Napo-

leon resolved to stay himself six or seven days longer at Boulogne, the better to deceive the public in regard to his plans.

As all these corps were to traverse France excepting that of Marshal Bernadotte, which was to give itself out in Germany for a corps destined to recross the frontiers, it was certain that they must be in full march before they gave any signs of their presence, before these signs were transmitted to Paris, sent from Paris abroad, and that many days must elapse before the enemy could be acquainted with the breaking up of the camp of Boulogne. Besides, as the tidings of these movements could be accounted for by the mission of 30,000 men to the Rhine, of which no secret was made, they left the most perspicacious minds in doubt; and there was a great chance of being upon the Rhine, the Neckar, or the Mayn while the army was supposed to be still on the shores of the Channel. Napoleon at the same time sent away Murat and his aides-de-camp, Savary and Bertrand, to Franconia, Suabia, and Bavaria. They had orders to explore all the roads leading from the Rhine to the Danube, to observe the nature of each of these roads, the military positions to be found upon them, the means of subsistence which they afforded; lastly, all the suitable points for crossing the Danube. Murat was to travel under a fictitious name, and having finished his survey to return to Strasburg, and there take the command of the first columns that should reach the Rhine.

To leave the Russians in ignorance of his resolutions as long as possible, Napoleon moreover recommended to M. de Talleyrand to delay the manifesto destined for the cabinet of Vienna, and the purport of which was to summon that cabinet to explain itself definitively. In reply to this summons he expected from it nothing but falsehoods, and as for convicting it of duplicity before the face of Europe, it would be time enough to do that at the moment of the first hostilities. He despatched General Thiard, who had entered into the service of France on the return of the emigrants, to Carlsruhe, and charged him to negotiate an alliance with the grand duchy of Baden. He addressed offers of the like nature to Wurtemberg, alleging that he foresaw war, judging from the preparations of Austria, but never hinting how far he was ready to commence it. In short, it was to the Elector of Bavaria alone that he communicated the whole secret of his plans. That unfortunate prince, hesitating between Austria, which was his enemy, and France, which was his friend, but the one near, the other distant, recollecting too that in preceding wars, invariably trampled upon by both, he had always been forgotten at the peace, this unfortunate prince knew not to which to attach himself. He was aware that, if he gave himself up to France, he might expect accessions of territory; but, still ignorant of the breaking

up of the camp of Boulogne, he beheld her, at the period of which we are treating, wholly occupied by her struggle with England, importuned by her German allies, and unable to assist them. Accordingly he was incessantly talking of an alliance to our minister, M. Otto, without ever daring to conclude one. This state of things was soon changed in consequence of the letters of Napoleon. The latter wrote directly to the elector, informing him (as a secret of State entrusted to his honour) that he had deferred his plans against England, and should march immediately with 200,000 men into the heart of Germany. "You shall be succoured in time," he sent him word, "and the vanquished house of Austria shall be forced to compose for you a considerable State with the wrecks of its patrimony." Napoleon made a point of gaining that elector, who had 25,000 well organised soldiers, and magazines, abundantly supplied, in Bavaria. It would be an important advantage to snatch these 25,000 soldiers from the coalition and to secure them for himself. For the rest, the secret was not in danger, for that prince felt a real hatred for the Austrians; and when once set at ease, he desired no better than to ally himself with France.

Napoleon then turned his attention to the army of Italy. He ordered the troops dispersed in Parma, Genoa, Piedmont, and Lombardy to be assembled under the walls of Verona. He withdrew the command of those troops from Marshal Jourdan, observing the greatest delicacy towards that personage, whom he esteemed, but whose character he deemed unequal to the circumstances, and who, moreover, was wholly unacquainted with the country situated between the Po and the Alps. He promised to employ him on the Rhine, where he had always fought, and directed Massena to set off without delay. The distance at which Italy was caused the divulging of these orders to be attended with little danger, for it could not but be late.

These dispositions arranged, he devoted the remaining time that he had to pass at Boulogne in prescribing himself the most minute precautions for securing the flotilla from all attacks on the part of the English. It was natural to suppose that they would take advantage of the departure of the army to attempt a landing, and to burn the stores accumulated in the basins. Napoleon, who had not renounced the intention of returning soon to the coasts of the ocean, after a successful war, and who, moreover, was most unwilling to expose himself to so mortifying an insult as the burning of the flotilla, enjoined the following precautions to the ministers Decrès and Berthier:—The divisions of Etaples and Vimereux were to be united with those of Boulogne, and all placed at the extremity of the basin of the

Liane, out of reach of the enemy's projectiles. The same precaution could not be taken for the Dutch flotilla, which was at Ambleteuse, but everything was so arranged that the troops stationed at Boulogne could hasten to that point in two or three hours. Netting of a particular kind, attached to a heavy anchor, prevented the introduction of the incendiary machines which might be launched under the form of floating bodies.

Three entire regiments, including their third battalion, were left at Boulogne. To these were added twelve third battalions of the regiments which set out for Germany. The sailors belonging to the flotilla were formed into fifteen battalions of a thousand men each. They were armed with muskets, and officers of infantry appointed to train them. They were to do duty alternately either on board the vessels continuing afloat, or about those aground in the port. This assemblage of land troops and seamen formed a force of thirty-six battalions, commanded by generals and a marshal, Marshal Brune, the same who in 1799 had thrown the Russians and the English into the sea. Napoleon gave orders for the construction of entrenchments on land all round Boulogne, to cover the flotilla and the immense magazines which he had formed. He desired that picked officers should be attached to each entrenched position, and that they should remain constantly at the same post, in order that, answering for its safety, they might study incessantly to improve its defences.

He then charged M. Decrès to assemble the naval officers, Marshal Berthier to assemble the military officers, to explain to both the importance of the post confided to their honour, to console them for being left inactive while their comrades were gone to fight, to promise that they should be employed in their turn, that they should even have before long the glory of concurring in the expedition to England; for after punishing the continent for its aggression, Napoleon would come back to the shores of the Channel, perhaps the next spring.

Napoleon was personally present at the departure of all the divisions of the army. It would be difficult to form any conception of their joy, of their ardour, when they learned that they were going to be employed in a great war. It was five years since they had been in battle; and for two and a half they had been waiting in vain for an opportunity to cross over to England. Old and young soldiers become equals from living several years together, confident in their officers, enthusiasts for the chief who was to lead them to victory, hoping for the highest rewards from a system which had raised a fortunate soldier to the throne, full, in short, of the sentiment which at that period had superseded every other, the love of glory—all, old and young, ardently longed for war, battles, dangers, and

distant expeditions: They had conquered the Austrians, the Prussians, the Russians; they despised all the soldiers of Europe, and did not imagine that there was an army in the world capable of resisting them. Broken to fatigue, like real Roman legions, they felt no horror of long marches which were to lead to the conquest of the continent. They set off singing and shouting "*Vive l'Empereur!*" begging for as speedy a meeting as possible with the enemy. It is true that in those hearts boiling over with courage there was less pure patriotism than in the soldiers of '92; there was more ambition, but a noble ambition, that of glory, of rewards legitimately acquired, and a confidence, a contempt of dangers and difficulties, which constitute the soldier destined for great things. The volunteers of '92 were eager to defend their country against an unjust invasion; the veteran soldiers of 1805, to render it the first power in the world. Let us not make a distinction between such sentiments: it is praiseworthy to hasten to the defence of one's country when in danger; it is equally praiseworthy to devote one's self that it may be great and glorious.

After seeing with his own eyes his army commence its march, Napoleon set out from Boulogne on the 2nd of September, and arrived on the 3rd at Malmaison. Nobody was informed of his resolutions; he was supposed to be still engaged with his plans against England: people merely felt uneasy respecting the intentions of Austria, and they accounted for the march of troops which began to be talked of by the mission already published of a corps of 30,000 men, which was to watch the Austrians on the Upper Rhine.

The public, not correctly acquainted with facts, ignorant to what a point a profound English intrigue had knitted the bonds of a new coalition, censured Napoleon for having pushed Austria to extremity by placing the crown of Italy on his head, uniting Genoa to the empire, and giving Lucca to the Princess Elisa. They ceased not to admire him; they deemed themselves extremely fortunate in living under a government so firm, so just as his; but they found fault with his excessive fondness for that in which he so highly excelled, his fondness for war. No one could believe that he was unfortunate under such a captain; but people heard talk of Austria, of Russia, of part of Germany being in the pay of England: they knew not whether this new struggle would be of short or long duration, and they recollected involuntarily the distresses of the first wars of the Revolution. Confidence, however, predominated far over all other sentiments; but a slight murmur of disapprobation, extremely perceptible to the sensitive ears of Napoleon, was nevertheless heard.

What contributed more particularly to render the sensations

experienced by the public the more painful was the extreme financial embarrassment. It was produced by different causes. Napoleon had persisted in his plan of never borrowing. "While I live," he wrote to M. de Marbois, "I will not issue any paper." (Milan, May 18, 1805.) In fact, the discredit produced by the assignats, the mandats, and all the issues of paper still continued, and all-powerful, all-dreaded as the Emperor of the French then was, he could not have forced an annuity of 5 francs to be accepted for a capital of more than 50 francs, which would have constituted a loan at 10 per cent. Serious embarrassments, however, resulted from this situation, for the wealthiest country could not defray the expenses of war without throwing part of them upon the future.

We have already explained the state of the budgets. That of the year XII. (September 1803 to September 1804), estimated at 700 millions, exclusive of the costs of collection, had amounted to 762. Fortunately the taxes had received from the public prosperity, which war did not interrupt under this powerful government, an increase of about 40 millions. The produce of the registration amounted to 18 millions, that of the customs to 16; in this increase of the revenue there was still a deficit of 20 and odd millions to be provided for.

The ways and means of the year XIII. (September 1804 to September 1805), which ended at this moment, exhibited a still greater deficiency. The naval works were partly finished: it had been at first thought that the expenses of this year might be considerably reduced. Though those of the year XII. amounted to 762 millions, it was hoped that the year XIII. would not require more than 684 millions. But the past months exhibited thus far a monthly expenditure of about 60 millions, which supposed a yearly expenditure of 720. To meet this there were the taxes and the extraordinary resources. The taxes, which produced 500 millions in 1801, had risen, by the mere effect of the general wealth and without any change in the tariffs, to a produce of 560 millions. The indirect contributions recently established having yielded this year very nearly 25 millions, the voluntary donations of the communes and departments, converted into additional centimes, furnishing very little short of 20 millions more, the permanent revenue had reached 600 millions. It was necessary, therefore, to find 120 millions to complete the budget of the year XIII. The Italian subsidy of 22 millions would supply a part; but then the Spanish subsidy of 48 millions had ceased in December 1804, in consequence of the brutal declaration of war which England had issued against Spain. The latter, thenceforward serving the common cause by her fleets, had no longer to serve it by her finances. The American fund, the price of

Louisiana, was consumed. To supply the place of these resources, there had been added to the Italian subsidy of 22 millions a sum of 36 millions in new securities, a species of loan, the mechanism of which we have explained elsewhere; then, an alienation of national domains to the amount of 20 millions; and lastly, some reimbursements due from Piedmont, and amounting to 6 millions. The whole made, with the ordinary imposts, 684 millions. From 36 to 40 millions more were therefore wanting to reach 720.

Thus there was an arrear of 20 millions for the year XII. and of 40 for the year XIII. But this was not all. The accounts, being still in a crude state, did not exhibit, as they now do, all the facts at a glance: there had just been discovered some balances of expenses not discharged, and some deficiencies in the receipts belonging to the service of preceding years, which constituted a further charge of about 20 millions. On adding all these deficits, 20 millions for the year XII., 40 for the year XIII., 20 recently discovered, one might estimate at about 80 millions the arrear that began to accrue since the renewal of the war.

Various means had been employed to provide for it. In the first place, a debt had been incurred with the Sinking Fund. The securities, of which a resource had been made, ought to have been repaid to that fund at the rate of 5 millions per annum. It ought to have been paid, at the rate of 10 millions per annum, for the 70 millions' worth of national domains which the law of the year IX. had assigned to it, to compensate the augmentation of the public debt. It had not been paid either of these two sums. It is true that security had been given for them in national domains, and that it was not a very importunate creditor. The treasury owed it about 30 millions at the end of the year XIII. (September 1805).

Some other resources had been found in various improvements introduced into the service of the treasury. If the State did not inspire in general any great confidence in financial matters, certain agents of the finances inspired much within the sphere of their official duties. Thus the central cashier of the treasury, established in Paris, superintending all the remittances of funds between Paris and the provinces, issued bills upon himself or upon accountable persons, his correspondents, which were always paid in the open office; because the payments were made, even amidst those interruptions, with perfect punctuality. This species of bank had been able to put into circulation not less than 15 millions in bills taken as ready money.

Lastly, a real melioration in the service of the receivers-general had procured a resource of nearly the like amount. For the direct contributions imposed upon land and buildings, the value

of which was known beforehand, and the payment fixed like a rent, the persons accountable were required to subscribe bills payable month by month into their chest, by the oft-mentioned title of obligations of the receivers-general. But for the indirect contributions, discharged irregularly in proportion to the consumption or the transactions upon which they were imposed, it was necessary to wait till the produce was realised before drawing upon the receivers-general what were called bills at sight. Thus they enjoyed this part of the funds of the State for about fifty days. It was settled that, in future, the treasury should draw upon them in advance, and every month, orders for two-thirds of the known amount of the indirect contributions (that amount was 190 millions); that the last third should remain in their hands to meet the variations of the returns, and should be remitted to the treasury only in the old accustomed form of bills at sight. This more prompt payment of part of the funds of the State was equivalent to an aid of about 15 millions.

Thus by running into debt with the Sinking Fund, by creating the bills of the central cashier of the treasury, by accelerating certain returns, there had been found resources for about 60 millions. Taking the deficit at 80 or 90, there would still be wanting about 30 millions. This had been supplied either by means of arrears with the contractors, that is to say, with the famous company of the United Merchants, whose supplies were not punctually paid for, or by discounting a larger amount in obligations of the receivers-general than ought to have been done.

Napoleon, who was unwilling to enter too far into this system of arrear, had devised while in Italy an operation, which, according to him, had nothing of the nature of a paper currency. Of the 300 or 400 millions' worth of national domains remaining in 1800, nothing was left in 1805; not that the whole of that valuable resource had been expended, but, on the contrary, because, with the view to its preservation, it had been applied to the endowment of the Sinking Fund, the Senate, the Legion of Honour, the Invalides, and the Public Instruction. The few portions which were still seen figuring in the budgets composed a last remnant which was assigned to the Sinking Fund, in discharge of what was owing and of what was not paid to it. Napoleon had an idea to take back from the Legion of Honour and the Senate the national domains which he had assigned to them, to give them rentes instead, and to dispose of those domains for an operation with the contractors. Accordingly, rentes were actually delivered to the Senate and the Legion of Honour in exchange for their immovables. For an income of 1000 francs in land there was granted them a revenue of 1750 francs in rentes, in order to compensate the difference between

the price of the one and the other. The Senate and the Legion of Honour thus gained a considerable increase of their annual income. Possession was again taken of the national domains, and they began to be disposed of to the contractors at a price agreed upon. The latter, obliged to borrow of capitalists, who lent them funds for which they had no occasion, found in the immovables a pledge by the aid of which they obtained credit and procured the means of continuing their service. It was the Sinking Fund to which this whole operation was committed, and which took from the redeemed rentes the sum necessary for indemnifying the Senate and the Legion of Honour. The State, in its turn, was obliged to indemnify it by creating for its profit a sum in rentes corresponding to that of which it had deprived itself. It was with these various expedients, some of them legitimate, as the improvements of service, others injurious, as the delays of payment to the contractors, and the resumption of the domains given to different establishments—it was with these expedients, we say, that means were found to supply the deficit produced during the last two years. At the present day, the floating debt which is provided for with *Bons royaux* would permit a charge four or five times as considerable to be contracted.

All this would have produced but a moderate embarrassment if the state of commerce had been good; but that was not the case. The French merchants in 1802, reckoning upon the duration of the maritime peace, had embarked in considerable speculations, and sent out goods to all countries. The violent conduct of England, rushing upon our flag before the declaration of war, had caused them immense losses. Many houses had concealed their distress, and making up their minds to great sacrifices, assisting each other with their credit, had got over the first blow. But the new shock resulting from the continental war could not fail to complete their ruin. Bankruptcies began already to take place in the principal commercial towns, and produced there general distress. This was not the sole cause of the stagnation of business. Ever since the fall of the assignats, specie, though it soon made its appearance again, had always been insufficient, owing to a cause easy of comprehension. Paper money, though discredited from the very first day of its issue, had nevertheless performed the service of specie for some part of the exchanges, and had driven part of the metallic currencies out of France. The public prosperity, suddenly restored under the consulate, had not lasted long enough to bring back the gold and silver which had been carried out of the country. The want of it was felt in all sorts of transactions. To procure it was at this period one of the incessant cares of commerce. The Bank of France, which had acquired rapid

prosperity, because it furnished by means of its perfectly accredited notes a supplementary currency—the Bank of France had the greatest difficulty to keep in its coffers a metallic reserve proportioned to the issue of its notes. For this purpose it had made praiseworthy efforts, and drawn from Spain a prodigious sum in dollars. Unluckily, a drain, then opened for specie, carried it away as fast as it was brought in: this was the payment for colonial produce. Formerly, that is to say, in 1788 and 1789, when we possessed St. Domingo, France drew from her colonies sugar, coffee, and other colonial productions to the amount of 220 million francs, of which she consumed 70 or 80 millions' worth and exported as much as 150, particularly in the form of refined sugar. If we consider the difference in the value of all things, a difference not less than double, between that time and the present, we shall conceive what an immense source of prosperity was dried up. It was necessary to go abroad for what we wanted, and to receive from our very enemies the colonial commodities which, twenty years before, we sold to all Europe. A considerable portion of our specie was carried to Hamburg, Amsterdam, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, Trieste, to pay for the sugar and coffee which the English introduced there by means of the free trade or by smuggling. To Italy was sent much more than the 22 millions paid us by that country. All the mercantile men of the time complained of this state of things, and this subject was daily discussed at the bank by the most enlightened men of business in France.

It was to Spain that all Europe was accustomed to apply for the metals. That celebrated nation, for which Columbus had procured ages of wealthy and fatal sloth by opening to it the mines of America, had suffered itself to run in debt through ignorance and negligence. The calamities of war were added to a vicious administration; it was then the most distressed of powers, and exhibited that so melancholy spectacle in all cases of opulence reduced to poverty. The loss of the galleons, intercepted by the English cruisers, was felt not only by Spain but by all Europe. Though the export of dollars was prohibited in the Peninsula, yet France contrived to extract them by smuggling, thanks to a long contiguity of territory, and neighbouring countries frequently carried them out of France by the same means. This contraband trade was as solidly established and as widely extended as a lawful traffic. But at this period it was much obstructed by the interruption of the arrivals from America, and it is a singular fact that England herself suffered from that cause. The money hoarded in the cellars of the Spanish governors of Mexico and Peru ceased to come either to Cadiz or Bayonne, to London or Paris. England was in want of the metals for all purposes, but particularly for the

payment of the European coalition; for the colonial produce and other merchandise with which she supplied either Russia or Austria no longer sufficed to discharge the subsidies which she had engaged to pay them. Pitt had himself alleged this reason for contesting with the coalesced powers part of the sums which they demanded. After giving for next to nothing enormous quantities of sugar and coffee to the allies, the British cabinet sent them notes of the Bank of England. Some were actually found in the hands of Austrian officers.

Such were the principal causes of the commercial and financial distress. If the company of United Merchants, which then transacted all the business of the treasury, supply of provisions, discount of obligations, discount of Spanish subsidy, had confined itself to the service which it had undertaken, it might, though not without difficulty, have supported the burden. It could no longer get the obligations of the receivers-general discounted at one-half per cent. per month (6 per cent. per annum); it was as much as it could do to find capitalists who discounted them for itself at three-quarters per cent. per month (9 per cent. per annum), which exposed it to an enormous loss. The treasury, it is true, entered into an agreement with it, and by indemnifying it for the usury practised by the capitalists, would have had means to facilitate the continuance of its service. But its chief director, M. Ouvrard, had based on this situation an immense plan, certainly very ingenious, and which would have been very advantageous too if this plan had combined with the merit of invention the still more necessary merit of accurate calculation. As we have seen, the three contractors forming the company of United Merchants had divided the parts among them. M. Desprez, formerly cashier to a banker, enriched by his extraordinary skill in the traffic in paper, was charged with the discount of the paper of the treasury. To M. Vanlerberghe, who was thoroughly acquainted with the corn trade, was assigned the supply of provisions. M. Ouvrard, the boldest of the three, the most fertile in resources, had reserved the grand speculations for himself. Having accepted from France the paper with which Spain paid her subsidy, and promised to discount it, which had seduced M. de Marbois, he conceived the idea of forming a great connection with Spain, the mistress of Mexico and Peru, from whose hands issued the metals, the object of universal ambition. He had gone to Madrid, where he found a court saddened by the war, by the yellow fever, by a frightful dearth, and by the importunate demands of Napoleon, whose debtor it was. Nothing of all this appeared to surprise or to embarrass M. Ouvrard. He had charmed by his ease, by his assurance, the old people who reigned at the Escorial, as he had charmed M. de Marbois by

procuring for him the resources that he could not procure for himself. He had at first offered to pay the subsidy due to France for the end of 1803 and for the whole of the year 1804, which was a first relief that came very seasonably. He had then furnished several immediate aids in money, of which the court was in urgent need. He had undertaken, moreover, to ship corn for the Spanish ports, and to procure for the Spanish squadrons provisions which they were in want of. All these services had been accepted with cordial acknowledgments. M. Ouvrard wrote immediately to Paris, and through M. de Marbois, whose favour he possessed, he had obtained the permission usually refused to export from France some cargoes of wheat to Spain. These sudden arrivals had stopped the monopolising of corn in the ports of the Peninsula, and by putting an end to the dearth, which consisted rather in a fictitious elevation of prices than in a scarcity of grain, M. Ouvrard had relieved, as by enchantment, the severest distresses of the Spanish people. This was more than enough to seduce and to captivate the not very clear-sighted administrators of Spain.

It will naturally be asked with what resources could the court of Madrid pay M. Ouvrard for all the services which it received from him. The means were simple. M. Ouvrard desired that the privilege of bringing over dollars from Mexico should be granted to him. He actually obtained the privilege of shipping them from the Spanish colonies, at the rate of 3 francs 75 centimes, while in France, in Holland, in Spain, they were worth 5 francs at least. This was an extraordinary profit, but assuredly well deserved, if M. Ouvrard could contrive to elude the British cruisers, and to transport from the new world to the old those metals which had become so precious. Spain, which was sinking under her distresses, was extremely happy to realise three-fourths of her treasures with the sacrifice of the other fourth. It is not always that the sons of indolent and prodigal families make such advantageous bargains with the stewards who pay ransom for their prodigality.

But how bring over these dollars in spite of Pitt and the English fleets? M. Ouvrard was not more embarrassed by this difficulty than by the others. He conceived the idea of making use of Pitt himself by means of the most singular of combinations. There were Dutch houses, particularly that of Hope & Co., which had establishments both in Holland and England. He devised the scheme of selling them the Spanish dollars at a price which still ensured a considerable profit to his company. It was for these houses to persuade Mr. Pitt to allow them to come from Mexico. As Pitt was in want of them for his own purposes, it was possible that he would permit a certain sum to pass, although he knew that he was to share it with his

enemies. It was a kind of tacit contract, which the Dutch houses in partnership with English houses were to negotiate. Experience subsequently proved that this contract was practicable for a part, if not for the whole. M. Ouvrard had also an idea of employing American houses, which, with his delegation, and thanks to the neutral flag, could go and ship the dollars in the Spanish colonies and carry them to Europe. But the question was to ascertain how many of these dollars Pitt would suffer to be brought, and how many the Americans could bring by favour of their neutrality. If there had been time, such a speculation might have succeeded, have rendered important services to France and Spain, and afforded the company abundant and legitimate profits. Unfortunately the necessities were extremely urgent. Out of an arrear of 80 or 90 millions which the French treasury was obliged to meet with expedients, there were about 30 millions which it owed to the company of United Merchants, and which it paid with immovables. It had therefore to bear this first charge. It had, moreover, to furnish this same French treasury with the amount for a year at least of the Spanish subsidy; that is to say, from 40 to 50 millions; it had to discount for it the obligations of the receivers-general; it had, lastly, to pay for the corn sent to the ports of the Peninsula and the provisions procured for the Spanish fleets. This was a situation which would not permit the company to await the success of hazardous and distant speculations. Until that success it was obliged to live by expedients. It had pawned to lenders the immovables received in payment. Having contrived, thanks to the complaisance of M. de Marbois, to gain almost complete possession of the portfolio of the treasury, it extracted from it handfuls of obligations of the receivers-general, which it placed in the hands of capitalists, lending their money on pledge at usurious interest. It got part of these same obligations discounted by the Bank of France, which, induced by its intimate connection with the government, refused nothing that was applied for in behalf of the public service. The company received the amount of these discounts in bank notes, and the situation then resolved itself into an issue, more considerable from day to day, of these bank notes. But the metallic reserve not increasing in proportion to the mass of notes issued, the consequence was a positive danger; and it was the bank in reality which had to sustain the weight of everybody's embarrassments. Hence voices were raised in the bosom of the council of regency, requiring that a stop should be put to the assistance granted to M. Desprez, representing the company of the United Merchants. But other voices, less prudent and more patriotic, that of M. Perregaux in particular, declared against such a

proposal, and caused the assistance applied for by M. Desprez to be granted.

The French treasury, the Spanish treasury, the company of United Merchants, which served to link them together, were like embarrassed houses, which lend each other their signature and assist one another with a credit which they do not possess. But, it must be confessed, the French treasury was the least cramped of these three associated houses, and it was least liable to suffer much from such a partnership; for, in reality, it was with its sole resources, that is to say, with the obligations of the receivers-general discounted by the bank, that all demands were met, and that the Spanish armies as well as the French armies were fed. For the rest, the secret of this extraordinary situation was not known. The partners of M. Ouvrard, whose engagements with him have never been clearly defined, though those engagements have been the subject of long legal proceedings, knew not themselves the full extent of the burden that was about to crush them. Finding themselves already much cramped, they called loudly for M. Ouvrard, and induced M. Marbois to order his immediate return to Paris. M. de Marbois, not very capable of judging with his eyes of all the details of a vast management of funds, deceived, moreover, by a dishonest clerk, had no suspicion to what an extent the resources of the treasury were abandoned to the company. Napoleon himself, though he extended his indefatigable vigilance to everything, perceiving in the services a real deficit of no more than about 60 millions, which could be supplied with national domains and different expedients, ignorant of the confusion which had crept in between the operations of the treasury and those of the United Merchants, was not aware of the real cause of the embarrassments and uneasiness that began to be felt. He attributed the pressure prevailing everywhere to the false speculations of French commerce, to the usury which the possessors of capital strove to practise, and railed against men of business nearly in the same manner as he railed against *idéologues*, when he met with ideas that displeased him. Be this as it may, he would not suffer objections to the execution of his orders to be drawn from this state of things. He had demanded 12 millions in specie at Strasburg, and demanded them so imperatively that recourse was had to extreme means to procure them. He had required 10 more millions in Italy, and the company, obliged to buy them at Hamburg, transmitted them to Milan either in specie or in gold across the Rhine and the Alps. Besides, Napoleon reckoned upon having struck such blows in fifteen or twenty days as to put an end to all embarrassments.

These resources obtained rightly or wrongly from the treasury,

he turned his attention to the conscription and the organisation of the reserve. The annual contingent was then divided into two halves of 30,000 men each, the first called into active service, the second left in the bosom of the population, but liable to be called to join the army on the mere summons of the government. There was still left a great part of the contingent of the years IX., X., XI., XII., and XIII.

These were grown men, whom the government could dispose of by decree. Napoleon called them all, but he determined also to anticipate the levy of the year XIV., comprehending the individuals who would attain the required age between the 23rd of September 1805 and the 23rd of September 1806; and as the use of the Gregorian calendar was to be resumed on the 1st of the following January, he directed the young men who would attain the legal age between the 23rd of September and the 31st of December 1806 to be included in this levy. He resolved therefore to comprise in a single levy of fifteen months all the conscripts to whom the law should be applicable from the month of September 1805 to the month of December 1806. This measure would furnish him with 80,000 men, the last of whom would not have completely attained the age of twenty years. But he had no intention of employing them immediately in military service. He purposed to prepare them for the profession of arms by placing them in the third battalions, which composed the *depôt* of each regiment. These men would thus have a year or two as well to acquire instruction as to gain their full strength, and would form, in fifteen or eighteen months, excellent soldiers, almost as well trained as those of the camp of Boulogne. This was a combination beneficial at once for the health of the men and for their military instruction; for the conscript of twenty, if sent immediately into the field, is soon in the hospital. But this combination was practicable only for a government which, having an army completely organised to meet the enemy with, had no need of the annual contingent but by way of a reserve.

The Legislative Body not being assembled, time must have been lost in calling it together. Napoleon would not consent to such a delay, and conceived the idea of addressing himself to the Senate, on the ground of two motives: the first, the irregularity of a contingent which comprised more than twelve months and some conscripts under twenty years of age; the second, the urgency of the circumstances. It was overstepping the bounds of legality to act in this manner, for the Senate could not vote either any contribution in money or any contribution in men. It was invested with functions of a different order, such as to prevent the adoption of unconstitutional laws, to fill up gaps in the constitution, and to watch the acts of the government

having an arbitrary taint. To the Legislative Body belonged exclusively the voting of imposts and levies of men. It was a fault to violate that constitution already too flexible, and to render it a great deal too illusory by neglecting so easily to observe its forms. It was another fault not to be more sparing of the employment of the Senate, which had been made the ordinary resource in all difficult cases, and to indicate but too clearly that more dependence was placed on its docility than on that of the Legislative Body. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who disliked excesses of power that were not indispensable, made these remarks, and maintained that it was necessary, at least for the observance of forms, to attribute by an organic measure the vote of the contingents to the Senate. Napoleon, who, without despising the views of prudence, deferred them to another time when he was in a hurry, would neither lay down a general rule nor postpone the levy of the contingent. In consequence, he ordered a *Senatus Consultum*, grounded on two extraordinary considerations, to be prepared: those considerations were the irregularity of the contingent, embracing more than an entire year, and the urgency of the circumstances, which would not admit of the delay required for assembling the Legislative Body.

He thought also of having recourse to the national guards, instituted by virtue of the laws of 1790, 1791, and 1795. This third coalition having all the characteristics of the two former, though times were changed, though Europe was less adverse to the principles of France, but much more to her greatness, he conceived that the nation owed its government a concurrence as energetic, as unanimous, as formerly. He could not expect ardour, for the revolutionary enthusiasm no longer existed; but he could reckon upon perfect submission to the law on the part of the citizens, and on a deep sense of honour in such of them as the law should summon. He therefore ordered the reorganisation of the national guards, but aimed at the same time to render them more obedient and more soldier-like. To this end he caused a *Senatus Consultum* to be prepared, authorising their reorganisation by imperial decrees. He resolved to reserve for himself the nomination of the officers, and to collect in the chasseur and grenadier companies the youngest and most warlike portion of the population. This he destined for the defence of fortresses, and for occasional assemblages at threatened points, such as Boulogne, Antwerp, La Vendée.

These different elements were disposed of in the following manner:—Nearly 200,000 soldiers were marching to Germany; 70,000 defended Italy; twenty-one battalions of infantry and more than fifteen battalions of seamen guarded Boulogne. We

have already seen that the regiments were composed of three battalions, two for war, one for the *depôt*, the latter charged to receive sick and convalescent soldiers, and to train the conscripts. A certain number of these third battalions had already been stationed at Boulogne. All the others were distributed from Mayence to Strasburg. Towards these three points were directed the men remaining to be levied for the years IX., X., XI., XII., and XIII., and the 80,000 conscripts for 1806. They were to be incorporated with the third battalions, in order to be trained and to acquire their full strength. The oldest, when they should be formed, were afterwards to be organised into marching corps, for filling the gaps which war should have made in the ranks of the army. This would be a reserve of 150,000 men at least guarding the frontier, and serving to recruit the corps. The national guards, supporting this reserve, were to be organised in the north and the west, to be in readiness to hasten to the coasts, and in particular to repair to Boulogne and Antwerp, if the English should attempt to burn the flotilla or to destroy the docks constructed on the Scheldt. Marshal Brune had already been appointed to command at Boulogne. Marshal Lefebvre was to command at Mayence, Marshal Kellermann at Strasburg. These nominations attested the admirable tact of Napoleon. Marshal Brune had a reputation acquired in 1799, by having repulsed a descent of the Russians and English. Marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann, old soldiers, who had been rewarded for their services by a place in the Senate and the honorary baton of marshal, were capable of superintending the organisation of the reserve, while their younger companions-in-arms were engaged in active warfare. They gave occasion, at the same time, to an infringement of the law, which forbade senators to hold public appointments. This law was extremely displeasing to the Senate, and it was very ingeniously evaded by calling some of its members to train the rearguard of the national defence.

These arrangements completed, Napoleon directed the measures just enumerated to be carried to the Senate, and presented them himself in an imperial sitting held at the Luxembourg on the 23rd of September. He there spoke, in firm and precise terms, of the continental war, which had come upon him unawares while he was engaged with the expedition against England, of the explanations demanded from Austria, of the ambiguous answers of that court, of its now demonstrated falsehoods, since its armies had passed the Inn on the 8th of September, at the moment when it was most strongly protesting its love of peace. He appealed to the attachment of France, and promised to have soon annihilated the new

coalition. The Senators gave him strong tokens of assent, though in the bottom of their hearts they attributed the new continental war to the incorporations of States which had been effected in Italy. In the streets through which the imperial train had to pass, from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries, the popular enthusiasm, damped by distress, was less expressive than usual. Napoleon perceived and was piqued at it, and expressed some vexation to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. He regarded it as an injustice done him by the people of Paris; but it seemed to inspire him with a determination to excite before long shouts of enthusiasm louder and more vehement than had yet rung so frequently in his ears; and he turned his thoughts, which had not time to dwell upon any subject, to the events that were preparing on the banks of the Danube. In haste to depart, he made a regulation for the organisation of the government in his absence. His brother Joseph was appointed president of the Senate; his brother Louis, in quality of constable, was to attend to the levies of men and the formation of the national guards. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was entrusted with the presidency of the Council of State. All matters of business were to be discussed in a Council composed of the ministers and the grand dignitaries, under the presidency of the Grand-Elector Joseph. It was settled that couriers, despatched every day, should carry to Napoleon a report on every affair, with the personal opinion of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. The latter, apprehensive lest Joseph Bonaparte, presiding over the Council of the government, might be hurt at this allotment of the part of supreme critic to one of the members of that Council, made an observation on the subject to Napoleon; but Napoleon suddenly interrupted him, declaring that he would not deprive himself of the aid of most valuable abilities to humour any man's vanity. He persisted. His decisions were to be transmitted to Paris after he had received the report sent by the arch-chancellor. It was only in urgent cases that the Council was authorised not to wait for the decision of the emperor, and to issue orders which each minister was to execute on his personal responsibility. Thus Napoleon reserved to himself the decision of all matters even during his absence, and made the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès the eye of his government while he was far away from the centre of the empire.

All about him witnessed his departure with sorrow. They knew not yet the secret of his genius; they were not aware how much he would shorten the war. They feared that it might be long, and they were sure that it would be bloody. They asked themselves what would be the lot of France, if that head should chance to be struck by the bullet that pierced

the breast of Turenne, or the ball that fractured the skull of Charles XII. ? Besides, all who approached him, abrupt and absolute as he was, could not help loving him. It was, therefore, with deep regret that they saw him depart. He consented to be accompanied as far as Strasburg by the empress, who was the more strongly attached to him the more fear she felt about the duration of her union with him. He took with him Marshal Berthier, leaving orders for M. de Talleyrand, with a few clerks, to follow the headquarters at a certain distance. Setting out from Paris on the 24th, Napoleon arrived at Strasburg on the 26th.

To the great astonishment of Europe, the army which twenty days before was on the shores of the ocean was already in the heart of Germany, on the banks of the Mayn, the Neckar, and the Rhine. Never had march more secret, more rapid, been performed in any age. The heads of columns got sight of each other everywhere, at Wurzburg, at Mayence, at Strasburg. The joy of the soldiers was at its height, and when they beheld Napoleon, they greeted him with shouts a thousand times repeated of "*Vive l'Empereur !*" That innumerable multitude of troops, infantry, artillery, cavalry, suddenly collected ; those convoys of provisions, of ammunition, formed in haste ; those long files of horses bought in Switzerland and in Suabia ; in short, all these movements of an army that was not expected a few days before, and which had suddenly made its appearance, presented an unparalleled spectacle, heightened by a military court, at once stern and brilliant, and by an immense concourse of persons curious to see the Emperor of the French setting out for war.

The coalition had hastened on its part, but it was not so well prepared as Napoleon, nor above all so active, though animated by the most ardent passions. It had been agreed between the coalesced powers that they should march their principal forces towards the Danube before winter, that Napoleon might not be able to take advantage of the difficulty of the communications during the bad season for crushing Austria separated from her allies. All the orders of the movement had, therefore, been given for the end of August and the beginning of September. In acting thus, the allies expected to be far in advance of Napoleon, and flattered themselves that they should have it in their power to commence hostilities at any moment which they should deem most seasonable. They had no conception that they should find the French transported so suddenly to the theatre of war.

A Russian force was collecting at Revel, and embarked in the first days of September for Stralsund. It was composed of 16,000 men, under the command of General Tolstoy. Twelve

thousand Swedes had preceded them to Stralsund. They were to march together through Mecklenburg into Hanover, and to be there joined by 15,000 English, who were to come up the Elbe and land at Cuxhaven. This would form an army of 43,000 men, destined to make an attack from the north. This attack was to be either principal or accessory, according as Prussia joined or did not join in it.

Two large Russian armies of 60,000 men each were advancing, the one through Galicia, under General Kutusof, the other through Poland, under General Buxhövdén. The Russian guard, 12,000 strong, picked men, under the Grand Duke Constantine, followed the first. An army of reserve, under General Michelson, was forming at Wilna. The young Emperor Alexander, hurried by levity into war, clear-sighted enough to perceive his error, but not possessing resolution enough to abandon or correct it by energy of execution—the Emperor Alexander, haunted, though he would not avow it, by a secret dread, had not decided till very late upon making the last preparations. The corps of Galicia, which, under General Kutusof, was to come to the assistance of the Austrians, had not reached the frontier of Austria till towards the end of August. It had traversed Galicia from Brody to Olmütz, Moravia from Olmütz to Vienna, and Bavaria from Vienna to Ulm. This was a much greater distance than the French had to travel from Boulogne to Ulm, and the Russians were not such adepts at distant marches as the French. Europe, which has seen our soldiers march, well knows that never were any so expeditious. The presage of Napoleon, therefore, was accomplished, and already the Russians were behindhand.

The second Russian army, placed between Warsaw and Cracow, in the environs of Pulawi, amounting with the Russian guards to 70,000 men, awaited the arrival of the Emperor Alexander to receive his directions in regard to Prussia. That monarch had gone to Revel to see the embarkation of his troops before he set out for the army in Poland, and had proceeded to Pulawi, a beautiful residence of the illustrious family of Czartoryski, at some distance from Warsaw. He was there with his young minister for foreign affairs, Prince Adam Czartoryski, to communicate the more readily with the court of Berlin.

In company with Alexander was Prince Peter Dolgorouki, an officer just starting in the career of arms, full of presumption and ambition, an enemy of that coterie of young wits who governed the empire, striving to persuade the emperor that those young men were faithless Russians who betrayed Russia to benefit Poland. The fickleness of Alexander gave Prince Dolgorouki more than one chance of success. It was false that Prince Adam, the most honourable of men, was capable

of betraying Alexander. But he hated the court of Prussia, the weakness of which he took for duplicity; he wished, from a sentiment entirely Polish, that the design of using force with that court, if it did not adhere to the views of the coalition, should be rigorously executed, that Russia should break with it, and that, trampling down its scarcely formed armies, the Russians should take from it Warsaw and Posen, and proclaim Alexander king of reconstituted Poland. This was a perfectly natural wish for a Pole, but an inconsiderate one for a Russian statesman. Napoleon alone was sufficient to beat the coalition; how would it be if the forced alliance of Prussia were given to him?

Besides, it was requiring too much from the irresolute character of Alexander. He had sent his ambassador, M. d'Alopeus, to Berlin, to make an appeal to the friendship of Frederick William, to demand of him in the first place a passage through Silesia for the Russian army, and then to insinuate that no doubt was entertained of the concurrence of Prussia in the meritorious work of European deliverance. The negotiator was even authorised to declare to the Prussian cabinet that there must be no hesitation, that neutrality was impossible, that if a passage were not granted with a good grace it would be taken by force. M. d'Alopeus was to be seconded by Prince Dolgorouki, aide-de-camp of Alexander. The latter was instructed to let it be clearly perceived at Berlin that there was a fixed determination to win Prussia by caresses or to decide her by violence. Things had even been carried to such a length at Pulawi, that the manifesto which was to precede hostilities was drawn up.

While these strong representations were addressed to Prussia by the Russian agents, she found herself face to face with the French negotiators, Messrs. Duroc and Laforest, commissioned by Napoleon to offer her Hanover. It will be recollected that the grand-marshal of the palace, Duroc, had left Boulogne, to carry this offer to Berlin. The integrity of the young king had not been proof against it; neither had the sentiments of M. de Hardenberg, who was called in Europe the right-thinking minister. M. de Hardenberg perceived but one difficulty in this affair, that was to find a form which should save the honour of his master in the eyes of Europe. Two months, July and August, had been spent in seeking this form. One had been devised which was ingenious enough. It was the same that the coalition had contrived on its part for commencing the war against Napoleon, that is to say, an armed mediation. The King of Prussia was, for the sake of peace, which, it was alleged, was needed by all the powers, to declare on what conditions the balance of Europe would appear to him sufficiently guaranteed,

to state those conditions, and then give it to be understood that he should pronounce in favour of those who should admit them against those who should refuse to admit them, which signified that he would make half war along with France in order to gain Hanover. He was, in fact, to adopt in his declaration most of Napoleon's conditions, such as the creation of the kingdom of Italy, with separation of the two crowns at the period of a general peace, the annexation of Piedmont and Genoa to the empire, the free disposal of Parma and Piacenza left to France, the independence of Switzerland and Holland, lastly, the evacuation of Taranto and Hanover at the peace. There was no difficulty but as to the construction to be put upon the independence of Switzerland and Holland. Napoleon, who had then no view upon those two countries, would nevertheless not guarantee their independence in terms which would allow the enemies of France to effect a counter-revolution there. The discussions on this subject were prolonged till the end of the month of September, and the young King of Prussia was about to make up his mind to the violence with which he was threatened, when he clearly perceived from the march of the Russian, Austrian, and French armies that war was inevitable and near at hand. Terrified at this prospect, he fell back, and talked no more either about armed mediation or the acquisition of Hanover as the price of that mediation. He returned to his ordinary system of neutrality of the north of Germany. Then Messrs. Duroc and Laforest offered him, agreeably to the orders of Napoleon, what the cabinet of Berlin had itself so often demanded, the delivery of Hanover to Prussia, by way of deposit, on condition that the latter should ensure the possession of it to France. But, gratified as King Frederick William would have been by the retreat of the French and the delivery to him of so valuable a deposit, he saw that he should be obliged to oppose the northern expedition, and he still refused. He made a thousand protestations of attachment to Napoleon, his dynasty, to his government, adding that, if he did violate his sympathies, it was because he was defenceless against Russia on the side of Poland. To this Messrs. Duroc and Laforest replied by the offer of an army of 80,000 Prussians ready to join the Prussians. But this would still be what Frederick William rejected it under this new form. It was at this moment that M. d'Alopeus and Prince Dolgorouki arrived at Berlin to require Prussia to declare herself for the emperor. The king was not less frightened at the demands of the emperor than at the proposals of the others. He replied by protestations exactly like those which he had addressed to the negotiators. He was, he said, full of attachment for the emperor, his friend whose acquaintance he had made at Memel, but

be the first to incur the vengeance of Napoleon, and he could not expose his subjects to such great dangers without making himself culpable towards them. The Russian envoys, insisting, told him that the army collected between Warsaw and Cracow was placed there expressly to succour him, and that it was a friendly forethought of the Emperor Alexander; that the 70,000 Russians composing that army were about to cross Silesia and Saxony on their way to the Rhine to receive the first shock of the French armies. Frederick William was not to be persuaded by these reasons. The envoys then proceeded still further, and gave him to understand that it was too late; that, not doubting his adhesion, the Russian troops had been already ordered to pass through the Prussian territory. At this kind of violence Frederick William could no longer contain himself. People were mistaken respecting his character. He was irresolute, which frequently gave him the appearance of weakness and duplicity; but when driven to extremity, he became obstinate and choleric. Filled with indignation, he convoked a council, to which were summoned the old Duke of Brunswick and Marshal de Mollendorf, and notwithstanding his parsimony, decided on putting the Prussian army upon the war footing. Seeing that he was on the point of suffering violence from both, he resolved to take his precautions, and ordered the assembling of 80,000 men, which would cost him 16 million Prussian dollars (64 million francs), to be taken partly from the revenues of the State, partly from the treasury of the great Frederick, a treasury drained during the preceding reign, but replenished during the present by dint of savings.

M. d'Alopeus, alarmed at these dispositions, hastened to write to Pulawi, to advise his emperor, with the most earnest entreaties, to humour the King of Prussia, if he wished not to have all the forces of the Prussian monarchy upon his hands.

When these tidings reached Pulawi, they shook the resolution of Alexander. Prince Adam Czartoryski had warmly urged him to decide not to give Prussia time to defend herself, and to take a passage instead of soliciting it for such a length of time. If Prussia turns to war, said Prince Adam, let us declare Alexander King of Poland and organise that kingdom, in the rear of the Russian armies. If, on the contrary, she complies, we shall have realised the plan of the coalesced powers and gained one more ally. But Alexander, enlightened by the correspondence of M. d'Alopeus, withstood the counsels of his young minister, sent his aide-de-camp Dolgorouki to Berlin to affirm to his royal friend that it had never been his intention to coerce his will, that, on the contrary, he had just given orders for his army to halt on the Prussian frontiers, that this was done in deference to him, but that affairs of such importance could not

be settled by means of agents, and that therefore he requested an interview. Frederick William, fearing lest he should suffer as much compulsion from the caresses of Alexander as he could have done from his armies, would rather have declined this interview. His court, however, which leaned to the coalition and to war, and the queen, whose sentiments corresponded with those of the young emperor, persuaded him that he could not refuse it. The interview was fixed for the first days of October. Meanwhile Messrs. Duroc and Laforest were in Berlin, receiving all sorts of assurances of neutrality.

While the Russians were thus employing the month of September, Austria was making better use of that valuable time. She commissioned M. de Cobentzel to repeat incessantly in Paris that her sole desire was to negotiate and to obtain guarantees for the future state of Italy, and was meanwhile availing herself of the English subsidies with the utmost activity. She had in the first place assembled 100,000 men in Italy, under the Archduke Charles. It was there that she placed her best general and her strongest army, to recover her most regretted provinces. Twenty-five thousand men, under the Archduke John, who had commanded at Hohenlinden, guarded the Tyrol; 80,000 or 90,000 men were destined to enter Bavaria, proceed to Suabia, and take the famous position of Ulm, where in 1800 M. de Kray had so long detained General Moreau. The 50,000 or 60,000 Russians under General Kutusof, coming to join the Austrian army, would form a mass of 140,000 or 150,000 fighting men, which, it was hoped, would give the French occupation enough to afford the other Russian armies time to arrive, the Archduke Charles time to reconquer Italy, and the troops sent to Hanover and Naples time to produce a useful diversion. It was the famous General Mack, the same who had formed the plans of campaign against France, and who came with great activity and a certain skill in military details to reorganize the Austrian army on a war footing—it was this same general who had been appointed to the command of the army of Suabia in conjunction with the Archduke Ferdinand.

Advantage had been taken of the towns belonging to Austria in that country to prepare magazines between the Lake of Constance and the Upper Danube. The city of Memmingen, situated on the Iller, and forming the left of the position of which Ulm formed the right, was one of these places. Immense stores of provisions had been collected there, and some entrenchments thrown up. Such could not have been done at Ulm, because it belonged to France.

All this had been accomplished by the last days of September. But Austria had, by a precipitation not usual with her, committed here an egregious blunder. The position of Ulm could not be occupied without crossing the Bavarian frontier. Besides,

possessed an army of 25,000 men, large magazines, the line of the Inn, and thus there were all sorts of reasons for being the first to seize such a valuable prey. Austria conceived the idea of acting towards her as Russia was doing towards Prussia, that is to say, to surprise and hurry her away. It was easier, it is true, but the consequences in case of failure would be disastrous.

On the arrival of General Mack upon the banks of the Inn, Prince de Schwarzenberg was sent to Munich to make the strongest solicitations to the elector on the part of the Emperor of Germany. He was commissioned to urge him to pronounce in favour of the coalition, to unite his troops with those of Austria, to consent to their being incorporated into the imperial army, dispersed regiment by regiment in the Austrian divisions, to give up his territory, his magazines, to the allies, to join, in short, in the new crusade against the common enemy of Germany and Europe. The Prince of Schwarzenberg was even authorised, in case of necessity, to offer to Bavaria in Salzburg, in the Tyrol itself, the fairest aggrandisements, provided that, on the reconquest of Italy by their joint arms, the collateral branches of the imperial house, which had been expelled from that country, could be re-established there.

When Prince de Schwarzenberg arrived at Munich, the elector was in much the same situation as Prussia herself. M. Otto, the same who in 1801 had so ably negotiated the peace of London, was our minister at Munich. Affecting, amidst that capital, to be neglected by the court, he had nevertheless secret interviews with the elector, and strove to prove to him that Bavaria existed solely through the protection of Napoleon. It is certain that on this, as on many other occasions, she could not save herself from Austrian rapacity without the support of France. If even in 1803 she had obtained a reasonable share of the Germanic indemnities, she owed it entirely to French intervention. M. Otto, by insisting on these considerations, had put an end to the hesitation of the elector, and had induced him to bind himself on the 24th of August by a treaty of alliance. It was a few days afterwards, on the 7th of September, that Prince de Schwarzenberg made his appearance at Munich. The elector, who was very feeble, had about him a fresh cause for feebleness in the electress, his wife, one of those three beautiful princesses of Baden, who had ascended the thrones of Russia, of Sweden, and of Bavaria, and who all three were distinguished for their animosity against France. Of the three, the Electress of Bavaria was the most vehement. She fretted, she wept, she manifested extreme vexation at seeing her husband chained to Napoleon, and rendered him more miserable than he would naturally have been from his own agitation. M. de Schwarzenberg, followed at the distance of two days' march by the Austrian

army, and seconded by the tears of the electress, succeeded in shaking the elector and extorting from him a promise to give himself up to Austria. This prince, however, dreading the consequences of this sudden change, fearing General Mack, who was near at hand, and Napoleon too, though he was at a distance, thought it right to inform M. Otto of the circumstance, to excuse his conduct by alleging his unfortunate position, and to solicit the indulgence of France. M. Otto being thus apprised of the fact, hastened to the elector, represented to him the danger of such a defection, and the certainty of soon having Napoleon as conqueror at Munich making peace by the sacrifice of Bavaria to Austria. Certain circumstances seconded the arguments of M. Otto. The requisition to dislocate the army and to disperse it among the Austrian divisions had roused indignation in the Bavarian generals and officers. News arrived at the same time that the Austrians, without waiting for the consent solicited at Munich, had passed the Inn, and public opinion was revolted by such a violation of the territory. People remarked publicly that, if Napoleon was ambitious, Pitt was not less so; that the latter had bought the cabinet of Vienna, and that, thanks to the gold of England, Germany was to be again trampled under foot by the soldiers of all Europe. Independently of these circumstances, favourable to M. Otto, the elector had an able minister, M. de Montgelas, fired with ambition for his country, dreaming of securing for Bavaria in the nineteenth century those aggrandisements which Prussia had acquired in the eighteenth, seeking incessantly whether it was in Vienna or in Paris that there was most chance of obtaining them, and having finally concluded that it would be from the most innovating power, that is to say, from France. He had therefore, been in favour of the treaty of alliance signed with M. Otto. Touched, however, by the offers of Prince Schwarzenberg, he was shaken for a moment under the influence of ambition as his master had been under that of weakness. But he was soon brought back, and the solicitations of M. Otto, seconded by the public opinion, by the irritation of the Bavarian generals, by the counsels of M. de Montgelas, once more gained ascendancy. The elector was again won for France. In the agitated state of mind in which that prince was, he did the thing that he was advised to do. It was proposed that he should retire to Wurzburg, a bishopric secularised for him in 1803, and that his army should follow him. He accepted this proposal. In order to gain time, he informed M. de Schwarzenberg that he was going to send to Vienna a French general, M. de Nogarola, a known partisan of Austria, commissioned to treat there. This done, the elector set off with the whole court, in the night between the 8th and 9th.

September, and proceeded first to Ratisbon, and from Ratisbon to Wurzburg, where he arrived on the 12th of September. The Bavarian troops collected at Amberg and at Ulm received orders to concentrate themselves at Wurzburg. The elector, on leaving Wurzburg, published a manifesto, denouncing to Bavaria and Germany the violence of which he was the victim.

M. de Schwarzenberg and General Mack, who had passed the Inn, thus saw the elector, his court, and his army slip out of their hands, and found themselves objects of ridicule as well as of indignation. The Austrians advanced by forced marches, without being able to overtake the Bavarians, and everywhere found the opinion of the country exasperated against them. One circumstance contributed more particularly to irritate the people in Bavaria. The Austrians had their hands full of paper money, not current at Vienna without a great loss. They obliged the inhabitants to take this discredited paper as money. Thus a serious pecuniary injury was added to the galled national feelings to incense the Bavarians.

General Mack, after this pitiful expedition, for which, however, he was less responsible than the Austrian negotiator, marched for the Upper Danube, and took the position which had long been assigned him, the right at Ulm, the left on Memmingen, the front covered by the Iller, which runs to Memmingen and falls into the Danube at Ulm. The officers of the Austrian staff had been for some years past incessantly extolling this position as the best that could be occupied for making head against the French debouching from the Black Forest. Here they had one of their wings supported on the Tyrol, the other on the Danube. They thought themselves, therefore, quite secure on both sides, and as for their rear, they never gave it a thought, not imagining that the French could ever come by any other than the ordinary route. General Mack had drawn to him General Jellachich with the division of the Vorarlberg. He had 65,000 men immediately at hand, and on his rear, to connect him with the Russians, General Kienmayer at the head of 20,000. This formed a total of 85,000 combatants.

General Mack, then, was just where Napoleon had supposed and wished, that is to say, on the Upper Danube, separated from the Russians by the distance from Vienna to Ulm. The Elector of Bavaria was at Wurzburg with his tearful court, with his army indignant against the Austrians, and in expectation of the speedy arrival of the French.

In order to form a complete idea of the state of Europe during this great crisis, all we have to do now is to cast our eyes on what was passing in the south of Italy. The supreme councillors of the coalition, unwilling that the court of Naples, watched by the 20,000 French under General St. Cyr, should compromise

itself too early, had suggested to it a real treachery, which that court, blinded and demoralised by hatred, was not likely to be very scrupulous about. It had been advised to sign a treaty of neutrality with France, in order to obtain the withdrawal of the corps which was at Taranto. When this corps should have retired, the court of Naples, less closely watched, would have, it was told, time to declare itself, and to receive the Russians and the English. The Russian general, Lascy, a prudent and considerate man, was at Naples, commissioned to make secret preparations, and to bring in the allies when the moment should be deemed seasonable. There were 12,000 Russians at Corfu, besides a reserve at Odessa, and 6000 English at Malta. They reckoned further upon 36,000 Neapolitans, somewhat less wretchedly organised than usual, and on the levy en masse of the banditti of Calabria.

This treaty, proposed to Napoleon just before his departure from Paris, had appeared acceptable to him, for he did not conceive that so weak a court would risk with him the consequences of such a treachery. He imagined that the terrible example which he had made of Venice in 1797 would have cured the Italian governments of their propensity to knavery. In a treaty of neutrality, excluding the Russians and the English from the south of Italy, he found the advantage of being enabled to give Massena 20,000 more men, if the 50,000 under his command were not sufficient to defend the Adige.

He accepted, therefore, this proposal, and by a treaty signed at Paris on the 21st of September, he consented to withdraw his troops from Taranto, on the promise made him by the court of Naples not to suffer any landing of the Russians and the English. On this condition General St. Cyr had orders to march towards Lombardy, and Queen Caroline and her weak husband were left at liberty to prepare a sudden levy of troops on the rear of the French.

Such was the situation of the allied powers from the 20th to the 25th of September. The Russians and the Swedes, charged with the attack on the north, joined at Stralsund, to combine with a landing of the English at the mouth of the Elbe; a Russian army was organising at Wilna, under General Michelson; the Emperor Alexander, with his corps of guards and Buxhövdén's army, was at Pulawi, on the Vistula, soliciting an interview with the King of Prussia; another Russian army, under General Kutusof, had penetrated through Galicia into Moravia, to join the Austrians. This latter was parallel to Vienna, and was about to ascend the Danube. General Mack, a hundred leagues in advance, had taken position at Ulm, at the head of 85,000 men, awaiting the French at the outlet of the Black Forest. The Archduke Charles was on the Adige with

100,000 men. The court of Naples was meditating a surprise, which was to be executed with the Russians from Corfu and the English from Malta.

Napoleon, as we have already seen, had arrived at Strasburg on the 26th of September. His columns had strictly followed his orders, and pursued the routes which he had prescribed them. Marshal Bernadotte, having furnished Hameln with stores, provisions, and a strong garrison, and left there the men least capable of taking the field, had set out from Göttingen with 17,000 soldiers, all fit to encounter any hardship. He had forewarned the Elector of Hesse of his passage, with the formalities enjoined by Napoleon. He had at first met with a consent, afterwards with a refusal, to which he had paid no heed, and had crossed Hesse without experiencing any resistance. Officers of administration, preceding his corps, ordered provisions at every station, and paying for everything in ready money, found speculators eager to supply the wants of our troops. An army that carries its travelling expenses along with it can live without magazines, without loss of time, without annoyance to the country through which it is passing, if that country is but moderately stocked with articles of consumption. With this auxiliary Bernadotte traversed without difficulty the two Hesses, the principality of Fulda, the territories of the prince arch-chancellor, to Bavaria. He marched perpendicularly from north to south. He arrived on the 17th of September near Cassel, on the 20th at Giessen, on the 27th at Wurzburg, to the great joy of the Elector of Bavaria, who was dying of fright amidst the contradictory tidings of the Austrians and the French. A minister of the Emperor of Germany had hastened to that prince, to make excuses for what had happened, and to endeavour to conciliate him. The Austrian minister knew nothing of the march of Bernadotte's corps till the French cavalry appeared on the heights of Wurzburg. He set out immediately, leaving the elector for ever, that is, for the whole time that our prosperity lasted.

M. de Montgelas, the better to colour the conduct of his master, solicited from us a precaution far from honourable for Bavaria; which was to alter the date of the treaty of alliance concluded with France. That treaty was signed in reality on the 24th of August. M. de Montgelas expressed a wish to give it another date, that of the 23rd of September. This was assented to, and he was enabled to assert to his confederates at Ratisbon that he had not given himself up to France till the day after the violences done him by Austria.

General Marmont, ascending the Rhine, and availing himself of it for the conveyance of his matériel, had marched along the fine road which Napoleon had opened on the left bank of the

river, and which is one of the memorable works of his reign. On the 12th of September he was at Nimeguen, on the 18th at Cologne, on the 25th at Mayence, on the 26th at Frankfurt, on the 29th in the environs of Wurzburg. He brought a corps of 20,000 men, a park of 40 pieces of cannon, well horsed, and a considerable supply of ammunition. These 20,000 men included a division of Dutch troops, commanded by General Dumonceau. As for the 15,000 French who composed this corps, a fact unexampled in the history of the war will afford a correct idea of their quality. They had just traversed part of France and Germany, and marched twenty successive days without halting; and on their arrival at Wurzburg nine men only were missing. There was not a general who would not have deemed himself fortunate if he had lost no more than two or three hundred, for it is the entering upon a campaign, and the effects of the first marches, that try weakly constitutions, and cause men to lag behind.

Towards the end of September, then, Napoleon had, in the heart of Franconia, six days' march from the Danube, and threatening the flank of the Austrians, Marshal Bernadotte with 17,000 men, General Marmont with 20,000. To these forces must be added 25,000 Bavarians, collected at Wurzburg, and animated with real enthusiasm for the cause of the French, which for the moment had become their own. They clapped their hands on seeing our regiments appear in sight.

Marshal Davout with the corps that had marched from Ambleteuse, Marshal Soult with that from Boulogne, Marshal Ney with that from Montreuil, traversing Flanders, Picardy, Champagne, and Lorraine, were on the Rhine on the 23rd and 24th of September, preceded by the cavalry which Napoleon had set in motion four days before the infantry. All had marched with unparalleled ardour. Dupont's division, in passing through the department of the Aisne, had left behind about fifty men belonging to that department. They had gone to see their families, and by the day after the next they had all of them rejoined. After travelling 150 leagues, in the middle of autumn, without resting for a single day, this army had neither sick nor stragglers, an unexampled circumstance, owing to the spirit of the troops and to a long encampment.

Marshal Augereau had formed his division in Bretagne. Setting out from Brest, passing through Alençon, Sens, Langres, Befort, he had to cross France in its greatest breadth, and was to be on the Rhine a fortnight after the other corps. Thus he was destined to act as a reserve.

Never was astonishment equal to that which filled all Europe on the unexpected arrival of this army. It was supposed to be on the shores of the ocean, and in twenty days, that is to say,

in the time required for the report of its march to begin to spread, it appeared on the Rhine, and inundated South Germany. It was the effect of extreme promptness in deciding, and of profound art in concealing, the determinations that were taken.

The news of the appearance of the French spread immediately, and produced in the Austrian generals no other idea than this, that the principal theatre of the war would be in Bavaria and not in Italy, since Napoleon and the army of the ocean were proceeding thither. The only consequences were an application to augment the Austrian forces in Suabia, and an order, highly displeasing to the Archduke Charles, to send a detachment from Italy into the Tyrol, which was then to proceed through the Vorarlberg to the assistance of General Mack. But the real design of Napoleon continued to be a profound secret. The troops which had joined at Wurzburg seemed to have no other errand but to pick up the Bavarians and to protect the elector. The principal force, placed at the Upper Rhine, at the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, seemed destined to enter there. General Mack, therefore, was more and more confirmed every day in his idea of keeping the position of Ulm, which had been assigned to him.

Napoleon, having collected his whole army, gave it an organisation which it has ever since retained, and a name which it will for ever retain in history, that of the Grand Army.

He divided it into seven corps. Marshal Bernadotte, with the troops brought from Hanover, formed the first corps, 17,000 strong. General Marmont, with the troops from Holland, formed the second, which numbered 20,000 men present under arms. The troops of Marshal Davout, encamped at Ambleteuse, and occupying the third place along the coast of the ocean, had received the designation of third corps, and amounted to an effective force of 26,000 fighting men. Marshal Soult, with the centre of the grand army of the ocean, encamped at Boulogne, and composed of 40,000 infantry and artillery, formed the fourth corps. Suchet's division was destined to be soon detached from it, in order to form part of the fifth corps, with Gazan's division and the grenadiers of Arras, which were henceforward known by the appellation of Oudinot's grenadiers, after the name of their gallant leader. This fifth corps was to consist of 18,000 men besides Suchet's division. It was assigned to the faithful and heroic friend of Napoleon, Marshal Lannes, who had been recalled from Portugal to take part in the perilous expedition of Boulogne, and was now summoned to follow the emperor to the banks of the Morawa, the Vistula, and the Niemen. Under the intrepid Ney, the camp of Montreuil composed the sixth corps, and amounted to 24,000 soldiers. Augereau, with two divisions, 14,000 strong at most, placed last

on the line of coast—he was at Brest—composed the seventh corps. The name of eighth corps was subsequently given to the Italian troops, when they came to act in Germany. This organisation was that of the army of the Rhine, but with important modifications, adapted to the genius of Napoleon, and necessary for the execution of the great things which he meditated.

In the army of the Rhine, each corps, complete in all arms, formed of itself a little army, having everything within itself, and capable of giving battle. Hence these corps had a tendency to separate, especially under a general like Moreau, who commanded only in proportion to his genius and character. Napoleon had organised his army in such a manner that it was entirely in his hand. Each corps was complete in infantry only; it had the necessary artillery, and of cavalry just what was requisite to guard itself well, that is to say, some squadrons of hussars or chasseurs. Napoleon reserved to himself to complete them afterwards by the aid of a reserve of those two arms, which he alone disposed of. According to the ground and circumstances, he withdrew from one to give to another either a reinforcement of artillery or a mass of cuirassiers.

Above all, he made a point of keeping together under one chief, and in immediate dependence on his will, the principal mass of his cavalry. As it is with this that one observes the enemy by running incessantly around him, that one completes his defeat when he is staggered, that one pursues and envelops him when in flight, Napoleon resolved to reserve to himself exclusively this means of preparing victory, of deciding it, and of reaping its fruits. He had therefore collected into a single corps the heavy cavalry, composed of cuirassiers and carabineers, commanded by Generals Nansouty and d'Haurpoul; to these he had added dragoons on foot as well as mounted, under Generals Klein, Walther, Beaumont, Bourcier, and Baraguay d'Hilliers, and had given the command of the whole to his brother-in-law, Murat, who was the most dashing cavalry officer of that day, and who, under his orders, represented the *magister equitum* of the Roman armies. Batteries of flying artillery followed this cavalry, and procured for him, in addition to the might of swords, that of fires. We shall soon see it spreading over the valley of the Danube, upsetting the Austrians and the Russians, entering astonished Vienna pell-mell with them; presently, hastening back to the plains of Saxony and Prussia, pursuing to the shores of the Baltic and carrying off the entire Prussian army, or rushing at Eylau upon the Russian infantry, saving the fortune of Napoleon by one of the most impetuous shocks that ever armed masses have given or received. This reserve numbered 22,000 horsemen, of whom 6000 were cuirassiers,

9000 to 10,000 mounted dragoons, 6000 dragoons on foot, and a thousand horse artillery.

Lastly, the general reserve of the grand army was the imperial guard, the finest *corps d'élite* in the world, serving at once for a means of emulation and a means of reward for such soldiers as distinguished themselves; for they were not introduced into the ranks of this guard till they had proved their prowess. The imperial guard was composed, like the consular guard, of mounted grenadiers and chasseurs, much the same as a regiment, where the companies of élite only have been retained. It comprised, moreover, a fine Italian battalion, representing the royal guard of the King of Italy, a superior squadron of Mamelukes, the last memorial of Egypt, and two squadrons of *gendarmérie d'élite*, to perform the police duty of the headquarters, in all 7000 men. Napoleon had added to it, in large proportion, the arm to which he was partial, because, on certain occasions, it made amends for all the others—artillery. He had formed a park of 24 pieces of cannon, manned and horsed with particular care, which made nearly four pieces to every thousand men.

The guard scarcely ever quitted the headquarters; it marched almost always beside the emperor, with Lannes' and Oudinot's grenadiers.

Such was the grand army. It presented a mass of 186,000 combatants really present under the colours. It numbered 38,000 horsemen, and 340 pieces of cannon. If we add to these Massena's 50,000 men, and General St. Cyr's 20,000, we shall have a total of 256,000 French spread from the Gulf of Taranto to the mouths of the Elbe, with a reserve of 150,000 young soldiers in the interior. If we further add 25,000 Bavarians, 7000 or 8000 subjects of the sovereigns of Baden and Wurtemberg ready to fall into line, we may say that Napoleon was going, with 250,000 French, thirty and odd thousand Germans, to fight about 500,000 men belonging to the coalition, 250,000 of whom were Austrians, 200,000 Russians, 50,000 English, Swedes, Neapolitans, having also their reserve in the interior of Austria, of Russia, and in the English fleets. The coalition hoped to join to them 200,000 Prussians. This would not be impossible if Napoleon did not make haste to conquer.

It was, in fact, urgent for him to commence operations, and he gave orders for passing the Rhine on the 25th and 26th of September, after sacrificing two or three days to rest the men, to repair some damages to the harness of the cavalry, to exchange some wounded and jaded horses for fresh horses, a great number of which had been collected in Alsace, and lastly, to prepare a large park and a considerable quantity of biscuit. His dispositions for turning the Black Forest, behind

which General Mack, encamped at Ulm, was waiting for the French, were these.

If we fix our eyes upon that country so often traversed by our armies, and for that reason so frequently described in this history, we see the Rhine issuing from the Lake of Constance, running westward as far as Basle, then suddenly turning and running almost direct north. We see the Danube, on the contrary, rising from some petty springs very near the point where the Rhine issues from the Lake of Constance, taking its course to the east, and following that direction with very few deviations to the Black Sea. It is a chain of mountains of very moderate height, most improperly called the Suabian Alps, that thus separates the two rivers, and sends the Rhine to the seas of the North, the Danube to the seas of the East. These mountains turn their steepest declivities towards France, and subside by a gradual slope in the plains of Franconia, between Nordlingen and Donauwerth. From their riven flank, clothed with woods, called by the general name of Black Forest, run to the left, that is to say, towards the Rhine, the Neckar and the Mayn; to the right, the Danube, which runs along the back of them, nearly bare of wood and formed into terraces. Through them run narrow defiles, which you must necessarily traverse in going from the Rhine to the Danube, unless you choose to avoid those mountains, either by ascending the Rhine to above Schaffhausen, or by travelling along the foot of them from Strasburg to Nordlingen and into the plains of Franconia, where they disappear. In the preceding war the French had alternately taken two routes. Sometimes debouching from the Rhine, between Strasburg and Huningen, they had traversed the defiles of the Black Forest; sometimes ascending the Rhine to Schaffhausen, they had crossed that river near the Lake of Constance, and found themselves at the sources of the Danube, without passing through the defiles.

Napoleon, proposing to place himself between the Austrians, who were posted at Ulm, and the Russians, who were coming to their assistance, was obliged to take another route. Studying in the first place to fix the attention of the Austrians on the defiles of the Black Forest by the appearance of his columns ready to enter it, he meant then to proceed along the foot of the Suabian Alps, without crossing them, as far as Nordlingen, to turn with all his united columns their lowered extremity, and to pass the Danube at Donauwerth. By this movement he should form a junction on the way with the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, which would have already reached Wurzburg, he should turn the position of Ulm, debouch on the rear of General Mack, and execute the plan long settled in his mind, and from which he expected immense results.

On the 25th of September he ordered Murat and Lannes to pass the Rhine at Strasburg with the reserve of cavalry, Oudinot's grenadiers, and Gazan's division. Murat was to proceed with his dragoons from Oberkirch to Freudenstadt, from Offenburg to Rothweil, from Freiburg to Neustadt, and thus appear at the head of the principal defiles, so as to induce a supposition that the army itself was to pass through them. Provisions were bespoken along this route, to complete the delusion of the enemy. Lannes was to support these reconnaissances by a few battalions of grenadiers, but, in reality, placed with the bulk of his corps in advance of Strasburg, on the Stuttgart road, he had orders to cover the movement of Marshals Ney, Soult, and Davout, who were directed to cross the Rhine lower down. General Songis, who commanded the artillery, had thrown two bridges of boats, the first between Lauterburg and Carlsruhe for the corps of Marshal Ney, the second in the environs of Spire for the corps of Marshal Soult. Marshal Davout had at his disposal the bridge of Mannheim. These marshals were to cross the valleys which descend from the chain of the Suabian Alps and to skirt that chain, supporting themselves one upon the other, so as to be able to assist each other in case of the sudden appearance of the enemy. All of them had orders to be provided with four days' bread in the soldiers' knapsacks, and four days' biscuit in the baggage-waggons, in case they should be obliged to make forced marches. Napoleon did not leave Strasburg till he saw his parks and his reserves move off under the escort of a division of infantry. He passed the Rhine on the 1st of October, accompanied by his guard, after taking leave of the empress, who remained at Strasburg with the imperial court and the chancellery of M. de Talleyrand.

On reaching the territory of the Grand Duke of Baden, Napoleon found the reigning family, which had come to meet and pay him homage. The old elector presented himself surrounded by three generations of princes. Like all the second and third rate sovereigns of Germany, he had been desirous to obtain the boon of neutrality, an absolute chimera under such circumstances; for when the petty German powers are not able to prevent war by resisting the great powers which are intent on it, they must not flatter themselves that they can obviate its calamities by a neutrality which is impossible, because they are almost all in the obligatory track of the belligerent armies. Napoleon had offered them his alliance instead of neutrality, promising to settle to their advantage the questions of territory or of sovereignty which separated them from Austria ever since the unfinished arrangements of 1803. The Grand Duke of Baden concluded to accept that alliance, and promised to furnish

3000 men, besides provisions and means of conveyance, to be paid for in the country itself. Napoleon, after sleeping at Ettlingen, set out on the 2nd of October for Stuttgart. Before his arrival a collision had well-nigh taken place between the Elector of Wurtemberg and Marshal Ney. That elector, known throughout Europe for the extreme warmth of his temper and disposition, was at that moment discussing with the minister of France the conditions of an alliance which he greatly disliked. But he insisted that, till the conclusion of this business, no French troops should enter either Louisburg, which was his country residence, or Stuttgart, which was his capital. Marshal Ney did consent not to enter Louisburg, but he ordered his artillery to be pointed against the gates of Stuttgart, and by these means obtained admission. Napoleon arrived opportunely to appease the anger of the elector. He was received by him with great magnificence, and stipulated with him an alliance, which has founded the greatness of that house, as similar alliances have founded that of all the princes of the south of Germany. The treaty was signed on the 5th of October, and contains an engagement on the part of France to aggrandise the house of Wurtemberg, and on the part of that house to furnish 10,000 men, besides provisions, horses, carriages, which were to be paid for when taken.

Napoleon stayed three or four days at Louisburg, to allow his corps on the left time to get into line. It was a most delicate position to brush for forty leagues the skirts of an enemy 80,000 or 90,000 strong, without rousing him too much, and at the risk of seeing him debouch on a sudden upon one of his wings. Napoleon provided against this with admirable art and foresight. Three routes ran across Wurtemberg, and terminated at those lowered extremities of the Suabian Alps, which it was necessary to reach in order to arrive at the Danube between Donauwerth and Ingolstadt. The principal was that of Pforzheim, Stuttgart, Heidenheim, which skirted the very flanks of the mountains, and which was in communication, by a great number of defiles, with the position of the Austrians at Ulm. It was this that required to be traversed with the greatest precaution, on account of the proximity of the enemy. Napoleon occupied it with Murat's cavalry, the corps of Marshal Lannes, that of Marshal Ney, and the guard. The second, which, running from Spire, passed through Heilbronn, Hall, Ellwangen, and terminated in the plain of Nordlingen, was occupied by the corps of Marshal Soult. The third, running from Mannheim, passing through Heidelberg, Neckar-Elz, and Ingelfingen, terminated at Oettingen. It was by this that Marshal Davout marched. It approached towards the direction which the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont were to

follow, in proceeding from Wurzburg to the Danube. Napoleon arranged the march of these different columns so as that they should all arrive from the 6th and 7th of October in the plain extending along the Danube between Nordlingen, Donauwerth, and Ingolstadt. But in this revolving movement, his left wheeling upon his right, the latter had to describe a less extensive circle than the former. He was therefore obliged to make his right slacken its pace, in order to give the corps of Marmont and Bernadotte, which formed the extreme left, Marshal Davout's which came next to them, lastly, Marshal Soult's, which came after Marshal Davout's, and connected them all with the headquarters, time to finish their revolving movement.

After waiting sufficiently, Napoleon set himself in march on the 4th of October with the whole of his right. Murat, galloping incessantly at the head of his cavalry, appeared by turns at the entrance of each of the defiles which run through the mountains, merely showing himself there, and then withdrawing his squadrons as soon as the artillery and baggage had made so much way as to have nothing to fear. Napoleon, with the corps of Lannes, Ney, and the guards, followed the Stuttgart route, ready to hasten with 50,000 men to the assistance of Murat if the enemy should appear in force in one of the defiles. As for the corps of Soult, Davout, Marmont, and Bernadotte, forming the centre and the left of the army, their danger did not begin till the movement that was executing by marching along the foot of the Suabian Alps was finished, and they should debouch in the plain of Nordlingen. It was possible, in fact, that General Mack, being timely apprised, might fall back from Ulm upon Donauwerth, cross the Danube, and come to this plain of Nordlingen to fight, for the purpose of stopping the French. Napoleon had so arranged things that Murat, Ney, Lannes, and with them the corps of Marshals Soult and Davout, at least, should converge together on the 6th of October between Heidenheim, Oettingen, and Nordlingen, in such a manner as to present an imposing mass to the enemy. But till then his incessant study was to deceive General Mack so long that he should not think of decamping, and that the French might reach the Danube at Donauwerth before he had quitted his position at Ulm. On the 4th and on the 6th of October, everything continued to wear the best aspect. The weather was splendid; the soldiers, well provided with shoes and greatcoats, marched merrily. One hundred and twenty-four thousand French advanced thus on a line of battle of 26 leagues, the right touching upon the mountains, the left converging towards the plains of the Upper Palatinate, capable of being collected in a few hours to the number of 90,000 or

100,000 men on one or the other of their wings, and, what is more extraordinary, without the Austrians having the least idea of this vast operation.

"The Austrians," wrote Napoleon to M. de Talleyrand and to Marshal Augereau, "are on the débouchés of the Black Forest. God grant that they may remain there! My only fear is that we shall frighten them too much. . . . If they allow me to gain a few more marches, I hope to have turned them, and to find myself, with my whole army, between the Lech and the Isar." He wrote to the minister of the police: "Forbid the newspapers of the Rhine to make any more mention of the army than if it did not exist." To reach the points indicated to them, the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont were to cross one of the provinces which Prussia possessed in Franconia, that of Anspach. By drawing them nearer to the corps of Marshal Davout, Napoleon could, in fact, have brought them closer to him, and thus avoided entering the Prussian territory. But the roads were already encumbered; to have accumulated more troops in them would have occasioned inconvenience for the order of the movement and for the supply of provisions. Besides, by contracting the circle described by the army, he would have diminished the chances of enveloping the enemy. Napoleon purposed to embrace in his movement the course of the Danube as far as Ingolstadt, in order to débouch as far as possible in the rear of the Austrians, and to be able to stop them in case they should fall back from the Iller to the Lech. Not imagining, from the state of his relations with Prussia, that she could make any difficulty towards him, reckoning upon the custom established in the late wars of traversing the Prussian provinces in Franconia, because they were out of the line of neutrality, having received no intimation that a different course would be adopted in this, Napoleon made no scruple to borrow the territory of Anspach, and gave orders to Marmont's and Bernadotte's corps accordingly. The Prussian magistrates appeared on the frontier, to protest in the name of their sovereign against the violence that was done them. In reply the orders of Napoleon were produced, and the troops passed on, paying in specie for all that was taken, and observing the strictest discipline. The Prussian subjects, well paid for the bread and the meat with which they supplied our soldiers, did not appear to be much irritated at the alleged violation of their territory.

On the 6th of October our six *corps d'armée* had arrived without accident beyond the Suabian Alps, Marshal Ney at Heidenheim, Marshal Lannes at Neresheim, Marshal Davout at Oettingen, General Marmont and Marshal Bernadotte on the Aichstädt road, all in sight of the Danube, considerably beyond the position of Ulm.

What, meanwhile, were General Mack, the Archduke Ferdinand, and all the officers of the Austrian staff about? Most fortunately, the intention of Napoleon was not revealed to them. Forty thousand men, who had passed the Rhine at Strasburg, and who had plunged at once into the defiles of the Black Forest, had confirmed them in the idea that the French would pursue the accustomed track. False reports of spies, artfully despatched by Napoleon, had confirmed them still more in this opinion. They had heard, indeed, of some French troops spread in Wurtemberg, but they supposed that they were coming to occupy the petty States of Germany, and perhaps to assist the Bavarians. Besides, nothing is more contradictory, more perplexing, than that multitude of reports of spies or of officers sent on reconnaissance. Some of them place *corps d'armée* where they have met with detachments only, others mere detachments where they ought to have found *corps d'armée*. Frequently they have not seen with their own eyes what they report, and they have merely picked up the hearsays of terrified, surprised, or astonished persons. The military, like the civil police, lies, exaggerates, contradicts itself. In the chaos of its reports the superior mind discerns the truth, while the weak mind is lost. And, above all, if any anterior prepossession exists, if one is disposed to believe that the enemy will come by one point rather than by another, the facts collected are all interpreted in a single sense, how far soever they may be from admitting of it. In this manner are produced great errors, which sometimes ruin armies and even empires.

Such was at this moment General Mack's state of mind. The Austrian officers had long extolled the position, which, supporting its right at Ulm, its left at Memmingen, faced the French debouching from the Black Forest. Authorised by an opinion which was general, and in obedience, moreover, to positive instructions, General Mack had established himself in this position. He had there his provisions, his military stores, and nothing would have persuaded him that he was not most conveniently placed there. The only precaution which he had taken upon his rear consisted in sending General Kienmayer, with a few thousand men, to Ingolstadt, to observe the Bavarians who had fled to the Upper Palatinate, and to connect himself with the Russians, whom he expected by the highroad from Munich.

While General Mack, with a mind prepossessed with an opinion formed beforehand, remained motionless at Ulm, the six corps of the French army debouched on the 6th of October in the plain of Nordlingen, beyond the mountains of Suabia, which they had turned, and on the banks of the Danube, which they were about to cross. On the evening of the 6th Vandamme's division, belonging to Marshal Soult's corps, out-

stripping all the others, reached the Danube, and surprised the bridge of Münster, a league above Donauwerth. On the 7th of October the corps of Marshal Soult took the bridge of Donauwerth itself, faintly disputed by a battalion of Colloredo's, which, unable to defend, endeavoured in vain to destroy it. The troops of Marshal Soult speedily repaired it, and passed over in the greatest haste. Murat with his divisions of dragoons, preceding the right wing, formed of the corps of Marshals Lannes and Ney, had proceeded to the bridge of Münster, already surprised by Vandamme. He claimed that bridge for his troops and those which were following him, left that of Donauwerth to Marshal Soult's troops, passed instantly with a division of dragoons, and dashed off on the other side of the Danube in pursuit of an object of great interest, the occupation of the bridge of Rain on the Lech. The Lech, which runs behind the Iller, nearly parallel to the latter, and falls into the Danube near Donauwerth, forms a position situated beyond that of Ulm, and by occupying the bridge of Rain, the French would have turned both the Iller and the Lech, and left General Mack few chances of falling back to good purpose. It took but the time required for Murat's dragoons to gallop the distance to make themselves masters of Rain and the bridge over the Lech. Two hundred horse overturned all the patrols of Kienmayer's corps, while Marshal Soult established himself in force at Donauwerth, and Marshal Davout came in sight of the bridge of Neuburg.

Napoleon repaired the same day to Donauwerth. His hopes were now realised, but he did not consider himself completely sure of success till he had won the very last result of his admirable manœuvre. Some hundreds of prisoners had been already taken, and their reports were unanimous. General Mack was at Ulm on the Iller: it was his rearguard, commanded by General Kienmayer, and intended to connect him with the Russians, which the French had just fallen in with and driven across the Danube. Napoleon immediately determined to take a position between the Austrians and the Russians, so as to prevent their junction. The first movement of General Mack's, had he been capable of a timely resolve, ought to have been to quit the banks of the Iller, to fall back upon the Lech, to pass through Augsburg, in order to join General Kienmayer on the Munich road. Napoleon, without losing a moment, ordered the following dispositions:—He would not throw Ney's corps beyond the Danube, but left it on the roads running from Wurtemberg to Ulm, to guard the left bank of the Danube, by which we arrived. He directed Murat and Lannes to pass to the right bank by the two bridges which the French were masters of, those of Münster and Donauwerth, to ascend the river, and

to place themselves between Ulm and Augsburg, to prevent General Mack from retreating by the highroad from Augsburg to Munich. The intermediate point which they had to occupy was Burgau. Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to leave the mouth of the Lech, where he was in position, to ascend that tributary of the Danube to Augsburg, with the three divisions of St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and Legrand. Suchet's division, the fourth of Marshal Soult's, was already placed under the command of Lannes. Thus Marshal Ney with 20,000 men on the left bank of the Danube, which had been abandoned, Murat and Lannes with 40,000 on the right, which had just been taken possession of, Marshal Soult with 30,000 on the Lech, surrounded General Mack, by whatever outlet he might attempt to escape.

Turning his immediate attention from this point to others, Napoleon ordered Marshal Davout to hasten and cross the Danube at Neuburg, and to clear Ingolstadt, towards which Marmont and Bernadotte were proceeding. The route followed by these latter was longer; they were two marches behindhand. Marshal Davout was then to proceed to Aichach on the Munich road, to push General Kienmayer before him, and to form the rearguard of the masses which were accumulating around Ulm. The corps of Marmont and Bernadotte had orders to quicken their pace, to cross the Danube at Ingolstadt, and to march for Munich, in order to replace the elector in his capital, barely a month after he had quitted it. It was for Marshal Bernadotte, at this moment the companion of the Bavarians, that Napoleon reserved the honour of reinstating them in their country. By this disposition Napoleon would present to the Russians coming from Munich Bernadotte and the Bavarians, then, in case of emergency, Marmont and Davout, who were to march, according to circumstances, either upon Munich or Ulm, to assist in the complete investment of General Mack.

On the following day, the 8th of October, Marshal Soult ascended the Lech on his way to Augsburg. He found no enemies before him. Murat and Lannes, destined to occupy the space comprised between the Lech and the Iller, ascended from Donauwerth to Burgau, through a country presenting some slight obstructions, covered here and there with woods, and traversed by several small rivers, tributaries of the Danube. The dragoons were marching at the head when they met with a hostile corps, more numerous than any which they had yet seen, posted around and in advance of a large village called Wertingen. This hostile corps was composed of six battalions of grenadiers and three of fusileers, commanded by Baron d'Auffenberg, of two squadrons of Duke Albert's cuirassiers, and two squadrons of Latour's light horse. They had been

sent on reconnaissance by General Mack, on the circulation of a vague rumour of the appearance of Frenchmen on the banks of the Danube. He still conceived that these French must belong to Bernadotte's corps, posted, it was said, at Wurzburg to assist the Bavarians. The Austrian officers were at dinner when they were informed that the French were in sight. They were extremely surprised, refused at first to believe the report, but could not long doubt its accuracy, and they mounted their horses precipitately, to put themselves at the head of their troops. In advance of Wertingen there was a hamlet named Hohenreichen, guarded by a few hundred Austrians, foot and horse. Sheltered by the houses of this hamlet, they kept up a galling fire, and held in check a regiment of dragoons which first arrived on the spot. The *chef d'escadron* Excellmans, the same who has since signalised his name by so many brilliant acts, then no more than aide-de-camp to Murat, had hastened up at the sound of the firing. He induced two hundred dragoons to dismount cheerfully, when, musket in hand, they rushed into the hamlet, and dislodged those who occupied it. Fresh detachments of dragoons had meanwhile come up; the Austrians were pressed more warmly; the assailants penetrated in pursuit of them into Wertingen, passed that village, and found on a sort of plateau the nine battalions formed into a single square, of small extent, but close and deep, having cannon and cavalry on its wings. The brave *chef d'escadron* Excellmans immediately charged this square with extraordinary boldness, and had a horse killed under him. At his side Colonel Meaupetit was upset by the thrust of a bayonet. But vigorous as was the attack, there was no breaking this compact mass. Some time was thus spent, the French dragoons endeavouring to cut down the Austrian grenadiers, who returned their efforts with thrusts of the bayonet and the fire of their pieces. Murat at length came up with the bulk of his cavalry, and Lannes with Oudinot's grenadiers, both drawn in haste by the reports of the cannon. Murat immediately ordered his squadrons to charge the enemy's square, and Lannes directed his grenadiers upon the margin of a wood which was seen in the background, so as to cut off the retreat of the Austrians. The latter, charged in front, threatened in rear, fell back at first in a close mass, but presently in disorder. If Oudinot's grenadiers could have reached the ground a few moments earlier, the whole of the nine battalions would have been made captive. Two thousand prisoners, several pieces of cannon, and several colours were nevertheless taken.

Lannes and Murat, who had seen the *chef d'escadron* Excellmans at the point of the hostile bayonets, determined to send him to Napoleon with the news of the first success obtained, and

the colours taken from the enemy. The emperor received the young and dashing officer at Donauwerth, granted him rank in the Legion of Honour, and delivered the insignia to him in the presence of his staff, to give the greater éclat to the first rewards earned in this war.

On this same day, October the 8th, Marshal Soult entered Augsburg without striking a blow. Marshal Davout had crossed the Danube at Neuburg, and proceeded to Aichach to take the intermediate position assigned to him, between the French corps going to invest Ulm, and those going to Munich to make head against the Russians. Marshal Bernadotte and General Marmont made preparations for passing the Danube towards Ingolstadt, with the intention of repairing to Munich.

Napoleon ordered the position of Ulm to be straitened. He enjoined Marshal Ney to ascend the left bank of the Danube, and to make himself master of all the bridges over the river, in order to be enabled to act on both banks. He directed Murat and Lannes, on their side, to ascend the right bank, and to contribute with Ney to the closer investment of the Austrians. Next day Marshal Ney, prompt at executing the orders which he received, especially when those orders brought him nearer to the enemy, reached the bank of the Danube, and ascended it till he was opposite to Ulm. The first bridges that he met with were those of Günzburg. He charged Malher's division to take them.

These bridges were three in number. The principal was before the small town of Günzburg; the second above, at the village of Leipheim; the third below, at the small hamlet of Reisensburg. General Malher ordered them all to be attacked at once. He charged the staff officer, Lefol, to attack that of Leipheim with a detachment, and General Labassée to attack that of Reisensburg with the 59th of the line. He reserved for himself, at the head of Marcognet's brigade, the attack of the principal bridge, that of Günzburg. The bed of the Danube not being regularly formed in this part of its course, it was necessary to cross a multitude of islands and petty channels, bordered with willows and poplars. The advanced guards rushed resolutely forward, forded all the waters that impeded their progress, and took two or three hundred Tyrolese, with Major-General Baron d'Aspre, who commanded at this point. Our troops soon arrived at the principal arm, over which was erected the bridge of Günzburg. The Austrians on retiring had destroyed part of the flooring of the bridge. General Malher would have had it repaired; but on the other bank were posted several Austrian regiments, a numerous artillery, and the Archduke Ferdinand himself, who had hastened thither with considerable reinforcements. The Austrians began to comprehend

how serious was the operation undertaken on their rear, and they resolved to make a strong effort to save at least the bridges nearest to Ulm. They poured a murderous fire of musketry and artillery upon the French. These being no longer screened by woody islands, and remaining uncovered on the strand, endured this fire with extraordinary firmness. To ford the river was impossible. They clambered up the piles of the bridge for the purpose of repairing it with planks. But the workmen, picked off one by one by the balls of the enemy, could not accomplish it, and the French lines, exposed meanwhile to the fire of the Austrians, sustained a heavy loss. General Malher made them fall back to the wooded islands, in order not to prolong a useless temerity.

This fruitless attempt had cost some hundreds of men. The two other attacks were made simultaneously. Impassable marshes had rendered that of Leipheim impracticable. That of Reisensburg had been more successful. General Labassée, having at his side Colonel Lacuée, commandant of the 59th, had advanced with this regiment to the margin of the great arm of the Danube. Here also the Austrians had destroyed part of the planks of the bridge, but not so completely as to prevent our soldiers from repairing and passing it. The 59th crossed the bridge, took Reisensburg and the surrounding heights in spite of at least treble their force. Its colonel, Lacuée, was killed there, fighting at the head of his soldiers. On seeing a French regiment thrown unsupported across the Danube, the Austrian cavalry hastened up to the assistance of the infantry, and most furiously charged the 59th, formed into a square. Thrice did it rush upon the bayonets of that brave regiment, and thrice was it stopped by the fire close to the muzzles of the guns. The 59th remained master of the field of battle after efforts the memory of which deserves to be perpetuated.

One of the three bridges being crossed, General Malher moved his whole division upon Reisensburg towards evening. The Austrians then did not care to persist in disputing Günzburg. They fell back upon Ulm in the night, leaving the French 1000 prisoners and 300 wounded. Great honours were paid to Colonel Lacuée. The divisions of Ney's corps, assembled at Günzburg, attended his funeral on the 8th, and paid unanimous regrets to his memory. Marshal Ney placed Dupont's division on the left bank of the river, and sent Malher's and Loison's divisions to the right bank, to keep up the communication with Lannes.

Napoleon remained till the evening of the 9th at Donauwerth. He then set out for Augsburg, because that was the centre for collecting intelligence and for issuing directions. At Augsburg he was between Ulm on one side and Munich on the other, between the army of Suabia, which he was about to envelop, and

the Russians, whose approach general rumour was proclaiming. His object in staying away from Ulm for a day or two was to concentrate the command there; and from a reason of relationship much more than from a reason of superiority, he placed Marshals Ney and Lannes under the orders of Murat, which highly displeased them, and produced sad bickering. These were embarrassments inseparable from the new system established in France. A republic has its inconveniences, which are sanguinary rivalships; and monarchy has its inconveniences, which are family compliances. Thus Murat had at his disposal about 60,000 men to keep General Mack in check under the walls of Ulm.

On his arrival at Augsburg, Napoleon found Marshal Soult there with the fourth corps. Marshal Davout had established himself at Aichach; General Marmont followed him; Bernadotte was on the road to Munich. The French army was in nearly the same situation as it had been at Milan, when, after miraculously crossing the St. Bernard, it was in the rear of General Melas, seeking to envelop him, but ignorant of the route by which it might catch him. The same uncertainty prevailed in regard to the plans of General Mack. Napoleon set about studying what he might be tempted to do in so urgent a danger, and was puzzled to guess; in fact, General Mack himself did not know it. You have greater difficulty to guess the intentions of an irresolute than of a resolute adversary, and if the uncertainty were not likely to ruin you to-morrow, it might serve you to deceive the enemy to-night. In this state of doubt Napoleon attributed to General Mack the most reasonable design, that of retreating through the Tyrol. That general, in fact, if he directed his course to Memmingen, on the left of the position of Ulm, would have but two or three marches to make in order to reach the Tyrol by way of Kempten. He would thus connect himself with the army which was guarding the chain of the Alps, and with that which occupied Italy. He would save himself and contribute to form a mass of 200,000 men, a mass always formidable, what position soever it occupies on the general theatre of operations. He would, at any rate, escape a catastrophe for ever celebrated in the annals of war.

Napoleon, therefore, attributed to him this design, without dwelling upon another idea which General Mack might have conceived, and which he did conceive for a moment, that of fleeing by the left bank of the Danube, guarded by only one of the divisions of Marshal Ney, Dupont's division. This desperate step was the least supposable, for it required extraordinary boldness. It could not be taken without crossing the route which the French had followed, and which was still covered with their equipages and their dépôts; and it would

perhaps expose those who had to execute it to the danger of meeting with them en masse, and fighting their way through them in order to retreat into Bohemia. Napoleon did not admit such a probability, and concerned himself only about barring the routes to the Tyrol. Accordingly, he ordered Marshal Soult to ascend the Lech to Landsberg, for the purpose of occupying Memmingen and intercepting the road from Memmingen to Kempten. He sent General Marmont's corps to Augsburg, to take the place of Marshal Soult's. In that city he likewise established his guard, which habitually accompanied the headquarters. There he awaited the movements of his different *corps d'armée*, rectifying their march whenever that was needed.

Bernadotte, pushing the rearguard of Kienmayer, entered Munich on the morning of the 12th, precisely a month after the invasion of the Austrians and the retreat of the Bavarians. He took about a thousand prisoners from the enemy's detachment, which he pushed before him. The Bavarians, transported with joy, received the French with vehement applause. It was impossible to come either more expeditiously or more surely to the aid of their allies, especially when they had been a few days before at the extremity of the continent, on the shores of the Channel. Napoleon wrote immediately to the elector, to induce him to return to his capital. He invited him to come back with the whole Bavarian army, which would have been useless at Wurzburg, and which was destined to occupy the line of the Inn conjointly with Bernadotte's corps. Napoleon recommended that it should be employed in making reconnaissances, because the country was familiar to it, and it could give the best intelligence respecting the march of the Russians, who were coming by the road from Vienna to Munich.

Marshal Soult, sent towards Landsberg, met with nothing there but Prince Ferdinand's cuirassiers, who fell back upon Ulm by forced marches. So great was the ardour of our troops that the 26th chasseurs were not afraid to measure their strength with the Austrian heavy cavalry, and took from it an entire squadron, with two pieces of cannon. This rencontre evidently proved that the Austrians, instead of running away towards the Tyrol, were concentrating themselves behind the Iller, between Memmingen and Ulm, and that they would there find a new battle of Marengo. Napoleon prepared to fight it with the greatest possible mass of his forces. He supposed that it might take place on the 13th or 14th of October, but not being hurried, as the Austrians did not take the initiative, he preferred the 14th, that he might have more time for collecting his troops. He first modified the position of Marshal Davout, whom he moved from Aichach to Dachau,

so that this marshal, in an advantageous post between Augsburg and Munich, could in three or four hours either advance to Munich, to oppose, with Bernadotte and the Bavarians, 60,000 combatants to the Russians, or fall back towards Augsburg, to second Napoleon in his operations against the army of General Mack. Having taken these precautions on his rear, Napoleon made the following dispositions on his front, with a view to that supposed battle of the 14th :—He ordered Marshal Soult to be established on the 13th at Memmingen, pressing that position with his left, and connecting himself by his right with the corps which were about to be moved upon the Iller. He sent his guard to Weissenhorn, whither he resolved to proceed himself. He hoped in this manner to assemble 100,000 men in a space of ten leagues, from Memmingen to Ulm. The troops, in fact, being able in one day to make a march of five leagues and to fight, it was easy for him to collect on one and the same field of battle the corps of Ney, Lannes, Murat, Marmont, Soult, and the guard. Fate, however, reserved for him a totally different triumph from that which he anticipated, a newer triumph, and not less astonishing for its vast consequences.

Napoleon left Augsburg on the 12th, at 11 o'clock at night, for Weissenhorn. On the road he fell in with Marmont's troops, composed of French and Dutch, overwhelmed with fatigue, laden at once with their arms and their rations of provisions for several days. The weather, which had been fine till the passage of the Danube, had become frightful. Thick snow melting as it fell was converted into mud, and rendered the roads impassable. All the little streams which run into the Danube were overflowed. The soldiers proceeded through absolute bogs, frequently impeded in their march by convoys of artillery. Nevertheless, not a murmur was heard. Napoleon stopped to harangue them: he made them form a circle around him, explained to them the situation of the enemy, and the manœuvre by which he had surrounded them, and promised them a triumph as glorious as that of Marengo. The soldiers, intoxicated by his speech, proud of seeing the greatest captain of the age explain his plans to them, burst forth into the most vehement transports of enthusiasm, and replied by unanimous shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" They resumed their march, impatient to assist in the great battle. Those who had heard the words of the emperor repeated them to those who had not heard them, and they cried with joy that it was all over with the Austrians, and that they would be taken to the last man.

It was high time for Napoleon to return to the Danube, for his orders, misunderstood by Murat, would have led to disasters if the Austrians had been more enterprising.

While Lannes and Murat were investing Ulm on the right bank of the Danube, Ney, continuing *à cheval* on the river, had two divisions on the right bank, and one only, that of General Dupont, on the left bank. On approaching Ulm to invest it, Ney had perceived the defect of such a situation. Enlightened by incidents of which he had a closer view, guided by a happy instinct for war, confirmed in his opinion by Colonel Jomini, a staff officer of the highest merit, Ney had discovered the danger of leaving but one division on the left bank of the river. Why, said he, should not the Austrians seize the opportunity for flight on the left bank, trampling under foot our equipages and our parks, which would certainly not oppose any great resistance to them? Murat would not admit that such a thing could happen, and appealing to the misconstrued letters of the emperor, who, expecting a serious affair on the Iller, ordered all the troops to be concentrated there, he was even on the point of concluding that it was wrong to leave Dupont's division on the left bank, since that division must be away from the place of action on the day of the great battle. This difference of opinion gave rise to a warm altercation between Ney and Murat. Ney was mortified to have to obey a superior whom he thought below himself by his talents, if he was above him by the imperial relationship. Murat, filled with pride at his new rank, proud above all of being admitted to a more particular acquaintance with the intentions of Napoleon, made Marshal Ney feel his official superiority, and at last went so far as to give him absolute orders. But for mutual friends, these two lieutenants of the emperor would have decided their quarrel in a manner not at all consistent with their position. This altercation led to the issue of contradictory orders to Dupont's division, and to a situation that was perilous for it. But, fortunately, while the dispute respecting the post fittest for it to occupy was going forward, it was extricated from the danger into which an error of Murat's had thrown it by an ever memorable battle.

General Mack, who could not entertain further doubt of his fate, had made a change of front. Instead of having his right at Ulm, he had his left there; instead of having his left at Memmingen, he had his right there. Still supported on the Iller, he turned his back to France, as if he had come from it, while Napoleon turned his on Austria, as if that had been the point from which he started. This would be the natural position of the two generals, one of whom has turned the other. General Mack, after drawing to him the troops dispersed in Suabia, as well as those which had returned beaten from Wertingen and Günzburg, had left some detachments on the Iller from Memmingen to Ulm, and had assembled the greater part of his

forces at Ulm itself, in the entrenched camp which overlooks that city.

The reader is acquainted with the situation and the form of this camp, which has been already described in this history. At this point the left bank of the Danube is much higher than the right bank. While the right bank presents a marshy plain, slightly inclined towards the river, the left bank, on the contrary, presents a series of heights laid out terrace-fashion, and washed by the Danube, nearly in the same manner as the terrace of St. Germain is washed by the Seine. The Michaelsberg is the principal of these heights. The Austrians were encamped there to the number of about 60,000, having the city of Ulm at their feet.

General Dupont, who was left alone on the left bank, and who, agreeably to the orders of Marshal Ney, was to approach nearer to Ulm on the morning of the 11th of October, had advanced within sight of that place by the Albeck road. It was the very moment which Murat and Ney, meeting at Günzburg, were spending in contention, and which Napoleon, hastening to Augsburg, was employing in making his general dispositions. General Dupont, on reaching the village of Haslach, from which the Michaelsberg is seen in its full extent, discovered there 60,000 Austrians in an imposing attitude. The last marches, performed in the worst weather and with extreme rapidity, had reduced his division to 6000 men. There had, however, been left him Baraguay d'Hilliers' dismounted dragoons, who during the journey from the Rhine to the Danube had been assigned not to Murat, but to Marshal Ney. This was a reinforcement of 5000 men, which might have been of great service if it had not remained at Languenau, three leagues in the rear.

General Dupont, having come in sight of the Michaelsberg and the 60,000 Austrians who occupied it, found himself before them with three regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and a few pieces of cannon. That officer, since so unfortunate, was seized at this sight by an inspiration which would do honour to the greatest generals. He judged that if he fell back he should betray his weakness, and be soon surrounded by 10,000 horse despatched in pursuit of him; that if, on the contrary, he performed an act of daring, he might deceive the Austrians, persuade them that he was the advanced guard of the French army, oblige them to be circumspect, and thus gain time to retrieve the wrong step into which he had been led.

In consequence, he immediately made his dispositions for fighting. On his left he had the village of Haslach, surrounded by a small wood. There he placed the 32nd, which had become celebrated in Italy, and commanded at this period by Colonel Darricau, the 1st hussars, and part of his artillery. On his

right, backed in like manner upon a wood, he placed the 96th of the line, commanded by Colonel Meunier, and the 17th dragoons. A little in advance of his right he had the village of Jungingen, surrounded also by a few clumps of wood, and he ordered it to be occupied by a detachment.

In this position General Dupont received the Austrians, detached to the number of 25,000 under the Archduke Ferdinand, to fight a division of 6000 French. General Dupont, still under the influence of a happy inspiration on this occasion, soon perceived that his division would be destroyed by the musketry alone if he suffered the Austrians to deploy their line and to extend their fire. Then, combining the daring of a vigorous execution with the daring of a great resolution, he ordered the two regiments of his right, the 96th of the line and the 9th light, to charge with the bayonet. At the signal given by him these two brave regiments moved off, and marched with bayonet lowered upon the first Austrian line. They overturned it, threw it into disorder, and took 1500 prisoners, who were sent to the left to be shut up in the village of Haslach. General Dupont after this feat placed himself again in position with his two regiments, and awaited immovably the sequel of this extraordinary combat. But the Austrians, not choosing to admit themselves to be beaten, returned to the attack with fresh troops. Our soldiers advanced a second time with the bayonet, repulsed the assailants, and again took numerous prisoners. Disgusted with these useless attacks in front, the Austrians directed all their efforts against our wings. They marched upon the village of Haslach, which covered the left of Dupont's division, and which contained their prisoners. The 32nd, whose turn was come to fight, vigorously disputed that village with them, and drove them from it, while the 1st hussars, vying with the infantry, made impetuous charges on the repulsed columns. The Austrians did not confine themselves to the attack of Haslach; they made an attempt on the other wing, and endeavoured to take the village of Jungingen, situated on the right of General Dupont. Favoured by numbers, they penetrated into it and made themselves masters of the place for a moment. General Dupont, appreciating the danger, caused Jungingen to be attacked by the 9th, by which it was retaken. Again it was wrested from him, and again he retook it. This village was thus carried by main force five times consecutively, and in the confusion of these repeated attacks the French made each time some prisoners. But while the Austrians were exhausting themselves in impotent efforts against this handful of soldiers, their immense cavalry, dashing away in all directions, fell upon the 7th dragoons, charged it several times, killed its colonel, the gallant St. Dizier, and

obliged it to retire into the wood against which it was backed. A host of Austrian horse then spread itself over the surrounding plateaux, galloped to the village of Albeck, from which Dupont's division had started, took its baggage, which Baraguay d'Hilliers' dragoons ought to have defended, and thus picked up some vulgar trophies, a sad consolation for a defeat sustained by 25,000 men against 6000.

It became urgent to put an end to so perilous an engagement. General Dupont, having fatigued the Austrians by an obstinate fight of five hours, hastened to take advantage of the night to retire upon Albeck. Thither he marched in good order, preceded by 4000 prisoners.

If General Dupont, in fighting this extraordinary battle, had not stopped the Austrians, they would have fled into Bohemia, and one of Napoleon's most splendid combinations would have been completely frustrated. It is a proof that great generals ought to have great soldiers; for the most illustrious captains often need their troops to repair by their heroism either the hazards of war or the errors which genius itself is liable to commit.

This rencontre with a part of the French army produced stormy deliberations at the headquarters of the Austrians. They were informed of the presence of Marshal Soult at Landsberg; they supposed that General Dupont was not alone at Albeck, and they began to believe that they were surrounded on all sides. General Mack, on whom the Austrians have endeavoured to throw all the shame of their disaster, had fallen into a perturbation of mind easily to be conceived. Whatever judges who have reasoned after the event may say, it would have required nothing less to save him than an inspiration from Heaven, to reveal to him all at once the weakness of the corps which was before him, and the possibility, by crushing it, of retiring to Bohemia. The unfortunate general, who knew not what has since become known, and who had no reason to think that the French were so weak on the left bank, fell to deliberating with the illustrious companion of his melancholy fate, the Archduke Ferdinand. He wasted precious time in agitations of mind, and could not resolve either to flee towards Bohemia, by cutting his way through Dupont's division, or to retreat towards the Tyrol, by forcing a passage at Memmingen. The measure which to him appeared the safest was to establish himself still more solidly in the position of Ulm, to concentrate his army there, and there await, in a large mass difficult to be carried by assault, the arrival of the Russians by Munich, or of the Archduke Charles by the Tyrol. He said to himself that General Kienmayer with 20,000 Austrians, General Kutusof with 60,000 Russians, would soon appear on the road from

Munich; that the Archduke John with the corps of the Tyrol, and even the Archduke Charles with the army of Italy, could not fail to hasten to his succour by way of Kempten, and that then it would be Napoleon who would be in danger, for he would be pressed between 80,000 Austro-Russians coming from Austria, 25,000 Austrians descending from the Tyrol, and 70,000 Austrians encamped below Ulm, which would make 175,000 men. But it would have been necessary that all these different junctions should be effected in spite of Napoleon, placed in the centre, with 160,000 French accustomed to conquer. In misfortune one catches eagerly at the slightest glimmer of hope; and General Mack believed even the false reports made to him by the spies sent by Napoleon. These spies told him sometimes that a landing of English at Boulogne would recall the French immediately to the Rhine, sometimes that the Russians and the Archduke Charles were debouching by the Munich road.

In difficult situations, subordinate persons become bold and talkative; they censure their superiors and form opinions of their own. General Mack had about him subordinates, who were nobles of high distinction, and who were not afraid to raise their voices. Some were for making off into Tyrol, others into Wurtemberg, and others into Bohemia. These last, who were right by accident, adduced the battle of Haslach to prove that the route to Bohemia was open. The usual effect of contradiction on an agitated mind is to weaken it still more, and to produce half measures, always the most fatal of any. General Mack, in order to grant something to the opinions which he combated, took two very singular resolutions for a man who had decided to remain at Ulm. He sent Jellachich's division to Memmingen, to reinforce that post which General Spangen was guarding with 5000 men, with the intention of thus keeping himself in communication with the Tyrol. He despatched General Riesc to occupy the heights of Elchingen, with an entire division, in order to extend himself on the left bank, and to attempt a strong reconnoissance on the communications of the French.

To remain at Ulm and wait for succours, and to fight a defensive battle there in case of emergency, he ought to have remained there en masse, and not to have sent corps to the two extremities of the line which he occupied, for that was the way to expose them to be destroyed one after another. Be this as it may, General Mack directed General Riesc to occupy the convent of Elchingen, which is situated on the heights of the left bank, quite close to Haslach, where the fight of the 11th had taken place. At the foot of these heights, and below the convent, was a bridge which Murat had sent a French detach-

ment to occupy. The Austrians had previously attempted to destroy it. Murat's detachment, in order to cover itself on the approach of the troops of General Riesch, completed its destruction by burning it. There was still left, however, the piles driven into the river, and which the water had saved from the conflagration. Thus the French army was without communication with the left bank otherwise than by the bridges of Günzburg, situated far below Elchingen. Dupont's division had retired to Langenau. Retreat was, therefore, open to the Austrians. Luckily they were ignorant of that.

It was during these transactions that Napoleon, leaving Augsburg in the night of the 12th of October, reached Ulm on the 13th. No sooner had he arrived than he visited on horseback, in terrible weather, all the positions occupied by his lieutenants. He found them extremely irritated against one another, and maintaining totally different opinions. Lannes, whose judgment was sound and perspicacious in war, had concluded, like Marshal Ney, that instead of intending to accept battle on the Iller, the Austrians were rather meditating an escape into Bohemia on the left bank, by fighting their way through Dupont's division. If Napoleon could entertain any doubts when at a distance from the spot, he had none whatever when on the spot itself. Besides, in ordering the left bank to be watched, and Dupont's division to be placed there, he went away without saying that one ought not to leave this division there without support, without securing, above all things, the means of passing from one bank to the other, for the purpose of succouring it if it were attacked. Thus the instructions of Napoleon had not been better understood than the situation itself. He coincided, therefore, entirely with Marshals Ney and Lannes against Murat, and gave instructions for repairing immediately the egregious blunders committed during the preceding days. He resolved to re-establish the communications of the right bank with the left bank by the bridge nearest to Ulm, that of Elchingen. One might have descended as far as Günzburg, which belonged to us, repassed the Danube there, and ascended again, with Dupont's division reinforced, to Ulm. But this would have been a very lengthened movement, which would have left the Austrians abundant time to escape. It was far preferable, at break of day on the 14th, to re-establish by main force the bridge of Elchingen, which was close at hand, and to cross in sufficient number to the left bank, while General Dupont, instructed to that effect, should ascend from Langenau towards Albeck and Ulm.

Napoleon gave his orders in consequence for the next day, the 14th. Marshal Soult had been moved to the extremity of the line of the Iller towards Memmingen; General Marmont

advanced intermediately on the Iller. Lannes, Ney, and Murat, united below Ulm, were to place themselves *à cheval* on both banks of the Danube, in order to give a hand to Dupont's division, alone on the left bank. But for this purpose it was requisite to re-establish the bridge of Elchingen. For Ney was reserved the honour of executing, in the morning of the 14th, the vigorous operation which was to put us again in possession of both banks of the river.

This intrepid marshal was deeply mortified by some indiscreet expressions used by Murat in the recent altercation which he had with him. Murat, as if impatient of too long arguments, had told him that he understood nothing of all the plans that were explained to him, and that it was his own custom not to make his till he was facing the enemy. This was the proud answer which a man of action might have addressed to an empty babbler. Marshal Ney, on horseback early in the morning of the 14th, in full uniform, and wearing his decorations, laid hold of Murat's arm, and shaking him violently before the whole staff and before the emperor himself, said haughtily, "Come, prince, come along with me and make your plans in face of the enemy." Then, galloping to the Danube, he went, amidst a shower of balls and grape, having the water up to his horse's belly, to direct the perilous operation assigned to him.

This operation consisted in repairing the bridge, of which nothing was left but the piles without flooring, passing it, crossing a small meadow that lay between the Danube and the foot of the eminence, then making himself master of the village with the convent of Elchingen, which rose amphitheatrically, and was guarded by 20,000 men and a formidable artillery.

Marshal Ney, undaunted by all these obstacles, ordered an aide-de-camp of General Loison's, Captain Coisel, and a sapper, to lay hold of the first plank and carry it to the piles of the bridge, for the purpose of re-establishing the passage, under the fire of the Austrians. The brave sapper had a leg carried away by a grapeshot, but his place was immediately supplied. One plank was first thrown in the form of flooring, then a second and a third. Having finished one length, they proceeded to the next, till they had covered the last piles under a murderous fire of small arms, poured upon our labourers by skilful marksmen on the opposite bank. Immediately the voltigeurs of the 6th light, the grenadiers of the 30th, and a company of carabineers, without waiting for the bridge to be made completely firm, threw themselves to the other side of the Danube, dispersed the Austrians who guarded the left bank, and cleared a sufficient space for Loison's division to come to their assistance.

Marshal Ney then ordered the 39th and the 6th light to cross to the other bank of the river. He directed General Villatte to put himself at the head of the 39th, and to extend himself on the right in the meadow, in order to make the Austrians evacuate it, while he himself, with the 6th light, would take the convent. The 39th, stopped while passing the bridge by the French cavalry, which rushed across it with ardour, was prevented from getting over entire. The first battalion alone of that regiment was able to execute the order which it had received. It had to sustain the charges of the Austrian cavalry and the attack of three hostile battalions; it was even forced back for a moment, after an obstinate resistance, to the head of the bridge. But being soon succoured by its second battalion, joined by the 69th and the 76th of the line, it recovered the lost ground, remained master of the whole of the meadow on the right, and obliged the Austrians to regain the heights. Meanwhile Ney, at the head of the 6th light, was pushing on through the steep and crooked streets of the village of Elchingen, under a downward fire from the houses, which were full of infantry. He wrested the village, house by house, from the hands of the Austrians, and stormed the convent, which is on the summit of the height. Arrived at this place, he had before him the undulated plateaux, interspersed with wood, on which Dupont's division had fought on the 11th. These plateaux extend to the Michaelsberg, above the very city of Ulm. Ney resolved to establish himself there, lest he might be tumbled into the Danube by an offensive return of the enemy. A large patch of wood came to the margin of the height, close up to the convent and the village of Elchingen. Ney determined to make himself master of it, in order to appuy his left there. He purposed, his left being well secured, to revolve upon it and to move forward his right. He threw into the wood the 69th of the line, which plunged into it in spite of a brisk fire of musketry. While a furious fight was kept up in that quarter, the rest of the Austrian corps was formed into several squares of two or three thousand men each. Ney ordered them to be attacked by the dragoons, followed by the infantry in column. The 18th dragoons made so vigorous a charge upon one of them as to break it and to compel it to lay down its arms. At this sight the Austrians retired in great haste, and fled at first towards Haslach, and then proceeded to rally on the Michaelsberg.

Meanwhile General Dupont, marching from Langenau towards Albeck, had fallen in with the corps of Werneck, one of those which had left Ulm on the preceding day, with the intention of pushing reconnaissances on the left bank of the Danube, and seeking means of retreat for the Austrian army. On

hearing the cannon on his rear, General Werneck had turned back and proceeded to the Michaelsberg by the road from Albeck to Ulm. He arrived there at the very moment when Dupont's division was repairing thither on its side, and when Marshal Ney was taking the heights of Elchingen. A new combat ensued at this point between General Werneck, who wished to get back to Ulm, and General Dupont, who wished, on the contrary, to prevent him. The 32nd and the 9th light rushed in close column upon the infantry of the Austrians and repulsed it, while the 96th received in square the charges of their cavalry. The day closed amidst this fray, Marshal Ney having gloriously reconquered the left bank, and General Dupont having cut off the retreat of Werneck's corps to Ulm. Three thousand prisoners and a great quantity of artillery had been taken. But what was still more important, the Austrians were definitively shut up in Ulm, and this time without any chance of escape, should even the happiest inspiration visit them at this last moment.

During these occurrences on the left bank, Lannes had approached Ulm on the right bank, General Marmont had advanced towards the Iller, and Marshal Soult, pressing the extremity of the position of the Austrians, had taken Memmingen. The enemy was still engaged in palisading that city when Marshal Soult arrived there. He had rapidly invested it, and obliged General Spangen to lay down his arms with 5000 men, the whole of his artillery, and a great number of horses. General Jellachich, hastening up, but too late, to the relief of Memmingen with his division, and finding himself in face of a *corps d'armée* of 30,000 men, retired, not upon Ulm, fearing that he should not be able to regain it, but upon Kempten and the Tyrol. Marshal Soult immediately proceeded towards Ochsenhausen, to complete on all sides the investment of the fortress and the entrenched camp of Ulm.

Such was the situation at the close of day on the 14th of October. After the departure of General Jellachich and the different actions which had been fought, General Mack was reduced to 50,000 men. From this must be deducted Werneck's corps, separated from him by Dupont's division. That unfortunate general found himself, therefore, in a desperate position. There was no eligible course for him to pursue. His only resource was to rush sword in hand upon one of the points of the circle of iron in which he had been enclosed, and to perish or to open an outlet for himself. To throw himself upon Ney and Dupont would still have been the least disastrous step to take. To a certainty he would have been beaten, for Lannes and Murat would have hastened by the bridge of Elchingen to the assistance of Ney and Dupont, and there needed not such an assemblage

of forces to conquer disheartened soldiers. Still the honour of the arms would have been saved, and, next to victory, that is the most important result that one can obtain. But General Mack persisted in his resolution of concentrating himself in Ulm, and waiting there for the succour of the Russians. He had to endure violent attacks from Prince Schwarzenberg and the Archduke Ferdinand. The latter, in particular, was determined to escape at any risk the misfortune of being made prisoner. General Mack produced the powers of the emperor, which, in case of difference of opinion, conferred on him the supreme authority. This was enough to render him responsible, not to make him be obeyed. The Archduke Ferdinand resolved, thanks to his less dependent position, to withdraw himself from the authority of the general-in-chief. When night came on, he chose that gate of Ulm which exposed him to the least risk of encountering the French, and started, with six or seven thousand horse and a corps of infantry, with the intention of joining General Werneck and escaping through the Upper Palatinate to Bohemia. By uniting General Werneck's corps to the detachment which accompanied him he took from General Mack about 20,000 men, and left him in Ulm with 30,000 only, blockaded on all sides, and forced to lay down his arms in the most ignominious manner.

It has been falsely alleged that the departure of the prince proved the possibility of escaping from Ulm. In the first place, it is most improbable that the whole army, with its artillery and its matériel, could slip away like a mere detachment, composed for the greater part of horse soldiers. But what happened a few days afterwards to the Archduke Ferdinand proves that the army itself would have plunged into ruin in this flight. The great fault lay in dividing itself. It ought to have remained or gone forth altogether—remained to fight an obstinate battle with 70,000 men; gone forth to rush with these 70,000 men upon one of the points of the investment, and there to find either death or that success which Fortune sometimes grants to despair. But to divide, some to flee with Jellachich to the Tyrol, others to escort the flight of a prince into Bohemia, others again to sign a capitulation at Ulm, was of all modes of proceeding the most deplorable. For the rest, experience teaches that, in these situations, the dejected human mind, when it has begun to descend, descends so low that among all courses it takes the worst. It is right to add that General Mack has since invariably asserted that he disapproved of this division of the Austrian forces and of these separate retreats.*

* The Austrians have never published any account of their operations in this first part of the campaign of 1805. Many works, however, have appeared in Germany, the writers of which have made a point of abusing General Mack

Napoleon passed the night between the 14th and 15th in the convent of Elchingen. On the morning of the 15th he resolved to bring the affair to a close, and gave orders to Marshal Ney to storm the heights of Michaelsberg. These heights, situated in advance of Ulm when you go along the left bank, overlook that city, which, as we have said, is seated at their foot, on the very margin of the Danube. Lannes had passed with his corps by the bridge of Elchingen, and flanked the attack of Ney. He was to take the Frauenberg, a neighbouring height to the Michaelsberg. Napoleon was on the ground, having Lannes near him, observing, on the one hand, the positions which Ney was going to attack at the head of his regiments, and on the other, casting his eyes down on the city of Ulm, situated in the bottom. All at once a battery unmasked by the Austrians poured its grapeshot upon the imperial group. Lannes abruptly seized the reins of Napoleon's horse to lead him out of the galling fire. Napoleon, who did not seek the fire, neither did he shun it, who approached it no nearer than was necessary in order to judge of things by his own eyes, placed himself in such a manner as to see the action with less danger. Ney set his columns in motion, climbed the entrenchments raised on the Michaelsberg, and carried them with the bayonet. Napoleon, fearing that Ney's attack would be too prompt, wished to slacken it, in order to give Lannes time to assault the Frauenberg and thus to divide the enemy's attention. "Glory is not to be divided," was Ney's answer to General Dumas, who brought him the order to wait for the assistance of Lannes, and he continued his march, surmounted all obstacles, and reached with his corps the back of the heights just above the city of Ulm. Lannes, on his part, carried the Frauenberg, and joining, they descended together to approach the walls of the place. In the ardour which hurried away the attacking columns, the 17th light, under

and extolling the Archduke Ferdinand, in order to account by the silliness of a single individual for the disaster of the Austrian army, and to diminish at the same time the glory of the French. These works are all inaccurate and unjust, and are grounded for the most part on false circumstances, the impossibility of which even is demonstrated. I procured with great difficulty one of the scarce copies of the defence presented by General Mack to the council of war, before which he was summoned to appear. This defence, of a singular form, in a tone of constraint, especially in what relates to the Archduke Ferdinand, fuller of declamatory reflections than facts, has nevertheless furnished me with the means of ascertaining what were the intentions of the Austrian general, and rectifying a great number of absurd conjectures. I think, therefore, that I have arrived in this narrative at the truth, at least as nearly as one can reasonably hope to do in regard to occurrences which have not been verified in writing, even in Austria, and of which there are now scarcely any living witnesses. The principal personages are actually dead, and in Germany there has been a very natural, very excusable, motive for disfiguring the truth, that of sparing the national self-love by sacrificing a single man.

the command of Colonel Vedel, of Suchet's division, scaled the bastion of the place nearest to the river, and established itself there. But the Austrians, perceiving the hazardous position of that regiment, fell upon it, repulsed it, and took from it some prisoners.

Napoleon thought it right to suspend the combat, and to defer till the morrow the business of summoning the place, and, if it resisted, to take it by assault. In the course of this day General Dupont, who had been ever since the preceding day in face of Werneck's corps, had again engaged him, to prevent his getting back to Ulm. Napoleon had sent Murat to see what was passing in that quarter, for he was extremely puzzled to conjecture, ignorant of the departure of a portion of the Austrian army. It soon became evident to him that several detachments had succeeded in stealing off by one of the gates of Ulm, the one that was the least exposed to the view and the action of the French. He immediately directed Murat, with the reserve cavalry, Dupont's division, and Oudinot's grenadiers, to pursue to the utmost that part of the enemy's army which had escaped from the place.

Next day, the 16th, he ordered a few shells to be thrown into Ulm, and in the evening he enjoined M. de Segur, one of the officers of his staff, to go to General Mack and summon him to lay down his arms. Obligated to proceed in the dark, and in very bad weather, he had the greatest difficulty to get into the place. He was led blindfold before General Mack, who, striving to conceal his profound anxiety, was nevertheless unable to dissemble his surprise and his grief on learning the whole extent of his disaster. He was not fully acquainted with it, for he knew not yet that he was encompassed by 100,000 French, that 60,000 more occupied the line of the Inn, that the Russians, on the contrary, were at a great distance, and that the Archduke Charles, detained on the Adige by Marshal Massena, could not come. Each of these pieces of intelligence, which at first he would not believe, but which he was soon obliged to admit on the repeated and solemn assertion of M. de Segur, cut him to the heart. After much exclamation against the proposal to capitulate, General Mack began by degrees to endure the idea, on condition of waiting a few days for the succour of the Russians. He would be ready, he said, to surrender in eight days, if the Russians should not make their appearance before Ulm. M. de Segur had orders to grant him no more than five, or, at the utmost, six. In case of refusal, he was to threaten him with an assault, and the most rigorous treatment for the troops under his command.

This unfortunate general thought that it concerned his honour, already lost, to obtain eight days instead of six. M. de Segur

retired to carry his answer to the emperor. The parleys continued, and at length Berthier, having introduced himself into the place, agreed with General Mack to the following conditions:— If, on the 25th of October, before midnight, an Austro-Russian corps capable of raising the blockade of Ulm did not make its appearance, the Austrian army was to lay down its arms, the men to be prisoners of war and to be conducted to France. The Austrian officers were to be at liberty to return to Austria, on condition of never again serving against France. Horses, arms, ammunition, colours, were all to belong to the French army.

This agreement was concluded on the 19th of October, but the convention was to be dated the 17th, which gave in appearance to General Mack the eight days demanded. That unfortunate man, having arrived at the emperor's headquarters, and been received with the attentions due to adversity, affirmed repeatedly that he was not to blame for the disasters of his army, that he had established himself at Ulm by order of the Aulic Council, and that since the investment his force had been divided contrary to his express desire.

This, it will be seen, was a new convention of Alessandria, without the dreadful bloodshed of Marengo.

Meanwhile Murat, at the head of Dupont's division, Oudinot's grenadiers, and the cavalry reserve, atoned for his recent fault by pursuing the Austrians with truly prodigious rapidity. He followed General Werneck and Prince Ferdinand unremittingly, swearing not to let a single man escape. Setting out on the morning of the 16th of October, he had a rearguard action with General Werneck in the evening, and took from him 2000 prisoners. Next day, the 17th, he took the road to Heidenheim, striving to harass the enemy's flanks by the rapid march of his cavalry. General Werneck and the Archduke Ferdinand having joined, made their retreat together. In the course of the day the French passed Heidenheim and arrived at Neresheim at night, at the same time as the rearguard of Werneck's corps. It was thrown into disorder and obliged to disperse in the woods. On the following day, the 18th, Murat, marching without intermission, followed the enemy towards Nordlingen. The regiment of Stuart being enveloped, surrendered entire. General Werneck, finding himself surrounded on all sides, and unable to advance further with a harassed infantry, having no longer any hope, or even any wish to escape, offered to capitulate. The capitulation was accepted, and this general laid down his arms with 8000 men. Three Austrian generals, taking with them part of the cavalry, resolved to escape in spite of the capitulation. Murat sent an officer to them to summon them to execute their engagement. They would not listen to him, and went off to rejoin Prince Ferdinand. Murat,

intent on punishing such a breach of faith, pursued them with still greater activity on the following day. In the night the great park, composed of 500 carriages, fell into the hands of the pursuers.

This route presented a scene of unparalleled confusion. The Austrians had thrown themselves upon our communications; they had taken a great number of our carriages, of our stragglers, and part of Napoleon's treasure. All that they had conquered for a moment was retaken from them, besides their artillery, their equipages, and their own treasure. There were to be seen soldiers and employés of both armies running away in disorder, without knowing whither they were going, ignorant which was the victor and which the vanquished. The peasants of the Upper Palatinate ran after the fugitives, stripped them, and cut the traces of the Austrian artillery to possess themselves of the horses. Murat continuing his pursuit arrived on the 19th at Gunzenhausen, the Prussian frontier of Anspach. A Prussian officer had the boldness to come and insist upon the neutrality, though the Austrian fugitives had obtained permission to pass through the country. Murat's only answer was to enter Gunzenhausen by main force, and to follow the archduke beyond it. Next day, the 20th, he passed through Nuremberg. The enemy finding his strength exhausted at length halted. An action ensued between the two cavalries. After numerous charges received and returned, the squadrons of the archduke dispersed, and the greater part of them laid down their arms. Some infantry that was left also surrendered. Prince Ferdinand was indebted for the advantage of saving his person to the attachment of a subaltern, who gave him his horse. He gained, with two or three thousand horse, the road to Bohemia.

Murat thought that he ought not to push on any further. He had marched four days without resting, at the rate of more than ten leagues a day. His troops were harassed with fatigue. This pursuit, prolonged beyond Nuremberg, would have carried him beyond the circle of the operations of the army. Besides, all that Prince Ferdinand had left was not worth an additional march. In this memorable expedition Murat had taken 12,000 prisoners, 120 pieces of cannon, 500 carriages, 11 colours, 200 officers, 7 generals, besides the treasure of the Austrian army. He had, therefore, his ample share in this glorious campaign.

The plan of Napoleon was completely realised. It was the 20th of October, and in twenty days, without giving battle, by a series of marches and some combats, an army of 80,000 men was destroyed. None had escaped but General Kienmayer with about a dozen thousand men, General Jellachich with five or six thousand, Prince Ferdinand with two or three thousand

horse. At Wertingen, Günzburg, Haslach, Munich, Elchingen, in the pursuit conducted by Murat, about 30,000 prisoners had been picked up.* There were left 30,000, who would soon be found in Ulm. These made a total of 60,000 men taken with their artillery, consisting of 200 pieces of cannon, with four or five thousand horses, well adapted for remounting our cavalry, together with all the matériel of the Austrian army, and 80 colours.

The French army had a few thousand lame in consequence of forced marches, and it numbered at most 2000 men *hors de combat*.

Napoleon, satisfied respecting the Russians, had not been displeased to halt four or five days before Ulm, to give his soldiers time to rest themselves, and particularly to rejoin their colours; for the last operations had been so rapid that a certain number of them had been left behind. Our emperor, said they, has found out a new way of making war; he no longer makes it with our arms but with our legs.

Napoleon, however, would not wait any longer, and he was desirous to gain the three or four days which were yet to run, in virtue of the capitulation signed with General Mack. He sent for him, and pouring some consolations into his heart, obtained from him a new concession, which was to deliver the place on the 20th, on condition that Ney should remain below Ulm till the 25th of October. General Mack conceived that he had performed his last duties by paralysing a French corps till the eighth day. In truth, in the situation to which he was reduced, all that he could do was very little. He consented, therefore, to leave the place on the following day.

Accordingly on the next day, October the 20th, 1805, an ever memorable day, Napoleon, placed at the foot of the Michaelsberg, facing Ulm, saw the Austrian army file away before him. He occupied an elevated slope, having behind him his infantry drawn up in semicircle on the hillside, and opposite his cavalry deployed in a right line. The Austrians filed off between the two, laying down their arms at the entrance of this sort of amphitheatre. A large watch-fire had been made, near which Bonaparte posted himself to witness the ceremony. General Mack first came forward and delivered his sword to him, exclaiming with grief, "Here is the unfortunate Mack!" Napoleon received him, himself and his officers, with the greatest courtesy, and directed them to be ranged on either side of him. The Austrian soldiers, before they came into his presence,

* Here is an approximative enumeration, but rather reduced than exaggerated, of these prisoners:—Taken at Wertingen, 2000; at Günzburg, 2000; at Haslach, 4000; at Munich, 1000; at Elchingen, 3000; at Memmingen, 5000; in the pursuit by Murat, 12,000 to 13,000. Total, 29,000 or 30,000.

hung down their arms with a vexation honourable to them, and that feeling gave way only to the curiosity which seized them on approaching Napoleon. All devoured with their eyes that terrible conqueror, from whom their colours had received, for the last two years, such cruel affronts.

Napoleon, conversing with the Austrian officers, said to them loud enough to be heard by all, "I know not why we are at war. It was not my wish. I thought only of warring with the English, when your master came to provoke me. You see my army: I have 200,000 men in Germany; your soldiers who are prisoners will see 200,000 more, traversing France to come in aid of the first. I need not, you well know, have so many to conquer. Your master ought to think of peace, otherwise the fall of the house of Lorraine may possibly arrive. It is not new territories on the continent that I desire: it is ships, colonies, and commerce that I wish to possess, and this ambition is as profitable to you as to myself."

These words, delivered with some haughtiness, were met by silence only from those officers, and sorrow to think that they were deserved. Napoleon afterwards conversed with the most noted of the Austrian generals, and watched for five hours this extraordinary sight. Twenty-seven thousand men filed away before him. From three to four thousand wounded were left in the place.

On the following day, according to his custom, he addressed a proclamation to his soldiers. It was couched in the following terms:—

"IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, ELCHINGEN,
"29th Vendemiaire, Year XIV. (21st October 1805).

"SOLDIERS OF THE GRAND ARMY,—In a fortnight we have made a campaign: we have accomplished what we intended. We have driven the troops of the house of Austria out of Bavaria, and reinstated our ally in the sovereignty of his dominions. That army, which, with equal ostentation and imprudence, came and placed itself on our frontiers, is annihilated. But what cares England? her object is attained; we are no longer at Boulogne! . . .

"Out of the hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they shall go and replace our conscripts in the labours of our fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, ninety colours, all the generals are in our power; not fifteen thousand men of that army have escaped. Soldiers, I had announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the vicious combinations of the enemy, I have been enabled to obtain the same success without running any risk; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, so great a result has diminished our force by no more than fifteen hundred men *hors de combat*.

“Soldiers, this success is owing to your unbounded confidence in your emperor, to your patience in enduring fatigues and privations of every kind, and to your extraordinary intrepidity.

“But we shall not stop there; you are impatient to commence a second campaign. That Russian army, which the gold of England has brought from the extremities of the earth, shall share the same fate.

“In this new struggle the honour of the infantry is more especially concerned. Here is to be decided, for the second time, that question which has been already decided in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the second or the first in Europe. There are no generals here against whom I can have any glory to acquire; all my care will be to obtain victory with the least possible effusion of your blood. My soldiers are my children.”

The day after the surrender of Ulm Napoleon set out for Augsburg, with the intention of reaching the Inn before the Russians, marching to Vienna, and, as he had resolved, frustrating the four attacks which were directed against the empire by the single march of the grand army for the capital of Austria.

Wherefore are we obliged to follow up immediately this glorious recital with one that is so afflicting! In the very same days of the month of October 1805, for ever glorious for France, Providence inflicted on our fleets a cruel compensation for the victories of our armies. History, on which is imposed the task of recording alternately the triumphs and the disasters of nations, and of imparting to curious posterity those same emotions of joy or grief which were felt in their time by the generations whose vicissitudes she relates—History must make up her mind to describe, after the marvels of Ulm, the terrific scene of destruction that was passing at the same moment off the coast of Spain, in sight of Cape Trafalgar.

The unfortunate Villeneuve, in leaving Ferrol, was agitated by the desire of proceeding to the Channel, in conformity with the grand schemes of Napoleon; but he was urged by an irresistible impulse towards Cadiz. The news of the junction of Nelson with Admirals Calder and Cornwallis had filled him with a sort of terror. This intelligence, true in some respects, for Nelson on his return to England had visited Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, was false in the most important point, for Nelson had not stopped off Brest but had sailed for Portsmouth. Admiral Calder had been sent alone to Ferrol, and had not appeared there till after the departure of Villeneuve. They were, therefore, running after one another in vain, as is often the case on the wide expanse of the ocean; and Villeneuve, if he had persisted, would have found Cornwallis, separate both from Nelson and Calder, off Brest. He thus lost the grandest

of opportunities, and caused France to lose it; though, indeed, it is impossible to say what would have been the result of that extraordinary expedition, if Napoleon had been at the gates of London, while the Austrian armies would have been on the frontiers of the Rhine. The rapidity of his blows, usually swift as lightning, would alone have decided whether forty days, from the 20th of August to the 30th of September, were sufficient for subjugating England, and for giving to France the conjoined sceptres of earth and ocean.

On leaving Ferrol, Villeneuve had not dared to tell Lauriston that he was going to Cadiz; but when once at sea, he no longer concealed from him the apprehensions by which he was tormented, and which urged him to get away from the Channel and to steer for the furthest point of the Peninsula. On the earnest remonstrances of General Lauriston, who endeavoured to represent to him the full magnitude of the designs, of the miscarriage of which he would be the cause, he resumed for a moment the intention of steering for the Channel, and put the head of the ship to the north-east. But the wind, being right in his teeth, blowing precisely from the north-east, forbade this route, and he resolved definitively to steer for Cadiz, his heart harassed by a new apprehension, that of incurring the anger of Napoleon. He came in sight of Cadiz about the 20th of August. An English squadron of moderate force usually blockaded that port. Arriving at the head of the combined fleet, he might have taken this squadron had he come rapidly upon it with his united strength. But, still haunted by the same terrors, he despatched an advanced guard, to ascertain whether there was not off Cadiz a naval force capable of giving battle; the English ships, taking the alarm, had time to sheer off. Admiral Ganteaume in 1801, having failed in the object of his expedition to Egypt, at least took the *Swiftsure*. Villeneuve had not even the slight consolation to enter Cadiz bringing with him two or three English ships, as some indemnification for his useless campaign.

He naturally expected a violent explosion of anger on the part of Napoleon, and he passed some days in deep despair. Nor was he mistaken. Napoleon, on receiving from Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, a detailed report of all that had taken place, regarding as an act of duplicity the double language held on leaving Ferrol, and as a sort of treason the ignorance in which Lallemand had been left of the return of the fleet to Cadiz, which exposed the latter to the danger of presenting himself singly before Brest, above all imputing to Villeneuve the frustration of the grandest design that he had ever conceived, applied to him, in the presence of the minister Decrès, the most disparaging expressions, and even called him a coward and a

traitor. He was a good soldier and a good citizen; but too much discouraged by inexperience of the French naval service and by the imperfection of his matériel, and frightened at the complete disorganisation of the Spanish navy, he anticipated only certain defeat in any rencounter with the enemy, and he was inexpressibly grieved at the part of the vanquished to which he was necessarily doomed by Napoleon. He had not thoroughly comprehended that what Napoleon required of him was not to conquer, but to devote himself to destruction, provided that the Channel was opened. Or, very likely, if he had comprehended this terrible destination, he might not have been able to make up his mind to it. We shall presently see how soon he was to be led to the same sacrifice, and this time without any result that could shed lustre on his defeat.

Napoleon, in the torrent of great things which hurried him along, soon lost sight of Admiral Villeneuve and his conduct. Nevertheless, before he set out for the banks of the Danube, he cast a last look at his navy, and on the way in which he should think fit to employ it. He gave orders for the separation of the Brest fleet, and for the division of that fleet into several squadrons, agreeably to the plan of M. Decrès, which consisted in avoiding great naval engagements, and meanwhile undertaking distant expeditions composed of a few ships, more likely to escape the English, and as injurious to their commerce as advantageous for the instruction of our seamen. He determined, moreover, to give General St. Cyr, who occupied Taranto, the support of the Cadiz fleet and the land troops which it had on board. He calculated that this fleet, amounting to forty and even forty-six ships, after it should have rallied the Carthage division, would for some time have the mastery of the Mediterranean, as that of Bruix had formerly had, take the weak English squadron stationed off Naples, and furnish General St. Cyr with the useful aid of the 4000 soldiers whom it had been carrying about over all the seas. He ordered it, therefore, to leave Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, to call for the Carthage division, then to proceed to Taranto, and in case the English squadrons should have united off Cadiz, not to let itself be shut up there, but to get out if it should be superior in number, for it was better to be beaten than disgraced by pusillanimous conduct.

These resolutions being taken by Napoleon, under the impression produced upon him by the timidity of Villeneuve, not sufficiently matured, and above all not sufficiently contested by the minister Decrès, who durst no longer repeat what he feared he had gone too far in saying, were immediately transmitted to Cadiz. Admiral Decrès did not report to Villeneuve all the expressions of Napoleon, but suppressing only the contumelious

language, he repeated to him the animadversions made on his conduct from his leaving Toulon till his return to Spain, intimating that he must perform great things before he could recover the esteem of the emperor. Informing him of his new destination, he ordered him to sail, and to proceed successively to Carthage, Naples, and Taranto, to execute there the instructions which we have just detailed. Without enjoining him to sail at all hazards, he told him that the emperor desired that the French navy, when the English were inferior in force, should never refuse to fight. There he stopped short, not daring to declare the whole truth to Villeneuve, or to renew his remonstrances with the emperor to prevent a great naval engagement, which then had no longer the excuse of necessity. Thus all parties contributed their share to produce a great disaster—Napoleon by his anger, the minister Decrès by his concealment, and Villeneuve by his despair.

When on the point of setting out for Strasburg, Napoleon gave M. Decrès a last order relative to the naval operations. "Your friend Villeneuve," said he, "will probably be too cowardly to venture out of Cadiz. Despatch Admiral Rosilly to take the command of the squadron, if it has not already sailed, and order Admiral Villeneuve to come to Paris, to account to me for his conduct." M. Decrès had not the courage to acquaint Villeneuve with this new misfortune, which deprived him of all means of redeeming his character, and merely informed him of the departure of Rosilly, without communicating the motive for it. He did not advise Villeneuve to sail before Admiral Rosilly should reach Cadiz, but he hoped that this would be the case; and in his embarrassment between an unfortunate friend, whose faults he was aware of, and the emperor, whose resolutions he deemed imprudent, he too frequently committed the error of leaving things to themselves, instead of taking upon him the responsibility of directing them.*

Villeneuve, on receiving the letters of M. Decrès, guessed all that was not told him, and was as miserable as he had reason to be on account of the reproaches which he had incurred. What touched him most was the imputation of cowardice, which he well knew that he had never deserved, and which he fancied that he could perceive in the very reservations of the minister, his patron and his friend. He wrote in answer to M. Decrès: "The seamen of Paris and the departments will be very

* Abundance of conjectures have been made respecting the causes which led to the sailing en masse of the fleet from Cadiz and the battle of Trafalgar. On this subject nothing is true but what is here stated. Our account is taken from the authentic correspondence of Napoleon and that of Admirals Decrès and Villeneuve. All that can be said concerning that melancholy event is here given.

unworthy and very silly if they cast a stone at me. Let them come on board our squadrons, and then they will see with what elements they are liable to have to fight. For the rest, *if the French navy has been deficient in nothing but courage, as it is alleged, the emperor shall soon be satisfied, and he may reckon upon the most splendid success.*"

These bitter words contained the prognostic of what was soon to happen. Villeneuve made preparations for sailing again, landed the troops that they might rest themselves, and the sick that they might get well. He availed himself of the very reduced means of Spain to refit his ships, which had suffered from a long navigation, to procure at least three months' provisions; lastly, to reorganise the various departments of his fleet. Admiral Gravina by his advice got rid of his bad ships, and exchanged them for the best in the dockyard of Cadiz. The whole month of September was devoted to these duties. The fleet gained much in matériel; the personnel remained as it was. The French crews had acquired some experience during a navigation of nearly eight months. They were full of ardour and zeal. Some of the captains were excellent. But among the officers there was too great a number borrowed recently from commerce, and having neither the skill nor spirit of the imperial navy. Instruction, especially in regard to the artillery, was far too much neglected. Our seamen were not then such skilful gunners as in these later times, thanks to the special attention bestowed on this part of their military education. What our navy also wanted was a system of naval tactics adapted to the new mode of fighting the English. Instead of placing themselves in order of battle in two opposite lines as formerly, of advancing methodically, each ship keeping her rank and taking for her antagonist the ship facing her in the opposite line, the English, directed by Rodney in the American war, and by Nelson in the war of the Revolution, had contracted the habit of advancing boldly, without observing any order but that which resulted from the relative swiftness of the ships, of dashing upon the enemy's fleet, breaking the line, and cutting off a portion to place it between two fires; in short, of not shrinking from the fray at the risk of sending their shot into one another. The experience, the skill of their crews, the confidence which they owed to their successes, always ensured to them in these rash enterprises the advantage over their adversaries, less agile, less confident, though having as much bravery, and often more. The English, then, had effected at sea a revolution very much like that which Napoleon had effected on land. Nelson, who had contributed to this revolution, was not a superior and universal genius like Napoleon; far from it: he was even narrow-minded in things foreign to his art; but he

had the genius of his profession ; he was intelligent, resolute, and possessed in a high degree the qualities suited to offensive war—activity, hardihood, and judgment.

Villeneuve, who was endowed with spirit and courage, but not that firmness of mind which befits a military chief, was perfectly acquainted with the defects of our mode of fighting. On this subject he had written letters full of good sense to M. Decrès, who agreed with him in opinion, as all seamen did. But he thought it impossible to prepare, while on active service, new instructions, and to render them sufficiently familiar to his captains for them to be able to apply them in any speedy encounter. At the battle of Ferrol, however, he had opposed to the English, as the reader will no doubt remember, an unexpected manœuvre, highly approved by Napoleon and by M. Decrès. Admiral Calder, advancing in column upon the end of his line with the intention of cutting it off, he had had the art to withdraw it with great promptness. But when the battle had once begun, he had not known how to manœuvre ; he had left part of his force inactive, and when a forward movement of his whole line would have been sufficient for retaking the two disabled Spanish ships, he had not ventured to order it. Villeneuve, nevertheless, displayed in that battle real talents in the judgment of Napoleon, but not decision equal to the intelligence which he possessed. Subsequently he addressed no other instructions to his captains but to obey the signals which he should make in the moment of action, if the state of the wind admitted of manœuvring, and, if it did not, to do their best to get into the fire, and to seek an adversary. “ You must not wait,” said he, “ for the signals of the admiral, who in the confusion of a sea-fight frequently cannot see what is passing, nor give his orders, nor, above all, find means to transmit them. Each must listen only to the voice of honour, and press on into the hottest of the fight. EVERY CAPTAIN IS AT HIS POST IF HE IS IN THE FIRE.”

Such were his instructions, and for the rest Admiral Bruix himself, so superior to Villeneuve, had not addressed any others to the officers whom he commanded. If in our great sea-fights every captain had followed these simple directions, dictated by honour as much as by experience, the English would have numbered fewer triumphs, or paid dearer for them.

What particularly alarmed Admiral Villeneuve was the state of the Spanish fleet. It was composed of fine large ships, one of them especially, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of 140 guns, the largest ever built in Europe. But these vast machines of war, which reminded one of the ancient splendour of the Spanish monarchy under Charles III., were, like the Turkish ships, superb in appearance, useless in danger. The penury of the Spanish arsenals

had not allowed them to be properly rigged, and the weakness of the crews was distressing. They were manned by an assemblage of people of all sorts, picked up at random in the maritime towns of the Peninsula, untrained, unaccustomed to the sea, and incapable in all respects of coping with the old sailors of England, though the generous Spanish blood flowed in their veins. The officers for the most part were no better than the seamen. Some of them, however, such as Admiral Gravina, Vice-Admiral Alava, Captains Valdez, Churruca, and Galiano, were worthy of the most glorious times of the Spanish navy.

Villeneuve, most determined to prove that he was not a coward, employed the month of September and the first days of October in introducing some system and better order into this compound of the two navies. He formed two squadrons, the one for battle, the other of reserve. He assumed himself the command of the squadron of battle, composed of twenty-one ships, and formed with it three divisions of seven ships each. He had under his immediate command the centre division; Admiral Dumanoir, whose flag was hoisted in the *Formidable*, commanded the rear division; Vice-Admiral Alava, who had his flag in the *Santa Anna*, commanded the van. The reserve squadron was composed of twelve ships, and formed into two divisions of six ships each. Admiral Gravina was the commander of this squadron, and had under him, to direct the second division, Rear-Admiral Magon, in the *Algesiras*. It was with this squadron of reserve, detached from the line of battle, and acting apart, that Villeneuve intended to parry any unforeseen manœuvres of the enemy, that is, if the wind permitted himself to manœuvre. In the contrary case, he trusted to the duty of honour imposed on all his captains to press into the fire.

The combined fleet, therefore, was composed of thirty-three ships, five frigates, and two brigs. In his impatience to sail, Villeneuve resolved, on the 8th of October (16th Vendémiaire), to take advantage of an east wind to get out of the road, for to work out of Cadiz you require winds from north-east to south-east. But three of the Spanish ships had just left the basin, and their crews had embarked on the preceding day: these were the *Santa Anna*, the *Rayo*, and the *San Justo*. Fit at most to sail with the fleet, they were incapable of keeping their place in a line of battle. This remark was urged by the Spanish officers. Villeneuve, to cover his responsibility, resolved to assemble a council of war. The bravest officers of the two fleets declared that they were ready to go wherever it was required, to second the views of the Emperor Napoleon, but that to rush into the immediate presence of the enemy, in the state in which most of the ships

were, would be a most perilous imprudence; that the fleet on quitting the road, having had scarcely time to manœuvre for a few hours, would fall in with the English fleet, of equal or superior force, and would be infallibly destroyed; that it would be better to wait for some favourable opportunity, such as a separation of the English forces, produced by any cause whatever, and till then to complete the organisation of the ships which had been last manned.

Villeneuve sent the result of this deliberation to Paris, adding to the opinion of the council his own, which was contrary to any great battle in the actual state of the two fleets. But he sent these useless documents, as if to make his quiet resignation the more conspicuous; and he added that he had taken the resolution to sail with the first east wind that should allow him to get out of the road with the fleet.

He waited therefore with impatience for a propitious moment for quitting Cadiz at all risks. He had at length before him that formidable Nelson, whose image, pursuing him over all the seas, had caused him to fail of fulfilling the most important of missions through fear of meeting with him. And now he no longer feared his presence, though it was more to be dreaded than ever, because his mind, worked up by despair, longed for danger, almost for defeat, in order to prove that he was right in avoiding an encounter with the British fleet.

Nelson, after touching for a moment at the British shores, which he was never to behold again, had sailed for Cadiz. He took with him one of the fleets which the Admiralty, penetrating after the lapse of two years the designs of Napoleon, had collected in the Channel. He was naturally conducted to Cadiz by the report spread over the ocean of the return of Villeneuve to the extremity of the Peninsula.

Nelson had at his disposal a naval force of about the same strength as Villeneuve, that is to say, thirty-three or thirty-four ships, but all seasoned by long cruises, and having that superiority over the combined fleet of France and Spain which blockading squadrons always have over blockaded squadrons. Not doubting, from the preparations of which he was accurately informed by Spanish spies, that he should soon catch Villeneuve on the passage, he observed his movements with the greatest attention, and addressed to the English officers, preparatory to the engagement which he foresaw, instructions made public since, and admired by all seamen.

He prescribed to them his favourite manœuvre, taking care to explain the motives for it. To form in line, he said, occasioned the loss of too much time, for all ships were not alike affected by the wind, and then a squadron would have to regulate its movements by those of the worst sailers. An enemy

who wished to avoid a battle would thus be allowed time to slip away. On this occasion, care must be taken not to let the combined French and Spanish fleet escape. Nelson supposed that Villeneuve had been joined by Lallemand's division and perhaps by that of Carthagená also, which would have composed a squadron of forty-six ships. He hoped himself to have forty, including those whose speedy arrival was announced; and the more numerous his fleet should be, the less would he attempt to draw it up in line. He therefore ordered two columns to be formed, one immediately under his own command, the other under the command of Vice-Admiral Collingwood, to bear down briskly on the enemy's line, without observing any order but that of swiftness, and to cut through that line in two places, at the centre and towards the rear, and then to envelop the portions so cut off and to destroy them. That part of the enemy's fleet which you will have excluded from the fight, he added, grounding himself on the numerous experiences of the age, will scarcely be able to succour the part attacked, and you will have conquered before it arrives. It was impossible to foresee with greater sagacity and accuracy the consequences of such a manœuvre. Nelson had previously impressed the idea upon the mind of each of his officers, and he expected from one moment to another the opportunity for realising it. That he might not intimidate his adversary too much, he had even taken care not to blockade Cadiz too closely. He merely stationed frigates to watch the road, and for his own part cruised with his ships of the line in the wide mouth of the Strait, tacking from west to east far out of sight of the coast.

Being informed of the real state of the forces of Villeneuve, who had not been joined either by Salcedo or Lallemand, he had not scrupled to leave four ships of the line at Gibraltar, to give one to Admiral Calder, who had been recalled to England, and to send another to Gibraltar to take in water. This circumstance, known at Cadiz, confirmed Villeneuve in his resolution to sail. He conceived the English to be stronger, for he supposed them to have thirty-three or thirty-four ships, and he was rejoiced to learn that they had not so many. He even believed that they numbered fewer than they really had, that is to say, twenty-three or twenty-four.

Meanwhile the last despatches from Paris, announcing the coming of Admiral Rosilly, arrived at Cadiz. At first this gave Villeneuve no great concern. The idea of serving honourably under an officer, his superior in age and rank, and behaving like a valiant lieutenant at his side, soothed his mind, oppressed by the weight of too great a responsibility. But Admiral Rosilly was already at Madrid, and no despatch from the minister had explained to Villeneuve the lot reserved for him under the new

admiral. Villeneuve soon began to think that he was purely and simply displaced from the command of the fleet, and that he should not have the consolation of redeeming his character by fighting in the second rank in a conspicuous manner. Anxious to escape this dishonour, and availing himself of his instructions, which authorised him, nay, even made it a duty for him, to sail when the enemy should be inferior in force, he considered the advices recently received as an authorisation to weigh. He immediately made the signal for so doing. On the 19th of October (27th Vendémiaire), a slight breeze from the south-east having sprung up, he sent Rear-Admiral Magon out of the road with a division. Magon gave chase to a ship of the line and some frigates of the enemy's, and came to an anchor for the night outside the road. Next day, the 20th (28th Vendémiaire), Villeneuve himself weighed with the whole fleet. The light and variable winds came from the east quarter. He put the ship's head to the south, having the reserve squadron under Admiral Gravina ahead and somewhat to larboard. The combined fleet consisted, as we have said, of thirty-three sail of the line, five frigates, and two brigs. It made a fine appearance. The French ships manœuvred well, but the Spanish, most of them at least, very ill.

Though the enemy was not yet in sight, the movement of his frigates gave reason to believe that he was not far off. One ship, the *Achille*, at length perceived him, but descried and signalled only eighteen sail. For a moment the French flattered themselves that they should meet the English in far inferior force. A spark of hope glimmered in the mind of Villeneuve—the last that was to cheer his life.

He gave orders in the evening for the ships to get into line in order of swiftness, forming the line from the ship most to leeward, which signified that each ship was to take her place according to her speed, not according to her accustomed rank, and to get into line from that which had given way most to the wind. The breeze had varied. The heads of the ships were to the south-east, that is, towards the entrance of the Strait. The signal for battle was given on board all the ships of the fleet.

During the whole night there were seen and heard the signals of the English frigates, which by rockets and cannon acquainted Nelson with the direction of our course. At daybreak the wind was west, still light and variable, with a rolling sea, high waves but no breakers, the sun bright; the enemy was at length perceived formed into several groups, which appeared to some to be two in number, to others three. He was steering towards the French fleet, and still five or six leagues distant.

Villeneuve immediately ordered the line to be regularly formed, each vessel retaining the place which she had taken in

the night, keeping as close as possible to her neighbour, and being on the starboard tack, a disposition in which the wind was received on the right, which was natural, since they had west winds to sail to the south-east from Cadiz to the Strait. The line was very ill-formed. The waves ran high, the breeze light, and the ships manœuvred with difficulty, a circumstance which rendered the inexperience of part of the crews the more to be regretted.

The reserve squadron, composed of twelve ships, sailed apart from the principal squadron. It had kept constantly to windward before the latter, which was an advantage, for by going with the wind it could always rejoin the other, taking such a position as was suitable for it to take, as, for instance, to place the enemy between two fires when he should be occupied in fighting us. If ever there was a sufficient motive for the creation of a squadron of reserve, it was on this occasion. Admiral Gravina, whose mind was prompt and clear in the midst of action, made a signal to Villeneuve, applying for leave to manœuvre in an independent manner. Villeneuve refused it, for what reasons it is difficult to conceive. Perhaps he feared that the reserve squadron might be compromised by its advanced position, and despaired of being able to succour it, since he was to leeward of it. This reason itself was not sufficient, for if he was not sure that he should be able to go to it, he was at least sure that he could bring it to him; and by making it return immediately into line, he deprived himself irretrievably of a movable detachment very usefully placed for manœuvring; he lengthened without advantage his line already too long, since it consisted of 21 ships, and was about to be increased to 33. He nevertheless ordered Admiral Gravina to rejoin and range himself in the line of the principal fleet. These signals were visible to the whole squadron. Rear-Admiral Magon, who was not less happily endowed than Admiral Gravina, descrying the question and the answer on the masts of the two admirals, exclaimed that it was a blunder, and warmly expressed his vexation in such a manner as to be heard by all his officers.

About half-past eight o'clock the intention of the enemy became more manifest. The different groups of the English squadron, less difficult to distinguish as they approached, now appeared to form but two. They clearly revealed Nelson's intention of breaking our line at two points. They advanced, with all sail hoisted, before the wind, peculiarly favoured in their plan of throwing themselves across our course, since they came with a west wind upon us, who formed a long line from north to south, a little inclined to east. The first column, placed to the north of our position, consisting of 12 ships, commanded by Nelson, threatened our rear. The second, placed to the south-

ward of the former, comprehending 15 ships, commanded by Admiral Collingwood, threatened our centre. Villeneuve, by that instinctive movement which always causes us to screen a threatened part, wished to go to the succour of his rearguard, and at the same time to keep himself in communication with Cadiz, which was behind him to the north, that he might have a secure refuge in case of defeat. He therefore made the signal to wear all at once, each vessel by this manœuvre revolving upon herself, the line remaining as it was, long and straight, but ascending to the north instead of descending to the south.

This manœuvre would not have any other advantage than that of bringing him nearer to Cadiz. Our fleet, ascending in a column towards the north instead of descending towards the south, was to be assailed at two different points, but still assailed by two hostile columns, which were coming to break through it. It was a case to excite more regret than ever for the loss of the independent position, and to windward, which the squadron of reserve had shortly before occupied, a position which at this moment would have permitted it to manœuvre against one of the two groups of the English fleet. In this state of things all that could be done was to close the line, to render it regular, and, if possible, to bring back to their post the ships which, having fallen to leeward, left gaps through which the enemy could pass.

But it was no easy matter for the ships that were out of line to get into it again, especially in the state of the wind, and with the inexperience of the crews. They might all have gone before the wind together for the purpose of trying to get into line with the leeward ships, which would have occasioned a general change of position and fresh irregularities greater than those which it was designed to correct. It was not deemed right to make it. The line, therefore, remained ill-formed, the distance not being equal between all the ships, several being either on the right or astern of their post. The variable breeze having acted more upon the rear and the centre, had produced a slight curvature in those divisions. Villeneuve had ordered the head-sails to be crowded, with a view to enable the curved parts to straighten themselves. In this manner he multiplied signals for the purpose of bringing each ship into her place, and could scarcely succeed, notwithstanding the universal alacrity and obedience. The frigates, ranged on the starboard and to leeward of the squadron, each opposite to her admiral's ship, were rather too distant to render any other service than that of repeating signals.

At length, about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the two hostile columns, advancing with the wind and all sail crowded, came up to our fleet. They followed each other in the order of

swiftness, with the single precaution of putting their three-deckers at the head. They had seven and we four only, unfortunately Spanish, that is, less capable of rendering their superiority serviceable. Thus, though the English had but 27 ships and we 33, they had the same number of guns, and consequently they were nearly equal in force. They had on their side experience of the sea, the habit of conquering, a great commander, and on that day even the favours of Fortune, since the advantage of the wind was for them. We lacked all these conditions of success, but we had a virtue, which can sometimes control fate, the resolution to fight to the death.

The fleets were within cannon-shot. Villeneuve, by a precaution frequently ordered at sea, but far from desirable on this occasion, had given directions not to fire till the enemy was within good range. The English columns presenting a great accumulation of ships, each shot would have done considerable damage. Be this as it may, about noon the southern column, commanded by Admiral Collingwood, outstripping a little the northern, commanded by Nelson, reached the centre of our line at the position of the *Santa Anna*, a Spanish three-decker. The French ship *Fougueux* hastened to fire at the *Royal Sovereign*, the leading ship of the English column, carrying 120 guns, and the flag of Admiral Collingwood. The whole French line followed this example, and opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's squadron. The damage done to it afforded reason to regret that the firing had not commenced before. The *Royal Sovereign*, continuing her movement, attempted to get between the *Santa Anna* and the *Fougueux* in order to pass between those two vessels, which were not sufficiently close to each other. The *Fougueux* crowded sail to fill the gap, but did not arrive in time. The *Royal Sovereign*, passing astern of the *Santa Anna* and ahead of the *Fougueux*, poured into the *Santa Anna* a broadside from her larboard guns, double-shotted with ball and grape, raking her fore and aft, which made great havoc in the Spanish vessel. At the same moment she sent her starboard broadside into the *Fougueux*, but without much effect, while she received considerable damage from the latter. The other English ships of that column, which had closely followed their admiral, fell upon the French line from north to south, sought to cut it by penetrating into the intervals, and to place it between two fires by proceeding towards its extremity. They were fifteen, and were engaged against sixteen. If, then, every one had done his duty, these 16 French and Spanish ships would have made head against the 15 English, independently of any succour from the van. But several ships, ill-managed, had already suffered themselves to be carried away from their post. The *Bahama*, the *Montanez*, the *Argonauta*, all of them

Spanish, were either on the right or astern of the place which they should have occupied in the line of battle. *L'Argonaute*, a French ship, did not follow a better example. On the contrary, the *Fougueux*, the *Pluton*, and the *Algesiras* were fighting with extraordinary vigour, and by their energy had drawn upon themselves the greater number of the enemy's ships, so that each of them was engaged with several at once. The *Algesiras* in particular, in which was Rear-Admiral Magon, was engaged hand to hand with the *Tonnant*, which he cannonaded with extreme violence, and made preparations for boarding. The *Prince of the Asturias*, commanded by Admiral Gravina, terminated our line, and, surrounded by enemies, avenged the honour of the Spanish flag for the misconduct of most of her companions.

Scarcely half an hour had elapsed from the commencement of the action, and the smoke which the subsiding breeze ceased to carry away already enveloped the two fleets. From this dense cloud issued tremendous and continual thunders, while all around floated wrecks of masts and numbers of horribly mangled corpses.

The north column, commanded by Nelson, came up twenty or thirty minutes after that of Collingwood to our centre, athwart the *Bucentaure*. There were at this part seven ships ranged in the following order: the *Santissima Trinidad*, having on board Vice-Admiral Cisneros, next to the *Bucentaure*, bearing the flag of Admiral Villeneuve, both in line, and so close that the bowsprit of the latter touched the stern of the former; the *Neptune*, a French ship, the *San Leandro*, Spanish, both fallen to leeward, and having left a double vacancy in the line; the *Redoutable*, precisely at her post and in the waters of the *Bucentaure*, but placed in regard to the latter at the distance of two ships; lastly, the *San Justo* and the *Indomptable*, fallen to leeward, and leaving two more posts vacant between this group and the *Santa Anna*, which was the first of the group attacked by Collingwood. Of these seven ships, then, the *Santissima Trinidad* and the *Bucentaure* alone were in line, very close to each other, and the *Redoutable*, having two vacant posts ahead of her and two astern. Fortunately, not for the success of the battle but for the honour of our arms, there were here men whose courage was superior to all dangers. It was these three ships, which alone out of seven remained at their posts, that had to bear the brunt of Nelson's entire column, composed of twelve ships, several of them three-deckers.

The *Victory*, in which Nelson had his flag, was to have been preceded by the *Temeraire*. The English officers, expecting to see their first ship furiously attacked, besought Nelson to permit the *Temeraire* to precede the *Victory*, that so invaluable

a life as his might not be too much exposed. "By all means," replied Nelson, "let the *Temeraire* go first if she can." He then crowded all sail in the *Victory*, and thus kept at the head of the column. No sooner was the *Victory* within cannon-shot than the *Santissima Trinidad*, the *Bucentaure*, and the *Redoutable* opened a tremendous fire upon her. In a few minutes they carried away one of her topmasts, cut up her rigging, and killed and wounded fifty of her crew. Nelson, who was seeking the French admiral's ship, imagined that he had discovered her, not in the gigantic Spaniard, the *Santissima Trinidad*, but in the *Bucentaure*, a French 80-gun ship; and he endeavoured to turn her by passing between her and the *Redoutable*. But an intrepid officer commanded the *Redoutable*; it was Captain Lucas. Comprehending Nelson's intention from the manner of his ship, he had bent all his sails to catch the least breath of wind, and had been fortunate enough to come up in time, so that with his bowsprit he dashed against and shattered the ornamental work which crowned the stern of the *Bucentaure*. Nelson, therefore, found the space closed. He was not a man to draw back. He persisted, and unable to part with his prow the two ships so strongly locked together, he let the *Victory* fall with her side against that of the *Redoutable*. From the shock, and a relic of the breeze, the two ships were carried out of the line, and the way was again clear astern of the *Bucentaure*. Several English ships came up at once to surround the *Bucentaure* and the *Santissima Trinidad*. Others ascended along the French line, where ten ships were left without antagonists, fired a few broadsides at them, and immediately fell upon the French ships of the centre, three of which made an heroic resistance against their assailants.

The ten French ships of the van became therefore nearly useless, as Nelson had foreseen. Villeneuve ordered the flags signifying that any captain was not at his post if he was not in the fire to be hoisted on his fore and mizen-mast. The frigates, according to rule, repeated the signal, which was more visible from their masts than from the admiral's, still shrouded in a cloud of smoke; and, agreeably to the same rule, they added to the signal the numbers of the vessels which had remained out of fire, till those which were thus designated responded to the voice of honour.

While those were thus called to danger whom Nelson's manœuvre had separated from it, an unexampled contest was going on at the centre. The *Redoutable* had to fight not only the *Victory*, laid along her larboard side, but also the *Temeraire*, which had placed herself a little astern of her starboard side, and kept up a furious combat with these two foes. Captain Lucas, after several broadsides from his larboard guns, which

had made terrible havoc on board the *Victory*, had been obliged to give up firing his lower tier, because in this part the protruding sides of the ships meeting prevented the use of those guns. The men who had thus become disposable he sent up into the tops and shrouds to pour a destructive fire of grenades and musketry upon the deck of the *Victory*. At the same time all his starboard guns were employed against the *Temeraire*, placed at some distance. To finish the contest with the *Victory*, he had given orders to board; but his ship having only two decks and the *Victory* three, there was the height of one deck to climb, and a sort of ditch to cross in passing from one to the other; for the receding form of the ships left a vacancy between them, though they touched at the water-line. Captain Lucas immediately ordered his yards to be brought to form a bridge for passing from ship to ship. Meanwhile the firing was continued from the tops and shrouds of the *Redoutable* upon the deck of the *Victory*. Nelson, dressed in an old frock coat which he wore on days of battle, having Captain Hardy, his flag-captain, by his side, would not withdraw himself from the danger for a moment. His secretary had already been killed near him; Captain Hardy had had a shoe-buckle carried away; and a chain shot had swept off eight men at once. This great seaman, a just object of our hate and of our admiration, unmoved upon his quarter-deck, was observing this horrible scene, when a ball from the tops of the *Redoutable* struck him on the left shoulder and lodged in his loins. Sinking upon his knees, he fell upon the deck, making an effort to support himself with his only hand. In falling, he said to Captain Hardy, "They have done for me at last, Hardy." "I hope not," replied the captain. "Yes," rejoined Nelson, "I have but a short time to live." He was conveyed to the place to which the wounded are carried, but he was almost insensible: he had, indeed, but a few hours to live. Rallying at times, he inquired how the battle went, and gave a piece of advice which soon proved his profound foresight. "Anchor," said he, "bring the fleet to an anchor."

His death produced extraordinary agitation on board the *Victory*. The moment was favourable for boarding. The gallant Lucas, at the head of a band of picked men, had already mounted upon the yards laid from one ship to the other, when the *Temeraire*, never ceasing to second the *Victory*, fired a tremendous broadside of grape. Nearly two hundred French fell dead or wounded. These were almost all that were about to make the attempt to board. There were not hands enough left to persist in it. The men returned to the starboard guns and renewed an avenging fire against the *Temeraire*, which dismasted and did her prodigious damage. But, as if it was

not enough to have two three-deckers to fight a ship of two decks, a new enemy came to join the former in crushing the *Redoutable*. The English ship *Neptune*, attacking her at the stern, poured into her broadsides which soon reduced her to a deplorable condition. Two masts of the *Redoutable* had fallen upon the deck; part of her guns were dismounted; one of her sides, nearly demolished, formed but one vast aperture; the helm was rendered unserviceable; while several shot-holes, just at the surface of the water, let it into the hold in torrents. The whole of the officers were wounded; ten midshipmen out of eleven were killed. Out of a crew of 640 men, 522 were *hors de combat*; 300 killed, 222 wounded. In such a state this heroic ship could no longer defend herself. Her flag was hauled down, but before she struck she avenged on the person of Nelson the disasters of the French navy.

The *Victory* and the *Redoutable* having been carried out of the line in meeting, the way was clear for the enemy's ships, which came to surround the *Bucentaure* and the *Santissima Trinidad*. These two ships were still strongly linked together, for the *Bucentaure* had her bowsprit jammed in the stern gallery of the *Santissima Trinidad*. Ahead of them, *l'Heros*, which was the nearest of the ten ships that had remained inactive, had at first lent them some succour; but after receiving a violent cannonade, she suffered herself to drive before the wind, and left the *Santissima Trinidad* and the *Bucentaure* to their deplorable fate. The *Bucentaure* at the commencement of the action had received from the *Victory* some broadsides, which, raking her from the stern, had done her much mischief. Soon afterwards she was surrounded by several English ships, which took the place of the *Victory*. Some laid themselves abaft the stern, others, turning the line, on her starboard side. She was thus attacked in rear and on the right by four ships, two of which were three-deckers. Villeneuve, as firm amidst the fire as irresolute under the anxieties of command, remained on his quarter-deck, hoping that, among so many French and Spanish ships that surrounded him, some one would come forward to succour their admiral. He fought with the utmost energy, and not without some hope. Having no enemies on the left, and several astern and on the right, in consequence of the movement which the English had made in passing within the line, he would have changed his position, to withdraw his stern as well as his starboard tier of guns, which had sustained great damage, and turn his larboard side to the enemy. But his bowsprit being fast in the gallery of the *Santissima Trinidad*, he could not stir. He directed the *Santissima Trinidad* to be ordered, by word of mouth, to let herself drive, in order to produce a separation of the two ships. The order was not executed, because the

Spanish ship, having lost her masts, lay absolutely immovable on the water.

The *Bucentaure*, nailed to her position, was therefore obliged to endure a raking fire astern and on the right, without being able to use her starboard guns. However, nobly supporting the honour of the flag, she replied by a fire quite as active as that which she received. This combat had lasted an hour when the flag-captain, Magendie, was wounded. Lieutenant Daudignon, taking his place, was wounded also, and succeeded in his turn by Lieutenant Fournier. Before long the main-mast and the mizen-mast went by the board, and produced frightful confusion on deck. The flag was hoisted upon the fore-mast. Buried in a thick cloud of smoke, the admiral could not distinguish what was passing in the rest of the fleet. The smoke clearing off a little, he perceived the ships of the van still motionless, and ordered them, by hoisting his signals on his only remaining mast, to wear all at once, and to come into the fire. Enveloped afresh in that murderous cloud, which launched forth death and destruction, he continued the fight, foreseeing that he should be obliged in a few moments to quit his flag-ship, and to prosecute his duties in another. About three o'clock his third mast went by the board, and the deck was completely encumbered with wrecks.

The *Bucentaure*, with her starboard side torn to pieces, her stern demolished, her masts gone, was reduced to a sheer hulk. "My part in the *Bucentaure* is finished!" exclaimed the hapless Villeneuve; "I will try to charm Fortune on board another ship." He purposed then to get into a boat and go to the van to bring it himself to the fight. But the boats, placed on the deck of the *Bucentaure*, had been dashed to pieces by the successive fall of all the masts, and those which were on the bows had been riddled by balls. The *Santissima Trinidad* was hailed, and a boat applied for. Vain efforts! no human voice could be heard amidst this confusion. The French admiral, therefore, found himself confined to the hull of his ship, which was ready to sink, no longer able to give orders, or to make any attempt to save the fleet committed to his charge. His frigate, *l'Hortense*, which ought to have come to his assistance, never stirred, whether prevented by the wind or terrified by this appalling sight. The admiral had nothing left him but death, and more than once he had made up his mind to it. The chief of his staff, M. de Prigny, had just been wounded by his side. Nearly the whole of his crew were *hors de combat*. The *Bucentaure*, completely dismasted, riddled with balls, unable to use her guns, which were dismounted or obstructed by the wrecks of the rigging, had not even the cruel satisfaction of returning one of the blows which she received. It was a quarter past four;

no assistance arriving, the admiral was obliged to strike his flag. An English pinnace came to fetch him and to carry him on board the *Mars*. There he was received with the attentions due to his rank, his misfortunes, and his bravery—a slender compensation for so severe a calamity. He had at length found that disastrous fate which he had dreaded meeting, sometimes in the West Indies, sometimes in the Channel. He found it at the very spot where he expected to avoid it, at Cadiz, and he submitted to it without the consolation of perishing for the accomplishment of a great design.

During this engagement the *Santissima Trinidad*, surrounded by enemies, had been taken. Thus of the seven ships of the centre attacked by Nelson's column, three, the *Redoutable*, the *Bucentaure*, the *Santissima Trinidad*, had been overpowered without receiving assistance from the four others, the *Neptune*, the *San Leandro*, the *San Justo*, and the *Indomptable*. These latter, having fallen to leeward at the commencement of the action, could not get back into the fight. They had, therefore, no other means of being serviceable than to descend within the line, under the impulsion of a light breeze, which continued to blow from the west, and to join the sixteen ships attacked by Collingwood. One only, the French ship, the *Neptune*, commanded by a good officer, Captain Maistrail, executed this manœuvre, keeping always close to danger. He gave broadsides successively to the *Victory* and to the *Royal Sovereign*, and endeavoured to afford some assistance to the rear, engaged with Collingwood's column. The three others, the *San Leandro*, the *San Justo*, and the *Indomptable*, permitted themselves to be carried by the expiring breeze far away from the field of battle.

There were, however, still left the ten ships of the van, which after exchanging a few shots with Nelson's column had remained without antagonists. The signal which called them to the post of honour had found them already drifted to leeward, or unable to stir from the lightness of the breeze. *L'Heros*, placed nearest to the centre, after having supported for a moment, as we have seen, her two neighbours, the *Bucentaure* and the *Santissima Trinidad*, had suffered herself to drift by the slight breath of air which still prevailed, and the impulsion of which unluckily served only to carry her out of the fight. At any rate, blood had flowed upon the deck of that ship; but her gallant captain, Poulain, killed at the first onset, had taken away with him the spirit by which he was animated. The *San Augustino*, placed above the *Heros*, having lost her post very early, had been followed and taken by the English conquerors of the *Bucentaure*. The *San Francisco* fared no better. Ascending this line of the van, there came successively the *Mont Blanc*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, the *Formidable*, the *Rayo*, the *Intrepide*,

the *Scipion*, and the *Neptune*. Admiral Dumanoir had repeated to them the signal to wear and to bear down upon the centre. Most of them had continued motionless, for want of knowing how to manœuvre, or for want of the ability or the will to comply. At length there were four which obeyed the signal of the commander of the division, by hoisting all their boats and employing them in assisting to wear. These were the *Mont Blanc*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, the *Formidable*, and the *Scipion*. Rear-Admiral Dumanoir had prescribed to them a good manœuvre; this was, instead of wearing before the wind, which must carry them within the line, to wear against the wind, which, on the contrary, must carry them outside, and enable them, by letting themselves drift before it, to join in the fight whenever they thought proper.

Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, on board the *Formidable*, which had won so much glory in the battle of Algeiras, with the *Scipion*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, and the *Mont Blanc*, prepared therefore to descend from north to south along the line of battle. At that part to which he was proceeding, he should have it in his power to place the English between two fires. But it was late, three o'clock at least. He perceived almost everywhere disasters consummated, and not having the resolution to share the general fate of the French fleet, he could be at no loss for good reasons for not involving himself inextricably. Having arrived opposite to the centre, he saw the *Bucentaure* in the possession of the enemy, the *Santissima Trinidad* taken, the *Redoutable* conquered long before, and the English, though they had themselves suffered severely, running after the ships which had fallen to leeward. In his progress he sustained a very brisk fire, which damaged his four ships and rendered them less fit for action. Warmly received by Nelson's victorious column, and seeing nothing to assist, he continued his course and came to the rear, where the sixteen French and Spanish ships engaged with Collingwood's column were fighting. There, by devoting himself, he might have saved some ships or added glorious deaths to those which were to console us for a great defeat. Disheartened by the fire which had just damaged his division, consulting prudence rather than despair, he did nothing of the kind. Treated by Fortune like Villeneuve, he was soon doomed, for having endeavoured to avoid a glorious catastrophe, to be overtaken elsewhere by a useless disaster.

At this extremity of the line, which had been engaged the first with Collingwood's column, the French ships, the *Argonaute* alone excepted, fought with a courage worthy of immortal glory. And as for the Spanish ships, two, the *Santa Anna* and the *Prince of the Asturias*, gallantly seconded the conduct of the French.

After a conflict of two hours, the *Santa Anna*, which was the first of the rear, having lost all her masts, and inflicted on the *Royal Sovereign* almost as much damage as she had received, struck her flag. Vice-Admiral Alava, severely wounded, had behaved nobly. The *Fougueux*, next neighbour to the *Santa Anna*, after making great efforts to assist her by preventing the *Royal Sovereign* from forcing the line, had been deserted by the *Monarca*, the ship astern of her. Being then turned and attacked by two English ships, the *Fougueux* had disabled both of them. Engaged afterwards side by side with the *Temeraire*, she had had to repel several attempts at boarding, and had lost about 400 out of 700 men. Captain Beaudouin, who commanded her, having been killed, Lieutenant Bazin had immediately taken his place, and resisted two assaults of the English as valiantly as his predecessor. The enemy returning to the charge, and having gained possession of the forecastle, the gallant Bazin, wounded and covered with blood, having but a few men left about him, and confined to the quarter-deck, found himself compelled to surrender the *Fougueux* after the most glorious resistance.

Astern of the *Fougueux*, on the very spot abandoned by the *Monarca*, the French ship, the *Pluton*, commanded by Captain Cosmao, manœuvred with equal daring and dexterity. Hastening to fill the space left vacant by the *Monarca*, she had stopped short an enemy's ship, the *Mars*, which attempted to pass there, riddled her with shot, and was preparing to carry her by boarding when a three-decker came up astern and cannonaded her. She had cleverly slipped away from this new adversary, and turning her bows instead of her stern, had avoided the enemy's fire, while sending into her several furious broadsides. Returning to her first antagonist, and contriving to get the weather-gage, she had succeeded in raking her astern, carrying away two of her masts, and putting her *hors de combat*. Having got rid of these two assailants, the *Pluton* sought to hasten to the assistance of the French, who were overwhelmed by numbers, owing to the retreat of the ships unfaithful to their duty.

Astern of the *Pluton*, the *Algesiras*, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Magon, was engaged in a memorable fight, worthy of that which the *Redoutable* had sustained, and quite as sanguinary. Rear-Admiral Magon, born in the Isle of France, of a family from St. Malo, was still young, and as handsome as he was brave. At the commencement of the action he had called together his crew, and promised to give the man who should be first to head the boarders a splendid shoulder-belt, presented to him by the Philippine Company. All were eager to earn such a reward from his hand. Behaving as the commanders of the

Redoutable, the *Fougueux*, the *Pluton* had done, Rear-Admiral Magon first carried the *Algesiras* forward to close the way against the English, who intended to cut the line. In this movement he fell in with the *Tonnant*, an 80-gun ship, formerly French, taken by the English at Aboukir, and commanded by a courageous officer, Captain Tyler. He approached very near to her, fired, and then wearing, ran his bowsprit to a great depth into the shrouds of the enemy's ship. The shrouds, as everybody knows, are those ladders of ropes which, binding the masts to the hull of the ship, serve to steady and to ascend them. Thus locked to his antagonist, Magon collected around him the stoutest of his crew to lead them to board. But the same thing happened to them that had befallen the crew of the *Redoutable*. Already assembled on the deck and on the bowsprit, they were about to rush upon the *Tonnant*, when another English ship, lying athwart the *Algesiras*, poured into her several rounds of grape, which mowed down a great number of the boarders. It was then necessary before prosecuting the attempt to reply to the new enemy that had fallen upon her, and also to a third which had just joined the two others in cannonading the already shattered sides of the *Algesiras*. While thus defending himself against three ships, Magon was boarded by Captain Tyler, who resolved in his turn to show himself on the deck of the *Algesiras*. He received him at the head of his crew, and he himself, with a boarding-axe in his hand, setting the example to his men, they repulsed the English. Thrice they returned to the charge, and thrice were they driven off the deck of the *Algesiras*. His flag-captain, Letourneur, was killed by his side. Lieutenant Plassan, who took the command, was immediately wounded also. Magon, whose brilliant uniform rendered him a conspicuous mark to the enemy, received a ball in the arm, which bled profusely. He took no heed of this wound, and continued at his post. But a second struck him on the thigh. His strength then began to fail him. As he could scarcely support himself on the deck of his ship, covered with wrecks and corpses, the officer who, after the death of all the others, had become flag-captain, M. de la Bretonnière, begged him to go down for a moment to the cockpit, at least to have his wounds dressed, that he might not lose his strength along with his blood. The hope of being able to return to the combat decided Magon to listen to the solicitations of M. de la Bretonnière. He went down to the lower deck, supported by two sailors. But the sides of the ship being shattered, afforded a free passage to the grapeshot. Magon received a ball from a musketoon in his chest, and dropped dead immediately. This event filled his crew with consternation. They fought with fury to avenge a commander whom they had alike loved and admired. But the

three masts of the *Algesiras* were gone, and the guns dismounted or obstructed by the wrecks of the masts. Out of 641 men, 150 were killed and 180 wounded. The crew, cooped up on the quarter-deck, held possession of only part of the ship. They were without hope, without resource; they poured a last discharge into the enemy, and surrendered that rear-admiral's flag which had been so valiantly defended.

Astern of the *Algesiras* others were still engaged, though the day was far advanced. The *Bahama* had withdrawn, but the *Aigle* fought gallantly, and did not surrender till after severe losses and the death of her commander, Captain Gourrège. The *Swiftsure*, which the enemy made a particular point of retaking, because she had been English, behaved with equal bravery, and yielded only to numbers, having seven feet water in her hold. Beyond the *Swiftsure*, the French ship, the *Argonaute*, after receiving some damage, sheered off. The *Berwick* fought honourably in her place. The Spanish ships, *Argonauta*, *San Nepomuceno*, and *San Ildefonso*, had quitted the field of battle. On the contrary, Admiral Gravina, in the *Prince of the Asturias*, surrounded by the English ships which had doubled the extremity of the line, defended himself alone against them with extraordinary energy. Encompassed on every side, riddled with shot, he held out stoutly, and must have been overpowered had he not been assisted by the *Neptune*, which we have seen exerting herself to get to windward to make herself useful, and by the *Pluton*, which, having succeeded in getting rid of her adversaries, had come to seek fresh dangers. Unfortunately at the end of this fight Admiral Gravina received a mortal wound. Lastly, at the extremity of this long line, marked by flames, by floating wrecks of ships, by thousands of mutilated bodies, a last scene occurred to fill the combatants with horror, and our very enemies with admiration. The *Achille*, attacked on several sides, defended herself with obstinacy. Amidst the cannonade a fire broke out in the ship. It would have been but natural to leave the guns and hasten to the fire, which already began to spread with alarming activity. But the sailors of the *Achille*, fearing that while they were extinguishing it the enemy might profit by the inaction of their artillery to gain the advantage, chose rather to be invaded by the flames than to forsake their guns. Presently volumes of smoke, issuing from the hull of the ship, frightened the English, and decided them to move away from this volcano, which threatened every moment to explode and to engulf alike assailants and defenders. They left it, therefore, all alone amidst the abyss, and began to contemplate this spectacle which, from one moment to another, must terminate in a horrible catastrophe. The French crew, already much thinned by the grapeshot, finding themselves delivered from their

enemies, directed all their efforts to the extinction of the flames which were consuming their ship. But it was too late: they were forced to think of saving their lives. They threw into the sea everything capable of floating, casks, masts, yards, and sought upon them a precarious refuge from the explosion expected every minute. Scarcely had a few of the sailors committed themselves to the sea when the fire, having reached the powder, caused the *Achille* to blow up with a tremendous crash, which terrified the conquerors themselves. The English hastened to send off their boats to pick up the unfortunate men who had so nobly defended themselves. A very small number found means to save their lives. Most of them, remaining on board, were hurled into the air along with the wounded who encumbered the ship.

It was five o'clock. The fighting was over almost everywhere. The line, broken at first in two places, and presently in three or four, from the absence of the ships which had not been able to keep in their positions, was ravaged from one extremity to the other. At the sight of that fleet, either destroyed or in flight, Admiral Gravina, extricated by the *Neptune* and the *Pluton*, and having become commander-in-chief, gave the signal for retreat. Besides the two French ships which came to his assistance, and the *Prince of the Asturias*, which he was on board of, he was able to rally eight more: three French—the *Heros*, the *Indomptable*, and the *Argonaute*; and five Spanish—the *Rayo*, the *San Francisco de Assisi*, the *San Justo*, the *Montanez*, and the *Leandro*. These latter, we must confess, had saved themselves much rather than their honour. These were eleven which escaped from the disaster, besides the four with Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, which made a separate retreat—in all, fifteen. To this number must be added the frigates, which, placed to leeward, had not done what might have been expected of them to assist the fleet. Seventeen French and Spanish ships had been taken by the English; one had blown up. The combined fleet had lost six or seven thousand men, killed, wounded, drowned, or prisoners. Never had so vast a scene of horror been beheld upon the seas.

The English had obtained a complete victory, but a sanguinary, a dear-bought victory. Of the twenty-seven ships composing their fleet, almost all had lost masts; some were unfitted for service, either for ever, or till they had received considerable repairs. They had to regret the loss of about 3000 men, a great number of their officers, and the illustrious Nelson, more to be regretted by them than an army. They took in tow seventeen ships, almost all dismasted or near foundering, and an admiral prisoner. They had the glory of skill, of experience, combined with incontestable bravery. We had the glory of an

heroic defeat, unequalled perhaps in history for the devotedness of the vanquished.

At nightfall Gravina stood away for Cadiz with eleven ships and five frigates. Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, fearful of finding the enemy between him and France, steered towards the Strait.

Admiral Collingwood assumed the signs of mourning for his deceased commander, but he did not think proper to follow the injunction of that dying officer, and resolved, instead of anchoring the fleet, to pass the night under sail. The coast and the disastrous Cape of Trafalgar, which has given name to the battle, were in sight. A dangerous wind began to spring up, the night to become dark, and the English ships, manœuvring with difficulty on account of their damages, were obliged to tow or to escort seventeen captured ships. The wind soon increased in violence, and the horrors of a bloody battle were succeeded by a tremendous storm, as if Heaven had designed to punish the two most civilised nations of the globe, and the most worthy to rule it beneficially by their union, for the fury in which they had just been indulging. Admiral Gravina and his eleven ships had a secure and speedy retreat in Cadiz. But Admiral Collingwood, too far distant from Gibraltar, had but the bosom of the ocean whereon to rest from the fatigues and the sufferings of victory. In a few moments, night, more cruel than the day itself, mingled conquered and conquerors, and made them all tremble beneath a hand mightier than that of victorious man, the hand of Nature in wrath. The English were obliged to throw off the ships which they were towing, and to give up watching those which they had under their escort. Singular vicissitudes of naval warfare! Some of the prisoners, overjoyed at the terrific aspect of the tempest, conceived a hope of reconquering their ships and their liberty. The English who guarded the *Bucentaure*, finding themselves without assistance, gave up of their own accord our admiral's ship to the remnant of the French crew. These, delighted at being delivered by an appalling danger, set up jury-masts in their dismasted ship, fastened to them fragments of sails, and steered for Cadiz, propelled by the hurricane. The *Algesiras*, worthy of the unfortunate Magon, whose corpse she carried, resolved also to owe her deliverance to the storm. Seventy English officers and seamen guarded this noble prize. Shattered as she was, the *Algesiras*, recently built, bore herself up on the waves in spite of her extensive damages. But her three masts were cut down; the mainmast, fifteen feet from the deck, the fore, nine, and the mizen, five feet. The ship which towed her flung off the cable that held her prisoner. The English left in charge of her had fired guns to demand assistance, but obtained no

answer. Then addressing themselves to M. de la Bretonnière, they begged him to assist them with his crew in saving the ship, and with the ship the lives of all on board. M. de la Bretonnière, struck at this application by a gleam of hope, desired to confer with his countrymen shut up in the hold. He went to the French officers and communicated to them his hope of wresting the *Algesiras* from her conquerors. They unanimously agreed to comply with the proposal that was made to them, and when once in possession of the ship to fall upon the English, to disarm them, to fight them to the last extremity amidst the horrors of that night, and afterwards to provide as they best could for their own safety. There were left 270 French disarmed, but ready for any attempt to recover their ship from the hands of the enemy. The officers went about among them, and imparted their plan, which was received with transport. It was agreed that M. de la Bretonnière should first summon the English, and that if they refused to surrender, the French at a given signal should fall upon them. The terrors of the tempest, the fears of the coast, which was not far off, were all forgotten: nothing was thought of but this new fight, a species of civil war, in presence of the incensed elements.

M. de la Bretonnière went back to the English, and told them that the state of neglect in which the ship was left amidst so great a danger had dissolved all their engagements; that from that moment the French looked upon themselves as free; and that if their guards conceived their honour interested in fighting, they could do so; that the French crew, though unarmed, would rush upon them at the first signal. Two French seamen in their impatient ardour actually fell upon the English sentinels, and received large wounds from them. M. de la Bretonnière repressed the tumult, and gave the English officers time for reflection. The latter, after deliberating for a moment, considering their small number, the cruelty of their countrymen, the common danger threatening the conquered and the conquerors, surrendered to the French on condition that they should be again free as soon as they should reach the shore of France. M. de la Bretonnière promised to demand their liberty from his government if they succeeded in getting into Cadiz. Shouts of joy rang through the ship; all hands fell to work; topmasts were sought out from among the spare stores; they were hoisted, fixed upon the stumps of the large masts, sails were fitted to them, and in this state the ship stood for Cadiz.

Daylight appeared, but instead of bringing any improvement in the weather it was worse than before. Admiral Gravina had returned to Cadiz with the remnant of the combined fleet. The English fleet was in sight of that port, accompanied by some

of its prizes, which it kept at the muzzle of its guns. After struggling the whole day against the storm, the commanding officer, La Bretonnière, though without a pilot, but assisted by a seaman who was familiar with the waters of Cadiz, arrived at the entrance of the road. He had but a single bower anchor left and one thick cable to resist the wind, which blew with violence towards the coast. He threw out that anchor and trusted himself to it, a prey at the same time to keen anxiety; for if that gave way the *Algesiras* must perish on the rocks. Unacquainted with the road, he had anchored near a formidable reef called Diamond Point. The night was passed in the most painful apprehension. At length day returned and shed a fearful light on that desolate beach. The *Bucentaure*, always unfortunate, had gone ashore there. Part of her crew had indeed been saved by the *Indomptable*, anchored not far off. The latter, which had sustained little damage because she had fought but little, was secured by good anchors and good cables. During the whole day the *Algesiras* fired signals of distress to claim assistance. A few boats perished before they could reach her. One only succeeded in bringing to her a very small grapnel. The *Algesiras* remained at anchor near the *Indomptable*, applying to the latter to tow her, which she promised to do as soon as it was possible to get into Cadiz. Night again shrouded the sea, and the two ships anchored one beside the other: it was the second since the fatal battle. The crew of the *Algesiras* looked with terror on the two weak anchors on which their salvation depended, and with envy on those of the *Indomptable*. The violence of the tempest increased, and all at once a thrilling shriek was heard. The *Indomptable*, her strong anchors having given way, came on suddenly, covered with her lanterns, having on deck her crew in despair, passed within a few feet of the *Algesiras*, and struck with a horrible crash upon Diamond Point. The lanterns which lighted her, the cries which rang, were buried in the billows. Fifteen hundred men perished at once, for the *Indomptable* had on board her own crew nearly entire, that of the *Bucentaure*, sound and wounded, and part of the troops embarked in the admiral's ship.

After this afflicting sight and the painful reflections which it occasioned, the *Algesiras* saw day return and the storm abate. She entered at last the road of Cadiz, and proceeding at random grounded in a bed of mud, where she was thenceforward out of danger. Just reward of the most admirable heroism!

While these tragic adventures marked the miraculous return of the *Algesiras*, the *Redoutable*, the ship which had so gloriously fought the *Victory*, and from which proceeded the bullet that had killed Nelson, foundered. Her stern, undermined by the

balls, had suddenly fallen in, and there had been scarcely time to take out of her 119 Frenchmen. The *Fougueux*, disabled, struck on the coast of Spain and was lost.

The *Monarca*, abandoned in like manner, had gone to pieces off the rocks of San Lucar.

The English had but few of their prizes left, and with the least damaged of their ships they kept at sea, within sight of Cadiz, constantly struggling against contrary winds, which had prevented them from regaining Gibraltar. At this sight the brave commander of the *Pluton*, Captain Cosmao, could not repress the zeal with which he was animated. His ship was riddled, his crew reduced to half, but none of these reasons could stop him. Borrowing some hands from the *Hermione* frigate, he repaired his rigging in haste, and exercising the command which belonged to him, for all the admirals and rear-admirals were dead, wounded, or prisoners, he made a signal to the ships capable of putting to sea to weigh, in order to take from Collingwood's fleet the French whom it was dragging away with it. The intrepid Cosmao accordingly sailed in company with the *Neptune*, which during the battle had done her best to get into the fire, and with three other French and Spanish ships, which had not had the honour of taking part in the battle of Trafalgar. They were five in all, accompanied by five frigates, which had also to make amends for their recent conduct. In spite of the foul weather, these ten ships approached the English fleet. Collingwood, taking them for so many ships of the line, immediately sent ten of his least damaged ships to meet them. In this movement some of the prizes were abandoned. The frigates availed themselves of the opportunity to seize and take in tow the *Santa Anna* and the *Neptune*. Cosmao, who had not sufficient force, and had against him the wind blowing towards Cadiz, returned, carrying off with him the two reconquered ships, the only trophy that he could gain after such disasters. That was not the only result of this effort. Admiral Collingwood, apprehensive that he should not be able to keep his prizes, sunk or burned the *Santissima Trinidad*, the *Argonauta*, the *San Augustine*, and the *Intrepide*.

The *Aigle* escaped from the English ship, the *Defiance*, and ran aground off Port St. Mary. The *Berwick* was lost by an act of devotedness similar to that which had saved the *Algeiras*. Among the ships which accompanied Captain Cosmao, there was one which could not get back: that was the Spanish ship, the *Rayo*, which perished between Rota and San Lucar.

The English admiral at length reached Gibraltar, carrying with him but four prizes out of seventeen—one French, the *Swiftsure*, and three Spanish; and he was afterwards obliged to sink the *Swiftsure* also.

Such was that fatal battle of Trafalgar. Inexperienced seamen, allies still more inexperienced, a lax discipline, a neglected matériel, everywhere precipitation, with its consequences; a commander too deeply impressed with these disadvantages, conceiving from them sinister presentiments, carrying these with him over all the seas, suffering their influence to thwart the great plans of his sovereign; that irritated sovereign under-rating material obstacles, less difficult to surmount on land than at sea, mortifying by the bitterness of his reproaches an admiral whom he ought rather to have pitied than blamed; this admiral fighting from despair, and Fortune, cruel to adversity, refusing him even the advantage of the wind; half of a fleet paralysed by ignorance and by the elements, the other half fighting with fury; on one side a bravery founded on calculation and skill, on the other an heroic inexperience, sublime deaths, a frightful carnage, an unparalleled destruction; after the ravages of men, the ravages of the tempest; the abyss engulfing the trophies of the conqueror; lastly, the triumphant chief buried in his triumph, and the vanquished chief projecting suicide as the only refuge from his affliction—such was, we repeat it, that fatal battle of Trafalgar, with its causes, its results, its tragic aspects.

From this great disaster there could, however, be drawn useful consequences for our navy. It was requisite to relate to the world what had happened. The combats of the *Redoutable*, the *Algesiras*, the *Achille* deserve to be recorded with pride, beside the triumphs of Ulm. Unsuccessful courage is not less admirable than successful courage: it is more touching. Besides, the favours of Fortune to us were great enough to permit us to avow publicly some of her severities. Then liberal rewards ought to have been bestowed on the men who had so worthily done their duty, and those to have been brought before a council of war who, daunted by the horror of the scene, had kept out of the fire. And had they even behaved well on other occasions, it would have been right to sacrifice them to the necessity of establishing discipline by terrible examples. Above all, government ought to find in this sanguinary defeat a lesson for itself; it ought to impress it with the conviction that nothing should be hurried, particularly where the navy is concerned; it ought to make it abstain from presenting in line of battle squadrons not sufficiently tried at sea, and to apply itself meanwhile to train them by frequent and distant cruises.

The excellent King of Spain, without entering into all these calculations, wrapped up in one and the same measure rewards for the brave and for the cowards, unwilling to bring to light anything but the honour done to his flag by the conduct of some of his seamen. It was a weakness natural to a court that had

grown old, but a weakness arising from benignity. Our sailors, somewhat recruited after their hardships, had mingled with the Spanish seamen in the port of Cadiz, when they were informed that the King of Spain gave a step in rank to every Spaniard who had been present at the battle of Trafalgar, besides particular distinctions to those who had behaved best. The Spaniards, almost ashamed of being rewarded when the French were not, said to the latter that probably they would soon receive the recompense of their courage. This was not the case: the brave and the cowards among the French also shared the same treatment, and that treatment was oblivion.

When the news of the disasters of Trafalgar reached Admiral Decrès, he was intensely grieved. That minister, notwithstanding his intelligence, notwithstanding his intimate acquaintance with naval matters, never had anything but reverses to report to a sovereign who, in every other line, obtained only successes. He transmitted these melancholy details to Napoleon, who was already advancing with eagle's speed upon Vienna. Though bad tidings had scarcely power to affect a mind intoxicated with triumphs, the news of Trafalgar mortified Napoleon, and excited his profound displeasure. On this occasion, however, he was less severe than usual toward Admiral Villeneuve, for that unfortunate chief had fought bravely, though very imprudently. Napoleon acted in this instance as men of the strongest as well as of the weakest minds frequently act; he strove to forget this vexation, and to make others forget it. He desired that little should be said about Trafalgar in the French newspapers, and that it should be mentioned as an imprudent fight, in which we had suffered more from the tempest than from the enemy. He resolved neither to reward nor to punish, which was a cruel injustice, unworthy of him and of the spirit of his government. At that time there was something passing in his mind which contributed powerfully to produce this so niggardly conduct: he began to despair of the French navy. He was devising a more sure, a more practicable way of fighting England; this was to fight her in the allies whom she paid; to take the continent from her, to exclude from it her commerce and her influence. It was natural for him to prefer this method, in the employment of which he excelled, and which, well managed, would certainly have conducted him to the aim of his efforts. From that day Napoleon thought less of the navy, and wished everybody else to think less of it too.

With respect to the battle of Trafalgar, Europe itself was willing enough to observe that silence which he desired. The mighty resonance of his steps on the continent drowned the echoes of the cannon of Trafalgar. The powers who had the sword of Napoleon at their breast were but little cheered by a

naval victory, profitable to England alone, without any other result than a new extension of her commercial domination, a domination which they disliked and tolerated only from jealousy of France. Besides, British glory did not console them for their own humiliation. Trafalgar, then, eclipsed not the splendour of Ulm, and, as we shall presently see, lessened none of its consequences.

END OF VOL. III.

